Dwayne Day has the conclusion to his piece at The Space Review on the history of the SEI program. A key point, that I've often made, and one that the Easterbrooks and other spewers of costing nonsense should understand:

One of the major problems facing NASA was a cultural one, an inability to think of new human spaceflight projects in terms other than the Apollo paradigm. During Apollo, NASA had gotten a huge amount of money and a great deal of autonomy and many at the agency still thought they would conduct SEI in the same manner. They therefore felt no pressure to keep costs under control.

But in addition to the cultural inability of agency personnel to stop thinking in terms of Apollo budgets, NASA, like all government agencies, had to deal with different internal and external constituencies, each clamoring for its own priorities. The space agency’s facilities are spread throughout the country at various field centers, each of which represents different interests such as human spaceflight and robotic exploration, and each having advocates in Congress. In addition, NASA has also had a less obvious rivalry between its scientists, who want to collect data, and its engineers, who want to build equipment. In many ways the 90-Day Study was a reflection of all of these conflicts within the agency, combined with an unwillingness by NASA Headquarters to clearly establish priorities, starting by saying no to some of its constituencies.

Let's return to one of your previous comments about Apollo, and NASA's subsequent lunar mission planning:

[...]there seems to be an assumption on the part of many that large launch systems are an intrinsic requirement of manned space travel. Accordingly, they've skipped past the part of the trade studies that would determine whether or not this assumption is valid, and gone straight to debating the best way to get heavy lift.

This sounds like an exaggeration to me. The Tom Paine-era lunar studies in 1969-70 assumed the bulk of the cargo (propellant, crews, surface payloads) would be launched by the Space Shuttle [ see, for example, http://www.abo.fi/~mlindroo/SpaceLVs/Slides/sld021.htm ]. The Saturn V would be retained, but only for deploying new (reusable-) nuclear and chemical interorbital space tugs & large habitation modules. Similarly, NASA's mid-1990s "cheaperfasterbetter" studies [ http://www.abo.fi/~mlindroo/Station/Slides/sld051x.htm ] were based on the assumption that only existing rockets and the Shuttle would be available.
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I think NASA's tendency to favor new heavy-lift rocket development programs has more to do with the limitations of today's rockets than with protecting jobs at MSFC. Once it became clear (in about ~1980-81) that the Shuttle would be capable of performing at most 24 missions per year, the agency had little choice but propose a new Shuttle derived HLLV since the early 1980s "lunar utilization" plans [ e.g. http://www.abo.fi/~mlindroo/Station/Slides/sld036a.htm ] typically would have required launching up to 600t of cargo into LEO per year. Even the 1989 Space Exploration Initiative "90-day study" plan would have been utterly impractical without a heavy-lift rocket, since each mission required the launch of some 200t of cargo. That's six Shuttle-C's or twenty Proton-class launches/year just to sustain a flight rate of two manned lunar landings per year! This plan would have required a significant in-orbit infrastructure for spacecraft assembly, refueling and maintenance.
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Now, you could argue that a high flight rate reusable spaceplane would be cheaper and better in the long run, even if the additional cost of the in-orbit infrastructure is factored in. Maybe -- but this option will probably require an expensive and risky development effort whereas converting the Shuttle or Delta IV into a moderately powerful HLLV seems quite straightforward in comparison.

MARCU$

It is worth repeating that the 90-Day Study of 1989 merely represented the most ambitious way of accomplishing these goals, not the _best_ way.

There were some unique aspects to that architecture that do not have to be repeated:

-missions had to go through Space Station Freedom (whether it made sense or not)
-very early permanent occupancy of a lunar base
-heavy reliance upon space shuttle
-heavy reliance upon reusable transit vehicles
-ambitious precursor missions (like Mars sample return)

All of these things added to the complexity and the cost. But they did not have to do things this way. In fact, if you compare that architecture with the First Lunar Outpost, you see that they really backed away from a lot of these early requirements: no assembly at space station, only long stays on the moon vs. permanent occupancy, no reusable transit spacecraft, no reliance upon shuttle.

So cut back on the requirements and you bring the cost way down.

I think NASA's tendency to favor new heavy-lift rocket development programs has more to do with the limitations of today's rockets than with protecting jobs at MSFC.

