Category Archives: Space

A Novel Means Of Cooking A Steak

Not a very effective one, though:

To break the sound barrier, you’ll need to drop the steak from about 50 kilometers. But this isn’t enough to cook it.

We need to go higher.

If dropped from 70 kilometers, the steak will go fast enough to be briefly blasted by 350°F air. Unfortunately, this blast of thin, wispy air barely lasts a minute—and anyone with some basic kitchen experience can tell you that a steak placed in the oven at 350 for 60 seconds isn’t going to be cooked.

From 100 kilometers—the formally defined edge of space—the picture’s not much better. The steak spends a minute and a half over Mach 2, and the outer surface will likely be singed, but the heat is too quickly replaced by the icy stratospheric blast for it to actually be cooked.

I think I’ll stick to my IR grill. Though it might be fun to apply for a NASA grant as a suborbital research payload.

Snow-Melting Satellites

Patrick Collins, a PhD economist who lives in Japan, has been a long-time promoter of space tourism, but he has also been interested in solar-power satellites. Many have promoted them as a means to mitigate greenhouse gases, but three years ago, he presented a paper in Nagoya on their use in preventing the next glacial advance, which would be much more catastrophic than any of the climate frights conjured up by the warm mongers. He writes:

The webmaster of spacefuture.com [presumably, Peter Wainwright] refuses(!) to put this paper into the Space Future library which we founded together! Living and working in NYC seems to have made him “politically correct” (i.e. unscientific) – and also “warmist”! This despite the fact that any arguments that once existed for the theory that human emissions of CO2 could lead to catastrophic “global warming” (now morphed into “climate change”) have been totally destroyed by ever-growing scientific evidence – including notable work by Burt Rutan.

This evidence has grown by leaps and bounds in the three years since this paper was written. For a taste of the power of private citizens dedicated to scientific truth, and armed with the Internet and Freedom of Information laws, wattsupwiththat.com is hard to beat.

When we wrote this paper, neither of us had read Fallen Angels, in which Larry Niven, Jerry Pournelle and Michael Flynn – back in 1991 – prefigured both the key ideas: that the coming of the next Ice Age is a far greater threat than any possible warming, and that solar-generated microwave beams from orbiting satellites offer a unique means of combatting the spread of glaciers. NB it will require a massive “crash program” to ramp production up to a scale that could save western civilisation – a cool 1 million square kilometres of solar panels in various orbits! Sadly they were also prophetic about the degeneration of the US government. Perhaps holding back the glaciers could become the trigger to wake people up and develop space at last? Their book receives honourable mention in the follow-up paper being published soon.

I’ve uploaded the paper to my own site, for anyone interested, despite Peter’s truculence in that regard.

Too Little, Too Late

Wayne Hale continues to recall the events of a decade ago, when Columbia was lost, here, and here. And as I suspected at the time, they took the attitude that Gene Kranz did in the movie:

Jon Harpold was the Director of Mission Operations, my supreme boss as a Flight Director. He had spent his early career in shuttle entry analysis. He knew more about shuttle entry than anybody; the guidance, the navigation, the flight control, the thermal environments and how to control them. After one of the MMTs when possible damage to the orbiter was discussed, he gave me his opinion: “You know, there is nothing we can do about damage to the TPS. If it has been damaged it’s probably better not to know. I think the crew would rather not know. Don’t you think it would be better for them to have a happy successful flight and die unexpectedly during entry than to stay on orbit, knowing that there was nothing to be done, until the air ran out?”

I was hard pressed to disagree. That mindset was widespread. Astronauts agreed. So don’t blame an individual; looks for the organizational factors that lead to that kind of a mindset. Don’t let them in your organization.

As I wrote:

…you’re asked to make an assessment, in the absence of any data except a launch video showing some insulation hitting the vehicle, as to whether or not the damage could be catastrophic. Others around you, whom you respect, are saying that it won’t be. You have a bad feeling, but you can’t prove anything with the available data.

What do you do? What’s the benefit, given that there’s no action that can be taken to alleviate the problem, in fighting to get people to recognize that we may have a serious problem?

Moreover, suppose that we do believe that there’s a problem.

Do we tell the crew? What can they do, other than make peace with their God and say goodbye to their families?

Add to that the fact that it would disrupt the mission, perhaps for nothing, and sadly, deliberate ignorance looks appealing.

Carbon Nanotubes

This looks like it would make a useful material for an electrodynamic tether:

Working with Teijin Aramid, the Rice group has now made carbon-nanotube fibers that have more of the properties of individual nanotubes. They have an electrical conductivity close to copper’s, but are much stronger. They’re not quite as strong as conventional carbon fibers, but they’re much less brittle. And they’re more thermally conductive than metal or carbon fiber. That means nanotube fibers could replace these materials in existing applications in aerospace and electronics, and enable new technologies that take advantage of the fibers’ unique combination of strength, flexibility, and thermal and electrical conductivity. Pasquali envisions washable electronic textiles, lightweight wiring for planes, and eventually, more efficient wires for the electrical grid.

Cool.

