I have a book teaser over at the Safe Is Not An Option blog.
Category Archives: Space History
That Didn’t Take Long
Paul Damphousse is out at NSS. As Michael Mealling notes, it really is a profoundly dysfunctional organization, not just because of its structure, but because of the tension between the constituencies within that has existed ever since the L-5/NSI merger in the eighties.
Twenty-Seven Years
That’s how long ago was the beginning of the end for the Shuttle, not even five years after it first flew. Eleven years ago, I recalled the event:
I was sitting in a meeting at the Rockwell Space Transportation Systems Division in Downey, California. It was a status review meeting for a contract on which I was working, called the Space Transportation Architecture Study. It was a joint NASA/USAF contract, and its ostensible purpose was to determine what kind of new launch systems should replace or complement the Space Shuttle. Its real purpose was to try to get the Air Force and NASA Marshall to learn how to play together nicely and stop squabbling over turf and vehicle designs (it failed).
It was a large meeting, with many people in attendance from El Segundo and Colorado Springs (Air Force) and Houston, Huntsville and the Cape (NASA) as well as many Rockwell attendees.
As I sat there, waiting for the meeting to begin, one of my colleagues came running into the room, his face white as a freshly-bleached bedsheet. He leaned over and told me and others, in an insistent sotto voce, “I just saw the Challenger blow up.”
We stared at him in momentary disbelief.
“I’m serious. I just came from the mission control center. It just exploded about a minute after launch.”
One could actually see the news travel across the large meeting room as expressions of early-morning torpor transformed into incredulity and shock. More than most people, even with no more information than the above, we understood the implications. While there was speculation in the media all morning that the crew might be saved, we knew instantly that they were lost. We knew also that we had lost a quarter of the Shuttle fleet, with a replacement cost of a couple billion dollars and several years, and that there would be no flights for a long time, until we understood what had happened.
The ironic purpose of our meeting became at once more significant and utterly meaningless. Most of the NASA people immediately made arrangements to fly back to Houston, Huntsville and the Cape, and we held the session without them, in a perfunctory manner.
This was one of those events, like the more recent one in September, that is indelibly etched into memory–where you were, what you were doing, what you were feeling. I’m curious about any inputs from others, either in comments here or email.
Oh, and I should note that it’s an easy date to remember for me–it was (and remains still) the anniversary of my date of birth…
So today, I start another trip around the sun, and space policy remains a mess.
And it’s not just today. The Apollo 1 fire happened the day before my twelfth birthday. And Columbia was lost four days after my forty eighth. I have no trouble remembering any of these anniversaries.
Forty-Six Years Ago Today
Ed White, Roger Chafee and Gus Grissom died on the launch pad, an event that resulted in the formation of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, and a complete overhaul of the design and management of Apollo. It was the first of the late-January tragedies that make this time of year a sad one for NASA. Tomorrow will be the twenty-sixeventh anniversary of the loss of Challenger, and Friday will be the tenth anniversary of the loss of Columbia.
The Xichang Disaster
The story of the worst launch catastrophe in history is finally being told.
[Via Clark Lindsey, who has video]
Ten Years After Columbia
The moment of truth for Wayne Hale:
Much later, while the debris recovery effort was going on in East Texas, the trajectory analysts put together an estimated plot of where the Columbia pieces would have come down for a 1 rev late deorbit. The toe of the ellipse – where the heaviest pieces would come down – cut across the southwestern suburbs of Houston. My home – my wife – would have been in the target zone where the 2 ton steel main engine combustion chambers would have hit the ground at supersonic speeds. JSC would have been at ground zero for the debris; the MCC would likely have been struck. That is a scenario that is just too implausible for words.
Knowing what we now know, it might have seemed, in some sense, ironic, poetic justice.
Dryden Flight Research Center
Paul Spudis explains why it should keep its name. “Armstrong” should be reserved for a lunar base, if the government ever builds one (I suspect that there will be a private one first).
Jesco
The German rocket scientist who was born too young to be part of von Braun’s team has died. Is anyone from von Braun’s team left?
Four Decades Since We Abandoned The Moon
Some anniversary thoughts (and a mention of my property-rights piece) from Adam Keiper.
Ten Years After Columbia
Former flight controller (and Shuttle program manager) Wayne Hale has been writing a series of blog posts about his recollections of the events leading up to the disaster. This week, he recalls the harbinger of the previous flight, that should have warned NASA about the problem, but didn’t.