Ugh. Is Obama trying to be the worst president ever? When the four years are up and we’re putting together an “Obama’s greatest hits (to the future of the US)”, I imagine this will be on the list. It’s a big mistake to throw away a considerable portion of the US’s defensive nuclear capabilities without getting corresponding concessions from anyone else in the process. It’s like burning money.
Worst. President. Ever.
It’s conceivable in my mind that there won’t be a USA by the time this guy is done, he seems determined to undermine the country any way he can.
Karl,
It’s like wearing a Kick Me sign on your back. Obama may think the world will love him but RUS and China will giggle with glee. At some point, with a policy like this, someone will want to find out what they can get away with. It will make Saddam’s Kuwait invasion look like a beach party. Taiwan anyone?
Karl, he doesn’t have to “try.” He’s taken to heart what Yoda told Luke Skywalker.
Silo based systems are a waste of time anyway. They are just too easy to target and destroy. You cannot quickly redeploy them in case the threat changes either.
The Moscow Treaty signed by W was a joke.
Considering China is planning to ramp up the nuclear weapons in their arsenal, the Russians would be foolish to reduce their own arsenal too much. ABM funding just is another drop in the bucket.
Bunker busting tactical nuclear weapons are a waste of money. Everyone has reservations about using nuclear weapons when engaging in limited warfare, which would be the case in Iran and North Korea. Can’t they develop non-nuclear bunker busting bombs?
If we had a patriotic media in this country he’d be impeached for this act alone. While we remain a strong nation his actions encourage others to nibble at the edges.
They are just too easy to target and destroy.
And the enemy knows the result of doing so. Explain how unilaterally giving up what we’ve already got is a good idea.
Unfortunately, any unilateral destruction of nuclear weapons probably just means some later president will be forced to push for an increase in the arsenal. It isn’t a safe or entirely sane world, sadly.
It isn’t a safe or entirely sane world
Deterrence only works with the sane. The insane require a different strategy.
According to treaty limitations current silo based ICBMs such as Minuteman can only carry one warhead. The US would be better served by having smaller and survivable mobile ICBMs and SLBMs.
As for tactical nuclear weapons of any sort they are a waste of money. They make sense in a large land war against a conventional army, against mainland Russia or China, but any such nuclear conflict will necessarily escalate into the use of strategic weapons, so why not use those instead if the targets are that valuable? Besides, it would be cheaper, not to mention more useful to reinstate nuclear warheads into cruise missiles than develop niche ground penetrating nuclear weapons.
Regarding bunker busting, weapons such as the Massive Ordnance Penetrator could actually be useful and used in limited war unlike tactical nuclear weapons of dubious utility.
Zilla, there is just so much wrong with that last statement….
Silo-based ICBMs are vulnerable to a first strike, but as long as the number of silos is kept reasonably large (typically >250), nothing short of an all-out war would threaten their viability. If one includes some SLBMs and perhaps a few land-mobile (or air-mobile) missiles as well. Silo-based systems enjoy numerous advantages (better maintenance prospects, greater security/reliability of command/control, high physical security, etc.) which are not available in SLBMs, and certainly not an option with cruise missile systems.
SLBMs are vulnerable to advances in ASW technology (though in truth, they are quite secure now), and remain extremely expensive to deploy over time. Communications and control are serious issues, and unless we assume that the GPS constellation survives a first strike (bad bet), it is unlikely that an SLBM-only deterrent would have a truly effective hard-target capability. SLBMs have some reliability issues, and the size limitations of their launchers reduces the option of adding penetration aids and other enhancements.
In a similar vein, cruise missiles are highly vulnerable to interception, and are extremely slow, making them highly unsuitable for prompt response, or tactical flexibility. Some cruise missiles are perhaps useful (though the arms-control issues with most systems make them problematic at best), but the advantages that they offered in the 80s (stealth and accuracy) have largely been eroded by techonogical advances. Cruise missiles are far cheaper than ballistic missiles, but they offer few significant advantages other than that.
The viability of tacnukes is (and has been for some time) more a matter of religion than anything else. If you believe that the first use of a nuke anywhere will inevitably lead to a wargasm, then you don’t believe that tacnukes are useful. If you believe that there are some cases where they can be used without triggering an all out conflagration, then there are (admittedly limited) options for their deployment. I fall in the latter camp, as the mechanistic view of human behavior used to justify the former seems to me to be limited.
