Category Archives: Space History

Yet More Anniversary Thoughts

Robert Zimmerman has a post, with which I mostly agree. But since I seem to be unable to comment there, I would add a couple corrections.

Gagarin’s launch vehicle had reached escape velocity and orbited the earth.

No, it reached orbital velocity. If it had reached escape velocity, it would never have come back. Escape velocity is about 1.4 (root of two, to be exact) times local circular velocity.

Another point (besides the fact that the two Bushes aren’t Junior and Senior).

In all these declarations, it was assumed that the space vehicles and rockets to get into space would be designed and operated by the federal government.

That actually was not the case for the Vision for Space Exploration. If you go back and read the Aldridge report, it recommends commercial (and international) participation, and doesn’t require or expect NASA to develop any launch systems. It only directs it to build a “Crew Exploration Vehicle” (what eventually became Orion). All of the contractors for the Concept Exploration & Refinement trade studies considered existing commercial launchers, or larger versions of them, for the lunar architecture. No one considered anything resembling what became Ares, because it was universally recognized that a Shuttle-derived system would be unaffordable (not to mention that it was always a nutty idea). It was only when Mike Griffin replaced Sean O’Keefe and fired Craig Steidle that a Marshall-developed rocket became the baseline. In fact, other than eliminating the goal of moon first, the new NASA plans (or, at least, the 2011 budget submission) resemble the original VSE much more than Mike Griffin’s Constellation did.

More Anniversary Posts

Clark Lindsey has a link collection on today’s anniversary. I’ll have a blog post up at the Washington Examiner shortly.

[Update a while later]

Tom Jones has his thoughts, over at Popular Mechanics. I continue to scratch my head over worries like this:

Until roughly 2015, when American companies hope to produce a commercial rocket and spacecraft that can carry NASA’s crews safely and economically, astronauts will be renting rides on the Russian Soyuz vehicle (at $55 million per seat and climbing). The fact that presidents and congresses have seen this gap coming and failed to close it is a significant gamble, and not just because it’s unclear whether commercial spaceflight will be ready to deliver crews by the 2015 target. NASA has no backup: If the new space startups can’t make a profit on flying astronauts and other customers to orbit, they will hang up the out-of-business sign and walk away. We’d be forced to buy Russian seats indefinitely while starting an expensive crash program to regain access to the ISS.

So let me get this straight. He’s afraid that, multiple companies, having developed systems capable of getting people to ISS, won’t be able to make a profit, regardless of how much the government pays them? And when they can’t do so, they will “walk away”? And then what? Destroy the factories and hardware? Why wouldn’t they just sell it to someone else at fire-sale prices, who presumable could then make a profit? Why would we have to develop yet another system to reach the ISS when multiple ones already existed, and could simply be operated under new management? Does this make any sense at all?

[Early afternoon update]

My Washington Examiner piece is up now.

Apollo Thoughts From The Economist

There will be many retrospectives this week on the half-century anniversary of Kennedy’s speech. Here’s one from The Economist, that reads like they’ve been reading me for a while:

To many Americans, neglecting human space flight this way looks like a sorry end to the glorious chapter Kennedy opened half a century ago. He set out to make America’s achievements in space an emblem of national greatness, and the project succeeded. Yet it did not escape the notice of critics even at the time that this entailed an irony. The Apollo programme, which was summoned into being in order to demonstrate the superiority of the free-market system, succeeded by mobilising vast public resources within a centralised bureaucracy under government direction. In other words, it mimicked aspects of the very command economy it was designed to repudiate.

Exactly. Well, not exactly. One of the reasons that they did it this way (as I pointed out in my recent debate with Bob Zubrin) was that it wasn’t intended to be a demonstration of the free-market system:

There was a reason that Apollo ended over forty years ago. It had accomplished its mission, which was not to go to the moon, but to demonstrate that democratic socialism was superior to totalitarian communism in terms of technological prowess, which it did when Apollo 8 flew around the moon in 1968, and the Soviets gave up and pretended they had never been racing.

In any event, few people have any conception of how much Apollo warped our perception of how to explore and develop space, because they have no other framework in which to think about it. But that will change over the next few years as private entities start to show how Americans do space in a more traditional American way.

