Category Archives: Space

Jeff Greason Speaks

I’m set up in the room at the Space Access conference, waiting to hear what XCOR Aerospace is up to. Live blogging will commence directly.

Henry Vanderbilt is introducing Jeff, but noting a change in schedule for later — Tomas Svitek won’t be able to make it, because his Zeppelin is late. True story.

Jeff:

Has been building up a really good space policy rant for the past couple months, but will mostly talk about XCOR.

Been around eleven years now, one of the few companies that weren’t founded by someone with deep pockets, but are still here, and right now, the times are really good. So he has a cautionary note to sound.

On track to be tied for best year ever, and if a couple potential contracts come in, will be the best. But floodgates haven’t yet opened up with money pouring on him out of the sky.

Can say more this year about XCOR/ULA alliance than he could last year. Costs of critical elements in building EELVs has been rising lately. Nice to work with ULA because they don’t act like canonical “Big Aerospace” companies. Have been occasions when small companies try to do new things and the response of big companies is to come up with non-market means to prevent them. In this case, ULA has decided to try to innovate and get a better product at a lower price. If you rounded up all the people at Boeing and Lockheed Martin who think that space should be done more commercially and shoved them into a ghetto, it would look like ULA.

It is a good thing for the industrial base that we have multiple companies competing to do launches, and that they are trying to rebuild the contractor base that they need. He is concerned that there is insufficient market to support multiple providers, but hopes things will continue.

Happy to be paid to work with hydrogen. Hadn’t been doing it before because it hadn’t made sense for his business, but it just beats everything else for in-space transportation. Now that the moon has been discovered to have significant amounts of water, hydrogen wins. So glad to have ULA work with them on hydrogen pumps so he could be “where the puck was going.” Things going well so far.

Starting to see that the conventional wisdom of how hard it is to work with hydrogen and handing rocket propellants in general share a lot of mythologies. Some propellants, the more you work with them the more you like them and some the more you hate them — not sure where hydrogen is yet.

Happy with development of Lynx engine, but propulsion has not been long pole on that development for a long time. Showing video of engine test. Dan DeLong (chief engineer) not at conference because at supplier doing acceptance test on lox tank. Nice thing about piston pumps is that they work with auto industry instead of aerospace industry.

Lynx serves three markets — people, research payloads, and nanosats. A lot of people seem to focus on one or the other, but XCOR is continuing all markets despite recent media emphasis on payload market.

Seeing a lot of interest in payloads in the external pod, for volume reasons and because it’s more readily accessible to the space environment. Have some researchers who want to do repeat flights, which makes it more worth their while than a one-time experiment.

Shuttle/ISS locker is “structurally baroque” single-point solution that has become a standard. Nineteen-inch rack will eventually replace, but not immediately.

Don’t want to be retailers, and hoping that payload integrator industry and standard payload interfaces will emerge. Want to work with a few people who will hold hands of thousands of customers. Will continue to work with custom payloads, as long as they are paid for it. Want to be able to offer “menu” of integrators to payload customers. Two “real” customers for wet leases (real in the sense that they have paid XCOR money), Curacao and South Korea, but are in discussion with others.

Discussing moratorium on FAA regulation that expires next year. Wants to extend it because things haven’t been moving as fast as hoped when regulation passed in 2004. Wants an event-based extension rather than a time-based one. FAA plans to set up a technical center in Florida and hire ex-NASA types. Has no opinion on that because it’s about commercial crew, which isn’t his current business.

Continues to think that export control policies are disastrous for the country, but have to work with them, and advice remains same with State Department as with FAA — don’t surprise the bureaucracy. Take your time to let them think about it and ask questions. So far, people at State are just trying to do their job in terms of making Curacao and South Korea happen.

Couldn’t be happier about Lynx progress. Working it very actively, pieces become better and better defined, but pace continues to be driven by profits from other customers, subject to getting jobs done for them. As they get more money, they’ll be able to focus more on it. Hasn’t been able to state a schedule, but if contract revenue stream continues to grow, will develop vehicle whether they get more investment or not. Investment climate is now “different” if not better. At some point, money has to come out of mattresses. Not much institutional investment yet, still dribbles and drabs. Could be less happy, could also be more happy.

