Like Thomas James, that’s exactly what I thought when I read the comments by (former astronaut, now ATK VP) Charlie Precourt in this piece by Brian Berger on the space transition team questions:
Executives at Alliant Techsystems (ATK), the Edina, Minn.-based prime contractor for the Ares 1 main stage, told Space News Nov. 25 they were not alarmed by the questions the transition team is asking about Ares and the Constellation program, which encompasses not only the shuttle replacement but also hardware NASA would need to land astronauts on the Moon. “They are doing due diligence,” said Charlie Precourt, ATK’s vice president of NASA space launch systems. “If you are the incoming steward of all federal agencies you are going to ask a spectrum of questions like this.”
Precourt said he was confident the transition team ultimately would reach the same conclusion as NASA, namely that Ares offers the best combination of cost, safety, reliability and performance, and that staying the course is the best way to minimize the gap between the shuttle and its replacement.
Of course he is. What else is he going to say?
But here’s what really drives me crazy about the reporting here. The headline on Berger’s story pretty accurately describes it, but when it was republished by Fox News, their copy editor picked up on the last phrase in that graf to rewrite it as “Obama May Cancel Shuttle Replacement.”
Sigh…
This kind of thinking is extremely misleading, and confuses, rather than enlightens policy discussion. It implies that we are going to continue along the path that we’ve followed for the past half century, and that NASA will develop and operate its own monolithic launch system for its own purposes, largely disconnected from the needs and aspirations of the rest of the space community and the public.
Beyond that, what does it even mean to “replace” the Shuttle, particularly with Ares 1/Orion? What is it that is being replaced, functionally?
The ability to deliver twenty tons to ISS? No.
The ability to return thousands of pounds from orbit? No.
The ability to launch seven (or more) crew to LEO, and perform research there for up to two weeks, and return the results? No.
The ability to provide a lifeboat for the ISS? Definitely no, since Shuttle doesn’t even have that capability (something that people urging the program extension seem to continually forget). Even if we continue the Shuttle program (with all the cost and risk) until that halcyon day that we have the “replacement,” we will continue to be reliant on the Russians for Soyuz, at least until something else can replace it, such as the SpaceX Dragon.
We have to break out of the mindset of referencing space policy to the “Shuttle.” A little over six years ago, when I was writing for Fox News myself, I wrote a piece on this theme, titled “A Shuttle By Any Other Name.” As I wrote then:
The original idea of SLI, started in the wake of the disastrous X-33 program, was that NASA would take the lead in developing technology for “next-generation” launch systems. This was code word for new reusable space transportation systems.
More importantly, hijacked by various factions at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, and the Marshall Spaceflight Center in Huntsville, it was really a plan to build a replacement for the current space shuttle, to be developed and operated by NASA, and thus preserve the current empires and fiefdoms that make the present space shuttle so costly and inefficient, and ensuring a continued costly monopoly of manned space by the agency for decades to come.
This agenda is revealed by the wording in popular accounts of the program’s purpose, in which the definite article is generally used to describe the desired outcome.
“The next-generation vehicle.”
“The ‘shuttle II'”
“The shuttle replacement.”
Note the implicit assumption — there will be a replacement for the current shuttle and it will be a replacement, not replacements (plural).
In the space community, the question is often asked, “What will the next shuttle look like?” Popular articles about space similarly speculate on the nature of the “next shuttle.” The question is often asked “can we get a shuttle to the moon?” (The answer is no).
Clearly, “shuttle” has become synonymous in the minds of many in the public with space vehicle.
In his great work, The Analects
, the ancient Chinese philosopher Confucious wrote that if he was ever asked for wisdom by the government, the first thing he would tell them was that, before he could provide such advice, a rectification of names would be required.
“If names are not rectified, then language will not be in accord with truth. If language is not in accord with truth, then things cannot be accomplished.”
It would be well for the government in general, and NASA in particular, to heed this admonition.
As a humble beginning to such a rectification of names, I hereby propose that we purge the word “shuttle” from our national space vocabulary. As applied to space vehicles, it is a word from a different era. It was an era still in the Cold War, when few could imagine a space program without NASA in charge, when few could imagine free enterprise offering rides into space. It became a symbol of a national space program, one size fits all — a vehicle that could build space stations, resupply space stations, and indeed (as a fallback position, in case the funding didn’t come through for space stations in the future) be a space station itself.
Shuttle was dramatically overspecified. Its payload capacity was too large. Its ability to change direction on entry (called cross range), which made its wings much larger than otherwise needed, was dictated not by NASA’s requirements, but by the Department of Defense, whose blessing was necessary for program approval. It wasn’t just a truck, but a Winnebago, capable of acting as a space hotel and science lab as well as a delivery system. These, among other reasons, are why it is so expensive, and such a policy failure.
Yes, while shuttle is a magnificent technical achievement, it truly is a catastrophic policy failure — a failure made almost tangible, in half-billion-dollar increments each time it flies, a few times a year.
And the failure is not in its design — it is in its requirements, its very philosophy, the very notion that a single system can be all things to all people, or even all things to all parts of our space agency. Anything that replaces the shuttle, in terms of those requirements, will suffer from the same flaws and failures.
We don’t need a replacement for the shuttle.
We need a space transportation industry.
It should be like our air transportation industry, or our ground transportation industry, competitive and flexible, to meet the needs of individuals and large corporations, and it should be based on the principles of a market economy — not the wish list of government bureaucrats.
We don’t have a “national airplane.” We don’t have a “national truck,” or a “national bus.” We have a variety of vehicles, tailored to a variety of markets at variety of prices for different customers and desires.
Three decades ago, with hope in our hearts, fresh from our lunar success, we initiated the first space shuttle program. If we wish a vibrant future in space, one in which thousands of people will venture off the planet in pursuit of their dreams, we should hope, even more, that it’s also our last.
Note that this was written about three months before the loss of Columbia.
Let’s hope that this time, with the “change” afoot in Washington, we can (finally) make better policy decisions, free from the blinkered thinking of the past.
Good idea to reiterate these points. I’ve been happening across articles examing space policy under Obama and have seen a lot of comments like, “We need NASA and NASA needs the shuttle.” Or, “If we need to go to the Moon then just send the Shuttle.” Or my favorite, “We can’t wait for space based power and can’t afford a gap without a Shuttle.”
It seems that the majority of peoples’ accounting skills don’t do so well when too many zeros start to appear after a number — Millions, Billions, Trillions? Ehhh, its a lot of something. Either they act like the money to launch the Shuttle just exists in some form and they don’t seem all that concerned. “Just put me a power generating satellite up in the sky so I don’t have to by more batteries for my cappuccino milk frothing wand.” Or, when they finally see how absurdly expensive the Shuttle is they wildly overreact and demand that we pull the plug on space exploration completely and use that money to balance the national budget. Yea, that will make a dent.
When it comes to space policy everyone suddenly wants to play Mr. Spock. A raised eyebrow, and knowing smirk, and a flippant answer of seemingly wise blather. There’s your damn space policy.
> Shuttle was dramatically overspecified. Its payload capacity was
> too large. Its ability to change direction on entry (called cross
> range), which made its wings much larger than otherwise needed,
> was dictated not by NASA’s requirements, but by the Department
> of Defense, whose blessing was necessary for program approval.