As for bunker-busters, certainly there is a viable role for non-nuclear penetrators, but the size problem means that we are rapidly coming to the limits of what can be usefully deployed. The MOP, for instance, leaves us with very few platforms for its use, and anything much bigger simply cannot be carried by all but a small percentage of our potential strike forces. A tacnuke penetrator could be deployed in any number of ways, and for use against extremely hard targets, it simply has no equal. There may be political reasons not to deploy tacnuke penetrators, but the technical (and tactical) reasons for them are still valid.
I don’t see a problem with reducing our nuclear arsenal by a moderate amount, IF it comes with concaminant reductions by our potential advesaries, and if it is tied to development of defensive systems. A general agreement of ‘rules of the road’ regarding legitimate targets (for instance, a general ban on countervalue use of nuclear weapons, and an understanding – public or not – regarding the use of nuclear weapons against or in the defense of nonnuclear third parties) would also be useful. Finally, a general agreement by the serious powers (US, USSR, PRC) regarding how to cope with rogue regimes and breakout nations (and here I am referring to strike options, not endless negotiations) might lessen the dangers associated with uncertainty.
According to Wikipedia, the Russians never ratified SALT II – did the US unilaterally abandon MIRV warheads?. That might have been a mistake …
I thought the reference in the New York Times article to the non-nuclear “Prompt Global Strike” would attract some comment here. The idea, I believe, is to be able to use ICBMs to hit targets with a non-nuclear anywhere in the world while reducing the risk of letting the Russians and Chinese mistakenly think we’re starting a nuclear war with them. I recollect a lot of discussion (for and against) of this option (for and against) in space groups…
Anyway, I don’t see why it matters what the wording on the NPR says — the decision to use nukes for whatever the reason is still up to the commander-in-chief and I have to think our adversaries would be more concerned about our actual capabilities than our stated-for-political-purposes declarations.
left out the word “warhead”. Wouldn’t mention it, except that Rand likes people to use the word “warhead” correctly!
Scott: The advantage of installing nuclear warheads into cruise missiles (again) is that there are a lot of platforms which can launch cruise missiles. Subsonic cruise missiles are not very useful against enemies with advanced air defenses as you say. They also have a slow response time making it impossible to hit some targets of opportunity. The advantage of a cruise missile is that you have longer range for the same form factor.
This is why I defend funding on hypersonic cruise missiles. Indeed you can see work in this area in the form of X-51. However hypersonic R&D is going to take a long time. This is why there are people who want to put conventional warheads into ballistic missiles as a stopgap measure. The Russians… well they make noise about putting conventional warheads into ballistic missiles, but use weapon systems such as Iskander.
Bob,
No peacenik I, but Prompt Global Strike is a horrible idea. One of the fundamental elements of Deterrence is CLARITY, i.e. your potentially deterred party should have absolutely no doubts about what you are doing and what the consequences of your actions are. Using ICBMs with conventional warheads (accuracy issues and size issues nothwithstanding) is a terrific way of destroying clarity. How EXACTLY are the PRC or Russians to know which warhead is being used on which missiles at any given time? In a crisis situation, where time is short, perceptions are likely to be clouded, and trust is lowest, do you really want to start firing off ICBMs an action that can be easily misinterpeted?
Yes, everyone has warning systems and ICBMs can be tracked relatively easily, but systems break down (the Russian system has been a mess for years, and in the late 90s, it was actually ‘down’ for several weeks at a time), people panic, and mistakes are made. Creating a situation where an ICBM launch might or might not be a threat (as opposed to now when ALL launches are threats) merely destroys clarity with very little tactical gain.
As to what our advesaries (potential and otherwise) might be concerned about (i.e. capabilities vs political claims), you are certainly correct, but a clear declaration of policy, along with a set of (perhaps private) understandings as to what constitutes a realistic set of policy limitations on major nuclear powers might go a long way towards defusing tensions. The Chinese (who face a far more realistic threat, living next door to the Russians and Indians) might welcome some sort of general understanding, even it it were only privately hammered out. The Russians are quite unlikely to allow any understanding to undermine their paranoia, but such agreements would limit their behavior as well, and over time, adherence to such agreements in crises by the US would tend to build at least some trust.
Eric,
The Minuteman III is a MIRVed system, and it is deployed as such.
The Minuteman III is a MIRVed system, and it is deployed as such.
With the ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I), the United States had until December 2001 to reduce its nuclear arsenal. As a result, the 90th Missile Wing reduced the fleet from three warheads permissible to a single warhead configuration. On August 6, 2001, all 150 Minuteman IIIs had been converted to the single warhead, beating the December deadline.
Zilla,
The number of platforms that cruise missiles can be launched from (practically anything these days) makes them highly problematic from an arms control point of view. Unless you are willing to ditch arms control treaties (even a die hard ‘bomb them into radioactive rubble’ hawk such as myself doesn’t like that idea), cruise missiles present a whole series of pretty much unsolvable problems.
