Does anyone have a reference that describes the decision to reduce the size of the Shuttle fleet from seven to five during the Carter administration, and Mondale’s role?
[Update late evening]
Thanks for all the inputs from all the commenters. I’m a little surprised, because my recollection (from the time — see, I’m such a fogie that I actually claim to remember such things) was that Mondale had reduced the fleet size by two in the late seventies. I apparently have some reading to do to get it right.
I do not currently have access to Science Direct, but this article seems to describe what you asked for:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6V52-4CX15RK-2&_user=10&_coverDate=08%2F31%2F2004&_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=1377058045&_rerunOrigin=google&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=3bfb490c92baf33dce5d8764ac50ad2e
I don’t have access, either, but if I get a nice book advance, maybe I’ll buy some. 😉
It’s not clear where the history starts, though. From the chapter titles, it seems to primarily discuss fleet size issues through the eighties and nineties. It doesn’t seem to mention the original plan of seven airframes. But no way to tell without getting the paper.
I’m curious if any names were considered at that stage. I believe Enterprise was originally supposed to be called Constitution.
Yes, it was. It was changed to Enterprise in 1977 at the urging of the Trekkies. They never cared whether or not we had a real space program, but wrote lots of letters to get a vehicle that wasn’t going to actually go into space to be named after their favorite imaginary spaceship. I think that the rest of them were named as they were being rolled off the line in Palmdale.
Doesn’t Jenkins discuss the early history of the Shuttle? I haven’t read it, but I hear it is highly recommended.
The article says the development contract awarded to Rockwell in mid-1972 called for five orbiters. In May 1976 NASA-DoD issued a paper on fleet size which stated a sixth orbiter would be desirable.
It also says OMB requested in mid-1976 that USAF-NASA do a reexamination of fleet size. USAF-NASA proposed five orbiters from two sites stating it was the minimum [1]. OMB recommended to Carter that he consider three orbiter/two sites or two orbiter/one site. Secretary of Defense Brown said a smaller fleet would endanger DoD needs. Then Carter replied “I agree on two sites – have doubts between 4 & 5. Check with OMB” [2].
References:
[1] Joint NASA/USAF Study on Space Shuttle Orbiter Procurement and Related Issues. 1976, in Congress, House. Space transportation
system: hearings (including report) before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology. 95th Congress 1st Session, 17, 18 May 1977. p. 177–311.
[2] Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense for the President. Budget decision on space shuttle, 11 November 1977, Jimmy Carter Library.
Hello Mr. Simberg:
I just e-mailed you a PDF of the article. Thank you Martijn Meijering for the reference.
It was never 7, at least with the Shuttle design approved by Nixon. Started at 5, went down to 4 during Carter. They build Endeavour after the Challenger accident using the structural test article for the orbiters
Or this link:
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/122386459/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0
Yeah, I own Dennis Jenkins’s book and he says it’s 5, then 4. The only compromise NASA/DOD could ever get was an “option for an option,” which ultimately becomes the structural spare that is then turned into Endeavour.
Somewhat off-topic: The stuff in Jenkins regarding Shuttle-C planning and SRB upgrades is fantastic.
Just checked and page 219 says that NASA studied Enterprise as late as 1997 to see if it could be made into an operational orbiter. It’s unclear whether this was as a 5th orbiter, or as a replacement if one was lost.
Also, on page 243, he says in 1988 NASA studied ordering a fifth orbiter alongside Endeavour for use as a SSF rescue vehicle.
Then, in 1989 NASA let — then cancelled — contracts for more structural spares.
Page 246 of Jenkins explains the fifth orbiter debate vis-a-vis the Carter Admin in detail.
Waaaay back before the Shuttle was approved, wasn’t the original idea to have ten orbiters? But then they were also talking about a launch every two weeks, and $100/lb for mass to near-earth orbit … *sigh*
Some Shuttle history here
Linked Here
Just checked and page 219 says that NASA studied Enterprise as late as 1997 to see if it could be made into an operational orbiter.
I don’t think there was ever any doubt Enterprise could be made operational, after all it was originally intended to be. The reason Challenger and Endeavour were built instead was because it was cheaper to do it that way. I think that was because of late design changes that were made after Enterprise had been constructed.
Trivia question: isn’t Endeavour usually spelled endeavor in American English? Is the British spelling used because it’s the name of a famous historical ship (the sailing kind)? I take it it’s not because of the Canadian robot arm…
Imagine an alternate history where Mondale, Proxmire, and the like had succeeded in stopping the space shuttle. Expendable launcher development would have pushed forward faster in the US. The US may have retained its commercial launch market share. We might even have seen something similar to SpaceX decades earlier.
