Mark Whittington has a useful overview of COTS. The only problem is in this paragraph:

The Falcon 9 is designed to launch up to 24,750 kilograms into low Earth orbit for a cost of seventy eight million dollars, according to the SpaceX web site. That compares to a cost of two hundred fifty four million dollars to launch 25,800 kilograms into low Earth orbit estimated for the Delta IV Heavy, a competitor to the Falcon 9 built by the Boeing Corporation.

No. Those numbers are the price, not the cost. Confusing the two words is one of the reasons that people get confused about whether or not we’ve made any progress in reducing launch costs over the years (partly because we don’t really know what launches actually cost, particularly in Russia, but also with the Shuttle, due to opaque bookkeeping).

Price is what is charged to a customer. Cost is the amount of resources that the launch provider has to devote to providing the service. If cost is less than price, then the provider makes money; if it’s the other way around, then the provider is operating at a loss. I’m sure that SpaceX costs (at least its marginal costs) are less (and probably quite a bit less, to account for the business risk factor of developing it) than the published price, or there would have been no point in going into the business. I’m also sure that Lockheed Martin is not losing money on Atlas launches.

In both cases, of course, the average cost is highly dependent on flight rate. This is one of the reasons that EELV prices have gone up dramatically over the last few years. In fact, I used that example in my piece in The New Atlantis a couple years ago as an explanation to why vehicle design is at best a secondary issue of launch costs, while flight rate is a primary one. There’s an appalling amount of ignorance, even within the professional space community, as to the reasons for high launch costs, not to mention low reliability (see comments in this post for an example), which is one of the barriers to improving the situation. And of course, the problem is made worse by the lack of recognition of their lack of knowledge. As the old saying goes, it’s not what we don’t know that hurts us, it’s the things we know for damn sure that are wrong.

We finally have an answer to whether or not Anousheh Ansari is a Muslim. Sort of.

In this USA Today article (per a commenter in the other linked post), she’s quoted as calling herself a “liberal Muslim” (whatever that means).

Who discovered the mouth of the Columbia River?

If you want to see some really ignorant and moronic commentary on space policy, check out the public thoughts on this BBC bulletin board. I couldn’t make myself click past the first page of it.

Mark Whittington continues his delusion that private industry cannot get to LEO without NASA money. Elon has been planning to get to orbit all along, and funding the development of vehicles to do so. People would be planning and funding private orbital trips in the absence of ISS. COTS has the potential to accelerate the schedule, but it’s not necessary. It will happen with or without it.

Thomas James defends Lockheed Martin from Seth Borenstein. And Howard McCurdy.

I agree with Clark Lindsey:

I doubt that in the coming months and years I will be commenting much on Orion or the other shiny, precious projects in Mr. Griffin’s Constellation. Frankly, it all seems a bit boring. Maybe this program will successfully return the US to the Moon by 2020. There are lots of great engineers working in it and they are quite capable of making it a success. However, the price tag is far too high for far too little. I want spaceflight to become practical, useful and broadly available. That’s when it gets exciting. NASA will achieve none of these with the Constellation program. They are not even goals the agency recognizes.

I’ll miss the paycheck. I won’t miss the program (though I will miss some good people that I worked with).

I just did an interview with the BBC, along with John Pike (the embarrassing thing is that I suggested him, because they insisted on doing a “point-counterpoint” format), who continues to denigrate the notion of people doing what they want in space. I’ll let you know when it airs, when I find out. Hopefully there will be some sort of webcast available.

[Update at 6:30 PM EDT]

It will be broadcast in half an hour, at 7 PM Eastern. Unclear if there will be a download later. If anyone listens, and can record, it will be appreciated.

[Update a little after 7 PM Eastern]

OK, not right at seven, but it’s about to start.

[A minute later]

Sorry, false alarm. Not sure when it will start. I assume within the hour, but no way to pin it down better than that.

Just got the news, prior to the announcement. Congratulations to the Lockmart team.

And no, I have nothing profound to say about it. I only saw one proposal, so I don’t have any basis on which to judge whether or not this was a good decision. Of course, I’m on record as thinking the program itself misbegotten, regardless of who builds it.

[Update while listening to the NASA webcast]

I should add that I want to offer my condolences to the NGB team, many of whom I’ve worked with for the last year, and who put in a lot of long hours, for naught. Unfortunately, someone has to win, and someone has to lose. We’ll find out in due course what NASA thought the key weaknesses of the NGB offer were.

[Update about 4:30]

They just showed a model. It has circular solar panels.

A reporter is asking about human space experience vis a vis Lockmart. Horowitz makes the point (with which I agree) that no one has experience in developing manned spacecraft. We’re a new generation.

[Update about 4:40]

I find it interesting (and a little amusing) that everyone in comments seems to think that this was Boeing versus Lockmart. Northrop Grumman was the team lead.