More ASAP Thoughts

I’ve been reading the report, and this (partial) graf jumped out at me:

Before NASA crew or personnel on NASA-sponsored missions will be allowed to fly on commercially provided spacecraft, the systems will need to be certified. NASA is still refining the details of the certification process, but as part of the recently awarded Commercial Crew Integrated Capability (CCiCap) Space Act Agreements (SAAs), the partners were asked to provide NASA with recommendations for what they believe it would take to complete a certification milestone, including an “option” to conduct an orbital flight-test demonstration (demo) — under the SAA (outside of a NASA contract) — with a non-NASA crew. Although there is plenty of precedent for contractor test flights in government aviation developments, such flights are always under the certification authority of the government (either the contracting agency, Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], or both). For this NASA option, the demo flight would be outside of NASA’s acquisition authority, thus raising several safety-relevant questions: (1) Would the SAA partner’s demo flight be conducted outside of NASA’s launch and entry certification authority? (2) To the extent that the required FAA license would not cover crew safety systems and procedures (FAA authority is limited by statute), would any other government agency step in to certify flight crew safety? (3) If not, would NASA be legally obligated to certify for crew safety? (4) If the answers to (1) through (3) leave a gap in government crew safety certification, would Agency stake-holders perceive NASA as irresponsible in its sponsorship/facilitation or tacit acceptance of a high-risk activity? [Emphasis added]

Note the unstated assumptions in the questions. For instance, there is an assumption that it is a federal responsibility to ensure passenger safety in private spaceflight. There is currently no such responsibility, statutorily. Let me answer the questions for the panel, under current law.

1) Yes.
2) No.
3) No.
4) Maybe.

The latter is a political question, but it strikes to the core of what I’m talking about in my book. “Agency stake-holders” is an ill-defined term, and certainly not a formal one. I presume they mean primarily Congress, but perhaps they mean the American people as well. If it is not NASA personnel involved, it truly is none of NASA’s business if SpaceX or Boeing want to risk their own employees. In any case, we need to discuss this, and that discussion should be happening now.

[Update a few minutes later]

Whoa! They’re singing my tune:

Space transportation, like all other modes of transportation, involves risk. In 2009, the most recent year for which data is available, 547 people lost their lives in aviation accidents, most of which involved general aviation aircraft. Accidents related to trains and railroad systems killed 695 people. Recreational boating claimed the lives of 736 participants. On our nation’s highways, we experienced 33,868 fatalities involving cars, trucks, buses, and motorcycles. It is not very realistic to assume that space transportation will be able to eliminate accidents completely, no matter how much emphasis we place on safety and mission assurance.

NASA must to do a better job of helping its stakeholders, which include senior political leadership,the news media, and the general public, to understand and manage expectations about the risks and benefits (the value) involved in human spaceflight. As Congress itself pointed out in the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004, “spaceflight is inherently risky.” Spaceflight will never, in the foreseeable future, be truly routine, nor will it ever be “safe” when that word is used in the context of our everyday life. Discussions of risk without concomitant discussions of the associated value to be gained are superficial, misleading, and do not permit those involved to arrive at a well reasoned judgment concerning the appropriateness in undertaking this risk. The ASAP recommends that NASA clearly and consistently communicate the hazards involved, their risk of occurrence, and why the value of the goals to be realized warrant taking such risks. This practice will enable the programs to better pursue innovative paths forward to achieve safe, reliable, and cost effective space transportation.

At its heart, the reticence to discuss problems is exacerbated by a failure to proactively explain the risk versus reward—in other words, the net value of the undertaking. It is not surprising that without a clear mission whose importance is understood and is explicitly articulated, stakeholders would be less likely to support an activity which is perceived as having problems without any countervailing benefits that offset the risks. NASA should develop a focused strategic communication plan covering priorities, risks, costs, and benefits. [Emphasis added]

From the conclusion of the book:

NASA must establish a finite value for an astronaut’s life. In practice, the amount cannot be infinite, since the agency has a finite budget and finds it necessary to get things done occasionally. If there is a political obligation to pretend that it is infinite, this means that honest discussion of safety tradeoffs and priorities is forbidden. This actively increases risk, because, as we saw with the Ares I program, it essentially guarantees that money and effort will be allocated haphazardly, rather than being focused on the most serious problems.

It’s almost like they read the book already.

The ASAP Report

The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel has come out with its annual report, much of which deals with commercial crew, and Clark Lindsey has some concerns. I share them, and may update the book to include this.

[Update a while later]

Here’s one statement in the ASAP report with which I strongly concur:

In the view of the ASAP, it is time for all stakeholders to reach a consensus on what the Nation is attempting to accomplish in human spaceflight and then fund that effort adequately and consistently.

And we’re a long way off from such a consensus.

Selling The Senate Launch System

One of the many problems with SLS has been that there were no missions defined for it. One of its contractors, Boeing, has accordingly decided to define some lunar exploration architectures that utilize it. Of course, they don’t have any comparisons with the much cheaper alternatives that don’t. If I were SpaceX (or ULA, though for political reasons they probably can’t), I’d be putting some together.

[Update early afternoon]

Now that I think about it, Golden Spike has already done it.