A useful talk on the cause of the financial crisis:

Before talking about how we did get here, let me say a quick word about what didn’t cause this mess. Those who wish to blame greed for the crisis need to explain how and why it is that greed seems to causes crises only at specific times, despite the fact that it is omnipresent as a feature of human nature and market economies. As the economist Larry White has noted, if we saw a bunch of planes crash all on the same day, we wouldn’t blame gravity. It’s always there. Something else must be at work. I would argue that the key is the set of institutions through which greed or self-interest is channeled. That is, good institutions can cause self-interest to generate desirable unintended consequences, and bad ones can cause undesirable ones. So perhaps we should be looking at institutions and policy.

Those who wish to blame deregulation or the supposed “laissez-faire” philosophy of the Bush Administration are going to have to identify the deregulation in question, which will be a challenge given that the last deregulatory legislation in the financial industry was in 1999 under Clinton. These folks will also have to explain how the enormous growth in the Federal Register and domestic spending over Bush’s two terms reconciles with his supposed belief in laissez-faire. Answer: it doesn’t.

The two key causes of this crisis are expansionary monetary policy on the part of the Fed and a series of regulatory and institutional interventions that channeled that excess credit into the housing market, creating a bubble that eventually had to burst. In other words, the boom (and the inevitable bust) are the product of misguided government policy, not unbridled capitalism.

The Fed drove up the money supply and drove down interest rates very consistently since 9/11. When central banks do so, they make long-term investments relatively cheaper than short-term ones, thus the excess funds flow toward such goods. Historically, these were producer goods in capital industries, but in this particular case, a set of other government interventions and policies pushed those funds toward housing.

A state-sponsored push for more affordable housing has been a staple of several prior administrations. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are key players here. Although they did not orginate the questionable mortgages, they did develop a number of the low down-payment instruments that came into vogue during the boom. More important, they were primarily responsible for the secondary mortgage market as they promoted the mortgage-backed securities that became the investment vehicle du jour during the boom. Both Fannie and Freddie are, we must remember, not “free-market” firms. They are “government-sponsored entities,” at one time nominally privately owned, but granted a number of government privileges, in addition to carrying an implicit promise of government support should they ever get into trouble. With such a promise in place, the market for mortgage-backed securities was able to tolerate a level of risk that truly free markets would not. As we now know, that turned out to be a big problem.

Read all. It also points out the ways that this mess is the debris of the New Deal and the depression.

And yet the lies that got Obama elected — that this was caused by “greed,” “deregulation,” and “tax cuts” continue, and continue to be used to justify running up the national debt to insane levels and nationalizing vast swathes of the economy.

[Update at 9 PM Pacific]

Richard Epstein:

…we take [failing enterprises] away from bankruptcy judges, who are experts, and give them to a collection of congressional individuals who are charitably called clowns. When you bring commercial decisions to Congress they become politicized, and politicized decisions become destructive decisions.

Charitably indeed.

Why we shouldn’t allow the federal government to accumulate any more power over the financial industry (and why in fact it already has too much):

… the case for broadening regulators’ oversight to include investment banks and other financial institutions is based on three flawed assumptions.

The first is that the same factors that justify expansive powers to close banks and take control of their assets are equally applicable to investment banks and other financial institutions. But the FDIC’s interest in commercial banks is unique — because it guarantees deposits up to $250,000, the FDIC is a bank’s most important creditor and has a stake in its health as the representative of American taxpayers. The government’s stake and the need to assure that depositors do not lose access to their deposits, even temporarily, arguably justify the FDIC’s extraordinary powers. Those factors are not present with investment banks or other financial institutions.

The second flawed assumption is that our bankruptcy laws are not adequate for handling defaults by investment banks or other financial institutions. …

Contrary to the widespread myth that bankruptcy is time-consuming and ineffectual, Lehman sold its major brokerage assets to Barclays less than a week after filing for bankruptcy. It is now in the process of selling its tens of billions of dollars of less time-sensitive assets at a more deliberate pace. …

The third flawed assumption is that financial firms flirting with distress are somehow worse decision makers than federal regulators. But the opposite is likely true. If the Treasury, FDIC and Fed had authority over investment bank failures, troubled banks would have a strong incentive to negotiate for rescue loans, and their pleas would be heard by regulators influenced as much by political as financial factors. The involvement of three different regulators (and mandatory consultation with the president) would magnify this risk. With bankruptcy, in contrast, the decision of whether and when to file is made by an institution’s managers and creditors, who have the best information and their own money on the line.

[Via Professor Bainbridge], who has more thoughts.

Much of the risk taking occurring in these institutions was caused by the moral hazard of knowing (or at least being willing to bet) that the government would step in and bail them out. Particularly since many in the government were on their payroll, either through campaign contributions, sweetheart mortgage deals, or simply the incestuous revolving door between the federal bureaucracy and the institutions. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac both seem to have been a cushy retirement home for former Democrat operatives (e.g., Franklin Raines).