> It wasn’t just a truck, but a Winnebago, capable of acting as a
> space hotel and science lab as well as a delivery system. These,
> among other reasons, are why it is so expensive, and such a policy failure.
I strongly disagree with this, specifically the last sentence. Yeah it was designed as a do all craft, but its not like they were going to get to build a fleet of craft specialized for various mission anymore then the Air Force or Navy can with aircraft. Most importantly this had little impact to the cost to develop or operate as a quick comparison with shuttle vrs Orion/Ares, EELV, etc. A loaded Orion in orbit is looking to be about 1/3rd the mass of a loaded orbiter. Though built to lower quality and safety standards then shuttle, without the EVA or cargo handeling capacities. It still needs about all the same systems. Costs are projected to be similar for the program etc. Though costs per flight or per pound are projected to be far higher.
Shuttle development was expensive because it was a government program and there are many legal, political, and organizational reasons why NASA programs will be 4 times what a similar big commercial program will be. In special cases with Tiger Teams like Scaled Composite SS1/WK1, NASA and its suppliers project it would be closer to 40 to 1. Anything built for NASA under the current rules will get similarly hosed.
Shuttle is operationally expensive because the customer (congress) likes high expenses per flight (more jobs in districts) and has little interest in flying often. In NASA theres also a institutional belief there is no need to expand much, and a desire to maintain NASA’s position. In NASA HQ, the office of space access, I over heard part of a conversation of some one with a higher ranking civil servant.
Jr CS: But if we cut the cost to orbit, the market size will explode.
Senior CS: ::laughter:: But we’re already launching everything anyone wants.
Saying shuttle failed to be CATS because it was to big, complex, special interest directed, etc – is technically inaccurate and misleading. Pointing at favored scapegoats and whipping boys doesn’t help anything, but distracts you from real issues.
“by the Department of Defense, whose blessing was necessary for program approval.”
Bear in mind that the military really would have preferred to keep using their existing ELV fleet and evolve it gradually. The administration was fixated on the One Big Spaceship idea and strong-armed the military and intelligence communities into going along with folding their payload requirements into the Shuttle program. They insisted, not unreasonably, that if they were to be required to use Shuttle, it meet their mission requirements. One of the drivers for the big cross-range requirement came from the fact that it would be launching sensitive military-intelligence payloads, and they wanted a series of launch-abort options that would guarantee they could abort to politically friendly territories in all cases.
Kelly, you say “its not like they were going to get to build a fleet of craft specialized for various mission anymore then the Air Force or Navy can with aircraft.” Well, the military and intelligence people felt at the time that they had that, and they were being forced to abandon it.
It’s interesting to speculate on what would have happened if Max Faget’s original Shuttle design had been built instead (no SRBs, no extraordinary TPS, therefore no Challenger or Columbia losses) while maintaining and evolving the Titan III or MOL Titan for big-lift requirements. Water under the bridge, unfortunately.
The right language replacement for “shuttle replacement” is “jobs program”. We need a jobs program. We need a replacement jobs program. We need a geographically targetted jobs program. We need to assure that our jobs program has a good cover story.
I think we will make more headway on space if we design a jobs program that provides more and better jobs to target states than NASA does.
I think we will make more headway on space if we design a jobs program that provides more and better jobs to target states than NASA does.
Wouldn’t either a fuel depot program or SSP fall in that catagory then?
There has always been one point in
my mind that leaves me to believe
we are taking a step in the wrong direction
with Ares/Orion, and it has nothing to do
with Orion being Apollo version 2.
The shuttle proved to be an excelllent
vehicle for on-orbit servicing and
assembly. The highly successful Hubbel
missions, and the ISS are both examples
of the shuttles abilities. My concern
though is wheather that capability will
still exist with Orion.
There is a huge difference between trying
to work out of an Orion capsule, and work
out of a shuttle cargo bay full of tools,
parts, and a highly useful manipulator arm.
Personally, I grew up with Apollo, and
would rather have seen NASA choose to
revive/update X-20 Dyna Soar.
But that came from an era when we actually
had some imagination.
The ability to provide a lifeboat for the ISS? Definitely no, since Shuttle doesn’t even have that capability (something that people urging the program extension seem to continually forget). Even if we continue the Shuttle program (with all the cost and risk) until that halcyon day that we have the “replacement,” we will continue to be reliant on the Russians for Soyuz, at least until something else can replace it, such as the SpaceX Dragon.
There may be a third option. I’m not sure if this would be practical, but what if a cargo carrying Dragon capsule could be converted into an ISS lifeboat while it is docked to the station. This assumes, of course, that SpaceX would be able to demonstrate safe and reliable return of cargo from the ISS. So long as the lifeboat is not needed, then crew rotations could continue using the Shuttle and cargo offloaded with Dragon. But as long as the Shuttle is still flying, we might as well launch more ISS components (many of which are nearly finished but will never fly under the current conditions).
I’ve posted a little bit more about this idea here.
Yeah it was designed as a do all craft, but its not like they were going to get to build a fleet of craft specialized for various mission anymore then the Air Force or Navy can with aircraft.
I don’t understand that comment, Kelly. The Air Force has (or had until recently) separate aircraft types for air superiority, close air support, deep strike, heavy bombardment, stealth strike, electronic warfare, airborne early warning, electronic reconnaissance, optical reconnaissance, weather reconnaissance, long-range strategic reconnaissance, medevac, tactical airlift, strategic airlift, search and rescue, aerial refueling, and airborne command and control. The Navy has its own fleet of specialized aircraft types designed to operate from carriers, and the Marines have the Harrier to meet their own unique VTOL requirement.
Perhaps you’re alluding to the Joint Strike Fighter which, if you believe the marketing, will replace most of these aircraft types. There’s little reason to believe the marketing, however, and even less reason to believe that trying to make one aircraft do all those things will actually save the taxpayers money. Just to give two examples of where the JSF comes up short, it is not a complete replacement for the Navy’s A-6, lacking the A-6’s combination of range and payload, and because of the need to accomodate the lift engine, the VTOL version’s c.g. is not where it ought to be for a dogfighter. Even in the CTOL version, the c.g. is compromised by the need to maintain airframe commonality.
One of the first signs that VSE was doomed was when they started talking about using JSF as a role model.
I’m not sure if this would be practical, but what if a cargo carrying Dragon capsule could be converted into an ISS lifeboat while it is docked to the station.
That actually might be a good option. I’ve suggested to Gwynne Shotwell that they might have some passenger applications of the vehicle that didn’t involve delivering them to orbit with it. It would save them the cost of developing the launch abort system.
Jim Bennett Says:
December 2nd, 2008 at 9:20 am> Kelly, you say
>> “its not like they were going to get to build a fleet of craft specialized
>> for various mission anymore then the Air Force or Navy can with aircraft.”
> Well, the military and intelligence people felt at the time that they had
> that, and they were being forced to abandon it.
Congress was – for a while – sold on the idea of a low cost system to reduce all launch costs. To be fair the low flight rate of each separate system would drive each to high costs then flying on one general purpose craft all shared.
