Category Archives: Space

X-Prize History

Memories from Peter Diamandis.

For the record, I have a vivid memory of sitting in a meeting with Peter in LA at a meeting on the subject in conjunction with a Space Frontier Foundation meeting around 1994-1995, and when he said that he had been talking to businessmen in St. Louis, I suggested that he suggest to them that the theme should be the “New Spirit Of St. Louis,” in memoriam to Lindbergh.

I’m not claiming that I came up with it first, or that someone else didn’t suggest it to him or them earlier, or that he didn’t come up with it prior — there’s no way to know that, unless Peter has something to say. But I recall it vividly.

New Life For Falcon 1

Falcon 1e, that is:

SpaceX plans to launch the second-generation satellites on multiple Falcon 1e launch vehicles, an enhanced version of SpaceX’s Falcon 1 launch vehicle. Most recently, Falcon 1 successfully delivered the RazakSAT satellite to orbit for ATSB of Malaysia. Designed from the ground up by SpaceX, the Falcon 1e has upgraded propulsion, structures and avionics systems in order to further improve reliability and mass-to-orbit capability.

There’s been an assumption that the Falcon 1 was kind of a learning experience, and that the focus would shift to Falcon 9, but it looks like they’re going to continue with both for quite a while. Also, I’ve been having an argument with someone over in comments at NASA Watch who thinks that SpaceX can’t survive without NASA. That’s always been nonsense, and remains so.

Of course, Falcon 1e has never flown. Considering what happened when they switched engines from Flight 3 to Flight 4, it would behoove them to not use one of Orbcomm’s birds for a guinea pig.

[Update a few minutes later]

If this page is right (it seems a little tentative, with the question mark — it’s probably a guess based on satellite weight and vehicle performance), they will go up three at a time, so that’s six flights.

[Update a while later]

Some commenters here think that it might be six birds per launch, so that would be only three additional flights to the manifest. Seems like a lot of eggs in each basket. I wonder what the cost of the satellites is versus launch cost? It would be an interesting sales job for SpaceX, because if they tried to get more launches by putting fewer satellites up per launch, they’d be implying that their vehicle wasn’t reliable…

But there really is a trade, if the satellites cost a lot more than the launch, and you have to have a good idea of vehicle reliability to perform it properly.

I should add that this is one of the key arguments for propellant as a payload. The vehicle reliability becomes almost irrelevant.

A Blow For Space Diving

I’ve heard from a reliable source that Eli Thompson has died in a skydiving accident in Switzerland. He had been planning to be the first person to dive from a rocket. I’m sure that someone else will step up, though. Condolences to his young family.

I thought this was kind of ironic, from the link:

After his first jump at 19, Eli Thompson knew that skydiving was something he would do for the rest of his life.

Sadly, he was right, but probably not quite in the way he intended.

Explaining The Problem

There’s a long comment over at NASA Watch that pretty much sums up how we got to where we are today:

Let me tell you how NASA works. Engineers in the hallways lament that they can’t believe we are designing a rocket and spacecraft this way….with very little redundancy in critical systems, no weight margin, severely restricted capabilities from what we initially wanted out of the system. And then these same engineers enter the meeting room and none will jump on the table and beat their fists and tell others what they *really* think. All of the design reviews come off swimmingly because everyone is drinking the kool-aid. You end up with a “forward work” chart a mile long but everyone smiles and exits stage left.

In a nutshell you have tremendous group-think within NASA. Why do they behave this way? I will give you a hint….its because they don’t want to rock the boat and they all want to collect their paycheck with a minimum of fuss and they all want to be promoted on schedule – many, many people think that “everything will just work itself out”.

So the answer to the initial question is that in the 1960s the people designing the hardware had real world experience building missles and they were not afraid to speak up and be heard – and they had leaders who were experts in their field – who knew what they were doing.

Today, none of the Cx leaders have any such experience. All of that experience died years ago when those people retired.

And it’s allowed to be this way, because space isn’t important. All that’s important are the jobs.

Space “Democratization”

Ferris Valyn has some thoughts on that WaPo editorial on commercializing LEO transportation.

It’s kind of amusing to see him arguing with some of the lefty anti-capitalist loons who populate Kos. This was a little less amusing:

Competitive markets (and I stress the word competitive) can be very good at lowering price points. Sometimes they can get too low, and we end up with things like Wal-mart, but this is an situation that desperately needs its price points lowered.

I doubt if the millions of lower-income people whose lives have been improved by Walmart think that their prices are “too low.”

The Constellation Empire

strikes back:

The video itself is perhaps a bit subtle: it’s arguing for staying the course in Constellation, but doesn’t hit the viewer over the head repeatedly with that message. The closing slide asks viewers to contact the White House and Congress and “tell them you DO NOT Want to ‘Take a Chance’ with the U.S. Human Space Flight Program.” (capitalization and punctuation in original.) The information on the YouTube page, though, is rather more blunt: “Although a thorough review was conducted four years ago—and a direction chosen, contracts awarded, tests conducted, and rockets built—the Augustine committee wants to stop work and do something new,” it claims. “This will widen the gap between the retirement of the shuttle and its replacement vehicle, waste billions of dollars and threaten Americas [sic] presence in space. You can STOP this.”

It’s going to be an interesting fall for space policy and politics.

More Road Apples From NASA

So, Orion supposedly passed its Preliminary Design Review (even though it never really made it through a System Requirements Review, and the requirements are still all over the map as a result of the Ares 1 problems and other issues). But I don’t buy this:

If Orion’s companion rocket — dubbed Ares 1 — is spiked in favor of another rocket, then any Orion mission would be delayed by up to two years so engineers could fit a new rocket to the capsule.

That possibility looms large. Ares 1 faces mounting technical and financial problems and an independent presidential panel said this summer that it would be impossible for Ares 1 to meet its goal of a first mission in 2015 without a funding increase of tens of billions of dollars.

Given these funding pressures, it’s uncertain when Orion could be ready for a new mission if a new rocket is chosen.

This is just more FUD by Hanley to try to save Ares 1. It is six years until 2015 (and they already had less than a 35% confidence of hitting that date even with Ares 1). Sure there will be some changes to the vehicle if they switch over to an affordable and safe launcher, but there is no reason in the world that those changes would have to add two years to an already long schedule. I’d be curious to see the project schedule and critical path.

[Afternoon update]

“Rocketman” has a plausible alternate theory:

Viceroy Hanley, standing on one leg with his fingers crossed behind his back, came as close as he’s going to admit the real status of Orion at it’s PDR. He’s at least two years behind schedule. How do we know that?

“It’ll take up to two years to fit a new rocket to the capsule,” he said. Design changes to accommodate weight and size differences are required he says.

But at least one EELV provides more mass margin than the corndog does.

As I note in comments, playing “schedule chicken” like this is a win-win for him — either he gets to keep Ares, or he gets an excuse for his schedule slip. But only if he keeps his job, and someone doesn’t call him on it. If I were Bolden I’d demand a briefing showing (as already noted) the assumptions behind his claim.

[Update a couple minutes later]

What is schedule chicken, you ask? It’s a game in which multiple teams on a project are behind, but they don’t want to report it, and they don’t in the hope that someone else will fess up first, making their own slip moot so they don’t have to. It can have just as disastrous program results as the road version, in terms of delays and cost increases.