All posts by Rand Simberg

More On The Media And War

Shannon Love has a useful comment in yesterday’s post (that I’ve slightly edited here for typos) about war reporting (and public perceptions):

I find it very odd that most lay people, like journalists, have no intuitive feel for the ebb and flow of war. I think this lack of intuitive feel arises because the vast majority of the population never study the history of warfare in any detail and therefore develop their intuitive understanding of “feel” of flow of war purely from its representation in popular fiction and media.

The common narrative structure of the common fictional war story bears little relation to the actual tempo and evolution of real wars. A literature professor of mine once observed that no author would have written a fictional WWII that unfolded in the same way as the actual conflict. The opening of the war with sweeping unexpected victories makes for a good story but the slow grinding down of the Fascist states by overwhelming force in the last two years of the conflict is emotionally unsatisfying. In a fictional WWII, Fascist victory would look all but certain until Americans created the atomic bomb in last great gasp of desperation and saved the day.

The other problem with fictional war is that people can experience it in its entirety from start to finish in a matter of days or weeks. I think this causes people to intuitively feel that real world wars run far to0 long and are thus failures.

In short, persistence and determination make for boring narratives. Wars won by time don’t make good stories. Most of the significant battles of the pre-industrial era were sieges won by the side with the most patience and the best logistical management. How many popular depictions of sieges have you ever seen in the fiction or even in histories of the era? If you have seen a siege depicted you see it at its dramatic end, not the months or years of siege itself.

Law enforcement often complains that the time frames depicted on crime shows, in which cops solve murders in a matter of days, severally distorts the expectations of crime victims and even juries when they evaluate how competently the justice system acts.

I think the same effect cripples the electorate’s popular understanding of how we fight real wars.

This no doubt a factor, though the fact that very few of today’s journalists have any military experience or training is a problem as well.

Learning The Wrong Lessons

Jon Goff has a must-read post on what we know and don’t know about reusable launchers, based on some insightful commentary by Jorge Frank.

The real mistake of the space shuttle was not that of attempting a reusable vehicle, nor a winged vehicle, nor a parallel-staged vehicle. The real mistake is that we attempted to build an “operational” vehicle before we had any real idea of what “operability” means in a space vehicle. The alternative – the real “road not taken” – would have been to build small experimental vehicles, starting from suborbital and working our way up, that explore all the different “corners” of the design trade space resulting from this multi-variable problem, and learning, one painful step at a time, what works and what doesn’t. Since these experimental vehicles would neither have carried payloads nor flown operational missions, there would be no attachment to them; they would have flown for a few years each and then retired and replaced with the next X-vehicle, just as happened with all the previous X-vehicles up to and including the X-15.

That approach may or may not have resulted in a truly economical launch vehicle by 2007, but it would surely by now have given us a better picture of what works and what doesn’t than the road we chose. By attempting an “operational” reusable vehicle that by definition would have to replace all the existing “operational” expendable vehicles, we locked ourselves into a path that was difficult to reverse and was expensive enough that we could not afford to replace it in parallel with flying it, necessitating another long and painful gap in our experience base.

And because that one vehicle represents the whole of our operational experience for the last generation, its failure has led many to overgeneralize. The space shuttle is a (partially) reusable, winged vehicle with parallel staging using a cryogenic propellant tank. And it failed to meet its cost, schedule, and reliability goals. Therefore, the reasoning goes, all reusable vehicles are bad, all winged vehicles are bad, all parallel-staged vehicles are bad, all cryogenically fueled vehicles are bad. This is nonsense. Were the emotionally charged names to be replaced with faceless variable names, any competent mathematics professor would reject this logic as faulty, and rightly so.

The latter is a point that I make often in response to the clueless and logic-challenged who think that Shuttle (or X-33) teach us that reusable vehicles aren’t possible.

Jorge’s comments are also a useful insight into what a kludgy compromise the Shuttle design was, and how many of the design choices were driven by other design choices, which were in turn driven by unrealistic requirements, both in terms of performance, and development budget.

As Clark Lindsey points out, we are going to be learning a lot of lessons from the suborbital business and rocket racing that will be directly applicable to orbital vehicles down the road. It’s a tragedy that it’s taken us so long to start this long process. But as long as the process might seem, at least we’re now going in the right direction (that is, to try a lot of different directions, and finally find out what works, and what doesn’t).

Completely Missing The Point

The idiotic media explanations for the poor box-office performance of the anti-American films on the Iraq war are cluelessly hilarious. But the many commenters are happy to explain it to them.

It would be quite gratifying to see a pro-American Iraq war movie made, and have it clean up at the box office. I’d pop some popcorn to see into what kinds of logical pretzels the media types would contort themselves in a pathetic attempt to explain it.

The Fire Has Gone Out

I was never much of a Norman Mailer fan. I read The Naked and the Dead as a teenager (my parents’ copy), and didn’t find it that impressive. Roger Kimball obviously never heard the phrase “de mortuis nil nisi bonum”–he has many not-so-good things to say of the author/cultural icon/literary thug, who died today (he had been ill for some time).

Interestingly, of all the works that Kimball mentions in his long anti-eulogy, he doesn’t talk about “Of A Fire On The Moon,” his book about Apollo XI.

The reviews here of it are interesting–many of the reviewers who disliked Mailer’s other work liked this one, and vice versa–his traditional fans had little use for it. I’ve never read it myself, and based on the reviews (including one by Roger Launius), I don’t know if I’ll bother now. Anyway, rest in peace. He certainly didn’t live that way.