I think that it has more to do with the limitations of NASA's imagination and orbital assembly technology than with limitations of today's rockets. And I don't think that MSFC job preservation is the dominant factor, but it's a factor. I think it's more of a factor in Florida.

Now, you could argue that a high flight rate reusable spaceplane would be cheaper and better in the long run, even if the additional cost of the in-orbit infrastructure is factored in.

I would, and do argue that (if we're serious about space).

Maybe -- but this option will probably require an expensive and risky development effort whereas converting the Shuttle or Delta IV into a moderately powerful HLLV seems quite straightforward in comparison.

Are "straightforward" and "non-risky" the appropriate figures of merit? Thinking that they are is a symptom of a desire, subconscious or otherwise, to redo Apollo.

It all comes back to what we think the goal is. If you're trying to come up with the quickest, lowest-risk way to get back to the moon, go build a Shuttle-C. If you want to build a spacefaring civilization, start developing the infrastructure and capability that characterizes such (which includes long-term economic sustainability).

Rand writes:

>> It all comes back to what we think the goal is. If you're trying to come up with the quickest, lowest-risk way to get back to the moon, go build a Shuttle-C. If you want to build a spacefaring civilization, start developing the infrastructure and capability that characterizes such (which includes long-term economic sustainability).

I want a system DEPLOYED by January 2009 that will not be easy to cancel if the Democrats win the White House in 2008. Testing to man-rate CEV by 2012 or 2014 is easily cancelled in 2009 or 2010.

6 orbiters + 6 shuttle C equals 24 orbiter flights for ISS completion purposes. $24 billion for STS operations between now and 2010 should be sufficient to accomplish that. ISS complete and a deployed tested HLLV as we enter 2010 or 2011.

If shuttle C is used to finish ISS then next President (Dem or GOP) is faced with some real institutional inertia. And voters in Florida/Louisiana he will not want to lay off.

America will have this new HLLV with nothing to do (ISS is compete after all) EXCEPT throw 75,000 kilograms to LEO to support lunar and Mars missions. Besides, there may be some doubts whether JIMO can be folded into a Delta IV payload fairing. Be a shame to delay nuclear propulsion because we lack a lifter to get the thing to LEO.

If CEV could be man-rated by November 2008, Rand, I might have more sympathy for your position to rely exclusively on EELVs. Otherwise, I foresee it being 2010 with a Dem in the White House, ISS compelte, the orbiter even more aged and deteriorated, no development work done on shuttle C or any other new HLLV, CEV man-rated tests a few yeats out and a great window to move all STS budget savings into a domestic agenda.

NASA's goal is to continue. NASA spacecraft designs are based on political expediency. Political goals shift with the winds. Public support of a government program like this will only seriously improve if there is competition by other governments. NASA isn't going to build Shuttle-C because two Shuttles have been lost (politically, they are the same thing, building more "Shuttles" now would be political suicide.)
They clearly have shown no interest in developing practical reusable spacecraft. Call me cynical if you want, but I've seen the NASA process too many times. I don't want to see NASA destroyed, but I just don't see the point in worrying about what rockets NASA will fly. Congress will keep NASA on a lifeline, it will continue to plod along, and real space development will be done by somebody else, whether 10 years or 50 years from now.

Yet another reason to flog shuttle derived:

As reported by SpaceRef, Chairman Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY) recently said this:

"Let's begin by looking at the Shuttle program - the program that obviously is of most concern to you. At first blush, the President's proposal terminates the Shuttle program in 2010. That is a wise decision. There is simply no way to affordably fund new initiatives without tapping the money now consumed by the Shuttle program. "

followed by this:

"But it turns out that the Shuttle decision is a little more fluid than it first appears. NASA says the Shuttle will continue to fly until the construction of the International Space Station is completed, and 2010 is simply the target date for that milestone.

Can the Station be completed by 2010? That seems like a stretch."

http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=13709

= = =

The shuttle program and the ISS are like conjoined twins. The orbiter cannot be cancelled until (a) ISS is complete or (b) ISS is abandoned. Option (b) is not on the Administration's radar (if we exclude Jeffrey Bell) so that leaves Option (a).