Sputnik, And Apollo

Over at NRO, Jonah Goldberg points out the ridiculousness of the administration’s attempts to leverage the bin Laden killing to promote its domestic agenda, but in doing so, he misses a crucial point about the president’s historical confusion in the State of the Union:

Which brings us back to salmon regulations, immigration, high-speed rail, renewable energy, and other action items on Obama’s “win the future” agenda laid out in January’s address. Back then, Obama said we were in a “Sputnik moment,” referring to the time when the Soviet Union’s launch of a satellite inspired the Apollo space program and increased spending on scientific education and research.

…the most bestest part, as Brennan might say, is the simple fact that the president doesn’t know how we’ll “win the future.” In his Oval Office address on the Gulf oil spill, Obama explained that we don’t know how we’ll get where we need to go or what the destination will even look like.

But that’s the genius of the Sputnik analogy. Since, as Obama explained, “we had no idea how we would beat (the Soviets) to the moon,” it’s okay that we don’t know how to “win the future.” And that in turn means that during the weakest recovery in half a century, we can blow billions on mythical green-energy jobs, push a government takeover of health care, encourage skyrocketing gas prices, impose crippling regulations and higher taxes, and make “investments” in white elephants and high-speed salmon.

To clarify, Sputnik did not in fact give us Apollo, though it did kick off the space race, so to conflate Sputnik with not knowing how we would beat the Soviets to the moon is historically ignorant. Apollo occurred not as a direct result of Sputnik, but as a result of Yuri Gagarin beating us at getting a man into space (on April 12th, 1961, three and a half years after Sputnik), the embarrassment of the Bay of Pigs fiasco a few days later, resulting in a need to show that we were still in the game internationally, and our (final) success in getting a man into space ourselves (though not orbit) on May 5th, boosting our confidence. Twenty days after that (the fiftieth anniversary is coming up in a few days), Kennedy announced the goal of sending a man to the moon and back by the end of the decade. So even if you buy the president’s absurd logic in attempting to contextualize Apollo, it would have made much more sense to talk about our “Gagarin moment,” not our “Sputnik moment.”

And of course, as I’ve written before, anyone who uses the hackneyed phrase “If we can put a man on the moon, why can’t we…” almost always makes an inappropriate analogy in the process.

Yuri’s Night In LA

Griffith Observatory 7:30 – 9:00 PM
Tuesday, April 12th, 2011

Admission is free

Join us for a very special opportunity to join over 200 events around the world celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of humanity’s first step into the cosmos. Hear Griffith Observatory’s Astronomical Observer, Anthony Cook, describe Yuri Gagarin’s historic 108 minute orbit around the planet and how it still affects us today. Look forward to the future as Virgin Galactic CEO, George Whitesides, describes how space travel might change in the coming 50 years. Meet Yuri’s Night co-founders Loretta Hidalgo-Whitesides and George Whitesides, share your own “where were you?” stories, and take part in this historic, global celebration of people in space.

Wood and Vine 9:00pm – 11:30pm
6280 Hollywood Blvd.
Los Angeles, CA

[Via Robin Snelson]

Anniversaries

Jeff Foust, Doug Messier and Clark Lindsey are on a panel discussing the Gagarin (fifty years on Tuesday), Dennis Tito (ten years) and Shuttle (thirty years on Tuesday) anniversaries, and where we’re going from here.

Doug Messier noting that Roscosmos will have a new director next week. The current one was fired about a week before the Gagarin anniversary.

Clark talking about Ice Age, Thaw, and New Spring. Need to get evolutionary process going, using example of early automotive age with lots of companies fighting with most efficient designs, but happens in an evolutionary manner. Plants need heat, technologies need funding. By Apollo 17, things had gotten frozen in space, including attitudes (space is expensive and always will be, and only government can do it).

Started to see attitudes thaw in the nineties, little projects started popping up to address the new markets of LEO comsats, then transitioned into tourism with the new century. Starting to see thriving diversity. Expects to see multiple competing designs that will prove out which is the best for which applications and who has the lowest operating cost. Will start to get feedback and change the public mindset about space, that will in turn help bring in investment. Sees hopeful next decade.