And in the “gee, ya think?” category — “Dodd’s Troubles Open Debate On Congress’ Ties With Special Interests“:

Dodd has become the poster boy for critics who say the inevitable ties between long-time members of Congress and special interests are undermining efforts to revive the economy.

“He literally thinks he’s going to play a critical role from saving us from ourselves,” Christopher Healy, the Republican Party chairman in Connecticut, said of the Democratic senator.

“It’s like putting the arsonist in charge of the volunteer fire department. He knows where the fire is because he set it. But beyond that, he can’t offer much help.”

Such a debate (assuming it actually occurs) is long overdue. It should have occurred during the election campaign.

We have to break up this megatrust.

I wish that I could make Human Action and The Road To Serfdom mandatory reading on the Hill, but it would probably be beyond the IQ of many, indeed most of them.

[Late afternoon update]

Thoughts on progressive corporatism:

At this point, I think that the relevant political divide is not between the two parties. It is between the forces of Progressive Corporatism and the (much smaller) forces of The Resistance.

Or, as Virginia Postrel has noted, between dynamism and stasis. That’s the real point. Despite all the rhetoric, these people don’t want change. They are defenders of the status quo. Everything they’re doing is to prevent change. They don’t want housing values to change, they don’t want bank stock values to change, they don’t want UAW workers’ salaries to change, and (most of all) they don’t want any change in their level of power over the rest of us.

Instapundit:

Remember, when a private company wants to cover up billions in losses and the responsibility for them, that’s a major scandal and proof of the evils of capitalism. But when a government regulator does the same thing, that’s just how people are, these things happen, whaddyagonnado? Plus, more evidence that the country’s in the very best of hands:

After the companies were taken over, investors around the world who buy the companies’ debt and mortgage investments weren’t willing to pay top dollar, reflecting doubts about whether the U.S. government would stand behind the firms if they faltered further. As a result, mortgage rates initially rose, further depressing house prices, contrary to what the government intended when it took over the firms.

Then, earlier this month Freddie Mac lost its chief executive, longtime banker David Moffett, who joined the company at the government’s behest in September. He clashed with government regulators who pushed him to take steps that would forgo revenue opportunities. Freddie Mac is now looking for a new chief executive, chief operating officer and chief financial officer — and having trouble finding them.

Gee, why would a business that the government has taken over and mismanaged have trouble recruiting fall guyssenior executives in this political climate?

I think that Liddy missed a big opportunity to have a McCarthy-hearing style moment, after having to take all that Bravo Sierra from the anal orifices on the Hill who really caused the crisis because they were on the take, after taking a thankless job for one dollar a year. He could have castigated them for their own roles, and resigned, with an “At last, Senator, have you no decency?” He’d have been my hero if he had, and I suspect a lot of people would have agreed.

Thoughts on the unsavory and oppressive relationship between big government and big business:

…one needs to remember that the New Deal was not the assault on big business that its fans claim. FDR may have talked a good game about going after “economic royalists,” and he did love confiscatory personal income taxes. But he and his Brain Trust also loved cartels, big businesses, and other “big units” of society. The notion that big business and big government are at war with one another is one of the great enduring myths of the 20th century. The truth is that ever since Teddy Roosevelt abandoned his love of trust-busting, progressives have liked big businesses big, really big. The bigger the business, the more reliable the partner for big government.

Contra popular myth/lies, It’s not libertarians who favor big business and corporations.

[Update late morning]

Not Japan — Argentina:

In visits to Asian capitals during the region’s financial crisis in the late 1990s, I often heard Asian reformers such as Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew or Japan’s Eisuke Sakakibara complain about how the incestuous relationship between governments and large Asian corporate conglomerates stymied real economic change. How fortunate, I thought then, that the United States was not similarly plagued by crony capitalism! However, watching Goldman Sachs’s seeming lock on high-level U.S. Treasury jobs as well as the way that Republicans and Democrats alike tiptoed around reforming Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae — among the largest campaign contributors to Congress — made me wonder if the differences between the United States and the Asian economies were only a matter of degree.

On Wall Street there is an old joke that the longest river in the emerging-market economies is “de Nile.” Yet how often do U.S. leaders respond to growing signs of economic dysfunctionality by spouting nationalistic rhetoric that echoes the speeches of Latin American demagogues like Peru’s Alan Garcia in the 1980s and Argentina’s Carlos Menem in the 1990s? (Even Garcia, currently in his second go-around as Peru’s president, seems to have grown up somewhat.) But instead of facing our problems we extol the resilience of the U.S. economy, praise the most productive workers in the world, and go on and on about America’s inherent ability to extricate itself from any crisis. And we ignore our proclivity as a nation to spend, year in year out, more than we produce, to put off dealing with long-term problems, and to engage in grandiose long-term programs that as a nation we can ill afford.

Read the whole depressing thing.