…actually, with no discernible fanfare, the Augustine report has been released. I’m looking it over now.
[Update a few minutes later]
It was clearly written by a committee, and has some politically correct statements in it, such as (from the summary on page 11):
Given the funding upon which it was based, the Constellation Program chose a reasonable architecture for human exploration.
This is eminently disputable. There were no fiscal circumstances under which this architecture ever made sense if, by being “reasonable,” one means satisfying the dictates of the VSE and the Aldridge Commission. But I understand that politically they want to grant Griffin’s team a fig leaf (and olive branch) and an excuse to accept a new direction. Don’t expect them to take it.
[Update a few minutes later]
Again in the summary, on page 12, they attempt to justify the assumption that heavy-lift is not optional:
No one knows the mass or dimensions of the largest hardware that will be required for future exploration missions, but it will likely be significantly larger than 25 metric tons (mt) in launch
mass to low-Earth orbit, which is the capability of current launchers. As the size of the launcher increases, the result is fewer launches and less operational complexity in terms of assembly and/or refueling in space. In short, the net availability of launch capability increases. Combined with considerations of launch availability and on-orbit operations, the Committee finds that exploration would benefit from the availability of a heavy-lift vehicle.
First of all, it’s a weak argument in that “benefits from” != “is essential to.” No one would dispute that an architecture could “benefit from” a large vehicle, in a world of unlimited financial resources. The question, in the real world, is whether it’s provides the most bang for the exploration buck. I’ll be interested to see if they try to show this in the details of the report.
But beyond that, it’s a word salad:
As the size of the launcher increases, the result is fewer launches and less operational complexity in terms of assembly and/or refueling in space. In short, the net availability of launch capability increases.
What does the phrase “net availability of launch capability” even mean? How does the first sentence relate to the second? Why is fewer launches better, considering that reliability and economies of scale come from increasing operational tempo? Why is “operational complexity” bad? The Shuttle huggers used to claim with apparent admiration that it was the most complex vehicle ever built, as though that was a feature. Has it now become a bug? Apparently, but no case is made for the proposition — it is simply assumed, and there’s no discussion of the trade between it and the ginormous costs of developing and operating a heavy lifter at low flight rates. Finally, as I’ve noted before, if no one knows what the largest piece is, then how does anyone know that it’s greater than 25 tons? Will there be an analysis to defend this? Stay tuned, as I get into the meat of the report (though not necessarily immediately).
I have to say that I love this:
…the EELV approach would also represent a new way of doing business for NASA, which would have the benefit of potentially lowering development and operational costs. This would come at the expense of ending a substantial portion of the internal NASA capability to develop and operate launchers. It would also require that NASA and the Department of Defense jointly develop the new system.
The big unstated assumption here is that NASA actually possesses an internal capability to develop launchers. All of the available evidence for this since the Shuttle development is that it does not — there is nothing to retain. In fact, this was one of the key rationales put forth by Mike Griffin to let Marshall build a new rocket — because they hadn’t done it in decades, didn’t know how to do it, had demonstrated this with several failed attempts in the interim, and needed some on-the-job training.
And the notion that either NASA or the DoD will be developing the EELV derivative, jointly or otherwise, is unfounded. Such a development will be performed by Boeing and/or Lockheed Martin, as the original EELVs were developed. NASA and DoD will jointly provide requirements, not develop a launch system. I agree, though, that if there were such an attempt for the government to get involved to that degree, it would end in tears.
But lest this be all bashing, let me praise this paragraph, even though it seems almost like a grudging afterthought (still on page 12):
All of the options would benefit from the development of inspace refueling, and the smaller rockets would benefit most of all. A potential government-guaranteed market to provide fuel in low-Earth orbit would create a strong stimulus to the commercial launch industry.
I’ll be interested to see them elaborate on this, again, as I get into the main report.
In general, be aware that this post is a work in progress, and pretty much stream of consciousness as I read through. My overall assessment of the report could (at least in theory) end up being quite favorable, once I’ve grokked the whole thing. These are simply initial impressions.
