I’m informed by a reliable source within NASA that COTS is not being cut (at least, not now). PAO will supposedly be straightening the story out with Flight International. While I’m obviously glad to hear it, the fact remains that I was unshocked at the original story. Things like this have happened too many times before, and NASA still has the sad precedent of Alternate Access to live down.

[Update at 3:40 PM EDT]

Clark Lindsey makes a good point about the danger of these kinds of rumors:

According to the FI story, it was one or more of the companies among the finalists in the program that told them about the problem. If the companies are confused about the NASA funding, that’s obviously not a good thing since it would hamper their money raising among private investors. Most of the money for their projects will have to come from private sources.

[One more late-night Monday update]

I’m informed (again, reliably) that COTS is in fact sacrosanct, as a result of strong support from the White House. Which makes it a shame that it doesn’t get support for more funding. Five hundred million sounds like a lot in absolute terms, and it’s better than a kick in the teeth. But over several years, it’s a pittance, both against what it would really need to ensure a diversity in space transportation providers, and against what NASA will be spending otherwise, almost certainly much less productively.

As I said before, it’s really amazing that we’ve ever flown this vehicle:

Current plans are for a 2:38 p.m. launch on Tuesday. However, the mission management team is meeting at 10 a.m. this morning to discuss “a range of possible options” related to the foam crack, NASA spokesman Bruce Buckingham said. The options include repairing the crack before launch or flying as-is.

It’s unclear if the repair can be done at the launch pad (though that seems very unlikely) or how long the work might take. If the work can’t be done at the pad, this is a rollback situation and it’s unlikely NASA could fly in this July window. The next window opens Aug. 28.

And there would go another few hundred million dollars.

It’s enough to make one cry when one contemplates what that kind of money would do for a new space transport industry.

[Update in mid afternoon]

John Kelly has the latest. They’re still going to attempt a launch tomorrow, but will have to do an inspection to ensure that ice isn’t forming in the spot where the foam isn’t. If it is, that will scrub the launch (and presumably necessitate a rollback, unless they can find some way to repair it on the pad).

I got an email on my NRO piece this morning from a David Barnhart:

I would like to offer another point of view. Every astronaut death has been avoidable. Yes, people are going to die when pushing the edge of the envelope. Shit happens. But Grissom, Young, and Chaffee died because the system (NASA) built an unreliable dangerous vehicle. You only have to listen to Grissom’s words days earlier complaining about the communications gear to realize that. Challenger astronauts died because the system did not listen to the real concerns of the scientists and engineers. The foam issue was always an accident waiting to happen. Columbia astronauts died because the system ignored the problem too long.

Soldiers die from EIDs but not because the command structure failed them. The soldiers’ commanders are doing everything they can to eliminate unnecessary risk. That is not the case at NASA.

While it can certainly be argued that NASA management was negligent in the cases of Challenger and Columbia (and the astronauts didn’t understand how risky their missions were), that can’t be said in the current situation, in which everyone, including crew, are aware of the risks now, given the openness of the discussion about it. I’ll bet they’re eager to go, regardless.

It’s very easy to talk about eliminating “unnecessary” risks. It’s a lot harder to get agreement on which risks are “necessary” and which are not. The command structure in Iraq is in fact not “eliminating all unnecessary risks” to the troops. Many (e.g., war opponents) would, in fact, argue that their being in Iraq at all is an “unnecessary risk,” because this was a “war of choice.” Every time they are sent out on patrol without adequate armor, they are taking an “unnecessary risk.” Never mind that they might be less effective in the armor, or that it costs money that might be better spent on other items. No, they’re being forced to take “unnecessary risks,” because soldiers’ lives are of infinite value, just like those of astronauts.

Right?

Every single day that we don’t fly the Shuttle represents another expenditure of over ten million dollars devoted to that program, with zero results. As I said in the column, “safe” is a relative word, not an absolute one. Flying Shuttles will never be “safe.” Neither will flying the new planned CLV/CEV. For that matter, neither is driving down the freeway in your car, and I don’t care what kind of car it is. There is no risk-free state except the grave. People are irrational about this, but we must make tradeoffs every day between safety, money and schedule. Rational people who recognize this develop optimum, cost effective, and relatively reliable and safe systems. Those in denial, who think that complete safety somehow can be achieved, if we only spend enough money, and delay launches long enough, give us Space Shuttle programs.