Range is another factor. Yes, you can build some fairly long-ranged cruise missiles, but you give up speed when you do, and substantially reduce the stealth factor. The longer one of these things is in the air, the greater the chance it is going to be detected and destroyed, which seriously undermines the value of these systems for nuclear deterrence.
Hypersonic systems (the ones currently under study, at least) have very serious range issues, and cost a boatload compared to other platforms. They also lack stealth (and given the kind of flight profile we are discussing with things like the X-51, they aren’t going to get stealthy, even with a whole lot more development), and really don’t bring anything to the table that existing ballistic systems don’t already provide.
As for the Iskander, the key here is RANGE. The Iskander is a theatre level weapon, and its range reflects this. If the Russians started taking SS-18s and adding conventional warheads to them as part of a prompt global strike initiative, I would oppose that, and decry that as I would if we did it with retired Minutemen IIs. Note that the Chinese are playing around with this sort of technology on the THEATRE level with their latest anti-carrier experimentation, based on stolen Pershing II technology as well.
For deterrence to work, you have to have diversity of platforms, and SLBMs, silo-based ICBMs, and some sort of mobile system (I prefer ICBMs on blimps myself, but I am an eccentric…) along with some manned bombers (not really necessary, but the USAF isn’t giving them up anytime soon, so whatever…) provide that quite nicely without the inherent probelms associated with cruise missiles.
Larry,
Yes and no…
The MIII has converted to a ‘downloaded’ version, with only a single warhead on the reentry bus, but it retains the capability to carry 3 warheads. This remains a bit of a sticking point with the Russians (who have done the same thing themselves, by the way), since as long as the capability is there, the potential for breakout remains.
Your core point is absolutely correct, however…
If you think having nuclear armed cruise missiles pose an arms control problem, I do not see how having a widely distributed tactical nuclear weapon for bunker busting would be much better. The politicians would never allow such a weapon to be widely distributed, less alone used, under the current environment as it causes proliferation concerns. It also provides little credible deterrence.
There are more conventional bunker busting weapons besides MOP that could be used, such as ATACMS-P.
I do not honestly see the point in pursuing this sort of B61 Mod 11 replacement. The USAF may think they need fighter-bomber deployed nuclear weapons, but I sure do not. By the time the fighter fuels and takes off, you have already been hit by an ICBM. Sure, you can use it to threaten Iran and North Korea, which have no ICBMs of their own (yet). But you could do it with ICBMs just as well if you wanted. If you want to invade you can do it with conventional forces. Between the South Korean military, US military personnel in South Korea and Japan, plus Iraq and Afghanistan, it is a matter of will.
But you could do it with ICBMs just as well if you wanted.
Godzilla, I’ve been glancing at this discussion. I think you’re completely wrong on the tactical nuke angle. First, it’s worth remembering that ICBMs are more costly and larger yield than tactical nukes, say 250-500 kilotons for ICBM launched missiles versus 1-10 kiloton yield for tactical nukes (I gather the minimum yield is somewhere between 1 and 5 kilotons so the lower limit isn’t probably viable). This means there will be more collateral damage and more fallout from the ICBM weapons. Bunker buster nuclear weapons in particular would result in a lot less collateral damage than a ground bursting ICBM.
Just look at the sort of weapons that the US likes to use. There’s a strong preference for “smart” weapons. That is, weapons that focus the effects of their lethality. They tend to be smaller in overall yield than older weapons, but make up for that deficiency by delivering more damage to the intended target.
Zilla,
Clearly you don’t understand much about either tacnukes or bunkbusters…
Tacnukes (and by the way, I am not thrilled with the things either for MOST purposes) are tactical because their delivery systems are limited in range. For purposes of arms control, it is the delivery system that counts, NOT the warhead. Hence there is a huge difference between say, a 10kt tacnuke on an F-18 and nuclear-tipped Tomahawk fired from an attack sub. The individual on the receiving end might not appreciate the difference, but in terms of arms control, there is an enormous difference.
As for tacnukes and their utility, the most typical scenarios for their use (by the US, the Russians had a whole different doctrine) involve strikes where most (not all) of the delivered nukes would be part of a coordinated strike with targets near or at medium range from the FEBA. The notion of most nukes being loaded onto a plane as an ICBM hits (if an ICBM has already been launched, we are likely all dead or soon will be) is fairly unlikely then. Artillery based nukes and the various special purpose nukes (depth charges, SUBROCs – thankfully gone, etc.) are indeed difficult to defend in principle because they are vulnerable to exactly this sort of problem.