> It’s interesting to speculate on what would have happened if Max Faget’s
> original Shuttle design had been built instead (no SRBs, no extraordinary
> TPS, therefore no Challenger or Columbia losses) ==
I knew a guy no the shuttle concept team – or whatever – in JSc. He said they literally came into the office Late Thursday afternoon, and told them by Monday morning they had to have a new configuration on Nixons desk with all the cargo and no orbit capacity but half the development costs. So in that three day weekend the current shuttle stack concept was thrown together, written up, and a model built for Spiro to show off to the press.
That’s when low operating costs, and higher safety effectively went out the window
Sam Dinkin Says:
December 2nd, 2008 at 9:26 am
> The right language replacement for “shuttle replacement” is “jobs program”.
> We need a jobs program. We need a replacement jobs program. We need
> a geographically targetted jobs program. We need to assure that our jobs program has a good cover story.
Hense why Griffen promised Ares/Orion would be designed to “Maximize retention of the shuttle team”. Every sane space advocate has been screeming that shuttles staffing and infrastructure support levels need to be cut back – but that would be beside the point. The ship isn’t benig built to support a space mission, space missions are defined as excuses to spend the money building and operating things like ships.
David C. Neal Says:
December 2nd, 2008 at 10:58 am
>.. The shuttle proved to be an excellent vehicle
> for on-orbit servicing and assembly. ==
>My concern though is wheather that capability
> will still exist with Orion.
>
> There is a huge difference between trying
> to work out of an Orion capsule, and work
> out of a shuttle cargo bay full of tools,==
Moot point. Orions design requirements explicitly exclude any EVA support capacity. No backpacks at all. So they can get ni the suits and depressurize, but the hoses noly reach 20 feet from the attack point well ni the cabin.The astrounauts can’t get any farthe from the
1. Edward Wright Says:
December 2nd, 2008 at 12:30 pm
>> Yeah it was designed as a do all craft, but its not like they were
>> going to get to build a fleet of craft specialized for various
>> mission anymore then the Air Force or Navy can with aircraft.
> I don’t understand that comment, Kelly. The Air Force has (or had until
> recently) separate aircraft types for air superiority, close air support, deep
> strike, heavy bombardment, stealth strike, electronic warfare, airborne
> early warning, electronic reconnaissance, optical reconnaissance,
> weather reconnaissance, —
Yes but as far as technically possible everything is integrated. Over the last 40 years the services have been pushed to fewer and fewer types of aircraft (or any craft), each type pushed to do more and more things. Rather then Fighters and attack craft, and general recon, etc. You get a F/A ? with recon pod and ground strike (remember the pre Deasert storm concept of replacing the A-10 with a F-16 with a GAU-8 gun pod?).
A 25 – 30 ton max capacity R?LV would lift about anything anyone had no their horizon, and allow vast increases in on orbit operability to build anything bigger and support construction and deep space missions. So there really wasn’t a practical or technical reason not to integrate them, and a integrated craft could get some kind of economies of scale.
— until al that fell apart in political hell of course..
>== Just to give two examples of where the JSF comes up short, it is
> not a complete replacement for the Navy’s A-6, lacking the A-6’s
> combination of range and payload, ==
A-6 was replaced with modified F-14s long ago, and the capacity of both was phased out when the F-14s were retired. Just like the F-15 wings wont (generally) get to be replaced with F-22s, but be downscaled to F-35 squadrons – or keep their F-15s fore another decade or two.
> One of the first signs that VSE was doomed was when they started talking about using JSF as a role model.
JSF has been a very successful program, and the craft does well to replace the Harrior, F-16, F-18 capacities it was supposed to replace, and will likely be as popular internationally as the F-16 was. You can’t blame it for not living up to the abilities of other more capable craft (F-14, A-6, etc), whose capabilities were deemed unnecessary. Harrior pilots will find the VTOL F-35 FAR better in a dog fight and most everything else then a Harrior. And hell, some in the air Force likely complained about F-4s being to heavy since they were designed for CTOL – until they saw how well they shrugged off battle damage.
Over the last 40 years the services have been pushed to fewer and fewer types of aircraft (or any craft), each type pushed to do more and more things.
With the result that system acquisition costs have gone through the roof. As a military officer once said, “If the enemy is an ass and a fool and a prating coxcomb, is it meet, think you, that we should also be an ass and a fool and a prating coxcomb?”
A 25 – 30 ton max capacity R?LV would lift about anything anyone had no their horizon, and allow vast increases in on orbit operability to build anything bigger and support construction and deep space missions. So there really wasn’t a practical or technical reason not to integrate them, and a integrated craft could get some kind of economies of scale.
Except for the fact that there was no demand to fly a heavy lifter like that more than 10 or 12 times a year. So, there could never be any economies of scale because there was no scale.
Other than that, Mrs. Lincoln, how did you like the play? 🙂
JSF has been a very successful program… You can’t blame it for not living up to the abilities of other more capable craft (F-14, A-6, etc), whose capabilities were deemed unnecessary.
So, we’re paying more money to get less capability. Interesting definition of success.
By that definition, Ares may be the most successful rocket ever.
Harrior pilots will find the VTOL F-35 FAR better in a dog fight and most everything else then a Harrior.
Unfortunately, the enemy will be flying Fulcrums, not Harriers or F-35s. Or do you think we’re going to go to war with England?
Then there’s the F-22, which has a structural weakness because all the money spent on development, they never bothered doing a static test to the point of failure, and an outdated gun, and despite all of its onboard electronics, it doesn’t have the data link that all other US fighters have for communicating with other units.
Oh, but it’s now an “F/A” so it’s going to “replace” the F-117 Nighthawk. Except that it carries only half the internal weapons load of the Nighthawk. So, they can hang bombs on the wings to compensate — and the F-22’s stealth suddenly becomes useless.
That’s one hell of a model to copy. 🙂
Rand,
That actually might be a good option. I’ve suggested to Gwynne Shotwell that they might have some passenger applications of the vehicle that didn’t involve delivering them to orbit with it. It would save them the cost of developing the launch abort system.
Well, I know that if I was on the station, and there was an emergency bad enough that leaving sounded like a good idea, that I’d be fine taking my chances on Dragon even if they hadn’t done any more development than the COTS A-C stuff. Even if they keep flying the shuttle, Dragon looks like the only real near-term way to guarantee lifeboat functions (and thus allow the station to ramp up to 6 crew) other than Soyuz.
~Jon
Well, I know that if I was on the station, and there was an emergency bad enough that leaving sounded like a good idea, that I’d be fine taking my chances on Dragon even if they hadn’t done any more development than the COTS A-C stuff.
Not so fast, Jon. You’re forgetting about the medical evacuation scenario.
You might be willing to take your chances if the station’s on fire but would you be willing to take the same chance if someone else has appendicitis and you’re just along for the ride (because NASA doesn’t want to leave crew onboard the station without a lifeboat)?
More importantly, would NASA be willing to risk the lives of several crewmembers in that situation?
Slashdot just linked to this essay
http://paulgraham.com/artistsship.html
that I think explains everything NASA and everything military procurement. Too many checks; nothing gets done.
This connects to the earlier comment on this thread that it isn’t the Shuttle as much as how NASA runs it or would run anything else.