Institutions were frozen as well — had gotten locked into Big Project mode by Apollo. For military ELVs were good enough, same thing for comsats. Slow evolution, very little money going into vehicle developments, other than incremental improvements. Shuttle was worst of all worlds, because reduced budget, but increase requirements, so got a hybrid of a system that was horrifically expensive to operate.

Jeff Foust more pessimistic about the future of government human spaceflight. Current policy situation more discombobulated than at any time in the past fifty years. Always knew what next project was going to be, but don’t have that clear of a future right now, because don’t know what the Space Launch System is. Several factors — lost the impetus that drove it initially (Cold War), which ended two decades ago but had so much momentum that it has continued to shape policy since, but ISS is complete, Shuttle is retiring, and the momentum has dissipated. Attempts to turn China into the new nemesis haven’t worked out very well, because they’re not in any particular hurry. It’s been two and a half years since their most recent manned launch. Trying to come up with rationale for why do human spaceflight, and are some compelling reasons (Augustine panel tried to describe them) but hard to communicate to the public. Thinks that there is still a possibility of business as usual, except for the fiscal situation. We are going to see significant changes in space spending, recalling talk that Charles Miller gave a couple years ago about OMB cuts, even before TARP and bailouts. Federal spending across the board will be scrutinized, and non-defense discretionary will be a major target. All these factors lead to a closing window for any kind of recognizable government human spaceflight program, of not more than ten years. Will keep ISS operating until 2020, but if a lot will happen between now and then to cause us to reconsider any activities beyond that.

What does this mean for commercial?

It means it might be the only game in town. Suborbital ventures making steady but slow progress, but will see them develop and perhaps evolve into orbital. Moon and points beyond LEO out of reach of current commercial, but CCDev, COTS may be the shock needed for government encouragement of commercial LEO human spaceflight. Time to rethink how to get the government and commercial sectors to work together for affordable and sustainable infrastructure that can support both government and commercial users. Infrastructure not a sexy term, but a very necessary one, so if we can get it into place, we can get people to see sufficient value in human spaceflight to continue to fund it. Opportunity, but it won’t last long, but it will require innovative thinking and breaking old paradigms.

Messier more upbeat, thinks that these infrastructural items will come to pass. Looking back to the fifties, there were high entry costs into the field, with big investments in tech development and infrastructure. NASA has enormous infrastructure that’s costly to build, maintain, and we’re discovering now to repair. There is a model for doing this in the Middle East, in the United Arab Emirates. Branson has shown the way in Dubai, with a government investment house buying access to suborbital space. XCOR has similar deals going in other countries. Bigelow has similar ideas, including working with the emirates. Future will see commercial provision of training from NASTAR, launch on commercial vehicles, using commercial orbital facilities — will go where the money is. China is rising, India and Brazil could be launching next year in cooperation with the Ukraine, and will transition from billionaires with dreams to institutional investors. With reusable vehicles, we’ll be able to launch from almost anywhere, for suborbital first and eventually orbital. Sees a future with mix of traditional and new spaceports, at least during transition. We get there by starting to fly. A lot of projects and talk, but not a lot of flights. It’s been seven years since Scaled Composites first flew SS1 suborbital, and six and a half since the last time, and it’s taken longer than we hoped. Orbital projects are feasible, once we get the transportation. Have to get commercial orbital transportation to and from facilities, and then they’ll proceed accordingly.

Challenge: hubris — don’t over promise, and don’t try to go too far too fast. Leap from SpaceShipOne to SpaceShipTwo may have been too big. Same may apply from Falcon 9 to Falcon Heavy. Don’t know much about reliability of vehicle with only two flights under their belt. Potential for next ten to fifteen years is a complete change from the way we’ve done space since the Cold War and if so it will be very exciting.

Ronald Reagan’s Space Legacy

Mark Whittington has an essay on it, but he misses the biggest part of it — the creation of the Office of Commercial Space Transportation (now FAA-AST), which enabled the development of the commercial spaceflight industry, as I described when Reagan died in 2004.

And, Mark, please stop demonstrating your profound ignorance of the meaning of the word “subsidy.” COTS and Commercial Crew are not subsidies.