When war erupted in summer 2006, Israel enjoyed overwhelming military superiority and favorable political conditions. However, its strategic follies and operational deficiencies resulted in a faltering, indecisive war. The Israeli military could have administered a serious blow to Hezbollah from the air during the first few days of the war or, alternatively, destroyed most of Hezbollah’s military presence in southern Lebanon with a large land invasion. Unfortunately, Israel’s political and military leadership had no clear concept of what victory over Hezbollah entailed.
Israel squandered an important opportunity to settle regional scores. It left unchecked Iran’s apparent efforts to expand Shi
It seems that ever since Britain and Denmark announced their intention to withdraw, the security situation has deteriorated. Troops from both countries now come under fire from the Shi’ite militias vying for power.
This is what happens when abandoning an area with a weak security apparatus in place. Now that the Brits and Danes have given the people of Basra a drop-dead date for their withdrawal, they have set in motion a fight for power that will only amplify as the withdrawal date approaches. Instead of throwing in with the central government, the flight of the Coalition has convinced Iraqis in that area that they have to find the strongest warlord for protection.
We can expect this across the country if the US withdraws precipitately from Iraq. A pullout will embolden the violent and frighten the law-abiding, and the end result will be a completely failed state.
Amir Tehari asks the obvious question of Harry Reid–if we’ve lost the war, who won?
Because all wars have winners and losers, Reid, having identified America as the loser, is required to name the winner. This Reid cannot do.
The reason is that, whichever way one looks at the situation, America and its Iraqi allies remain the only objective victors in this war…
…Reid may believe that Iran, either alone or with its Syrian Sancho Panza, is the victor. If that’s the case, Reid shares the illusion peddled by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Convinced that the Americans will run away, mostly thanks to political maneuvers by Reid and his friends, Ahmadinejad has gone on the offensive in Iraq and throughout the region. By heightening his profile, he wants to make sure that Iran reaps the fruits of what Reid is sowing in Washington.
But even then, it’s unlikely that most Iraqis would acknowledge Ahmadinejad as winner and bow to his diktat. The Islamic Republic cannot act as victor solely because Reid says so.
It’s possible that Reid imagined that his analytical problems are over simply because he has identified the war’s loser. The truth is that his troubles are only beginning. He must tell Americans to whom they wish their army to surrender in Iraq.