The more he works with wind tunnels, the more he likes them. May build their own. Will be going back to Huntsville tunnel after presumed government hiatus. Air Force considering providing more tunnel time for exploration of other parameters of interest to them. Showing tunnel runs, and noting how much faster runs can be done compared to CFD. Can machine model for reruns much faster than building a new grid for the CFD. “Support your local wind tunnel.” “We should have an agency that owns facilities to do things like that…”

Finalizing details of vehicle, and simulators. Doing ergonomic tests in suits to make sure that controls are controllable. Reaction-control system still in work, still wants to get all toxic propellants out of vehicle, and if any are left, it is still operationally hard. Hard to do non-toxic RCS, but think they have it figured out. May get government support for it, but can’t count on it.

Question: Is dorsal pod a permanent part of the vehicle? Answer: No, too much drag, so only carried when required.

Question: When is payload users guide coming out? Still need to review payload interfaces for ITAR purposes. Can talk about things if you are US citizen. Problem with ITAR is the “guilty-until-proven-innocent” nature of it — you don’t know a priori if discussing the location of a hole is verboten.

In response to a question I didn’t hear, Jeff says, flatly, “XCOR does not accept cost-plus contracts. I can’t speak for anyone else.”

In response to a question about orbit, says that as they get more comfortable with hydrogen, they may get more interested. Question is reusability. Like toxic propellants, no such thing as “99% reusable.” Still don’t know if it will be in the technology roadmap for future XCOR use.

Non-toxic RCS propellant is a highly oxygenated fuel that is “not quite monopropellant, but wants to be.” Oxygenated fuel is “fluffy” (not as dense as desired) but you don’t need very much of it. Doesn’t like monopropellants from a safety standpoint, and doesn’t find argument for getting rid of a tank and valve compelling.

A Launch Industry Earthquake

I’ve started blogging over at the Washington Examiner. My first post over there is about Elon’s announcement this week.

Hitting the road in a few minutes for Phoenix, so no more posts until this afternoon or evening.

[Late afternoon update]

Just got to the conference. Gwynne Shotwell, president of SpaceX, is scheduled to speak in a few minutes. It will be interesting to see what she has to say about Tuesday’s announcement.

[Friday afternoon update]

For those wondering about Gwynne’s talk, Clark Lindsey has some notes, as does Doug Messier.

Falcon 9 Heavy

I’m watching the press conference now. Clark Lindsey is live blogging it.

I’d say that the big news is that it’s got more payload than expected, and will mean previously unthinkable price per pound. It is also big enough to do any conceivable planetary mission one would want, in sufficient numbers. The one question I wish that someone would ask is fairing size.

[Update a while later]

Clark has the press release.

[Update later in the morning]

Apparently I mistitled the post. It’s not a Falcon 9 Heavy, it’s a Falcon Heavy. I’m not sure what this means, other than the upgraded engines. Is is a different upper stage as well? It’s not obvious from the press release. Time to ask SpaceX.

[Update late morning]

Here’s the SpaceX simulation:

That Aerospace Study

I was out of town for the weekend, and hadn’t had a chance to look at this briefing, which purports to show that Commercial Crew is a bad deal for NASA. While one suspects that this was the goal of those who commissioned it, ironically, it actually does the opposite.

I should preface this by saying that I’ve known John Skratt for about a quarter of a century, and worked with him quite a bit, and he’s a veteran cost analyst and a straight shooter. In fact, I left him a phone message last week, having no idea that this was in work, suggesting that we get together to discuss the situation with the broken cost models. In retrospect, I’m now unshocked that he hasn’t yet returned the call.

The real problem with the paper (as is often the case, unfortunately — it’s a lot easier to challenge such things when there are flaws in the math or logic) is in the assumptions. Every single one of them on charts 3 and 4 are nonsensical. I’m going to make the assumption that they are not John’s, but perhaps those who asked him to do it (with input from the Hill?). Thus, garbage in, garbage out, as the Commercial Spaceflight Federation points out in devastating detail.

But as frequent Space Politics commenter “Major Tom” also points out (scroll way down, it’s currently the bottom of a 150-comment post), even with these nutty assumptions, it’s still cheaper than a NASA solution:

The report’s bottom line is that under multiple worst-case conditions (halved NASA business, commercial customers at a loss, new LV developments, oppressive safety regime, etc.), NASA could expect to pay ~$20 billion for commercial crew development and ten years of operations.

