Fatal Honesty

NASA has told Congress that the Nelson rocket can’t be done within the schedule or budget. The GAO will back them up. This rocket is dead on arrival.

[Update a while later]

What’s happening here is that NASA is telling the truth because they think it will ultimately kill this legislated monstrosity, which they don’t want to build (at least at HQ). In the Shuttle days, they went along with an underfunded program because they feared that otherwise they’d have nothing (in terms of staying in the human spaceflight business). Today, they realize the the way forward is fixed-price contracts for services, not government rockets.

29 thoughts on “Fatal Honesty”

  1. Well, then, the obvious solution is to kill COTS and CCDEV, and add that money to the SDHLV. It still won’t be enough, but by golly, it’ll be a *NASA* program again!

  2. “the Nelson rocket can’t be done within the schedule or budget”

    And when has this ever stopped the government from doing anything? Sounds more like business as usual to me.

  3. And when has this ever stopped the government from doing anything? Sounds more like business as usual to me.

    True, but it’s rare for them to admit they can’t meet the budget and schedule constraints up front. Normally, they say everything is fine to get the funding flowing and then make up the inevitable overruns with supplemental funding for lucrative cost-plus contracts.

  4. So what are they going to have the centers do if there isn’t going to be a monster rocket? Maybe a make work R&D fest will suddenly no longer look all that bad to Nelson, Shelby, Hutchison & company…

  5. Today, they realize the the way forward is fixed-price contracts for services, not government rockets.

    Are we sure the top of NASA really groks that?

  6. Not exactly. The “Nelson rocket” was not Ares V. NASA basically handed them something similar to the Ares V design and said we can’t build this. Well that’s obvious. The only initial requirement is 70 tons to LEO. That does not take 5 seg booters, 5 SSME and J-2X.

  7. “Today, they realize the the way forward is fixed-price contracts for services, not government rockets”

    Are we sure the top of NASA really groks that?


    Bolden and Garver probably do. But the majority of NASA managers, working at their respective centers probably do not.

    I have nothing but respect for the NASA engineers. But the top 2/3rds of the (very tall) NASA pyramid just won’t learn. They may have to be removed to save the agency.

  8. Correct. They feel that they are in a “no win” situation that means they lose whatever they do in this situation, so they might as well take just what they have already and go with that.

    That gets them off the hook for being blamed by Congress for not doing what Congress asked them to do. Had they supplied Congress with a quickie / cheapie like a J-130 they would be blamed for a) it being too small, b) not having enough pork ala J2X / 5seg, c) it would still take longer and cost more than Falcon 9 never mind greater capacity, and d) if they slipped schedule/cost by even a year/billion they’d be called before Congress.

    I predict they won’t propose anything until the dust settles over COTS/CRS, and the other shoe drops with HSF qualification. At this point we’ll see if Congress has a belly for anything more than what SpaceX / ULA / Orbital can supply – if so, we’ll see another govt LV project otherwise no.

  9. If the Shuttle is retired before there is a new budget, does that mean the SSME is history? That would further complicate matters for SDLV.

  10. Rand, your’re half right. The powers that be at NASA are trying to kill off any STS derived HLV approach by resurrecting the Ares-5 Classic. The SLS they detail in this report is nearly identical to the recommendations of ESAS minus the shaft (ie Ares-1).

    What remains to be done, and the glaring omission in the report, is the entry level STS HLV better known as the Jupiter-130 (10m payload diameter, +70 tons).

    Long story short, Lori is using a Judo move on the Griffin camp and like all good extremist locked in mortal combat with each other they continue to ignore the clear compromise (scope, budget, schedule, risk, performance, politics) within their midst.

    The very same configuration NASA engineers came up with before the Space Shuttle first flight, resurrected after Challenger, resurrected again after Columbia, promoted before ESAS, promoted during ESAS, promoted after ESAS, presented before the Augustine Commission, and placed in their final report to Congress, but yet somehow is missing in their SLS report to Congress. The mind boggles.

    Earth to NASA, you have one more chance to get it right.

    P.S. And would everyone, including NASA, please stop listing the requirements as metric tons. The Congress clearly specified tons.

  11. Earth to NASA, you have one more chance to get it right.

    No, not one more chance to get it right. One more chance to preserve SDLV maybe.

  12. Actually no more chances. Its not SDLV but SHLV – Shuttle Heritage LV. Like trying to build a modern Indy 500 car out of 1970’s designed parts that are almost up on auction sites as relics. People don’t know when they’ve gone off the end of the cliff, until they’ve hit bottom and boy are they surprised …

  13. Congress has specified the use of shuttle-derived hardware, a minimum mass to orbit, and a schedule and budget. NASA points out that they cannot meet all the requirements at the same time; if the first two requirements are met then the last two will not be met. Senators reply “Do it anyhow. You’re smart, you’ll find a way.”