Edward Wright Says:
>December 2nd, 2008 at 3:35 pm
>> Over the last 40 years the services have been pushed to fewer
>> and fewer types of aircraft (or any craft), each type pushed to do more and more things.
>With the result that system acquisition costs have gone through the roof==
Having been on a couple programs, it’s the damn paperwork and congressional nonsence for 20 years that drives the costs up.
>> A 25 – 30 ton max capacity R?LV would lift about anything anyone
>> had no their horizon, ==
>Except for the fact that there was no demand to fly a heavy lifter like
> that more than 10 or 12 times a year. ==
That’s 1/4th the total yearly launch rate for Earth, and the point isn’t that their were a lot of 25 ton lifts, but that it could carry virtually anything. I.E. it could serve virtually al the market. As Orion is illustrating, a smaller craft isn’t really cheaper (Orion Aries is looking to be far more expensive per flight), so all downsizing would do is lock you out of market.
=
>>JSF has been a very successful program… You can’t blame it for not
>> living up to the abilities of other more capable craft (F-14, A-6, etc),
>> whose capabilities were deemed unnecessary.
>So, we’re paying more money to get less capability. ==
How do you figure that? F-14’s, A-6s, etc are not what JSF was built to replace. It was built to replace F-16/18/Harrior etc – and it does all there jobs very well. I’ld agree that we also need to replace F-14’s/15’s/A-6’s – but congress and significant folks in the DOD disagree. (Which is disturbing given F-15’s are outdated and falling apart in flight from age!!)
>Then there’s the F-22, which has a structural weakness because all
> the money spent on development, they never bothered doing a
> static test to the point of failure, and an outdated gun, and despite
> all of its onboard electronics, it doesn’t have the data link that all
> other US fighters have for communicating with other units.
Yeah the “guns are outdated” folks had to much say. I don’t know the details no the structure, but the avionics and data link capacity is awsom. In war games the damn thing was functioning like a mini AWACS! Forwarding detailed battle space info to the rest of the fleet.
>Oh, but it’s now an “F/A” so it’s going to “replace” the F-117 Nighthawk.
> Except that it carries only half the internal weapons load of the Nighthawk.
> So, they can hang bombs on the wings to compensate — and the F-22’s
> stealth suddenly becomes useless.
The concept is you only use stealth F/A for precise small hits early in the war. If you want stealth major loads early you call ni a B-2 or something. After the start of the war, they assume the enemy radar will be trashed so you can dump truck in bigger loads for more massive strikes.
Course now Gates and company figure you won’t need anythink like the Nighthawks or F-22’s anymore..
;/
1. > Paul Milenkovic Says:
2. >December 2nd, 2008 at 7:22 pm
>Slashdot just linked to this essay
>http://paulgraham.com/artistsship.html
>that I think explains everything NASA and everything military
>procurement. Too many checks; nothing gets done.
>
>This connects to the earlier comment on this thread that it isn’t
>the Shuttle as much as how NASA runs it or would run anything else.
When I was at McDonnel Douglas the CEO gave a speech about gov “oversight”. They were working no 2 programs. One developed the F-15 strike Eagle, the other a stretched DC? Airliner. Technically they about as hard, but the paper work for the airliner was a 80 page contract, the fighter bomber paperwork filled a UPS truck.
As Orion is illustrating, a smaller craft isn’t really cheaper (Orion Aries is looking to be far more expensive per flight), so all downsizing would do is lock you out of market.
I don’t know what illustrations you’re looking at, Kelly, but Orion isn’t small. Orion is freaking huge. Griffin deliberately made it so big that it couldn’t fit on any existing rocket to justify the development of two new heavy lifters.
Contrary to the “bigger is cheaper,” that hasn’t turned out to be cheap. How many times must we repeat the experiment before you will accept the results?
How do you figure that? F-14’s, A-6s, etc are not what JSF was built to replace. It was built to replace F-16/18/Harrior etc – and it does all there jobs very well.
You’re apparently not familiar with the program. The Joint Strike Fighter is intended to replace *every* fixed-wing carrier aircraft. Not only the F-14, A-6, and F/A-18; there are also variants being designed for electronic warfare, airborne early warning, antisubmarine warfare, even medevac. And in the USAF, it’s supposed to replace the F-16, the F-117, and the A-10.
It isn’t doing all these jobs well. It isn’t even in service yet. I suggest you read the history of past attempts to design one airframe that can do everything. The F-111 is a notable example.
Don’t believe everything you hear from the marketing people. That “awesome” datalink, for example, will only work between F-22s and can only talk to one other aircraft at a time. They can’t talk to “the rest of the fleet.” See http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=dti&id=news/DTINETS.xml&headline=F-22%20and%20F-35%20Suffer%20From%20Network%20Gaps
I’ld agree that we also need to replace F-14’s/15’s/A-6’s – but congress and significant folks in the DOD disagree. (Which is disturbing given F-15’s are outdated and falling apart in flight from age!!)
So, why do you think we ought to copy a model that you admit is not working?
Kelly, you should take a look at this article by Bob Kress and Admiral Paul Gillcrist about the Super Hornet:
http://www.flightjournal.com/ME2/dirmod.asp?sid=F999E8C39FCE47DEB4CDBABBFBF37179&nm=The+Magazine&type=PubPagi&mod=Publications%3A%3AArticle+Title&mid=13B2F0D0AFA04476A2ACC02ED28A405F&tier=4&id=660129034AD142DEB047684EBF25581F
“we have listened, with no small restraint, to the pontifications that justify how well the Navy is doing with its favorite program, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet—despite unimpeachable reports to the contrary from the guys in the fleet; comments made to us by young fleet pilots who have flown the airplane and describe it as ‘a dog’ carry much more weight with us than statements from senior officers and civilians higher in the food chain.”
Are you sure this is a model you want to emulate?
>
># Edward Wright Says:
>December 3rd, 2008 at 11:10 am
>
>> As Orion is illustrating, a smaller craft isn’t really cheaper (Orion
>> Aries is looking to be far more expensive per flight), so all downsizing
>> would do is lock you out of market.
>
>I don’t know what illustrations you’re looking at, Kelly, but Orion isn’t small. ==
Its tiny compared to Shuttle, though nearly a third the weight of a fully loaded orbiter, much more expensive, and not as safe.
> Orion is freaking huge. Griffin deliberately made it so big that it couldn’t
> fit on any existing rocket to justify the development of two new heavy lifters.
True. Griffen loved the stick and wants his legacy to be it and his Ares V as his legacy of a Saturn V + class booster.
>> How do you figure that? F-14’s, A-6s, etc are not what JSF was built to
>> replace. It was built to replace F-16/18/Harrior etc – and it does all there jobs very well.
>
>You’re apparently not familiar with the program. The Joint Strike Fighter is
>intended to replace *every* fixed-wing carrier aircraft. Not only the F-14,
> A-6, and F/A-18; ==
No its not suppose to replace the F-14 and A-6. NOTHING is supposed to replace them. Their missions and capabilities are officially unnessisary.
>… in the USAF, it’s supposed to replace the F-16, the F-117, and the A-10.
F-16 makes complete sence. F-117 iskind of redundant adn obsolete if you have F-22’s and F-35’s. A-10 is the same stupid crap they tried about 20 years ago to repace it with F-16s. AF hates the A-10, adn really it should not be under the Air Force.
