Jeff Foust points out another article on the upcoming commission report over at AP. As Jeff points out:

The article also notes that "some experts have said President Bush's goals could ultimately cost $1 trillion," citing Douglas Osheroff, the Stanford physicist and CAIB member. Perhaps that shows that even Nobel laureates can be lousy cost estimators…

Indeed. This is a dumb statement on several levels, and it's disappointing it to see it come from a member of the CAIB. It demonstrates to me why it's a bad idea to put scientists on such panels (or at least why it's not automatically a good one--there are obviously exceptions, such as Dick Feynman, and I'd love to have seen Freeman Dyson on the commission).

First of all, there's zero basis for it, as Dwayne Day has shown.

Second, it's even more meaningless in the absence of a precise definition of what the "President's space goals" are, with a timetable. Does he mean lunar base, plus Mars landing? A Mars settlement? How many people? How long will it be there? If it's there for hundreds of years, the costs could be in the trillions, but the benefits might be even more.

Which gets to the real issue, which is that we analyze space policy in a very dysfunctional way that we rarely, if ever, do with any other kind of public investment--an ongoing symptom of our continuing decades-long hangover from the exhilaration of Apollo and the Cold War.

Jeff has a good article at the Space Review today with some sensible things said by scientists, particularly by Wes Huntress. Wes addresses the issue appropriately:

Huntress had two general recommendations for the plan. The first called for NASA to look outside the agency for exploration architectures. “The agency should do everything possible to solicit and engage as many innovative ideas as they can from individuals and organizations throughout the nation and other countries before drawing the roads on the map of the solar system and specifying the vehicles that are going to travel on them,” he said. This, he feels, is a “necessary step towards gaining ownership of this enterprise” among more than just NASA and its major contractors today.

His second, and arguably more difficult, recommendation is for Congress to view the exploration plan as a long-term investment in the nation. “The current tendency is for Congress to focus on total cost,” he said. “There’s no such number. This number is incalculable for the very same reason that no one could have provided such a number when Eisenhower initiated the US interstate highway system in the 1950s.” The correct approach, he said, is to determine how much money is needed each year “to sustain real progress” towards the goals of the policy.

Yes. As I said back in January, the key point is that the president has now made it the explicit policy of the nation that we will expand humanity out into the solar system. That is new. The rest is details. As far as how much it costs, there's no way to determine that, and it makes no more sense to ask that than it would have been to ask how much it would cost to develop Alaska after Seward committed his "folly." And as unknowable as the investment is, the return is even more so, in monetary terms or any other.

We will, as a nation, decide how much annual federal resources to devote to the job, and we will, as individuals and companies, decide how much in the way of private resources to invest (with those decisions driven at least in part by smart or dumb federal policies independently of federal expenditures). Then we will accomplish as much as we can, as quickly as we can, within those budgetary constraints. It's pointless to argue that it's too expensive--we simply have to decide if we want to advance the broad goal, and then decide how much we want to spend how fast.

Historically, since Apollo, we seem to be willing to spend about a percent of the federal budget on spaceflight, and we can certainly afford to continue to do that. If it's spent more intelligently than it has been in the past, with better focus and less bureaucracy, we could make an astounding amount of progress with that funding level.

And 'the beyond' part of the initiative could open up a possibility of exploiting those rocks floating around out there with materials we deem precious. The day someone parachutes down a 2 ton slab of platinum into a Oklahoma field will definently change our views. Then, everyone will be all over there chance to ride into space cause there be gold in them there asteroids.

Mr. Simberg made a mistake in his post--Dr. Osheroff is _not_ on the Aldridge Commission. He was on CAIB, where his contributions were significant. I suggest editing or amending your original post.

I disagree with your comment that scientists should not have been on a commission like this. Such a commission should have a mix of scientists, engineers and policy wonks. But I'll skip that issue for the moment.

Also, although I traced the original source of the $1 trillion estimate, some of my numbers in that article are actually wrong. In the future I will amend them. They do not invalidate the overall article, however. The original AP estimate was essentially invented with the wave of a magic wand, not through serious budget analysis or even semi-serious budget analysis.

Finally, I am willing to give Dr. Osheroff the benefit of the doubt here and suspect that he was answering a leading question. It is possible that the reporter asked him "Do you think it could cost $1 trillion?" And he responded "I suspect it could cost up to $1 trillion."

You may be looking at this all wrong... it's an opportunity I say! They say one trillion? I say 100 x $10 billion X-prizes should do the trick.

Whadayasay? Ya think we can make 'em go for it?

D'oh! I read Jeff's "CAIB" and, having Aldridge on the brain, did a mistranslation.

I don't object to scientists per se. What I really object to is the notion that scientists are intrinsically qualified to sit on such panels--I think they have to be carefully chosen. As I said, I thought that Feynman was an excellent choice, as would be Freeman Dyson. What's necessary is a scientist with an ability to think more broadly than simply about science.

As for whether or not he was answering a leading question, I still think that it was an inappropriate response. He could just as easily (and with as much--or little--justification) said it could cost up to ten trillion. The point should have been the one that I made, that it's not a fixed program with a fixed goal, like space station or Apollo, and it's not useful or meaningful to even attempt to put a price tag on it at this time.

Your amended post is no better. Are you arguing that Osheroff should not have been on the CAIB? If so, you're wrong on that. I think that Osheroff made important contributions to the CAIB.

Of course it's better. It's now factually accurate--before it wasn't. I think you just mean that you still disagree.

