A To-Do List For Bridenstine

Some advice from Scott Hubbard. But here is the problem:

…the new administrator must provide NASA and the rest of the world much more clarity on the brief statement issued by Vice President Pence and the newly revived Space Council that the United States will “lead the return of humans to the Moon.” Studies of the future of human space exploration have for decades emphasized that Mars is the target of greatest interest for reasons of science and exploration.1–4 The last initiative that attempted to include both human landings on the Moon and eventually Mars, the so-called Constellation program, collapsed from its own budgetary (over) weight.

Two points: First, the assumption that human spaceflight is about “science and exploration.” I’ve written about this error at length. Second is the notion that Constellation collapsed because it was attempting to do both the Mars and moon. It wasn’t seriously trying to do either. NASA wasn’t seriously trying to do either.

7 thoughts on “A To-Do List For Bridenstine”

  1. I would say the focus should start with robotic exploration.
    One should imagine that both Moon and Mars will have large robotic component of their exploration program.

    Or analogy in building a house, the robotic program is foundation and framing with roof, and crewed exploration is finishing work.

    1. I agree, especially as site selection for human landings but I worry that NASA will take it too slow with their new Moon initiative. It looks like they want small robotic platforms that might not even be rovers. This isn’t necessarily bad but I think private industry is capable enough to build larger platforms, which would allow for a smoother transition to infrastructure to support humans.

      1. In terms of infrastructure, with moon less infrastructure.
        A major infrastructure issue is making lots robotic missions, cheap and quickly.
        In terms of moon, making safer landing zones, and this is carried forward in terms of Mars exploration. With Mars there should a focus on many bases rather one base. Or obviously you start with one, but should be planning a few bases being made on Mars surface.
        And other than landing zones, no base moon. Or a focus of a lunar base, would lengthen time, before starting Mars exploration. And perhaps, private sector and/or other countries can focus on lunar bases. Though once finished lunar exploration, and doing Mars, US leadership might then decide upon establishing a govt lunar base, and if they want to fund it, they could get it.

  2. Scott Hubbard was adamantly opposed to Bridenstine, and even days before the confirmation was heard to be absolutely certain that he would not get the job.

  3. Constellation was barely trying to go to the Moon, and not at all to Mars. It died despite those limited objectives because NASA insisted on developing all required vehicles in-house, via a process that demonstrably costs decades and tens of billions per vehicle.

    At the point where it became unconcealably obvious this would not fit within NASA Human Exploration’s’s large but essentially flat budget, Constellation was terminated. (Alas, with insufficient prejudice. SLS and Orion zombie on, eating budgets and going nowhere.)

    The cure, then and now, is for NASA to ditch the dysfunctional in-house development process and procure vehicles truly commercially – EG, in the limited-NASA-interference manner manner of the COTS program.

    This is however not a speakable truth for anyone who can’t afford to have those bits of NASA blackball them out of ever working in this industry again. Until that changes, we’re headed down the same road all over again.

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