Which brings us to bunkerbusters. MOP is useful because it is a PENETRATOR, and hence it penetrates the ground before detonation. The various missile launched penetrators lack the size and penetrating capability to take out superhard targets of the sort that the MOP was designed for. Typically a bunkerbuster for superhard targets has to be either very large or very powerful, and a missile warhead isn’t going to come close without using nukes. This is precisely why a nuclear bunker buster is an appealing option, as it provides a great deal of power, and permits a useful penetrating configuration to be implemented on a much smaller delivery system. I am unclear as to whether this would work well with missiles (I doubt it, but I leave that to the engineers), but it certainly can be done effectively with MUCH smaller aircraft delivered weapons than is possible with nonnuclear devices.
Regarding using ICBMs or troops to invade Iran or North Korean…have you lost your mind? Launching one more more ICBMs to targets within a few hundred km of both the PRC and Russia, not to mention SKorea? Sending in troops to attack what would certainly be well-defended positions, also close to these countries? This sounds like a great way to create all sorts of downstream problems with nations we really don’t want to get jiggy with. National will is all well and good, but foolishness is another matter entirely.
Karl,
The few studies that I have seen suggest that a nuclear bunkerbuster would produce far less contamination than an airburst (if it penetrated deeply enough), but that the surface shock wave could concievably do a very large amount of collateral damage depending upon distance. On the other hand, bunkers arne’t likely to be all that close to population centers….
There were IIRC even proposals for modifying a Minuteman missile with a rod penetrator for bunker busting. There are basically two things you want with a kinetic energy penetrator: heavy mass (tungsten or depleted uranium are commonly used), high impact velocity (a ballistic missile is probably the fastest thing you can use). You “only” need to modify the last stage of the missile. The advantages of nuclear for such an application are: larger blast radius, high temperature burn. However the instant you make it nuclear you make it that much more unpalatable to actually use it when you need it.
Prompt Global Strike has been in DoD proposals long before Obama was elected. The FALCON program is one example aimed at providing these sorts of rapid response capabilities. I also remember reading about hypersonic cruise global reach conventional weapons in a public DoD proposal many years ago. Since scramjet development has been painful, they switched to rockets.
I actually think invading Iran would be a good idea. It does not border Russia any more than Afghanistan does. Lots of advantages. Easier access to Afghanistan, lots of oil, surrounded on 3 sides (Iraq, sea, Afghanistan). The problem is $$$ and shitty terrain. It is bigger and more mountainous than Iraq.
Invading North Korea is more iffy. Should be done with the Chinese on board.
“bunkers arne’t likely to be all that close to population centers….”
Arguably the BEST place to put them. How soon we forget that our enemies, knowing our distaste for collateral damage, place bunkers etc in/under population centers so as to either dissuade us or leave us open to condemnation.
The proposals to modify a Minuteman did indeed exist, and they were discarded largely because they were impractical (CEP is BIG problem for ICBMs, even modern ones…all that speed) and wasteful. The ONLY way that an ICBM is a good platform for a penetrator is if the target cannot be reached by any other means. The only targets falling into that category are in Russia and China, and if we are going after superhard targets there, then using ICBMs is probably already happening with the far more effective nuclear warheads.
Nukes as bunker busters detonate deep undergroud (that is the whole point), which with a small enough warhead generates very little secondary damage. Certainly more than with a conventional penetrator, but nothing like an airburst or large yield burrowing ground burst. For use with missiles (which have much more limited payloads than aircraft), only a nuke is going to have the punch for anything other than semi-hard targets. Long-rod penetrators aren’t magic, and unless you hit the target VERY closely, they are simply going to drill an extra deep hole in the ground.
Yes, Prompt Global Strike has been around for quite some time, and it was a lousy idea then too. I don’t remember blaming this on Obama (hey, he cannot have ALL the bad ideas), but ultimately this is just another way for the Air Force to create new missions for itself and insulate itself against competition by the Navy. The mission has never been clearly defined, and the scenarios for it have been speculative even by the standards of DOD. Interesting technology, but it is akin to suggesting that we should go to Mars in order to improve communications satellites…
As for invading Iran, piffle… Lousy communications/transportation infrastructure, hostile poplation, too much space between targets, etc. It is close enough to Russia that they would almost certainly go beserk, and the Chinese (who are working hard to get that oil too) would freak out as well. If we must deal with them. Airstrikes against the surface installations (including the air and thermal vents for the buried sites) with the best bunker-busters we have for the harder targets. No nukes yet, but that option should remain on the table…
The Chinese aren’t coming on board re: NK…why shoudl they?