>
>Don’t believe everything you hear from the marketing people. == See
> http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=dti&id=news/DTINETS.xml&headline=F-22%20and%20F-35%20Suffer%20From%20Network%20Gaps
Actually I was quoting a Av wek article.
>So, why do you think we ought to copy a model that you admit is not working?
You miss understand. Simple fact NASA would never have gotten the support to build a series of multi sized RLVs, nor would multi sized RLVs be economically lower cost then a do it all craft given the curent market. Same way most all trucking goes on one size fits all 18wheelers. It can carry about anything you need, and cut the primary costs of space flight over fleets of multi sized specialized craft.
Now shuttles being cut down and pushed to maintain the high costs to keep up staff sizes in districts countered a lot of those advantages, but it still was a better idea to build a generalist craft given the market to tiny to economically use several specialized fleets.
># Edward Wright Says:
>December 3rd, 2008 at 12:27 pm
>
>Kelly, you should take a look at this article by Bob Kress and Admiral Paul Gillcrist about the Super Hornet:
>
>=
>
>“we have listened, with no small restraint, to the pontifications that justify how
> well the Navy is doing with its favorite program, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet—
> young fleet pilots who have flown the airplane and describe it as ‘a dog’ –
I was in McDonnell Douglas back when the superHornet waas being developed, and when it was chosen over the Super Tomcat as the new fleet craft. They didn’t get it either. Realy thought the super Tomcat made a lot more sence give similar costs etc.
Oh not loaded with racks of bombs etc the superhornet was a hot little craft, but my favorite quote from someone in the program was “its a great little plane, but you try to do the job of a F-14 with it and your going to die.”
But again, your arguing toward my point of view. Both the F-35 adn Super Hornet are programs where they desided to base everything around a small support fighter, and make it tryto do the work of a bit top line fighter. My point with Shuttle relatiuve to this is,a big fighter can do small fighter jobs, but not the other way round. So if you can only get one, and it doesn’t cost much differnt for eiather, get the big one that can do all you need.
Example to hopefully clarify.
If you did have the lobotomy, and decided Orion was a reasonable next step manned craft for NASA and you needed a big heavy booster to launch a moon mission (neither make any sense, but moving on), then you can see a good reason for Areis V, but also having Ares 1 is just a waste of money. It buys you nothing over a Orion on Ares-V, except more cost and headache.
[Orion is] tiny compared to Shuttle, though nearly a third the weight of a fully loaded orbiter, much more expensive, and not as safe.
It’s also tiny compared to the Starship Enterprise. Both comparisons are silly. The Shuttle orbiter is close to being a complete launch vehicle. Orion is merely a capsule.
If you want to compare Orion to part of the Shuttle system (although I don’t know why you would), the best comparison would be to the Shuttle’s (never built) escape capsule — not a “fully loaded orbiter.”
No its not suppose to replace the F-14 and A-6. NOTHING is supposed to replace them. Their missions and capabilities are officially unnessisary.
Who decided that fleet air defense and naval air strike were “officially unnecessary”? That statement is bizarre. The squadrons performing those missions were not disbanded. They were reassigned to fly F/A-18s (on an interim basis) with JSF as the long-term replacement.
Simple fact NASA would never have gotten the support to build a series of multi sized RLVs,
Good. NASA should not get support to build a series of RLVs. Or ELVs. NASA should not be building launch vehicles, period, any more than the NACA built airliners.
nor would multi sized RLVs be economically lower cost then a do it all craft given the curent market.
*Nothing* will lower costs given the current market. That’s the whole point. Steve Jobs didn’t try to lower the cost of computing by building mainframes for the then-current market. He built machines that created whole new markets.
Small launch vehicles can grow the market. See http://tour2space.com/archives/economic/20013962.htm, for example.
My point with Shuttle relatiuve to this is,a big fighter can do small fighter jobs, but not the other way round. So if you can only get one, and it doesn’t cost much differnt for eiather, get the big one that can do all you need.
But your assumption that you can “only get one” is just wrong. Developing one airplane that can do every job generally costs *more* than developing two or more airplanes for separate roles — the growth in military procurement costs proves that — and you end up with a “camel” that does none of its jobs well. Again, look at the history of the F-111.
Edward Wright Says:
December 3rd, 2008 at 5:17 pm
>>[Orion is] tiny compared to Shuttle, though nearly a third the weight of a
>> fully loaded orbiter, much more expensive, and not as safe.
> It’s also tiny compared to the Starship Enterprise. Both comparisons are silly.
> The Shuttle orbiter is close to being a complete launch vehicle. Orion is merely a capsule.
Orion is the capsule and service module (not just the capsule), effectively holding all the functions of the orbiter, except the Orbiters cargo bay, and the orbiter carries the assent engines. In both cases the bulk of the stack is dropped of before reaching orbit. In both cases all life support, power, manuvering, avionics, orbital insertion propulsion systems, TPS, etc etc.
Hence why it weighs so much and is so expensive.
>> No its not suppose to replace the F-14 and A-6. NOTHING is supposed to
>> replace them. Their missions and capabilities are officially unnessisary.
> Who decided that fleet air defense and naval air strike were “officially unnecessary”?
Navy adn DOD brass. The Navy would not need a air dominance/interceptor like the F-14 since post cold war there would never be a attack by a seriously capable AirForce. It would no longer need long range higher capacity bombers (or long range fighters) since theNavy in the future would only fight “Litorial battles” I.E. fight just off, and a couple hundred miles in from, a shore.
> That statement is bizarre. =
Insane. But thats why the F-14s were retired from fighter duties to ground attack, adn replaced by the F-18s. The F-18s were NEVER requested to have anything like the F014s or A-6s capacities — just a upgrade from the old F-18s – which were developed as short range lower threat craft that filled in for the F-14s and A-10s.
>> Simple fact NASA would never have gotten the support to build a series
>> of multi sized RLVs,
> Good. NASA should not get support to build a series of RLVs. Or ELVs.
> NASA should not be building launch vehicles, period, any more than the
> NACA built airliners.
I’d agree, but its Irrelevant, NASA isn’t NACA, and the similar logic would aply to commercials. Course with NASA there is the point that a NASA should develop cutting edge systems, to advance the state of the art from a usability/capacity/etc stance.
>> nor would multi sized RLVs be economically lower cost then a do it all craft given the curent market.
> *Nothing* will lower costs given the current market. That’s the whole point. ==
Eiather way, to become viable – you need to maximize flight rate per amount of overhead and operational costs. Making several classes of craft to do the same jobs one class of craft could do cheaper, makes no sense and makes it much harder to
> Steve Jobs didn’t try to lower the cost of computing by building mainframes for
> the then-current market. He built machines that created whole new markets.
Not by developing lots of specialized computers for each, but mulit-fuction ones that would support broad ranges of users (though to be fair desktop publishing pretty much carried them).
Small launch vehicles can grow the market. See http://tour2space.com/archives/economic/20013962.htm, for example.
>> My point with Shuttle relatiuve to this is,a big fighter can do
>> small fighter jobs, but not the other way round. So if you can
>> only get one, and it doesn’t cost much differnt for eiather, get
>> the big one that can do all you need.