If ISS completion gets stetched out then the orbiter program gets extended and the transfer of funds from STS and ISS to exploration is delayed. Does this delay man-rating CEV and cause return to the Moon to be closer to 2020 than 2015?

= = =

If shuttle derived (shuttle C being the easiest) allow more rapid completion of ISS - - and I envision a mission architecture based on having an on-orbit shuttle receive 3 ISS components in a near simultaneous shuttle C launch - - then ISS can be completed with 12 flights of 6 orbiters + 6 shuttle C carrying 24 ISS component payloads.

I agree with VR, NASA currently exists only to further its own existence. It's not got one percent of the pionering thought it once had. It is a typical government agency, top heavy and cumbersome to get into and keep in motion.

I recently watched a show about the early years at NASA, on Discovery. All the engineers they talked to were hired not because of a Masters or PhD, but because they seemed to be good, young engineers who wanted a chance to do something important.
Several of them said they don't remember any post graduate people around. Now you need an Masters to push a broom at NASA.

As to the money spent, NASA engineers did what all good engineers do when money is short, they MADE IT WORK!!! Sometimes by shear strength of will it now seems. Our government space culture now is money heavy, engineering light and worried about the possible loss of spacefaring crews.

Not one of the astronauts that we have lost would have gutted out all the time training if survival was their main worry. As unfortunate as it is to say no exploration can take place without some loss of life. And yet people apply to NASA every year to become astronauts.

Until we decide that space DOES NOT belong to the goverment, and that the prime aim of space travel is not long lived astronauts, we will continue to be bogged down here, at the bottom of the gravity well, on the big blue marble.

Personally, I'm still hoping they need 50 year old fat guys to go to Mars.

Hey Steve and VR, maybe Sean O'Keefe needs to kick some butts. Fine by me. My point is that until we (a) finish ISS or (b) abandon ISS, there will be little federal money to do anything else.

Hey Steve and VR, maybe Sean O'Keefe needs to kick some butts. Fine by me. My point is that until we (a) finish ISS or (b) abandon ISS, there will be little federal money to do anything else.

VR writes:
>NASA's goal is to continue.

At it's base, that's the goal of any agency, industry, or individual biological entity....
:::grin:::

>NASA spacecraft designs are based on political
>expediency.

If by 'expediency' you mean 'compromise' then I agree. NASA had to promise that the Shuttle would be everything to everyone, and attempt to engineer it to do those jobs. Instead of being a simple, reusable means to get people and material to orbit.

With the CEV, (so far :o) they seem to be going towards the direction of "tell the engineers what you need and let them build it"
I suppose we will see :o)

>NASA isn't going to build Shuttle-C because two
>Shuttles have been lost (politically, they are
>the same thing, building more "Shuttles" now
>would be political suicide.)

Actually not. The Shuttle, per-se is not totally worthless, (politically or economically :o) as NASA and others keep pointing out. What IS the 'problem' is the Orbiter. It can't be fixed.
However, parts can be 'salvaged' from the system. And as mentioned before, it will keep the workers employed, at least in part :o)

>They clearly have shown no interest in
>developing practical reusable spacecraft.

I don't agree with this assesment. It's much to simplistic. NASA HAS been interested, but political calls, various in-fighting between centers, and general in-effctive leadership by NASA HQ, (plus a bit of contractor over-confidence and ego over technical challenges :o) has resulted in no replacement for the Shuttle.

>Call me cynical if you want, but I've seen the
>NASA process too many times.

Just a bit cynical maybe. And I can't blame you for that. Call me an optimist if you must, but I've been seeing signs that there are changes.

>Hey Steve and VR, maybe Sean O'Keefe needs to
>kick some butts.

Hey Bill.. maybe he has been? One 'thorn' in a lot of folks side has been MSFCs "not-invented-here/or-it's-not-what-WE-think-is-needed/wanted" attitude towards both independent projects and inovations from other centers.

Note please, (I hope I'm not the only one who noticed, or I'm just missing something everyone else 'knew' about :o)that the director of MSFC suddenly retired. Even with the new Space Inititive coming on. Curious? I don't think so. I've noticed that both on the web and in articles on many of the 'failed' projects for access to space, MSFC and especially the director were directly, or indirectly responsible for those failures.

I don't think the retirement was such as it was a choice of 'retire-or-fired' :o)

Randy