[Update]

On further reflection, I should add that this is a bitter pill for Boeing (not legacy Boeing people, but the former McDonnell-Douglas and Rockwell folks), because they remember the X-33 program, when Lockmart conned NASA, and pissed away a billion dollars of taxpayer money, while devastating prospects for reusable vehicles for years (something from which the agency hasn’t recovered, given its current launcher development choices). I’m sure that a lot of them are thinking that this just happened again. The difference, of course, is that this isn’t a technology development program, but I can understand the bitterness, if it exists.

[Update at 5:45 PM EDT]

An emailer who wants to remains anonymous defends Lockmart:

…it’s worth noting that aside from the inherent problems with the concept, the execution was botched by Skunk Works, due to a combination of handing it to their “second string” team and lingering Lockheed/Martin Marietta rivalries. LMSW wouldn’t listen to Michoud when told that what they were doing on the LH2 tanks was wrong, for example, despite Michoud having the bulk of the corporation’s expertise in that area. For another, LMSW couldn’t *ever* seem to grasp the notion that they were designing a (suborbital) spacecraft rather than a plane, and indeed continued to call X-33 and VentureStar “the airplane” throughout the program.

Thankfully, LMSW has nothing to do with Orion, so the X-33 debacle doesn’t directly apply here (aside from the bitter lessons learned coming from the Michoud side). Denver and Michoud are the primary business units involved, so we at least have *some* clue what we’re doing on this project.

I’ll also add, per a comment, that Lockmart doesn’t share sole responsibility for the X-33 fiasco. I would assign at least as much, if not more blame to Marshall, for letting themselves be snookered. It does take two to tango, after all.

[Update a little after 6 PM EDT]

Boy, CNN is really bashing Lockmart, too. As my anonymous emailer notes, this really isn’t fair, but it’s also not ununderstandable (if that isn’t a word, it oughtta be. As should “oughtta”).

Just got the news, prior to the announcement. Congratulations to the Lockmart team.

And no, I have nothing profound to say about it. I only saw one proposal, so I don’t have any basis on which to judge whether or not this was a good decision. Of course, I’m on record as thinking the program itself misbegotten, regardless of who builds it.

[Update while listening to the NASA webcast]

I should add that I want to offer my condolences to the NGB team, many of whom I’ve worked with for the last year, and who put in a lot of long hours, for naught. Unfortunately, someone has to win, and someone has to lose. We’ll find out in due course what NASA thought the key weaknesses of the NGB offer were.

[Update about 4:30]

They just showed a model. It has circular solar panels.

A reporter is asking about human space experience vis a vis Lockmart. Horowitz makes the point (with which I agree) that no one has experience in developing manned spacecraft. We’re a new generation.

[Update about 4:40]

I find it interesting (and a little amusing) that everyone in comments seems to think that this was Boeing versus Lockmart. Northrop Grumman was the team lead.

[Update]

On further reflection, I should add that this is a bitter pill for Boeing (not legacy Boeing people, but the former McDonnell-Douglas and Rockwell folks), because they remember the X-33 program, when Lockmart conned NASA, and pissed away a billion dollars of taxpayer money, while devastating prospects for reusable vehicles for years (something from which the agency hasn’t recovered, given its current launcher development choices). I’m sure that a lot of them are thinking that this just happened again. The difference, of course, is that this isn’t a technology development program, but I can understand the bitterness, if it exists.

[Update at 5:45 PM EDT]

An emailer who wants to remains anonymous defends Lockmart:

…it’s worth noting that aside from the inherent problems with the concept, the execution was botched by Skunk Works, due to a combination of handing it to their “second string” team and lingering Lockheed/Martin Marietta rivalries. LMSW wouldn’t listen to Michoud when told that what they were doing on the LH2 tanks was wrong, for example, despite Michoud having the bulk of the corporation’s expertise in that area. For another, LMSW couldn’t *ever* seem to grasp the notion that they were designing a (suborbital) spacecraft rather than a plane, and indeed continued to call X-33 and VentureStar “the airplane” throughout the program.

Thankfully, LMSW has nothing to do with Orion, so the X-33 debacle doesn’t directly apply here (aside from the bitter lessons learned coming from the Michoud side). Denver and Michoud are the primary business units involved, so we at least have *some* clue what we’re doing on this project.

I’ll also add, per a comment, that Lockmart doesn’t share sole responsibility for the X-33 fiasco. I would assign at least as much, if not more blame to Marshall, for letting themselves be snookered. It does take two to tango, after all.

[Update a little after 6 PM EDT]

Boy, CNN is really bashing Lockmart, too. As my anonymous emailer notes, this really isn’t fair, but it’s also not ununderstandable (if that isn’t a word, it oughtta be. As should “oughtta”).