> But your assumption that you can “only get one” is just wrong. —
Its proved true foe every other gov vehicle program then and since. Its why the F-35 was designed to replace the 16’s/18’s/Harrior — and will wind up filling in for others.
NASA in the ‘70s was not going to get a couple RLVs or LVs programs to handel its futire missions. It had to justify it as a do all craft that could launch not just everything NASA would need – but everything the gov would need. Like it or not, that was the rules of the game.
Further, if your a commercial wanting to make a go of it, not locking out any customers is pretty good rule of thumb.
> Developing one airplane that can do every job generally costs
> *more* than developing two or more airplanes for separate roles
> — the growth in military procurement costs proves that —
The growth of mil procureet has little to do with the aircraft, mainly its due to the explosion in government “oversight” and set asides. Hell even after you pull that off (about 2/3rds the dev program) over half goes for the avionics.
>== you end up with a “camel” that does none of its jobs well. Again, look at the history of the F-111.
Different issue. F-111 was asked to de several missions requireing radically different and contradictory capabilities. A fairly heavy long range bomber, that could also be a top end dogfighter, that could also operate off carriers (that really hate bulk). The feature needed for one, interfered with the others. A better example would be the F-14 which required little if anything extra to be a highly proficient F/A-14, or to do the missions of the lighter
A big space truck, and a little space truck need all the same systems, one just needs to be bigger, which doesn’t inhibit its ability to carry something smaller. A big space truck with a bigger cabin, or cargo arm, also hasn’t any trouble carrying and handeling smaller cargo. Nor does it really increase the costs of the bigger craft. Since the bigger size doesn’t cost particularly more per flight (especially if anyone had allowed the shuttle “ility development work to be done). The extra cost to develop a second craft for smaller cargo, or a separate one for cargo, and another for people. You drive the Fleet costs up. Dividing higher total fleet costs over the same size market.
You argued that you develop it for a completely new market, but that doesn’t mater if that new market is equally capable of being served by the same craft. A shutle like craft (that was allowed to upgrade usability and csafty) would do well for tourist, small launches, big sats, or shuttles intended on orbit repair and construction.
Example:
Your NASA in the early ‘70’s. You are planning on launching sats, building stations, launching groups of people, sat repair, etc. The Air Force wants bigger sats – and not being stupid when handed a blank check – adds other nice to haves like more cross range, etc. And you want the capacity to bring things down (a real big plus if you want to do routine or industrial operations in space).
They could develop and field: A 6 passenger craft, a large (25 ton) cargo lifter/lander, a small cargo lifter/lander. Maybe ad a 100 ton lifter etc. Or you can buildone 25 ton lift shuttle and add the human cary systems to it. You need the cabin systems, avionics, RCS, TPS, propulsion, thermal control, power, etc. Integrating it into one launch system with fewer parts and systems then the several vehicles.
Where you run into trouble is if you one craft starts needing a lot of new stuff non of the separate craft would have needed, or would interfere with the separate crafts missions.
Note this logic also applies to a commercial builder looking at multiple potential markets.
Its proved true foe every other gov vehicle program then and since. Its why the F-35 was designed to replace the 16’s/18’s/Harrior — and will wind up filling in for others.
If it were true, procurement costs would be going up instead of down. The fact that government bureaucrats decided something should be done a certain way does not prove that it was a good idea. Government bureaucrats are not always right.
NASA in the ‘70s was not going to get a couple RLVs or LVs programs to handel its futire missions. It had to justify it as a do all craft that could launch not just everything NASA would need – but everything the gov would need. Like it or not, that was the rules of the game.
Those “rules” were set by NASA itself. There’s nothing in the Constitution (or even in the NASA Act) that requires NASA to develop launch vehicles. They didn’t even have a Presidential mandate like Kennedy’s call to land a man on the Moon. NASA decided that developing a new launch vehicle and a space station was what it wanted to do after Apollo.
Again, the fact that government bureaucrats decided to do something does not prove that they were right.
A big space truck, and a little space truck need all the same systems, one just needs to be bigger, which doesn’t inhibit its ability to carry something smaller. A big space truck with a bigger cabin, or cargo arm, also hasn’t any trouble carrying and handeling smaller cargo. Nor does it really increase the costs of the bigger craft.
Do you have any evidence for that? Standard models show that aircraft development costs scale with dry weight to a power of ~0.85, and those models have been validated by hundreds of data points.
Building a bigger aircraft requires a bigger factory than building a small aircraft, and a bigger workforce. Do you dispute that? Do you think that those things don’t cost extra money?
A shutle like craft (that was allowed to upgrade usability and csafty) would do well for tourist, small launches, big sats, or shuttles intended on orbit repair and construction.
So, you launch a big satellite, then your shuttle sits on the ground for a month or two until you have enough little satellites to fill your cargo bay. In the meantime, you have to keep paying your astronauts, maintenance workers, and launch crews — you can’t just lay them off and hire them back for the next launch. The cost per flight can never drop appreciably because the denominator is tiny. And because the flight rate is small, you have no learning curve effects helping to reduce costs, either.
1. Edward Wright Says:
December 4th, 2008 at 2:26 am
>> Its proved true foe every other gov vehicle program then and
>> since. Its why the F-35 was designed to replace the
>> 16’s/18’s/Harrior — and will wind up filling in for others.
> If it were true, procurement costs would be going up instead of down. ==
No, the cost are driven by other factors. I suppose though this does lower the total procurement costs since instead of paying for all this bloat and political BS on 3 programs, your only paying for one. So though current rules and process make producing any plane far several times more expensive then nessisary – not producing several planes helps balance somewhat.
;/
Realistically in some cases integrating functions makes sense. Buying more F-14s and have them do both F-14 fleet defense, deep interception, etc and A-6 bombing gives you a better set of capacity no your limited deck space then a separate F-14 and A-6 sets. In other case (F-111 being the most insane example) its just nuts.
>> NASA in the ‘70s was not going to get a couple RLVs or LVs programs
>> to handel its futire missions. It had to justify it as a do all craft that
>> could launch not just everything NASA would need – but everything
>> the gov would need. Like it or not, that was the rules of the game.
> Those “rules” were set by NASA itself. –
No, NASA had little say, it was congress and the press who only saw a NASA as valuable if it could be a national launch resource. It couldn’t even fly out the last 3 moon missions even though it had all been paid for. Certainly nothing else was of interest in Washington.
>> A big space truck, and a little space truck need all the same systems,
>> one just needs to be bigger, which doesn’t inhibit its ability to
>> carry something smaller. A big space truck with a bigger cabin,
>> or cargo arm, also hasn’t any trouble carrying and handeling
>> smaller cargo. Nor does it really increase the costs of the bigger craft.
> Do you have any evidence for that? Standard models show that
> aircraft development costs scale with dry weight to a power of ~0.85,
> and those models have been validated by hundreds of data points.
I should have said “Nor does it really increase the OPERATING costs of the bigger craft”
Though given the Aries Orion budget is already more then the inflation adjusted Shuttle program budget and project to go more then half again more, while based around reusing shuttle parts, certainly is suggestive?