[Update a few minutes later]
Bobby Block has been reading it:
A first reading of the 157-page report shows that it is stronger than the summary with more explanations and data.
It depcits NASA’s Constellation Program, which is supposed to replace the space shuttle after it retires, as being expensive and unlikely to arrive in time to service the International Space Station for very long if the White House agrees to extend the use of the complex from 2015 to 2020.
That’s hardly news to anyone who’d been paying attention. Which would exclude Congresspeople.
[Update about 2 PM Eastern]
The Commercial Spaceflight Federation has issued a release (not on their website yet):
The Commercial Spaceflight Federation welcomes the strong support for commercial human spaceflight expressed by the White House’s Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee, also known as the Augustine Committee, which released its final report today. The Augustine Committee endorsed the creation of a Commercial Crew program to develop commercial capabilities to transport crew to the International Space Station, with a baseline NASA investment of $3 billion, to include multiple competitors and human-rating of an existing reliable launch vehicle.
The report further included the following key statements in support of the commercial procurement of crew transportation services to the International Space Station in low-Earth orbit:
- The time is right: The report stated, “Commercial services to deliver crew to low-Earth orbit are within reach. … A new competition with adequate incentives should be open to all U.S. aerospace companies. This would allow NASA to focus on more challenging roles, including human exploration beyond low-Earth orbit…”
- Industry is capable: The report stated, “There is little doubt that the U.S. aerospace industry, from historical builders of human spacecraft to the new entrants, has the technical capability to build and operate a crew taxi to low-Earth orbit.”
- Commercial is safe: The report stated, “Any concepts falling short in human safety have simply been eliminated from consideration.” Later, the report added, “The Committee… would not suggest that a commercial service be provided for transportation of NASA crew if NASA could not be convinced that it was substantially safe.”
- A diverse set of competitors exist: The report stated, “During its fact-finding process, the Committee received proprietary information from five different companies interested in the provision of commercial crew transportation services to low-Earth orbit. These included large and small companies, some of which have previously developed crew systems for NASA.”
Commenting on the release of the Augustine Report, Mark Sirangelo, Chairman of the Commercial Spaceflight Federation and Chairman of Sierra Nevada Corporation Space Systems, stated, “Augustine’s detailed report could not be more clear – only by pursuing commercially procured crew transportation can the nation afford to extend the Space Station beyond 2015, even if NASA does receive extra funding. Leveraging the commercial sector will also free up NASA resources for exploration beyond Earth orbit.”
A recent industry-wide survey by the Commercial Spaceflight Federation revealed that 5,000 direct American jobs would be created by a full Commercial Crew program. Through a combination of government and private investment, companies such as United Launch Alliance, Sierra Nevada Corporation, SpaceX, and others would be able to create jobs in states including Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Nevada, Texas, Maryland, and Virginia.
“If a Commercial Crew program is not started now,” added Sirangelo, “America will be forced to pay Russia to launch our astronauts to orbit for years to come, at a price of $51 million per seat and rising. With so many capable American companies here at home, why should we outsource our entire human spaceflight program to Russia?”
Bretton Alexander, President of the Commercial Spaceflight Federation, added, “Shortly before the Augustine report was released, over a dozen distinguished former NASA astronauts, including Buzz Aldrin, published an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal stating that commercial companies can safely handle the task of low-Earth orbit transportation. NASA already relies on the commercial sector for high-value satellite and cargo missions, and the time has come for an evolution to commercial procurement of crew services as well.”
It is progress, especially considering the friendly words from the new administrator. It really is a sea change from a decade ago, when Dan Goldin was fighting to keep tourists off the ISS.
[Early afternoon (Pacific) update]
Here’s the report from the New York Times, presumably based on the press conference.
[Late afternoon update]
Chuck Divine attended the press conference, and blogged it.
Important points from the Final Report, even if mentioned earlier.
Fuel Depots:
“All of the options would benefit from the development of in space refueling, and the smaller rockets would benefit most of all.”