The histrionics against and demonization of Mondale et al. reminds me of the current flaming against Obama’s redirection of space policy. The difference is that recognizing NASA’s ongoing dysfunction is easier now.
It’s really ironic. The people who were developing the Shuttle really wanted to open up space for mankind. There was talk of ordinary citizens being able to vacation on the moon. Sometimes our best efforts actually lead us in the opposite direction of where we intend to go.
The people who were developing the Shuttle really wanted to open up space for mankind.
Call me old and cynical, but to me most of the people developing the Shuttle were primarily interested in preserving their income streams. Understandable, but not something that entitles them to our admiration.
The people who called the Shuttle what it was — a fiasco in the making — were few and far between. If they were aerospace insiders, and jeopardized their careers by speaking up, then they are the ones that should be applauded.
The people who called the Shuttle what it was — a fiasco in the making — were few and far between.
Can you give examples of people who called the fiasco early?
Well, Mondale, for one…
Seriously, did he predict it would not achieve its goals or did he simply disagree with spending any money on it?
Looking back, when did you personally realise the Shuttle would never reduce launch prices? Did you go through a period of denial before coming to that conclusion? Not blaming you if you did, just curious!
Imagine an alternate history in which JFL did not issue the Apollo Challenge. Military spaceplane development would have continued; we’d have had an orbital spaceplane (a version of the X-15, perhaps, or the X-20 Dynasoar) by 1965, giving us regular access to orbit. Extrapolate forty-five years of development beyond the X-20…
Seriously, did he predict it would not achieve its goals or did he simply disagree with spending any money on it?
Here, you judge.
Looking back, when did you personally realise the Shuttle would never reduce launch prices?
I strongly suspected it in 1982, when I first went to work at Rockwell. It became abundantly clear after Challenger (and I was working the Space Transportation Architecture Study).
Rand,
Reading between the lines, it looks like Mondull wanted the money for more .gov cheese closer to home.
Reading between the lines, it looks like Mondull wanted the money for more .gov cheese closer to home.
Absolutely. I recall being appalled in 1984 that Mondale was the Democrats’ presidential nominee, because he’d made any number of statements indicating that he was willing to gut the space program and “spend all that money back here on earth, instead.”
Imagine an alternate history where Mondale, Proxmire, and the like had succeeded in stopping the space shuttle. Expendable launcher development would have pushed forward faster in the US.
With much less government funding for space, and a much smaller market for space services?
Mondale and Proxmire had no conservative or libertarian impulses, they liked big government spending programs as long as they resulted in lots of pork for the Upper Midwest. If NASA had built the MSFC down the road from the Yerkes Observatory, Proxmire would have defended the space program tooth and nail.
Imagine an alternate history in which JFL did not issue the Apollo Challenge. Military spaceplane development would have continued; we’d have had an orbital spaceplane (a version of the X-15, perhaps, or the X-20 Dynasoar) by 1965, giving us regular access to orbit.
Then we would have had some other massive, government-directed program to counter the Soviet Union’s perceived superiority over the West in technology, space exploration, and national power and influence … only it would have been later, and more desperate. The Soviet space program was in large part a creature of propaganda and national prestige, as ours was.
(And the Soviets did have a lunar program. Without the need to race against Apollo, they might well have proceeded in a less frenzied fashion and landed on the Moon by 1973 or so … and claimed it for themselves and the “for the fraternal socialist progressive peoples of Earth” rather than “for all mankind.”.)
The X-20 and the MOL were conceived as reconnaisance infrastructure. In our world, as soon as the DoD realized that unmanned satellites could do the job as well or better for less money, military support for the manned space program dried up. Remember all those secret Shuttle missions launched from Vandenberg?
With much less government funding for space, and a much smaller market for space services?
Military and commercial markets would have remained even if NASA had been utterly abolished. As it was, we ceded the commercial launch market to Ariane.
Seriously, did he predict it would not achieve its goals or did he simply disagree with spending any money on it?
He didn’t want to spend money on space. But this means he wasn’t susceptible to the wishful thinking and truth shading (willful or otherwise) that others succumbed to. He was willing to bring up bad news, with great relish I am sure.
What is interesting, though, is that even Mondale didn’t predict the shuttle would have operating costs as high as it did, that it would be uneconomical even if the development costs were completely written off.