    Have Rockefeller, Hutchison, Nelson or Vitter ever explained why heavy lift is needed? Has any reporter ever asked them what payload is so big that it must be launched all at once, which could not be launched in smaller pieces on existing rockets and assembled in orbit? Has anyone suggested such a payload? I’d really like to know.

  14. You’d think that a critical press would ask such questions. Or that at least one member of Congress would make a stink about it.

  15. Has any one else seen the obvious problem with Nasa’s design?

    As the “Exploration Status Document” shows, the law says that they were to build a vehicle with a lift of 70 to 100 tons to orbit. Instead, their design is for one that does 108 tons. What part of 70 to 100 tons don’t they get?

    It would probably be fine if they target something in the midrange of 70 to 100 tons (maybe something like 85 tons). They’d probably have to get rid of the 5 segment solids and maybe go with cheaper engines (kind of like Direct suggests).

  16. Rand,

    “What’s happening here is that NASA is telling the truth because they think it will ultimately kill this legislated monstrosity, which they don’t want to build (at least at HQ).”

    “Are we sure the top of NASA really groks that?
    I’m sure that the second-from-the-top of it does. I don’t know about the tippy top, but I suspect so.”

    The technical expertise to do analysis of booster configurations comes from below the HQ level (certainly below the Bolden/Garver level). Are you saying Garver has “put her thumb on the scale” of the actual people doing the analysis to achieve a specific result?

    Note that this is not a hostile question; I am trying to make sure I understand what you are saying.

    Joe

  17. The technical expertise to do analysis of booster configurations comes from below the HQ level (certainly below the Bolden/Garver level). Are you saying Garver has “put her thumb on the scale” of the actual people doing the analysis to achieve a specific result?

    No, I’m saying that this has nothing to do with technical analysis of boosters. It has to do with budgets and schedule. Congress has (cynically) asked the impossible, and some people at NASA aren’t stupid.

  18. Rand Simberg Says:
    January 13th, 2011 at 9:04 am
    “The technical expertise to do analysis of booster configurations comes from below the HQ level (certainly below the Bolden/Garver level). Are you saying Garver has “put her thumb on the scale” of the actual people doing the analysis to achieve a specific result?
    No, I’m saying that this has nothing to do with technical analysis of boosters. It has to do with budgets and schedule. Congress has (cynically) asked the impossible, and some people at NASA aren’t stupid.”

    Forgive me for still being confused but “technical analysis) includes costing. Question again: are you saying Garver has overruled people (below her on the food chain) that you (and she) consider “stupid”?

  19. Joe, the trade space of “shuttle-derived design preserving the workforce, 70 or 100 ton lift capacity, and the budget and schedule ordered by Congress” is a null set. There doesn’t need to be any thumbs on the scale other than the ones Congress has already put there.

  20. Ed Minchau Says:
    January 13th, 2011 at 11:54 am
    “Joe, the trade space of “shuttle-derived design preserving the workforce, 70 or 100 ton lift capacity, and the budget and schedule ordered by Congress” is a null set. There doesn’t need to be any thumbs on the scale other than the ones Congress has already put there”

    Ed,

    I have some insight into costing of the Side Mount Configuration, which from what I know could meet the budget wickets defined by Congress. However, since the Authorization specifically called for an In-Line Configuration (and a maximum payload beyond what the Side Mount could provide) that leaves this discussion to the In-Line. In an attempt to be precise I am not going to talk about In-Line costing as my information is limited. But the post by Stephen Metschan, above (January 12th, 2011 at 4:44 pm) indicates he at least believes the same is true for the In-Line. The response from Congress seems to indicate they do no trust the NASA answer on this issue. Hence my question.

    The more I see of this situation the more I think we should all take the advice of the Betty Davis character from All About EVE: “Fasten your seat belts. It’s going to be a bumpy night.”

  21. The response from Congress seems to indicate they do not trust the NASA answer on this issue.

    Hey, the solution to that problem is to ask GAO. Think they’ll do that?

    Me, neither. They know they won’t like the answer.

  22. Rand Simberg Says: January 13th, 2011 at 3:12 pm

    “The response from Congress seems to indicate they do not trust the NASA answer on this issue.

    Hey, the solution to that problem is to ask GAO. Think they’ll do that?

    Me, neither. They know they won’t like the answer.”

    Thanks for asking the question and answering it, saves me a lot of time and I am notoriously lazy. 🙂

    Howerever, the thruth is I have no idea what they will do. This is the most “disjointed” (and I am trying to be polite) situation I have ever seen. The outcome is going to be interesting. Thus causing the quote: “Fasten your seat belts. It’s going to be a bumpy night.”

  23. Howerever, the thruth is I have no idea what they will do. This is the most “disjointed” (and I am trying to be polite) situation I have ever seen.

    You must be a youngster. 😉

  24. “Howerever, the thruth is I have no idea what they will do. This is the most “disjointed” (and I am trying to be polite) situation I have ever seen.

    You must be a youngster.”

    Depends on what you define as a “youngster”. I have been in the business for approximately 25 years, so I will take that as a complement. 🙂

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