Commercial Crew to Orbit:
As we move from the complex, reusable Shuttle back to a simpler, smaller capsule, it is appropriate to consider turning this transport service over to the commercial sector. This approach is not without technical and programmatic risks, but it creates the possibility of lower operating costs for the system and potentially accelerates the availability of U.S. access to low-Earth orbit by about a year, to 2016.
Launch Economics and Frequency of Launch:
It seems improbable that significant reductions in launch costs will be realized in the short term until launch rates increase substantially—perhaps through expanded commercial activity in space.
It seems improbable that significant reductions in launch costs will be realized in the short term until launch rates increase substantially—perhaps through expanded commercial activity in space.
All of the options would benefit from the development of in space refueling, and the smaller rockets would benefit most of all.
If only they had combined these two thoughts. The greatest benefit of depots is that they could lead to a much higher flight rate and therefore lower cost. By not realising this the committee allows NASA to erect a barrier against lowering cost to orbit.
Reusable hardware has a similar effect. With throwaway hardware mission cost will remain high and flight rates low, even if cost to orbit drops to zero. Initially reusable hardware doesn’t make things cheaper, but it does eliminate an obstacle to a virtuous cycle of higher flight rates and lower costs.
Similarly, if they had combined the idea of Lagrange points and depots, they would have realised that large EDSs and large launcher are unnecessary.
The committee has squandered the best opportunity in a generation to open up space for mankind. Tragic.
They should have written something like this:
All of the options would benefit from the development of in space refueling, and the smaller rockets would benefit most of all. But important though this is, it is not the most important consideration. It seems improbable that significant reductions in launch costs will be realized in the short term until launch rates increase substantially. At current costs expanded commercial activity in space is unaffordable, which means the commercial sector alone cannot reduce costs by much. On the other hand, if NASA were to use commercial propellant launches, flight rates would increase dramatically and this in turn could reduce costs by enough to enable expanded commercial activity in space, which in turn would lead to higher flight rates and lower costs further and so on.
Heh. Well, Rand, there it is, in black and white (well, black and blue), in the Executive Summary:
“It really is rocket science”.
So there.
BBB
So there.
[shrug]
Just one more thing they got wrong. It is, after all, a committee.
just skimming the first impressions on the blogo/newssphere, it appears that the report has a little something for everyone. kind words for EELVs, heavy lifters, Constellation, fuel depots and whatnot.
Which effectively makes it ultimately worthless, no matter how many sentences in favour of something one digs up from the pages, there will be always a sentence of two to be quoted as a counterargument, and so it falls by the wayside, just being used as a tool to bludgeon the opponents in the arguments.
real decisions will be still made based on everything BUT a reasonable analysis of the data.
the report is there just to provide soundbites. well done.
Let me offer a contrarian thought. The best thing that could happen for commercial development of space would be if the most expensive and riskiest Ares V Lite variant is chosen and MSFC gets to develop it. While this would waste a lot of time and money, it would also maximise the probability of failure. I don’t think NASA launchers could withstand another colossal failure.
Also bear in mind the shifting balance of power. Senator Shelby does not possess political immortality, nor does Senator Nelson. And Nelson has already warmed to commercial space. Commercial crew rotation for ISS allows commercial players to prove their mettle, and this includes EELV-based solutions. ACES the upper stage and with it EELV Phase 1 will happen anyway, just more slowly. A lot of Shuttle workers will be fired, thus weakening the Shuttle workforce and supply chain as a political force.
In a more rational world an exploration program might have given a huge boost to commercial space soon. In the real world we may still end up with a boost that is merely delayed by 10 years, as opposed to lost forever. In the long run we’ll all be dead, so delay is still very bad, but all is not lost yet.
Martin:
Page 13 says:
All of the options would benefit from the development of inspace refueling, and the smaller rockets would benefit most of all. A potential government-guaranteed market to provide fuel in low-Earth orbit would create a strong stimulus to the commercial launch industry.
How much more obvious would you like them to make it?
How much more obvious would you like them to make it?
Fair enough, I was projecting my worst fears based on insufficient information. My bad.
