…remains a problem, even with the recent successful flight.
This is the kind of technology that (as it did as the NACA, before it became NASA) that NASA should have been prioritizing for decades. But it was more important to build a giant expendable rocket without a design reference mission.
And the article has NO references to the data from Starship Flight 13 or earlier flights . It is talking to some “expert” from NASA who references the SHUTTLE. It is clear that the shuttle had issues (CF Colombia although that was the leading edge, which did NOT use tiles but carbon fiber that was damaged by material shed from the fuel tank). Starship has learned lfrom the Shuttle. Its tiles are mostly identical and tessellated across the belly of the Starship. The shuttle’s tiles were often unique. They were pushing higher MAX Q this time to stress the tiles. Pretty much until they catch and look at reflying a Starship they won’t have a good idea of how much repair they’ll have to do, all the more reason to push the Starship catch forward in preference to resolving a Super Heavy catch in flight 14. Otherwise, it’s a lot of grousing from NASA engineers who haven’t actually built a reentry vehicle since the Shuttle. I’d bet most of those folks are LONG retired as the first shuttle flights were in the early ’80’s (and the last were 15 years ago) and I started working in 1983 and retired after 40 years of work. Better to look at the existing X-37, although much of that data is classified.