That’s half of what Ares I/Orion development would have cost ($35-40 billion). It’s equivalent to what SLS/MPCV development will cost ($16 billion-plus for Shuttle-derived SLS plus another ~$5 billion for an Orion-based MPCV). Neither of those option even get to operations before blowing $20 billion.

Per the Commercial Spaceflight Federation, the study is conservative to a fault.

But even with all that conservatism and all those worst-case conditions, commercial crew still comes out ahead of Shuttle-derived solutions like Ares I/Orion or SLS/MPCV by a factor of 2-4.

Expect it, though, to be trumpeted by the defenders of the status quo as the death knell for the nutty notion of having actual competition in human spaceflight.

[Mid-afternoon update]

Funny, John returned my call this afternoon. I don’t know if it was in response to this post (I doubt it), but the conversation was cordial. And interesting. But unfortunately, off the record.

Yes, I know it’s a tease, but I thought I should at least mention that we did finally talk.

A Static Analysis

Paul Spudis says that propellant depots are a necessary but not sufficient condition for opening up the solar system.

Well, in the long run, sure. But as Clark Lindsey notes, in the short term, I think that a dollar spent on reducing launch costs will have a lot higher ROI than a dollar spent on getting propellant from the moon. That’s just the harsh economic reality, largely because reducing launch costs is a very low-hanging fruit, given how ridiculously and unnecessarily high they currently are. Elon has already started to show the way, and fully reusable space transports that develop out of the suborbital and other markets will accelerate the process. Once we solve that problem (and it won’t take that long, once we get serious about it, which will start when the markets flower), then ISRU will start to look a lot more attractive, because doing it will be a lot cheaper as well.

How To Explore

Alan Wilhite, Doug Stanley, Dale Arney and Chris Jones have put together an extremely politically incorrect technical presentation, in that it explains how one does serious space exploration and even development without using the Senate Launch System. They baselined Falcon 9 and its heavy version for the launch systems. I haven’t looked at it in detail, but as Jon Goff and Clark Lindsey have noted, it is a much more affordable concept than the SLS route. They appear to be assuming that the Merlin 2 won’t be developed, but if it were, I would imagine a significant decrease in recurring costs, particularly for the heavy. I’m curious to know how much cooperation they got from SpaceX for this work.

I’ll be looking it over and figuring out how to repurpose it to wage some political battles, but for now I’d just note chart 6, and the dominance of the costs for heavy lift in the HEFT studies. There are a lot of things that we could buy for that $2.5B per year that would have a lot more value.

One other point (as Jon also mentioned) — I’ve known Alan Wilhite and Doug Stanley for decades, having done a lot of work with them at Langley in the early nineties, and they’re both good guys, but Doug was in charge of the controversial ESAS activity that gave us Constellation (he had left Langley and gone to work at OSC, where he was working fairly closely with Mike Griffin). Whatever one wants to think about that effort, I would say that this one redeems him considerably. It also (as Jon notes) makes a very powerful statement about the earlier results and the need for heavy lift. Also, Doug was on record of opposing a lunar return, wanting to get on to Mars. I’m thinking that the de-emphasis on the moon in the new “Flexible Path” approach has freed him up somewhat (not to mention that he no longer has to please his former boss).

[Update a few minutes later]

I would add that there some very clueless comments at the NASA Watch post. Those commenting either didn’t actually read, or didn’t understand the briefing, if they still believe that HLV is more cost effective.

[Update a while later]

OK, I’m glancing through the briefing, and they don’t seem to be considering the fact that dry launching the in-space hardware will reduce its structural weight somewhat. Doing so will make the concept even better.

Also, Chart 31 is interesting — note the note: “These NAFCOM costs are a factor of 3 to 6 higher than actual costs for ISS Cygnus and Dragon DDT&E.”

NAFCOM is the NASA Air-Force Cost Model. I’ve been wanting to write a piece for a while now with the title, “The Cost Models Are Broken.” We’ve sort of known it since DC-X and the X-Prize, but SpaceX has really completely shattered them. This is actually good news, since parametric costing has been locking us into high costs on cost-plus contracts for decades.