The Report has been delayed and pondered and its jist leaked for so long now that its unveiling is meaningless (not just to the space community, but to the 99.9% of America across all parties that doesn’t give a rat’s ass about space).
The WH, not to mention Congress, will take bits and pieces from all over those 167 pages (and some out of thin air) to fashion a new space policy that will probably end up similiar (that is to say, “non-executable”) to the existing one. In which case, Mike Griffin was far better at politics than I ever imagined gave him credit for.
Jeff Foust has Congressional reaction at space politics.
When Senator Shelby (R-AL) and Representative Giffords (D-AZ) both say they intend to fight for the program of record, eh, it sounds like there shall be a problem.
Jeff Greason is going to brief COMSTAC next week. I am looking forward to that.
If the moon has water that is fairly easy to retrieve, would it be feasible to generate hydrogen fuel using nuclear reactors on the lunar surface and ship it to LEO? Do you think this is something that NASA ought to do?
No, the economics are iffy enough using the water in-situ; shipping it to LEO is a definite loser.
FYI, it’s most likely the water is dispersed throughout the regolith at low concentration, analogous to dry concrete (NOT wet concrete, even dry concrete on Earth has a high concentration of water by lunar standards), and will require heavy tech just to extract it for in-situ usage.
If I were to describe the full Augustine Report in a single word, the word I would pick is this:
Rorschach
Bill White – Well, that’s YOUR reaction.
Nemo,
FYI, it’s most likely the water is dispersed throughout the regolith at low concentration, analogous to dry concrete (NOT wet concrete, even dry concrete on Earth has a high concentration of water by lunar standards), and will require heavy tech just to extract it for in-situ usage.
FYI, this is not known, is probably not true and is arguably true only for the newly discovered water deposits at high latitudes seen by the M3 instrument. In fact, there is strong evidence that significant concentrated deposits of water (billions of metric tonnes) exist in the permanently dark areas near the poles. A study by the Colorado School of Mines for DARPA in 2002 found that water deposits present in quantities greater than 1.5 wt. % are economically viable.
Bill White — okay, that was a cheap shot, but oh! so tempting.
Actually, it was a very good observation. I’ve been sort of impressed/depressed by the scattered newspaper headlines which have appeared to summarize Augustine 2, and it’s fascinating to see that the reporters have obviously found very clear “facts” which struck me as rather blurrily presented in the text of the document.
In retrospect, it’s clear that the report can be used to justify just about any Obama policy that might occur, from killing off the manned space program to urging interstellar colonization before the decade is out. And I sort of suspect that the White House had that in mind when setting up the committee in the first place. Which is what presidential commissions do normally, to be honest. I imagine that was clear to the commission members when they signed on.
@mike schupp
In retrospect, it’s clear that the report can be used to justify just about any Obama policy that might occur, from killing off the manned space program to urging interstellar colonization before the decade is out.
Yep, exactly.
And we may not know what direction Obama chooses until February 2010
And also, like Rohrsach, how individual Congress-critters respond will reveal where they stand, showing their cards before Obama shows his.
I like that the Committee members have said that picking a path is above their pay grade as is the question of whether NASA should be primarily a jobs or a space program.
I like that they have shaped debate to change the settlement question to “When?”
Depots are also a likeable highlight.
But why is NASA really seeking water on the Moon?
see:
http://notionscapital.wordpress.com/2009/10/21/water-on-the-moon/
I think they’ll just throw more money at NASA, as requested. After all, what’s a few billion in this age of trillions?
The Denver Post, serving the nation’s second-biggest space workforce, ran a cut-and-paste AP wire story on the report, whose takeaway was that “NASA should skip the moon, build bigger rocket.”
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_13621721
If they just grabbed a passer-by from the street in Englewood or Boulder, chances are maybe one in ten that person could have written a better-informed story on it.
I only really read the rag for its sports coverage these days.
Wait a minute, they also predicted that the Broncos would be 3-and-0 this season.
Sorry, that was 3-and-13.