I got an email on my NRO piece this morning from a David Barnhart:

I would like to offer another point of view. Every astronaut death has been avoidable. Yes, people are going to die when pushing the edge of the envelope. Shit happens. But Grissom, Young, and Chaffee died because the system (NASA) built an unreliable dangerous vehicle. You only have to listen to Grissom’s words days earlier complaining about the communications gear to realize that. Challenger astronauts died because the system did not listen to the real concerns of the scientists and engineers. The foam issue was always an accident waiting to happen. Columbia astronauts died because the system ignored the problem too long.

Soldiers die from EIDs but not because the command structure failed them. The soldiers’ commanders are doing everything they can to eliminate unnecessary risk. That is not the case at NASA.

While it can certainly be argued that NASA management was negligent in the cases of Challenger and Columbia (and the astronauts didn’t understand how risky their missions were), that can’t be said in the current situation, in which everyone, including crew, are aware of the risks now, given the openness of the discussion about it. I’ll bet they’re eager to go, regardless.

It’s very easy to talk about eliminating “unnecessary” risks. It’s a lot harder to get agreement on which risks are “necessary” and which are not. The command structure in Iraq is in fact not “eliminating all unnecessary risks” to the troops. Many (e.g., war opponents) would, in fact, argue that their being in Iraq at all is an “unnecessary risk,” because this was a “war of choice.” Every time they are sent out on patrol without adequate armor, they are taking an “unnecessary risk.” Never mind that they might be less effective in the armor, or that it costs money that might be better spent on other items. No, they’re being forced to take “unnecessary risks,” because soldiers’ lives are of infinite value, just like those of astronauts.

Right?

Every single day that we don’t fly the Shuttle represents another expenditure of over ten million dollars devoted to that program, with zero results. As I said in the column, “safe” is a relative word, not an absolute one. Flying Shuttles will never be “safe.” Neither will flying the new planned CLV/CEV. For that matter, neither is driving down the freeway in your car, and I don’t care what kind of car it is. There is no risk-free state except the grave. People are irrational about this, but we must make tradeoffs every day between safety, money and schedule. Rational people who recognize this develop optimum, cost effective, and relatively reliable and safe systems. Those in denial, who think that complete safety somehow can be achieved, if we only spend enough money, and delay launches long enough, give us Space Shuttle programs.

I got an email on my NRO piece this morning from a David Barnhart:

I would like to offer another point of view. Every astronaut death has been avoidable. Yes, people are going to die when pushing the edge of the envelope. Shit happens. But Grissom, Young, and Chaffee died because the system (NASA) built an unreliable dangerous vehicle. You only have to listen to Grissom’s words days earlier complaining about the communications gear to realize that. Challenger astronauts died because the system did not listen to the real concerns of the scientists and engineers. The foam issue was always an accident waiting to happen. Columbia astronauts died because the system ignored the problem too long.

Soldiers die from EIDs but not because the command structure failed them. The soldiers’ commanders are doing everything they can to eliminate unnecessary risk. That is not the case at NASA.

While it can certainly be argued that NASA management was negligent in the cases of Challenger and Columbia (and the astronauts didn’t understand how risky their missions were), that can’t be said in the current situation, in which everyone, including crew, are aware of the risks now, given the openness of the discussion about it. I’ll bet they’re eager to go, regardless.

It’s very easy to talk about eliminating “unnecessary” risks. It’s a lot harder to get agreement on which risks are “necessary” and which are not. The command structure in Iraq is in fact not “eliminating all unnecessary risks” to the troops. Many (e.g., war opponents) would, in fact, argue that their being in Iraq at all is an “unnecessary risk,” because this was a “war of choice.” Every time they are sent out on patrol without adequate armor, they are taking an “unnecessary risk.” Never mind that they might be less effective in the armor, or that it costs money that might be better spent on other items. No, they’re being forced to take “unnecessary risks,” because soldiers’ lives are of infinite value, just like those of astronauts.

Right?

Every single day that we don’t fly the Shuttle represents another expenditure of over ten million dollars devoted to that program, with zero results. As I said in the column, “safe” is a relative word, not an absolute one. Flying Shuttles will never be “safe.” Neither will flying the new planned CLV/CEV. For that matter, neither is driving down the freeway in your car, and I don’t care what kind of car it is. There is no risk-free state except the grave. People are irrational about this, but we must make tradeoffs every day between safety, money and schedule. Rational people who recognize this develop optimum, cost effective, and relatively reliable and safe systems. Those in denial, who think that complete safety somehow can be achieved, if we only spend enough money, and delay launches long enough, give us Space Shuttle programs.