While I was waiting for something other than passing cars on the feed, I noticed that one of their top stories is “Pilot who survived SpaceShipTwo crash identified” That’s just a bad headline that can be misinterpreted in so many ways. Did they use dental records, pass around photos of him at VG to see if anyone recognized him, run DNA matches through a missing person’s database, or what? Arg. Journalism majors….
I saw the video of the NTSB press conference later. It looks like the sheer volume of data available to the NTSB, while all helpful, is going to extend the timescale of the investigation. They usually only have some wreckage and a couple black boxes to work with; this time, they’ve got six on-board cameras, six independent data recorders, three cameras on WK2, the chase plane camera, long range camera from Edwards AFB, and over a thousand telemetry tracks.
More than devastating. It is over for them. Being a billionaire just makes it worse for Branson.
They use outdated methods like testing and then seeing what happens.
As opposed to what? Sitting around discussing platonic forms? The problem wasn’t testing. It was ignoring the results.
Ken, were you quoting Branson and, if so, who were the “they” he was refering to?
Dave,
I read that quote also somewhere. I remember it as being an oldspace slam on newspace in general. I couldn’t find it again with a quick look.
Testing and then seeing what happens is the scientific method. If that’s outdated, it explains CAGW.
The quote was from a link on another thread. It was by the former head of safety for ESA.
From NTSB:
“The spaceship was released normally, and after it was released – shortly after it was released, the rocket engine ignited. About nine seconds after the engine ignited, the telemetry data told us, showed us that the feather parameters changed from ‘lock’ to ‘unlock,'” Hart said.
“Now, in order for feathering – this action to be commanded by the pilots, two actions must occur. One is the lock-unlock handle must be moved from ‘lock’ to ‘unlock,’ and No. 2 is, the feathering handle must be moved to the feather position,” he said.
“Approximately two seconds after the feathering parameters indicated that the lock-unlock lever was moved from ‘lock’ to ‘unlock,’ the feathers moved toward the extended position, the deployed position, even though the feather handle itself had not been moved. And this occurred at a speed just above approximately Mach 1.0. Shortly after the feathering occurred, the telemetry data terminated and the video data terminated.”
That sounds like something was burning through the I/O wiring.
Or maybe not. Oopsie.
It looks like we’re about to learn a lot about the feather deployment system, especially whether deployment is automatic after unlocking or whether the co-pilot was just working ahead and uncovered a glitch or design error.
I’ve also never been happy with having actuators that can push all the way to structural failure, such as occurred on the Airbus crash in New York City right after 9/11, where we learned that applying full rudder at speed does indeed snap the vertical stabilizer off. It seems the thought was that a pilot would never do that, so it’s not a concern. I prefer an engineering approach of “The pilot would never do that, but if he tries, then…”
Decades ago when I was studying to become a private pilot, I read that there was a speed (Va, or maneuvering airspeed) below which full control deflection wouldn’t cause structural failure. Only, we were told wrong. After that Airbus crash, they clarified the definition of maneuvering airspeed.
Fly-by-wire systems typically won’t allow pilots to exceed the plane’s flight envelop. The pilot can make whatever inputs he wishes but the computers will prevent him from causing structural failure or stalling the plane. However, as the Air France A330 accident a few years ago showed, there are conditions where the computer will revert to a different set of flight control laws. In that case, the copilot was holding full aft stick – effectively stalling the plane – all the way down to the ocean’s surface. Ultimately, even the best systems can have issues under certain conditions. As that Korean Air 777 crash last year showed, even a plane with an outstanding safety record can have an accident if flown improperly.
While I was waiting for something other than passing cars on the feed, I noticed that one of their top stories is “Pilot who survived SpaceShipTwo crash identified” That’s just a bad headline that can be misinterpreted in so many ways. Did they use dental records, pass around photos of him at VG to see if anyone recognized him, run DNA matches through a missing person’s database, or what? Arg. Journalism majors….
I saw the video of the NTSB press conference later. It looks like the sheer volume of data available to the NTSB, while all helpful, is going to extend the timescale of the investigation. They usually only have some wreckage and a couple black boxes to work with; this time, they’ve got six on-board cameras, six independent data recorders, three cameras on WK2, the chase plane camera, long range camera from Edwards AFB, and over a thousand telemetry tracks.
More than devastating. It is over for them. Being a billionaire just makes it worse for Branson.
They use outdated methods like testing and then seeing what happens.
As opposed to what? Sitting around discussing platonic forms? The problem wasn’t testing. It was ignoring the results.
Ken, were you quoting Branson and, if so, who were the “they” he was refering to?
Dave,
I read that quote also somewhere. I remember it as being an oldspace slam on newspace in general. I couldn’t find it again with a quick look.
Testing and then seeing what happens is the scientific method. If that’s outdated, it explains CAGW.
The quote was from a link on another thread. It was by the former head of safety for ESA.
From NTSB:
“The spaceship was released normally, and after it was released – shortly after it was released, the rocket engine ignited. About nine seconds after the engine ignited, the telemetry data told us, showed us that the feather parameters changed from ‘lock’ to ‘unlock,'” Hart said.
“Now, in order for feathering – this action to be commanded by the pilots, two actions must occur. One is the lock-unlock handle must be moved from ‘lock’ to ‘unlock,’ and No. 2 is, the feathering handle must be moved to the feather position,” he said.
“Approximately two seconds after the feathering parameters indicated that the lock-unlock lever was moved from ‘lock’ to ‘unlock,’ the feathers moved toward the extended position, the deployed position, even though the feather handle itself had not been moved. And this occurred at a speed just above approximately Mach 1.0. Shortly after the feathering occurred, the telemetry data terminated and the video data terminated.”
That sounds like something was burning through the I/O wiring.
Or maybe not. Oopsie.
It looks like we’re about to learn a lot about the feather deployment system, especially whether deployment is automatic after unlocking or whether the co-pilot was just working ahead and uncovered a glitch or design error.
I’ve also never been happy with having actuators that can push all the way to structural failure, such as occurred on the Airbus crash in New York City right after 9/11, where we learned that applying full rudder at speed does indeed snap the vertical stabilizer off. It seems the thought was that a pilot would never do that, so it’s not a concern. I prefer an engineering approach of “The pilot would never do that, but if he tries, then…”
Decades ago when I was studying to become a private pilot, I read that there was a speed (Va, or maneuvering airspeed) below which full control deflection wouldn’t cause structural failure. Only, we were told wrong. After that Airbus crash, they clarified the definition of maneuvering airspeed.
Fly-by-wire systems typically won’t allow pilots to exceed the plane’s flight envelop. The pilot can make whatever inputs he wishes but the computers will prevent him from causing structural failure or stalling the plane. However, as the Air France A330 accident a few years ago showed, there are conditions where the computer will revert to a different set of flight control laws. In that case, the copilot was holding full aft stick – effectively stalling the plane – all the way down to the ocean’s surface. Ultimately, even the best systems can have issues under certain conditions. As that Korean Air 777 crash last year showed, even a plane with an outstanding safety record can have an accident if flown improperly.