Ugh. Is Obama trying to be the worst president ever? When the four years are up and we’re putting together an “Obama’s greatest hits (to the future of the US)”, I imagine this will be on the list. It’s a big mistake to throw away a considerable portion of the US’s defensive nuclear capabilities without getting corresponding concessions from anyone else in the process. It’s like burning money.
Worst. President. Ever.
It’s conceivable in my mind that there won’t be a USA by the time this guy is done, he seems determined to undermine the country any way he can.
Karl,
It’s like wearing a Kick Me sign on your back. Obama may think the world will love him but RUS and China will giggle with glee. At some point, with a policy like this, someone will want to find out what they can get away with. It will make Saddam’s Kuwait invasion look like a beach party. Taiwan anyone?
Karl, he doesn’t have to “try.” He’s taken to heart what Yoda told Luke Skywalker.
Silo based systems are a waste of time anyway. They are just too easy to target and destroy. You cannot quickly redeploy them in case the threat changes either.
The Moscow Treaty signed by W was a joke.
Considering China is planning to ramp up the nuclear weapons in their arsenal, the Russians would be foolish to reduce their own arsenal too much. ABM funding just is another drop in the bucket.
Bunker busting tactical nuclear weapons are a waste of money. Everyone has reservations about using nuclear weapons when engaging in limited warfare, which would be the case in Iran and North Korea. Can’t they develop non-nuclear bunker busting bombs?
If we had a patriotic media in this country he’d be impeached for this act alone. While we remain a strong nation his actions encourage others to nibble at the edges.
They are just too easy to target and destroy.
And the enemy knows the result of doing so. Explain how unilaterally giving up what we’ve already got is a good idea.
Unfortunately, any unilateral destruction of nuclear weapons probably just means some later president will be forced to push for an increase in the arsenal. It isn’t a safe or entirely sane world, sadly.
It isn’t a safe or entirely sane world
Deterrence only works with the sane. The insane require a different strategy.
According to treaty limitations current silo based ICBMs such as Minuteman can only carry one warhead. The US would be better served by having smaller and survivable mobile ICBMs and SLBMs.
As for tactical nuclear weapons of any sort they are a waste of money. They make sense in a large land war against a conventional army, against mainland Russia or China, but any such nuclear conflict will necessarily escalate into the use of strategic weapons, so why not use those instead if the targets are that valuable? Besides, it would be cheaper, not to mention more useful to reinstate nuclear warheads into cruise missiles than develop niche ground penetrating nuclear weapons.
Regarding bunker busting, weapons such as the Massive Ordnance Penetrator could actually be useful and used in limited war unlike tactical nuclear weapons of dubious utility.
Zilla, there is just so much wrong with that last statement….
Silo-based ICBMs are vulnerable to a first strike, but as long as the number of silos is kept reasonably large (typically >250), nothing short of an all-out war would threaten their viability. If one includes some SLBMs and perhaps a few land-mobile (or air-mobile) missiles as well. Silo-based systems enjoy numerous advantages (better maintenance prospects, greater security/reliability of command/control, high physical security, etc.) which are not available in SLBMs, and certainly not an option with cruise missile systems.
SLBMs are vulnerable to advances in ASW technology (though in truth, they are quite secure now), and remain extremely expensive to deploy over time. Communications and control are serious issues, and unless we assume that the GPS constellation survives a first strike (bad bet), it is unlikely that an SLBM-only deterrent would have a truly effective hard-target capability. SLBMs have some reliability issues, and the size limitations of their launchers reduces the option of adding penetration aids and other enhancements.
In a similar vein, cruise missiles are highly vulnerable to interception, and are extremely slow, making them highly unsuitable for prompt response, or tactical flexibility. Some cruise missiles are perhaps useful (though the arms-control issues with most systems make them problematic at best), but the advantages that they offered in the 80s (stealth and accuracy) have largely been eroded by techonogical advances. Cruise missiles are far cheaper than ballistic missiles, but they offer few significant advantages other than that.
The viability of tacnukes is (and has been for some time) more a matter of religion than anything else. If you believe that the first use of a nuke anywhere will inevitably lead to a wargasm, then you don’t believe that tacnukes are useful. If you believe that there are some cases where they can be used without triggering an all out conflagration, then there are (admittedly limited) options for their deployment. I fall in the latter camp, as the mechanistic view of human behavior used to justify the former seems to me to be limited.
As for bunker-busters, certainly there is a viable role for non-nuclear penetrators, but the size problem means that we are rapidly coming to the limits of what can be usefully deployed. The MOP, for instance, leaves us with very few platforms for its use, and anything much bigger simply cannot be carried by all but a small percentage of our potential strike forces. A tacnuke penetrator could be deployed in any number of ways, and for use against extremely hard targets, it simply has no equal. There may be political reasons not to deploy tacnuke penetrators, but the technical (and tactical) reasons for them are still valid.