Given the dry weight of the orbiter is likely twice that of Orion, the ET cost is independent of the size ($300 million a year to keep its production factory open regardless to what and how many tanks it makes, etc. Though comparing the operations cost of a comparatively frequent flying partially RLV, to a seldom flying fully expendable, gets very complicated. Flying a shuttle 7 times a year or not at all costs about the same.
Same costs for life support dev, avionics dev, TPS dev if its big or small. Likely not a lot of dif for the motors. Kind of like hoe Falcon 1 cost far more to develop then Falcon 9, since 9 just repackaged the same systems on a bigger hull.
Its weird, and not how the economics of normal transport craft add up, but space launchers are living way off in a nasty corner of vehicle economics.
Little of the operating costs of shuttle relate to the shuttles size – or even the shuttle itself vrs overhead. You need a KSC (if your NASA) whatever you launch, and NASA will load all KSC’s op costs on whatever they launch.
In any event your realy arguing over the costs of fielding a couple fleets of vehicles vrs 1.
>> A shutle like craft (that was allowed to upgrade usability and safty)
>> would do well for tourist, small launches, big sats, or shuttles
>> intended on orbit repair and construction.
> So, you launch a big satellite, then your shuttle sits on the ground for
> a month or two until you have enough little satellites to fill your cargo bay. ==
Course not. You do as Shuttle has always done, and how must trucks do, you launch with the cargo you get even if its tiny compared to your capacity.
> In the meantime, you have to keep paying your astronauts,
> maintenance workers, and launch crews — you can’t just lay them
> off and hire them back for the next launch. ==
True but the point is you don’t need 3 or more staffs (HLVC folks, small shuttle folks, medium shuttle folks, etc) for 3 or more fleets, each flying 1/3rd as often. Your one big truck can fly anytime you get any cargo or mission that fits in it (which since its fairly big is most of them), which maximizes its flight rate to lower cost per flight. More flights per vehicle type, means more flight carrying the same fixed overhead (astronauts, maint and support crews, infrastructure, etc.) and you have lower upfrount R&D by not developing multiple craft, etc.
No, the cost are driven by other factors…. So though current rules and process make producing any plane far several times more expensive then nessisary – not producing several planes helps balance somewhat.
So, why do those rules and processes affect some programs and not others? How was Kelly Johnson able to develop the A-12/SR-71 so cheaply, in the same time period when aircraft like the F-111 were going through the roof?
If you read Kelly Johnson’s rules for aircraft development, you will see that he did not allow Mission Creep. He believed it was a major factor driving up development costs, and the evidence suggests he is correct.
I should have said “Nor does it really increase the OPERATING costs of the bigger craft”
Oh? You think you will pay the same amount of money for a big hangar as a little hangar, a big runway as a small runway, a big staff as a little staff?
I think you’re wrong. Just compare the operating costs of a Cessna and a 747.
Falcon 1 cost far more to develop then Falcon 9, since 9 just repackaged the same systems on a bigger hull.
Its weird, and not how the economics of normal transport craft add up, but space launchers are living way off in a nasty corner of vehicle economics.
Ahem. Elon Musk does not seem to agree with you — he’s charging *more* for a Falcon 9 flight than for a Falcon 1.
Same costs for life support dev, avionics dev, TPS dev if its big or small. Likely not a lot of dif for the motors.
Again, all the standard cost models disagree with you. They show that those things scale strongly, almost linearly, with aircraft size.
Since you claim they don’t scale at all, the burden of proof is on you. Please explain why you think those models, based on many hundreds of data points, are wrong. Arguing from a single data point is not convincing.
1. Edward Wright Says:
December 4th, 2008 at 12:00 pm
>> No, the cost are driven by other factors…. So though
>> current rules and process make producing any plane
>> several times more expensive then nessisary – not producing
>> several planes helps balance somewhat.
>So, why do those rules and processes affect some programs and not others?
> How was Kelly Johnson able to develop the A-12/SR-71 so cheaply,
> in the same time period when aircraft like the F-111 were going through the roof?
>If you read Kelly Johnson’s rules for aircraft development, you will
> see that he did not allow Mission Creep. He believed it was a major
> factor driving up development costs, and the evidence suggests he is correct.
True. The fact he kept the A-12/SR-71/YF-12a pretty focused on core features of the family helped a lot, also he didn’t follow a lot of modern (or even current then) contract rules, which allowed him to run a very small “tiger team” like program. The extream classification level actually helped by locking out a lot of “oversight” overhead. The AF tried that in the ‘80’s to save money by over classifying stuff to cut the paperwork cost. (The fact this overcame the inefficency of doing things in a classified environment shows how nuts the over head and “political costs” have become.
The F-111 was the ultimate in feature creap to the point of a tidal wave. It really did make a very good medium bomb, and did several other similar “big aircraft” rolls very well. But a carrior based fighter bomber??!!!
>>I should have said “Nor does it really increase the OPERATING costs of the bigger craft”
>Oh? You think you will pay the same amount of money for a big hangar
> as a little hangar, a big runway as a small runway, a big staff as a little staff?
Hangers, runways don’t impact launch costs in LVs much more then they do in airliners. Even staff costs get completely overwhelmed. Once you shell out your several billion ni dev costs, and most of a billion for a launch site, add in liability insurance, cost to clear out half the atlantic for a launch, care and feeding of range staff etc – it maters surpizingly little if your launching a Saturn V or a damn redstone. The diff from a 50-60? Ton dry weight orbiter, or 25 ton Orion sized 6 man no cargo “shuttle” get lost in the noise.
Now if you want to get into cost savings with different design focus, that can get orders of magnitude.
>I think you’re wrong. Just compare the operating costs of a Cessna and a 747.
They have a hundred fold dry weight dif and are mature highly utilized fleets, where fuel cost are 1/3rd op costs, and dev costs are lost in the weeds. With launch vehicles theirs less size and cost dif per size, and overheads kinda fixed per flight. In shuttle for example (which would cost about $30 billion adjusted for inflation), direct costs, (fuel, labor, consumed parts) Are about 1/3rd cost per launch (you could cut those down 3 orders of mag with some redesign) and the other 3/4ths are fixed costs divided by flight. Do the redesign work NASA couldn’t, and the launch costs are virtually all overhead. The ship and flights are virtually free. About all that shows up is the original dev cost. Not counting for interest and adjusting for inflation, that would average to about $300 million per flight. Compared to nearly a billion more to carry the centers, fixed overhead for any launch regardless of size, etc. $72 million a fight for the overhead to keep the ET factory open outside New Orleans. Shutle sized, DynaSoar sized. Cost doesn’t change much.
As to how the actual dev costs vary with size, a new biz jet takes a billion to get into production. The 787 took $18 ish. So a hundred fold size increase, cost 18 times more to field.
>> Falcon 1 cost far more to develop then Falcon 9, since 9 just
>> repackaged the same systems on a bigger hull.
>> Its weird, and not how the economics of normal transport craft
>> add up, but space launchers are living way off in a nasty corner of vehicle economics.
>Ahem. Elon Musk does not seem to agree with you — he’s charging
> *more* for a Falcon 9 flight than for a Falcon 1.
I know hes charging more, but he also said the F09 project took a fraction as much cost as the F-1.
