Category Archives: Space History

Forty-Two Years Ago

Hard to believe it’s been that long (doesn’t seem that long ago that I attended a celebration in Hollywood thrown by Ron Howard for the quarter-century anniversary), but today is the anniversary of the launch of Apollo 11. Wednesday is Evoloterra, so it’s a good time to plan a get together with family and friends to celebrate. Bill Simon and I, the principal authors of the ceremony, will be discussing it on The Space Show on Monday afternoon.

Seven Years Ago Today

I should have posted this earlier, and it’s hard to believe it’s been that long, but I drove up to Mojave on the twentieth of June, 2004, to see the first flight of SpaceShipOne into space. I put up several blog posts about it, starting with this one. Just consecutively click on the next post (at the top of the page) to see them all, along with links to other posts.

Yet More Anniversary Thoughts

Robert Zimmerman has a post, with which I mostly agree. But since I seem to be unable to comment there, I would add a couple corrections.

Gagarin’s launch vehicle had reached escape velocity and orbited the earth.

No, it reached orbital velocity. If it had reached escape velocity, it would never have come back. Escape velocity is about 1.4 (root of two, to be exact) times local circular velocity.

Another point (besides the fact that the two Bushes aren’t Junior and Senior).

In all these declarations, it was assumed that the space vehicles and rockets to get into space would be designed and operated by the federal government.

That actually was not the case for the Vision for Space Exploration. If you go back and read the Aldridge report, it recommends commercial (and international) participation, and doesn’t require or expect NASA to develop any launch systems. It only directs it to build a “Crew Exploration Vehicle” (what eventually became Orion). All of the contractors for the Concept Exploration & Refinement trade studies considered existing commercial launchers, or larger versions of them, for the lunar architecture. No one considered anything resembling what became Ares, because it was universally recognized that a Shuttle-derived system would be unaffordable (not to mention that it was always a nutty idea). It was only when Mike Griffin replaced Sean O’Keefe and fired Craig Steidle that a Marshall-developed rocket became the baseline. In fact, other than eliminating the goal of moon first, the new NASA plans (or, at least, the 2011 budget submission) resemble the original VSE much more than Mike Griffin’s Constellation did.

More Anniversary Posts

Clark Lindsey has a link collection on today’s anniversary. I’ll have a blog post up at the Washington Examiner shortly.

[Update a while later]

Tom Jones has his thoughts, over at Popular Mechanics. I continue to scratch my head over worries like this:

Until roughly 2015, when American companies hope to produce a commercial rocket and spacecraft that can carry NASA’s crews safely and economically, astronauts will be renting rides on the Russian Soyuz vehicle (at $55 million per seat and climbing). The fact that presidents and congresses have seen this gap coming and failed to close it is a significant gamble, and not just because it’s unclear whether commercial spaceflight will be ready to deliver crews by the 2015 target. NASA has no backup: If the new space startups can’t make a profit on flying astronauts and other customers to orbit, they will hang up the out-of-business sign and walk away. We’d be forced to buy Russian seats indefinitely while starting an expensive crash program to regain access to the ISS.

So let me get this straight. He’s afraid that, multiple companies, having developed systems capable of getting people to ISS, won’t be able to make a profit, regardless of how much the government pays them? And when they can’t do so, they will “walk away”? And then what? Destroy the factories and hardware? Why wouldn’t they just sell it to someone else at fire-sale prices, who presumable could then make a profit? Why would we have to develop yet another system to reach the ISS when multiple ones already existed, and could simply be operated under new management? Does this make any sense at all?

[Early afternoon update]

My Washington Examiner piece is up now.

Apollo Thoughts From The Economist

There will be many retrospectives this week on the half-century anniversary of Kennedy’s speech. Here’s one from The Economist, that reads like they’ve been reading me for a while:

To many Americans, neglecting human space flight this way looks like a sorry end to the glorious chapter Kennedy opened half a century ago. He set out to make America’s achievements in space an emblem of national greatness, and the project succeeded. Yet it did not escape the notice of critics even at the time that this entailed an irony. The Apollo programme, which was summoned into being in order to demonstrate the superiority of the free-market system, succeeded by mobilising vast public resources within a centralised bureaucracy under government direction. In other words, it mimicked aspects of the very command economy it was designed to repudiate.

Exactly. Well, not exactly. One of the reasons that they did it this way (as I pointed out in my recent debate with Bob Zubrin) was that it wasn’t intended to be a demonstration of the free-market system:

There was a reason that Apollo ended over forty years ago. It had accomplished its mission, which was not to go to the moon, but to demonstrate that democratic socialism was superior to totalitarian communism in terms of technological prowess, which it did when Apollo 8 flew around the moon in 1968, and the Soviets gave up and pretended they had never been racing.

In any event, few people have any conception of how much Apollo warped our perception of how to explore and develop space, because they have no other framework in which to think about it. But that will change over the next few years as private entities start to show how Americans do space in a more traditional American way.

Sputnik, And Apollo

Over at NRO, Jonah Goldberg points out the ridiculousness of the administration’s attempts to leverage the bin Laden killing to promote its domestic agenda, but in doing so, he misses a crucial point about the president’s historical confusion in the State of the Union:

Which brings us back to salmon regulations, immigration, high-speed rail, renewable energy, and other action items on Obama’s “win the future” agenda laid out in January’s address. Back then, Obama said we were in a “Sputnik moment,” referring to the time when the Soviet Union’s launch of a satellite inspired the Apollo space program and increased spending on scientific education and research.

…the most bestest part, as Brennan might say, is the simple fact that the president doesn’t know how we’ll “win the future.” In his Oval Office address on the Gulf oil spill, Obama explained that we don’t know how we’ll get where we need to go or what the destination will even look like.

But that’s the genius of the Sputnik analogy. Since, as Obama explained, “we had no idea how we would beat (the Soviets) to the moon,” it’s okay that we don’t know how to “win the future.” And that in turn means that during the weakest recovery in half a century, we can blow billions on mythical green-energy jobs, push a government takeover of health care, encourage skyrocketing gas prices, impose crippling regulations and higher taxes, and make “investments” in white elephants and high-speed salmon.

To clarify, Sputnik did not in fact give us Apollo, though it did kick off the space race, so to conflate Sputnik with not knowing how we would beat the Soviets to the moon is historically ignorant. Apollo occurred not as a direct result of Sputnik, but as a result of Yuri Gagarin beating us at getting a man into space (on April 12th, 1961, three and a half years after Sputnik), the embarrassment of the Bay of Pigs fiasco a few days later, resulting in a need to show that we were still in the game internationally, and our (final) success in getting a man into space ourselves (though not orbit) on May 5th, boosting our confidence. Twenty days after that (the fiftieth anniversary is coming up in a few days), Kennedy announced the goal of sending a man to the moon and back by the end of the decade. So even if you buy the president’s absurd logic in attempting to contextualize Apollo, it would have made much more sense to talk about our “Gagarin moment,” not our “Sputnik moment.”

And of course, as I’ve written before, anyone who uses the hackneyed phrase “If we can put a man on the moon, why can’t we…” almost always makes an inappropriate analogy in the process.