I don’t see a problem with reducing our nuclear arsenal by a moderate amount, IF it comes with concaminant reductions by our potential advesaries, and if it is tied to development of defensive systems. A general agreement of ‘rules of the road’ regarding legitimate targets (for instance, a general ban on countervalue use of nuclear weapons, and an understanding – public or not – regarding the use of nuclear weapons against or in the defense of nonnuclear third parties) would also be useful. Finally, a general agreement by the serious powers (US, USSR, PRC) regarding how to cope with rogue regimes and breakout nations (and here I am referring to strike options, not endless negotiations) might lessen the dangers associated with uncertainty.
According to Wikipedia, the Russians never ratified SALT II – did the US unilaterally abandon MIRV warheads?. That might have been a mistake …
I thought the reference in the New York Times article to the non-nuclear “Prompt Global Strike” would attract some comment here. The idea, I believe, is to be able to use ICBMs to hit targets with a non-nuclear anywhere in the world while reducing the risk of letting the Russians and Chinese mistakenly think we’re starting a nuclear war with them. I recollect a lot of discussion (for and against) of this option (for and against) in space groups…
Here’s the link: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/01/us/politics/01nuke.html
Anyway, I don’t see why it matters what the wording on the NPR says — the decision to use nukes for whatever the reason is still up to the commander-in-chief and I have to think our adversaries would be more concerned about our actual capabilities than our stated-for-political-purposes declarations.
left out the word “warhead”. Wouldn’t mention it, except that Rand likes people to use the word “warhead” correctly!
Scott: The advantage of installing nuclear warheads into cruise missiles (again) is that there are a lot of platforms which can launch cruise missiles. Subsonic cruise missiles are not very useful against enemies with advanced air defenses as you say. They also have a slow response time making it impossible to hit some targets of opportunity. The advantage of a cruise missile is that you have longer range for the same form factor.
This is why I defend funding on hypersonic cruise missiles. Indeed you can see work in this area in the form of X-51. However hypersonic R&D is going to take a long time. This is why there are people who want to put conventional warheads into ballistic missiles as a stopgap measure. The Russians… well they make noise about putting conventional warheads into ballistic missiles, but use weapon systems such as Iskander.
Bob,
No peacenik I, but Prompt Global Strike is a horrible idea. One of the fundamental elements of Deterrence is CLARITY, i.e. your potentially deterred party should have absolutely no doubts about what you are doing and what the consequences of your actions are. Using ICBMs with conventional warheads (accuracy issues and size issues nothwithstanding) is a terrific way of destroying clarity. How EXACTLY are the PRC or Russians to know which warhead is being used on which missiles at any given time? In a crisis situation, where time is short, perceptions are likely to be clouded, and trust is lowest, do you really want to start firing off ICBMs an action that can be easily misinterpeted?
Yes, everyone has warning systems and ICBMs can be tracked relatively easily, but systems break down (the Russian system has been a mess for years, and in the late 90s, it was actually ‘down’ for several weeks at a time), people panic, and mistakes are made. Creating a situation where an ICBM launch might or might not be a threat (as opposed to now when ALL launches are threats) merely destroys clarity with very little tactical gain.
As to what our advesaries (potential and otherwise) might be concerned about (i.e. capabilities vs political claims), you are certainly correct, but a clear declaration of policy, along with a set of (perhaps private) understandings as to what constitutes a realistic set of policy limitations on major nuclear powers might go a long way towards defusing tensions. The Chinese (who face a far more realistic threat, living next door to the Russians and Indians) might welcome some sort of general understanding, even it it were only privately hammered out. The Russians are quite unlikely to allow any understanding to undermine their paranoia, but such agreements would limit their behavior as well, and over time, adherence to such agreements in crises by the US would tend to build at least some trust.
Eric,
The Minuteman III is a MIRVed system, and it is deployed as such.
The Minuteman III is a MIRVed system, and it is deployed as such.
Not any more:
With the ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I), the United States had until December 2001 to reduce its nuclear arsenal. As a result, the 90th Missile Wing reduced the fleet from three warheads permissible to a single warhead configuration. On August 6, 2001, all 150 Minuteman IIIs had been converted to the single warhead, beating the December deadline.
Zilla,
The number of platforms that cruise missiles can be launched from (practically anything these days) makes them highly problematic from an arms control point of view. Unless you are willing to ditch arms control treaties (even a die hard ‘bomb them into radioactive rubble’ hawk such as myself doesn’t like that idea), cruise missiles present a whole series of pretty much unsolvable problems.
