Looks like a lot of interesting stuff at The Space Review today. I've only gotten to this one, so far, by Mary Lynne Dittmar, on selling NASA to the general public. I was pretty familiar with most of this analysis, and it hasn't changed much since I was looking over public opinion data that we were doing at Rockwell in the early nineties, in terms of the public's ignorance of the size of the NASA budget. But she identifies the real problem at the end:

...the second category of responses that emerged when asked about how NASA could become more relevant was that NASA could do so by actually engaging in activities that are perceived to be of value [Gee, what a concept...--rs]. This response may be difficult to understand at first. It also may provoke a defensive reaction among those who already believe NASA’s activities are of great value. But at its core lies a question of critical importance to NASA’s survival: “What is the nature of the value that NASA (and the VSE) creates and delivers to its customers?”

In the course of deciding whether to rethink value, NASA must identify who its customers really are—including customers that it may not recognize as such. To begin, it must first understand that real value is created in the marketplace, not mandated by policy. It is customer-driven, not internally-focused. Even more fundamentally, however, the agency and the larger space community need to have a shared understanding of what is meant by the word “value”, and why it is so important to NASA’s future and to the future of space exploration.

And a better question to ask might be, what is the value that ESAS, in implementing the VSE, brings to the customer? She doesn't say it, but when you're selling a flawed product, to a disinterested customer, all of the marketing in the world isn't going to help you.

Rand

This is the other side of the argument that John Marburger made at the Goddard Syposium last year. He directly said that the administration was going to increase funding to DoE and NSF because they had a higher value in increasing American economic competitiveness. NASA is suffering from the federal side because NASA has not done much of anything in this area.

I think that you are exactly right about ESAS in this regard. The VSE could easily be recast in a way that supports american competitiveness but if you really really wanted to do exactly the opposite, and tried really really hard to do so, you would come up with the ESAS architecture. It is amazing the lack of understanding of this at the agency.

The problem with Dennis' analysis is that most people neither know nor care about architecture when it comes to returning to the Moon.

They'll care when you tell them that using existing rockets with a different architecture will get us there years earlier for billions less...

And yes, I think they'll get excited about architecture when it involves putting permanent stuff up there, whether you're talking L1 or a moonbase. There's just something different about building something permanent as opposed to just passing through.

Uninterested, please. Would that they were disinterested.

The problem with Dennis' analysis is that most people neither know nor care about architecture when it comes to returning to the Moon.

People care in that they want the money spent to mean something. Throwing money into a rats hole because by God that's the way that we are going to do it, does not qualify. Mr. Griffin has said recently that what we do on the Moon is not the problem, it is his problem to build a launch vehicle to get us there. This mindset is indicative of a limited mental framework in regards to actually building the rocket.

We go to the Moon for the value that it can bring civilization here on the Earth. That value is far more than scientific research that brings back some more rocks. It is the first step in the evolution of a solar system wide economic development, something that is as important as the founding of the new world was five centuries ago. Without this as a mindset, and without this as a goal, NASA founders, and it is foundering.

Now ultimately it is not NASA's reason for being to lead this economic development as they are singularly not qualified to do so, but they are in a position to set up the infrastructure in such a way that private enterprise can leverage off that infrastructure. This is the value of the International Space Station. The nascent space tourism industry would probably not exist if not for the flight of Dennis Tito and his successors. I cannot tell you how many conferences that I went to before that where it was postulated as something for the future, but there was never any money put up toward that goal. After Tito, the x prize got fully funded and the ball started rolling forward.

This is the value of the International Space Station. The nascent space tourism industry would probably not exist if not for the flight of Dennis Tito and his successors.

Dennis, it wasn't necessary for the taxpayers to spend $100 billion on ISS just so Dennis Tito could go into space.

Toyohiro Akiyama and Helen Sharman went to Mir before ISS even existed.

Dennis Tito could have gone to Mir also. He originally planned to go to Mir and changed his plans only because NASA Administrator Dan Goldin insisted Mir must die so ISS could live.

NASA's role in the process was primarily that of a speed bump.

"I think that you are exactly right about ESAS in this regard. The VSE could easily be recast in a way that supports american competitiveness but if you really really wanted to do exactly the opposite, and tried really really hard to do so, you would come up with the ESAS architecture. It is amazing the lack of understanding of this at the agency."

For the VSE implementation, you could:

- use an EELV-based transportation architecture, which would have the benefit of making the most of (and sharing costs with) existing and under-utilized EELVs. This would help the various users of EELVs (the military, NOAA, etc).

- use some new COTS launch vehicle, which presumably would be more cost-effective, and could be used for commercial launches, too. This would have the benefit of expanding the U.S. launch industry, and giving benefits to its launch users.

- since the NASA budget is limited, while the Shuttle is still flying, focus on those parts of the VSE that don't involve manned lunar transportation. A lot of the VSE was lunar robotics and other robotic missions (Europa, astronomy, etc). This would again require launch services in the short term, expanding that market in this generation. It would also help make the satellite industry more competitive.

- focus for now on lunar orbiters, rovers, penetrators, static landers, and so on. Build a constituency in the science community, commercial community, international community, and the general public for things lunar. Do ISRU demos. Scout potential base sites. Find out where the useful resources are. Test base infrastructure. Do "teaser" science and astronomy missions on the lunar surface and in lunar orbit that would be much better if humans could support them. This would again help the real launch and robotics industries, as well as making it easier to sell the later human missions, and to do those missions intelligently. It would also give incentives for some kind of early lunar transport infrastructure.

- Use a more modest transportation architecture (eg: 2 astronauts to the Moon at a time), giving a more realistic hope that the thing can be done on a reasonable schedule and budget, even if Shuttle-derived.

- Use in-space refueling, which would benefit commercial launchers and their customers.

- Simply follow the policy of "go as you pay" - meaning don't whack the science and aeronautics areas of NASA that currently return benefits (science returns, launch industry business, satellite industry business). Even using ESAS you could "cause no harm" to other areas and just let the schedule slide as it will.

- Take the VSE/Aldridge comments on "security, economics, and science" as well as "commercial and international" a bit more seriously. Don't defer them to the next generation.

- Maybe even a NASA run Shuttle-derived Direct approach would work (at least by only having 1 rocket family and thus leaving more funds for COTS, etc)?

Most or all of these would have helped American competitiveness, given returns earlier, etc ... so I certainly can see how Dennis says "if you really really wanted to do exactly the opposite, and tried really really hard to do so, you would come up with the ESAS architecture".

The kind of thing discussed by Dittmar -- with the follow up comments here -- is the external side of a set of problems I and others have noted for a long time on the inside. Many parts of NASA have a highly authoritarian culture. They don't listen to outsiders. They don't listen to their own staff too often -- think Columbia.

Currently I am involved in workforce issues. Too many of the people I work with see the issue in selling young people on aerospace. They wonder why they lose so many people as they grow up. Currently a few colleagues want to start telling high school students how to behave so they won't screw up their chances for security clearances when they are older. The notion that such demands will backfire hasn't sunk in yet.

Some people on the inside are starting to get it. Some others? Well, the best thing I can say about one woman is that she is doing the best possible thing in her career for NASA soon. She's retiring.