When I worked in business development for a government space contractor, I’d always be amused by the standard section we’d always have to put in our proposals to NASA or the Air Force about our company’s previous experience and heritage, as though the people who’d worked on those programs in the sixties weren’t dead or retired.
Organizations don’t have knowledge — individuals do. And to the degree that NASA has any knowledge, it is because it has retained employees who have it.. But many of those knowledgeable people have gone to work for the commercial companies, so there really is nothing “unique” about NASA. But to the degree that there is, it is primarily that, at least with respect to safety, its procedures have resulted in the loss of fourteen astronauts in flight.
But I’m sure Palazzo et al will continue to think that Boeing is a better bet than SpaceX.
An op-ed supporting the spaceport there. In the interest of disclosure, I should note that I’ve been doing some consulting for them to help develop strategies to expand their market.
I have no problem with this, as worded. It’s probably about the best you’re going to do and still have consensus, given who was involved in crafting it. I disagree, though, that the 2010 NASA authorization is consistent with it. I’m sure they had to say that to get Bingham to go along.
This is about defense, but it applies to space as well. NASA in particular suffers from paralysis by analysis, as demonstrated by how long and how much money it took to do that stupid Orion test flight last year (and how long and how much more money it will be until the next one). But it doesn’t matter, because Congress doesn’t really care if anything is accomplished as long as the jobs don’t go away. I may expand on this in the next edition of the book.