He may very well have made valuable contributions, and I'm not saying that he shouldn't have been on the CAIB. I'm saying that neither he, nor any scientist, is intrinsically qualified to sit on such a board (or to render opinions on space systems costing) simply by dint of being a scientist, but that's the impression that many have (the same kind of misconception that gives rise the phrase "rocket scientist").

And even if it was in response to a leading question, I still found his statement disappointing. As I said over at Space Politics, the most appropriate (and refreshing) response would have been (to use your own words): "I'm a low-temperature physicist, not a budget analyst."

Mr. Simberg wrote:
"Of course it's better. It's now factually accurate--before it wasn't. I think you just mean that you still disagree."

No, it is still confusing. I'm not accusing you of being wrong, only sloppy. You wrote:

"Indeed. This is a dumb statement on several levels, and it's disappointing it to see it come from a member of the CAIB. It demonstrates to me why it's a bad idea to put scientists on such panels (or at least why it's not automatically a good one--there are obviously exceptions, such as Dick Feynman, and I'd love to have seen Freeman Dyson on the commission)."

Which "such panels" are you referring to here? CAIB and the Aldridge commission combined? Do you realize that they were addressing entirely different types of events?

The AP article you cited was about the Aldridge commission, and yet you chose to use it as an example of why Dr. Osheroff should not have been on the CAIB. This is confusing the issue mightily. Do you have any good justification for why Dr. Osheroff should not have been on the CAIB?

Which "such panels" are you referring to here? CAIB and the Aldridge commission combined? Do you realize that they were addressing entirely different types of events?

Either kind. And yes, they are different kinds of events, but they are both related to space policy, and it's not at all obvious that being a scientist is an intrinsic qualification to being on either kind of panel.

And once again, I am not saying that Dr. Osheroff, as a specific individual, shouldn't have been on the CAIB, but I remain disappointed with his response on the cost question, which is frankly beyond his purview or knowledge.

Mr. Simberg wrote:
"and it's not at all obvious that being a scientist is an intrinsic qualification to being on either kind of panel."

But it is a _panel_, which means that it incorporates individuals of different talents and abilities. Dr. Osheroff's ingorance of budgetary matters had no relevance to his service on the CAIB because he did not write those sections of the report (I did, among others).

Look at the makeup for both of the organizations that you refer to and you will see that they had people from various disciplines and backgrounds. It wasn't all scientists. That's as it should be. They fill in the various holes in knowledge that are inevitable for such commissions.

You seem to have established a rather weak strawman argument here, that being a scientist does not automatically qualify one to be on a space policy panel. But nobody ever really argued that it did. After all, neither panel was solely populated by scientists.

I could argue the flip side, that being only a policy wonk is also not automatic qualification for being on a space policy panel (or that being a--fill in the blank--is also not automatic qualification). The important thing is to have a mix of skills, knowledge, contacts, etc. And keep in mind that the people on such a commission will address the subjects that they are experts in. So nonsensical comments outside of their field of expertise are likely to be corrected by the people who have the expertise.

One thing that scientists do bring to the table for such commissions is street cred with other scientists. They can speak the lingo. They can sit down with (for instance) someone who deals with liquid hydrogen in the External Tank and understand issues such as cryoshock.

Another thing that is very important for such commissions is not simply knowledge of a subject, but contacts within the community--in other words, everybody who sits on such a commission brings his Rolodex to the table. A scientist on such a commission may not know the answer to a question, but he knows people who know the answer. Or he knows people who know people who know the answer. It is for these reasons as well that having people with scientific training and contacts is important to round out such a panel.

You seem to have established a rather weak strawman argument here, that being a scientist does not automatically qualify one to be on a space policy panel. But nobody ever really argued that it did.

This seems to be the crux of the issue. Of course no one ever argued that it did. Similarly, no one ever explicitly argued that only governments can or should explore space, and no one ever explicitly argued that space is about science, and there's no other reason for it, and no one ever argued that going into space is intrinsically expensive and unaffordable to normal mortals and it always will be. Yet somehow, those prevailing cultural views are the milieu in which much space policy discussion takes place.

After all, neither panel was solely populated by scientists.

I'm not sure what this fact has to do with my argument, strawman or otherwise, since I never said that people believed that only scientists should be on such panels.

I've ignored the rest of your comment because, like this statement, it seems to be a huge strawman itself.

I said what I said. I stand by it.

I'd like to see some project managers on those panels. They wouldn't even have to be from the aerospace industry. Ninety percent of a PM's job is communication -- they'd ferret out any answers they needed. And they would bring a keen appreciation for the Triple Constraint (cheap, fast, good -- pick two).

As Rand has perhaps alluded to without stating explicitly, cost estimates cannot be made in the absence of scope and schedule estimates. Sure, we could spend $1 trillion if we wanted to have people on Mars by 2010, or wanted a base with 5,000 people instead of 5.

Then there's the whole design-ahead problem; trying to imagine our capabilities in, say, 2025, is no easier than it would have been for people -- even engineers and scientists -- in 1900 to imagine the capabilities of 2000 (see Ray Kurzweil for an explanation).

So a reasonable assumption might look like this. Cost: 1% of Federal budget (totaling, very roughly, $400 billion in current dollars over the next 20 years); schedule: do it by 2025; scope: what the technology available, which will be considerably beyond that of the present, will permit. As Rand says, the results, even within the constraints of a politicized system, could be astounding.

I'm not sold on the Administration's approach, but it's far from hopeless.