Rand,
Thanks for the link to my blog entry. I hope it helps people get an impression of the press conference. Writing seems to be one of my talents.
I personally was impressed that Augustine mentioned the various modern ways people communicated with his committee. That shows an openness that is important.
I also got one piece of advice from Keith Cowing that I will try to follow. He advised me to write at least one blog posting a day. I will try to do that. I will probably comment on the people side of things. Yes, I have worked in IT for more than two decades. But, unlike most techies (whom I do respect), I am good at the people side as well — and I’d rather write about things from that perspective, unless someone is paying me to write IT stuff.
A couple folks asked what my reaction to the Augustine report was.
One personal surprize.
On page 22 of the report the committee quotes lines out of 6 emails the received. The first listed:
“As an American, having NASA field a retro-reenactment of the Apollo program to get back to the moon a half-century after we sent people there the first time is humiliating”
is from MY email (or a damn big coincidence of two of us using the exact same phrase).
Just hitting nuggets like
— Ares is designed to be the safest..
— As we move from the complex, reusable Shuttle back to a simpler, smaller capsule, …
It was pretty obvious that the party line was to be respected regardless of the reality of the projects.
Some bits like:
“..The Committee strongly believes it is time for NASA to reassume its crucial role of developing new technologies for space…”
Is a really good idea – but how do you put that in the same report supporting Ares/Orion/Altair?
Hell, they seem to have forgotten everything learned, and all the strengths, NASA developed during the shuttle program. Given Shuttle listed 60% of al the people and half of al the cargo ever carried to orbit, and even the most optimistic of their options charted would have 5-10 times fewer NASA astrounauts flying to space in a given year when Orions flying. And no NASA launched cargo until Ares-V in the 20’s. Thats a huge step away from space for NASA. But the committe seemed to only focus on the impart of workforce cuts, and gap in NASA maned launch capacity. I think it deserved more consideration.
Though to be fair in section 4.2.2 they go into how the ISS was designed to be built and operated with a craft with shuttle like capacities – which no one is going to have, or plan to field, after they ground the orbiters. Even operating the ISS after shuttles grounded seems iffy. When ISS was to be dumped in 2016 it wasn’t as big a problem. Now its to be kept going until the 2020’s.. how the hell do you keep it in the air without shuttle?
The big thing that bugs me is it lists all the conventional options (current system Constellation design, Shuttle C version, some commercial carry to ISS, support ISS to extend the benefit to the US). But off the table are cheaper RLV solutions (in constant year dollars the shuttle program was vastly cheaper then just Ares-1/Orion, much less all of Constellation). No mention of a COTS lunar contract (potentially 10-20 times cheaper by industrial history and estimates). There is no mention of reusable transport in any section I saw. They mention the importance of lots of minor technologies like boil off control and Ullage, but reusable transport is ignored?
Another thing that worried me is some of the $ calcs. on the table on page 20. They are projecting constellation costs of $100B until 2020. That’s only the vehicle development costs. Given GAO was talking $250B total program costs until 2024… I’m thinking they may be low balling their estimates to make Constellation look better.
All in all we’ll be paying far far morethen we do now for NASA, adn getting far less out of it and space.
For all of the people saying refueling depots in orbit would be such a good idea, and eliminate the need for heavy lifters, I have a question: How do they propose to get the fuel to the in-orbit depots? Fuel is heavy and bulky stuff. For me, the only practical way I can see to get all of that fuel into orbit is with heavy lifters. The very heavy lifters the depot supporters claim to eliminate the need for. Sorry, folks, but until you can find a way to create rocket fuel out of the vacuum of space then heavy lifters are going to be a necessity.
And if you really want to reduce the cost of getting into orbit then you need to find a way to do it without throwing away your vehicle in the process.
> How do they propose to get the fuel to the in-orbit depots?==
Multiple flights of medium (25ton) lifters. Assembling lots of small volumes of liquid, to form a large volume of liquid in a tank, is a very viable technology.
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😉
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High flight is a big plus to lowering cost.
opps
High flight RATE is a big plus to lowering cost.