More later as I continue to peruse.

[Update a while later]

Here’s the summary of the issues and benefits:

Issues

  • Authorization Act language
  • Requires longer storage of cryo propellants than alternatives and addition of zero-g transfer technologies
  • Multiple launches statistically will result in more launch failures, but most launches are to the depot and not on critical mission path
  • NASA loses some control/oversight
  • Added complexity of depot

Benefits

  • Tens of billions of dollars of cost savings and lower up-front costs to fit within budget profile (no HLLV-based options fit within budget)
  • Launch every 2 or 3 months rather than 1 every 18 months with HLLV
  • – Provides experienced and focused workforce to improve safety
  • – Operational learning for reduced costs and higher launch reliability.
  • Allows multiple competitors for propellant delivery
  • – Competition drives down costs
  • – Alternatives available if critical launch failure occurs
  • – Low-risk, hands-off way for international partners to contribute
  • Reduced critical path mission complexity (AR&Ds, events, number of unique elements)
  • Provides additional mission flexibility by altering propellant load
  • Commonality with commercial crew/COTS vehicles will allow sharing of fixed costs between programs and “right-sized” vehicle for ISS
  • Stimulate US commercial launch industry

They forgot the biggest issue — it doesn’t preserve the Shuttle Industrial Complex, particularly in Utah. Though they may be subtly alluding to that with their semi-cryptic “Authorization Language” bullet. As for the benefits, it’s almost like they read my essay.

The Senate Launch System

I’ve added a new page to the “Issues” section of the Competitive Space Task Force web site.

[Update a while later]

The Space Frontier Foundation has just issued a press release calling for people to hit the Hill:

Please remind your Representative & Senators they are not rocket scientists!
Let NASA compete all the best ideas for a Space Launch System…
Don’t mandate an unaffordable/unsustainable “Senate Launch System”!

Six months into Fiscal Year 2011 the U.S. Congress is still trying to write a budget for a year that’s half over. Down in the weeds of the final “continuing resolution” (CR) will be NASA’s budget for human space exploration. The House-passed CR provides flexibility for NASA to choose the most affordable and sustainable approach. The Senate’s draft CR, which didn’t even pass the Senate, told NASA to build a 130-ton heavy-lift launch vehicle right away… using current contractors and 1970s era technology.

Everyone reading this alert wants NASA to start exploring again. But there are a lot of options for exploration transportation that don’t require paying the huge fixed costs of the Shuttle or Constellation forever. Heavy-lift capabilities can be developed incrementally over time, as we can afford them and are ready to use them.

Our space program needs an open and fair competition among not just different contractors but different and even multiple approaches to see which are the most affordable, most flexible, and most sustainable to develop and operate.

Instead, some in Congress want to make NASA build their favorite rocket, without competition, even though NASA has already told them it can’t be done for the resources available on anything like the timetable Congress wants. It’s time to stop the Congress from mandating the Senate Launch System, and let NASA compete ideas for one (or more) Space Launch System(s).

We can’t afford to repeat the mistakes of Constellation, and just rubber-stamp a pre-selected design for a rocket.

No more sole-source, non-competitive procurements for cost-plus contracts!

Every pro-space American should call their Senators and Representative, and tell them that they must encourage NASA to compete the Space Launch System’s design and contracts! This means you!!!

What we‘re asking you to do: Call the congressional switchboard (202-224-3121) – when you talk to them, tell them who your Senators and Representative are (or where you live), and they’ll connect you to the appropriate office. Alternatively, look them up, then call or fax their Washington, D.C. office.

How to communicate: Be polite and respectful, but don’t lose your passion. It’s important to avoid swearing or insulting words, but at the same time it’s also important to let the staffer know that this issue is important to you.

What to say: Congress should stop telling NASA what kind of rocket to build, and instead advocate the tried and true American approach of competition. NASA should be encouraged to compete not just the contractors but the best, most affordable ideas for exploration transportation. Anything less will be unaffordable, unsustainable, and un-American.

Thanks for your help!
Bob Werb, Chairman of the Board, Space Frontier Foundation

Well, what are you waiting for…?

[Update a while later]

Here’s the release at the SFF site, if you want to comment there.