Range is another factor. Yes, you can build some fairly long-ranged cruise missiles, but you give up speed when you do, and substantially reduce the stealth factor. The longer one of these things is in the air, the greater the chance it is going to be detected and destroyed, which seriously undermines the value of these systems for nuclear deterrence.
Hypersonic systems (the ones currently under study, at least) have very serious range issues, and cost a boatload compared to other platforms. They also lack stealth (and given the kind of flight profile we are discussing with things like the X-51, they aren’t going to get stealthy, even with a whole lot more development), and really don’t bring anything to the table that existing ballistic systems don’t already provide.
As for the Iskander, the key here is RANGE. The Iskander is a theatre level weapon, and its range reflects this. If the Russians started taking SS-18s and adding conventional warheads to them as part of a prompt global strike initiative, I would oppose that, and decry that as I would if we did it with retired Minutemen IIs. Note that the Chinese are playing around with this sort of technology on the THEATRE level with their latest anti-carrier experimentation, based on stolen Pershing II technology as well.
For deterrence to work, you have to have diversity of platforms, and SLBMs, silo-based ICBMs, and some sort of mobile system (I prefer ICBMs on blimps myself, but I am an eccentric…) along with some manned bombers (not really necessary, but the USAF isn’t giving them up anytime soon, so whatever…) provide that quite nicely without the inherent probelms associated with cruise missiles.
Larry,
Yes and no…
The MIII has converted to a ‘downloaded’ version, with only a single warhead on the reentry bus, but it retains the capability to carry 3 warheads. This remains a bit of a sticking point with the Russians (who have done the same thing themselves, by the way), since as long as the capability is there, the potential for breakout remains.
Your core point is absolutely correct, however…
If you think having nuclear armed cruise missiles pose an arms control problem, I do not see how having a widely distributed tactical nuclear weapon for bunker busting would be much better. The politicians would never allow such a weapon to be widely distributed, less alone used, under the current environment as it causes proliferation concerns. It also provides little credible deterrence.
There are more conventional bunker busting weapons besides MOP that could be used, such as ATACMS-P.
I do not honestly see the point in pursuing this sort of B61 Mod 11 replacement. The USAF may think they need fighter-bomber deployed nuclear weapons, but I sure do not. By the time the fighter fuels and takes off, you have already been hit by an ICBM. Sure, you can use it to threaten Iran and North Korea, which have no ICBMs of their own (yet). But you could do it with ICBMs just as well if you wanted. If you want to invade you can do it with conventional forces. Between the South Korean military, US military personnel in South Korea and Japan, plus Iraq and Afghanistan, it is a matter of will.
But you could do it with ICBMs just as well if you wanted.
Godzilla, I’ve been glancing at this discussion. I think you’re completely wrong on the tactical nuke angle. First, it’s worth remembering that ICBMs are more costly and larger yield than tactical nukes, say 250-500 kilotons for ICBM launched missiles versus 1-10 kiloton yield for tactical nukes (I gather the minimum yield is somewhere between 1 and 5 kilotons so the lower limit isn’t probably viable). This means there will be more collateral damage and more fallout from the ICBM weapons. Bunker buster nuclear weapons in particular would result in a lot less collateral damage than a ground bursting ICBM.
Just look at the sort of weapons that the US likes to use. There’s a strong preference for “smart” weapons. That is, weapons that focus the effects of their lethality. They tend to be smaller in overall yield than older weapons, but make up for that deficiency by delivering more damage to the intended target.
Zilla,
Clearly you don’t understand much about either tacnukes or bunkbusters…
Tacnukes (and by the way, I am not thrilled with the things either for MOST purposes) are tactical because their delivery systems are limited in range. For purposes of arms control, it is the delivery system that counts, NOT the warhead. Hence there is a huge difference between say, a 10kt tacnuke on an F-18 and nuclear-tipped Tomahawk fired from an attack sub. The individual on the receiving end might not appreciate the difference, but in terms of arms control, there is an enormous difference.
As for tacnukes and their utility, the most typical scenarios for their use (by the US, the Russians had a whole different doctrine) involve strikes where most (not all) of the delivered nukes would be part of a coordinated strike with targets near or at medium range from the FEBA. The notion of most nukes being loaded onto a plane as an ICBM hits (if an ICBM has already been launched, we are likely all dead or soon will be) is fairly unlikely then. Artillery based nukes and the various special purpose nukes (depth charges, SUBROCs – thankfully gone, etc.) are indeed difficult to defend in principle because they are vulnerable to exactly this sort of problem.
