For a(nother) white pope. So much for my prognostication.
All posts by Rand Simberg
A Tale Of Two Meetings
On the tenth anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing, Laura Mansfield has a very disturbing story–Jihad comes to Small Town, USA:
Khaled and three of his companions had gone to New York for several days in January. He told of how uncomfortable his trip up to NYC had been. He felt like he was being watched, and thought he was the victim of racial profiling.
Khaled and his friends were pretty unhappy about it, and while in New York, they came up with a plan to “teach a lesson” to the passengers and crew. You can imagine the story Khaled told. He described how he and his friends whispered to each other on the flight, made simultaneous visits to the restroom, and generally tried to “spook” the other passengers. He laughed when he described how several women were in tears, and one man sitting near him was praying.
The others in the room thought the story was quite amusing, judging from the laughter. The imam stood up and told the group that this was a kind of peaceful civil disobedience that should be encouraged, and commended Khaled and his friends for their efforts.
This part of the meeting was all spoken in Arabic.
In Israel, Yasser Arafat was well known (at least to the non-naive) for making conciliatory speeches in English and inflammatory ones in Arabic. Apparently, he’s not alone in this practice.
Parsimonious
Mike Griffin seems to agree with me about Shuttle upgrades:
Asked at his first news conference if he would allow Discovery to fly despite some reservations by the independent Stafford-Covey Commission, which monitors NASA progress on safety recommendations after the Columbia disaster, Griffin replied, “In concept, yes I would.”
…”Advisory groups advise. We need to take our advice very seriously …,” Griffin said. “But at the end of the day, the people wearing government and contractor badges charged with launching the vehicle will be the ones who are responsible and accountable for their actions.”
Opaque
Byron York describes the ongoing absurdity of campaign finance “reform.”
…after years of campaign-finance reform, we are entering an era in which a donor can give an unlimited amount of money to an unaccountable group without any public disclosure. Before McCain-Feingold, big donors gave fully-disclosed money to the political parties, which, because they represented the entire coalition that made up the Democratic or Republican parties, were far more accountable to the public than the new, outside, groups became. Now, new C4s like protectyourcheck.org do not even have to reveal where they get their money
The Redcoats Came
Two hundred and thirty years ago, the first American revolution started, when British troops attempted to enforce gun-control laws in Massachussetts. This incident was doubtless fresh in the memories of the Founders when they wrote the Second Amendment.
It Ain’t Heavy, It’s My Lifter
Jon Berndt has an article in the current issue of the Houston AIAA newsletter on the subject of heavy lift, citing yours truly, among others. (Warning, it’s a three meg PDF). My only quibble is that he misses one of the other problems with a heavy lifter–lack of resiliency. If we develop an exploration architecture that’s dependent on heavy lift, then we should have multiple means of providing it, which means two development programs with inadequate flight rate to amortize the costs.
Along similar lines, Bob Zubrin has a long essay on space policy in The New Atlantis that’s now available on line, with a harsh critique of NASA, including the Bush-era NASA and Sean O’Keefe. Surprisingly, I agree with much of the early part of it (though as always, the tone is a little problematic). I don’t agree with this:
The ESMD plan requires a plethora of additional recurring costs and mission risks for the sole purpose of avoiding the development cost of a big new rocket
It Ain’t Heavy, It’s My Lifter
Jon Berndt has an article in the current issue of the Houston AIAA newsletter on the subject of heavy lift, citing yours truly, among others. (Warning, it’s a three meg PDF). My only quibble is that he misses one of the other problems with a heavy lifter–lack of resiliency. If we develop an exploration architecture that’s dependent on heavy lift, then we should have multiple means of providing it, which means two development programs with inadequate flight rate to amortize the costs.
Along similar lines, Bob Zubrin has a long essay on space policy in The New Atlantis that’s now available on line, with a harsh critique of NASA, including the Bush-era NASA and Sean O’Keefe. Surprisingly, I agree with much of the early part of it (though as always, the tone is a little problematic). I don’t agree with this:
The ESMD plan requires a plethora of additional recurring costs and mission risks for the sole purpose of avoiding the development cost of a big new rocket
It Ain’t Heavy, It’s My Lifter
Jon Berndt has an article in the current issue of the Houston AIAA newsletter on the subject of heavy lift, citing yours truly, among others. (Warning, it’s a three meg PDF). My only quibble is that he misses one of the other problems with a heavy lifter–lack of resiliency. If we develop an exploration architecture that’s dependent on heavy lift, then we should have multiple means of providing it, which means two development programs with inadequate flight rate to amortize the costs.
Along similar lines, Bob Zubrin has a long essay on space policy in The New Atlantis that’s now available on line, with a harsh critique of NASA, including the Bush-era NASA and Sean O’Keefe. Surprisingly, I agree with much of the early part of it (though as always, the tone is a little problematic). I don’t agree with this:
The ESMD plan requires a plethora of additional recurring costs and mission risks for the sole purpose of avoiding the development cost of a big new rocket
Props To Time Mag
In their Ann Coulter edition (and yes, that was an awful cover photo, and I don’t think it’s an accident), they mistook Communists For Kerry and the Protest Warriors for real anti-right-wing groups protesting Ann. Maybe the protesters were a little too “nuanced” for them.
They’ve since fixed it though. Rather than just putting it down the memory hole, they’ve since changed the caption of the picture to reflect reality, and noted their original error. That’s refreshing, and when they do something right, we should encourage them.
It does make you question their savvy, though. Weren’t the jokes obvious, or did they look too much like signs that moonbats would actually carry? I like the “Criminals for Gun Control,” myself.
A Million Here, A Million There
A commenter at this post writes:
When it costs hundreds of millions of dollars to fly a single Shuttle mission, I fail to see the problem with spending another 10 to fix the wiring.
The first problem is a misunderstanding of Shuttle costs. The marginal cost of a flight is not “hundreds of millions of dollars.” It’s probably somewhere between a hundred and a hundred and fifty million. The average cost is much more, but that’s not a useful number, because it can vary so much with flight rate (for example, when the flight rate is zero, as it has been since February, 2003, the average cost per flight is infinite, regardless of how much we spend on the Shuttle program).
The second problem is that, while ten million dollars may not seem like much in the context of a program that costs billions annually, the fact remains that NASA has a finite budget, and ten million spent on one item is ten million less available to be spent on something else, that might be more important. According to the article that the original post linked to, the odds of an uncommanded thruster firing resulting in a catastrophe are somewhere between one in ten thousand and one in a million (it doesn’t say if that’s on a per-mission basis, or totaled over the next twenty-odd flights). Assuming that those are valid numbers, with any degree of confidence, then the standard way to determine how much we should spend to prevent that event from happening would be to use the expected value of that event (probability times cost). The problem with that, of course, is assessing the value of either the Shuttle fleet, or the ISS, given that current policy recognizes them both as dead ends, in terms of future space policy.
That, in fact, is why I think that the CAIB recommendations should have been revisited after the new policy was announced. If the CAIB had known that the Shuttle was going to be retired at the end of the decade, they may not have recommended some of the more costly (and impractical) fixes for what would then have been recognized as a rapidly depreciating asset.