>> Same costs for life support dev, avionics dev, TPS dev if its big or small. Likely not a lot of dif for the motors.
>Again, all the standard cost models disagree with you. They show
> that those things scale strongly, almost linearly, with aircraft size.
This isn’t a aircraft, and actually a lot of things like this don’t scale. Cockpit systems don’t vary much with size since it’s a fixed cost. A bigger plane doesn’t need bigger nav, radio, cockpit systems, sibnce the same two man crew, airspace, etc.
>Since you claim they don’t scale at all, the burden of proof is on you.
> Please explain why you think those models, based on many hundreds
> of data points, are wrong. Arguing from a single data point is not convincing.
Because that hasn’t been the reported norms on the programs I’ve been involved ni from shuttle to 787, to Comanche helos etc. Experience reported by programs from Eclipse, to SpaceX, to fighter programs. Standard rules of thumb don’t always apply in weird different systems – especially in government programs.
Firther those cost factors are based no aircraft, not space craft. Since space craft – like fighters – have a lot of systems which are a big fraction of the dev costs, but that don’t scale with the size of the craft.
Hangers, runways don’t impact launch costs in LVs much more then they do in airliners. Even staff costs get completely overwhelmed.
Which “LVs” are you looking at? In the case of the Space Shuttle, labor costs are the largest component of recurring costs.
Once you shell out your several billion ni dev costs, and most of a billion for a launch site,
If someone is foolish enough to build a vehicle that costs several billion to develop, and a billion-dollar launch site, that’s a problem. You’re contradicting yourself, though — you said you were talking about recurring operational costs, not development costs.
add in liability insurance, cost to clear out half the atlantic for a launch,
Why would you want to clear out half the Atlantic? That’s only necessary if you’re silly enough to launch from a NASA or USAF test range. FAA regulations don’t require it. Especially if you’re not doing something silly like dropping valuable hardware into salt water.
The diff from a 50-60? Ton dry weight orbiter, or 25 ton Orion sized 6 man no cargo “shuttle” get lost in the noise.
Let’s
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle
http://www.tour2space.com/archives/bearcubx/bearcub.htm
One costs $250 million per flight. The other $250,000.
I wouldn’t say that’s “lost in the noise.”
Compared to nearly a billion more to carry the centers, fixed overhead for any launch regardless of size, etc. $72 million a fight for the overhead to keep the ET factory open outside New Orleans. Shutle sized, DynaSoar sized. Cost doesn’t change much.
Why would I want to carry fixed overhead for NASA centers, or maintain a useless factory in New Orleans? Those things are good arguments for why NASA should not be involved in space transportation.
Firther those cost factors are based no aircraft, not space craft. Since space craft – like fighters – have a lot of systems which are a big fraction of the dev costs, but that don’t scale with the size of the craft.
No, those same cost models are used to estimate the cost of fighters.
And if you look at NASA’s Spacecraft/Vehicle Level Cost Model or Advanced Missions Cost Model, you’ll see that they also use dry weight as a primary variable.
http://cost.jsc.nasa.gov/SVLCM.html
http://cost.jsc.nasa.gov/AMCM.html
>Edward Wright Says:
>December 5th, 2008 at 3:14 pm
>
>> Hangers, runways don’t impact launch costs in LVs much more then
>> they do in airliners. Even staff costs get completely overwhelmed.
>
>Which “LVs” are you looking at? In the case of the Space Shuttle,
>labor costs are the largest component of recurring costs.
Hardly maters given labors about $300 million out of the GAO calculated total per flight cost of $1.3 billion (likely more by now) of each shuttle flight. Likely more not with the lower flight rates.
>
>> Once you shell out your several billion in dev costs, and most of
>> a billion for a launch site,
>
> If someone is foolish enough to build a vehicle that costs several
> billion to develop, and a billion-dollar launch site, that’s a problem.=
Those are pretty standard costs for a commercially developed LV. (Or for a aircraft of similar dry weights.) Goverment developed would be several timesthat much of course.
>== You’re contradicting yourself, though — you said you were talking
> about recurring operational costs, not development costs.
I was talking about costs per flight. That includes all the over head, definatly including R&D. Shutle (last time I read the reports) was about $1.3 bill per flight. Labor about $300Mill, tanks and SRBs $140 mill.
Note that the DC-X program demonstrated a over 1,000 fold labor cost per flight reduction per flight compared to similar (or projected for shuttle size), adn the ET’s and SRBs were corners they had to cut, so you could easily project pretty well deleting those costs. So the other $800+ million per flight costs for centers, range costs, etc (which are pretty much unreltaed to the size of the vehicle) REALLY kill you.
>>add in liability insurance, cost to clear out half the atlantic for a launch,
>
>Why would you want to clear out half the Atlantic? ==
Because LVs very often crash after launch, and usually drop things along their assent even when they are flying fine.
>The diff from a 50-60? Ton dry weight orbiter, or 25 ton Orion sized 6 man no cargo “shuttle” get lost in the noise.
>
>Let’s
>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle
>http://www.tour2space.com/archives/bearcubx/bearcub.htm
>
>One costs $250 million per flight. The other $250,000.
>
>I wouldn’t say that’s “lost in the noise.”
Given the total cost per flight for the shuttle (or most any gov system) early a billion a flight of other overhead, range costs, etc — both are lost in the noise.
Also I’m really skeptical of the Bearcub. Some numbers (like pilot plus 450kg or Pilot or 3 passengers. Far to little weight for 3 passengers and the special support for them.
>
>> Compared to nearly a billion more to carry the centers, fixed overhead
>> for any launch regardless of size, etc. $72 million a fight for the
>> overhead to keep the ET factory open outside New Orleans.
>> Shutle sized, DynaSoar sized. Cost doesn’t change much.
>
>Why would I want to carry fixed overhead for NASA centers, or
> maintain a useless factory in New Orleans? Those things are
> good arguments for why NASA should not be involved in space
> transportation.
In congress the argument would be if your not carrying that kind of “contributions” to the various areas, what’s the point of shuttle or a launch program? Thats why they could never fix up stuff with shuttle that was known would dramatically reduce labor adn any other cost per flight. If the cost per flight drop that low – there was no reason to have you fly.
In congress, and really with the public, the purpose of NASA is not the space missions, the space missions just act as a justification (excuse) for the high costs paid in the correct districts. Its the costs that have the higher voter and hence congressional, support.
Obviously a commercial operation (or a government one with missions of greater priority) could field a craft of far less (1,000 fold) operating costs, and development costs that were 3-4 times less.
>
>> Further those cost factors are based on aircraft, not space craft.
>> Since space craft – like fighters – have a lot of systems which are
>> a big fraction of the dev costs, but that don’t scale with the size of the craft.
>
>No, those same cost models are used to estimate the cost of fighters.
>
>And if you look at NASA’s Spacecraft/Vehicle Level Cost Model
> or Advanced Missions Cost Model, you’ll see that they also use
>dry weight as a primary variable.
Hasn’t seemed to work in programs I’ve been on. The cost of Shuttle vrs Orion/Ares for example. Though I suppose the orbiter of Orion are a comparatively low fraction of the total dry weight — and being done a couple decades apart that expains why theOrion Ares costs so much more to develop then shuttle did in adjusted for inflation dollars.