Which brings us to bunkerbusters. MOP is useful because it is a PENETRATOR, and hence it penetrates the ground before detonation. The various missile launched penetrators lack the size and penetrating capability to take out superhard targets of the sort that the MOP was designed for. Typically a bunkerbuster for superhard targets has to be either very large or very powerful, and a missile warhead isn’t going to come close without using nukes. This is precisely why a nuclear bunker buster is an appealing option, as it provides a great deal of power, and permits a useful penetrating configuration to be implemented on a much smaller delivery system. I am unclear as to whether this would work well with missiles (I doubt it, but I leave that to the engineers), but it certainly can be done effectively with MUCH smaller aircraft delivered weapons than is possible with nonnuclear devices.
Regarding using ICBMs or troops to invade Iran or North Korean…have you lost your mind? Launching one more more ICBMs to targets within a few hundred km of both the PRC and Russia, not to mention SKorea? Sending in troops to attack what would certainly be well-defended positions, also close to these countries? This sounds like a great way to create all sorts of downstream problems with nations we really don’t want to get jiggy with. National will is all well and good, but foolishness is another matter entirely.
Karl,
The few studies that I have seen suggest that a nuclear bunkerbuster would produce far less contamination than an airburst (if it penetrated deeply enough), but that the surface shock wave could concievably do a very large amount of collateral damage depending upon distance. On the other hand, bunkers arne’t likely to be all that close to population centers….
There were IIRC even proposals for modifying a Minuteman missile with a rod penetrator for bunker busting. There are basically two things you want with a kinetic energy penetrator: heavy mass (tungsten or depleted uranium are commonly used), high impact velocity (a ballistic missile is probably the fastest thing you can use). You “only” need to modify the last stage of the missile. The advantages of nuclear for such an application are: larger blast radius, high temperature burn. However the instant you make it nuclear you make it that much more unpalatable to actually use it when you need it.
Prompt Global Strike has been in DoD proposals long before Obama was elected. The FALCON program is one example aimed at providing these sorts of rapid response capabilities. I also remember reading about hypersonic cruise global reach conventional weapons in a public DoD proposal many years ago. Since scramjet development has been painful, they switched to rockets.
I actually think invading Iran would be a good idea. It does not border Russia any more than Afghanistan does. Lots of advantages. Easier access to Afghanistan, lots of oil, surrounded on 3 sides (Iraq, sea, Afghanistan). The problem is $$$ and shitty terrain. It is bigger and more mountainous than Iraq.
Invading North Korea is more iffy. Should be done with the Chinese on board.
“bunkers arne’t likely to be all that close to population centers….”
Arguably the BEST place to put them. How soon we forget that our enemies, knowing our distaste for collateral damage, place bunkers etc in/under population centers so as to either dissuade us or leave us open to condemnation.
The proposals to modify a Minuteman did indeed exist, and they were discarded largely because they were impractical (CEP is BIG problem for ICBMs, even modern ones…all that speed) and wasteful. The ONLY way that an ICBM is a good platform for a penetrator is if the target cannot be reached by any other means. The only targets falling into that category are in Russia and China, and if we are going after superhard targets there, then using ICBMs is probably already happening with the far more effective nuclear warheads.
Nukes as bunker busters detonate deep undergroud (that is the whole point), which with a small enough warhead generates very little secondary damage. Certainly more than with a conventional penetrator, but nothing like an airburst or large yield burrowing ground burst. For use with missiles (which have much more limited payloads than aircraft), only a nuke is going to have the punch for anything other than semi-hard targets. Long-rod penetrators aren’t magic, and unless you hit the target VERY closely, they are simply going to drill an extra deep hole in the ground.
Yes, Prompt Global Strike has been around for quite some time, and it was a lousy idea then too. I don’t remember blaming this on Obama (hey, he cannot have ALL the bad ideas), but ultimately this is just another way for the Air Force to create new missions for itself and insulate itself against competition by the Navy. The mission has never been clearly defined, and the scenarios for it have been speculative even by the standards of DOD. Interesting technology, but it is akin to suggesting that we should go to Mars in order to improve communications satellites…
As for invading Iran, piffle… Lousy communications/transportation infrastructure, hostile poplation, too much space between targets, etc. It is close enough to Russia that they would almost certainly go beserk, and the Chinese (who are working hard to get that oil too) would freak out as well. If we must deal with them. Airstrikes against the surface installations (including the air and thermal vents for the buried sites) with the best bunker-busters we have for the harder targets. No nukes yet, but that option should remain on the table…
The Chinese aren’t coming on board re: NK…why shoudl they?