Category Archives: Space

More Bolden Commentary

There’s a story at the LA Times. Not much new, but I thought that this was worth a comment:

Logsdon said he believed the skepticism about Obama’s support for manned flight was “misguided” from the first. The comment about taking money from NASA was made by a junior campaign aide, he said.

I’m disappointed in Professor Logsdon. His own comment is more than “misguided.” It’s disingenuous, and in fact false, though I’ll give him the benefit of the doubt and just assume that he’s unfamiliar with what actually happened, and was told this by someone else (though he should be following it closely, being a premier expert on space policy and all…).

It wasn’t merely a “comment” from a “junior campaign aide.” He says this as though it was just an aside on background. No. It was the official position in a white paper at the campaign web site. Jeff Foust described the history of the Obama space-policy shifts, and their ongoing nebulosity, back in August.

If Senator Obama didn’t pay any attention to it at the time (we know how much trouble he has getting good help) and he’s since reversed it (and he seems to have) that’s great, but I see no point in whitewashing the history of what happened. It was an area of legitimate concern for space (or at least NASA) enthusiasts at the time, and it does provide legitimate cause to question how deep his enthusiasm is now. His supporters might claim that he had a road-to-Damascus moment, and now talks about how excited he was by Apollo growing up in Hawaii, but he was talking about that prior to the “funding education by delaying Constellation” time period as well.

I remain an agnostic on the degree of support of this president for either space, or NASA. Only the future will tell.

The Heroes Of Space

Frank Sietzen says that we should remember them as well on Memorial Day.

I agree — in their own way, particularly in the sixties, they were on the front lines of the Cold War. Even if you don’t believe that Apollo and subsequent events (such as ASTP) really helped to bring down the Soviet Union, the people supporting it believed that it was vital at the time, and on Memorial Day, we commemorate all who have served or fallen, regardless of the strategic significance of their efforts in retrospect.

Unfortunately, we’re a little nationally schizophrenic on the subject. We consider what they do vital and important, yet we consider them too important to allow them to take risk, and when they die, the symbolism of their loss overwhelms common sense. This is one of the reasons that human spaceflight is so expensive — we consider astronaut loss unacceptable and will spend billions to prevent even a single incident, even though it’s inevitable if we are to open the final frontier, and economically insane.

Occasional commenter Paul Dietz once noted that if we were serious about opening up space, we’d force America to grow up, and set aside a huge cemetery, like Arlington, to symbolize the numbers of lost pioneers that we expected in the endeavor. I agree.

But in a sense, we have. Down at the KSC Visitor Center, there is a memorial wall that contains the names of those who have died so far, including the crews of Apollo 1, and the Challenger and Columbia disasters. It’s worth noting that there are a lot more than seventeen squares on it. There’s room for many more, should we have the boldness to continue.

[Update late morning]

This post brings to mind what I wrote the day after the Columbia loss:

The crewmembers of that flight were each unique, and utterly irreplaceable to those who knew and loved them, and are devastated by their sudden absence from their lives, and to paraphrase what the president said after September 11, seven worlds were destroyed yesterday.

But, while this may sound callous, the space program will go on just fine without them. They knew their job was hazardous, they did it anyway, and by all accounts, they died doing what they wanted, and loved, to do. There are many more astronauts in the astronaut corps who, if a Shuttle was sitting on the pad tomorrow, fueled and ready to go, would eagerly strap themselves in and go, even with the inquiry still going on, because they know that it’s flown over a hundred times without burning up on entry, and they still like the odds. And if yesterday’s events made them suddenly timorous, there is a line of a hundred people eagerly waiting to replace each one that would quit, each more than competent and adequate to the task. America, and the idea of America, is an unending cornucopia of astronaut material.

When it comes to space, hardware matters, and currently useful space hardware is a very scarce commodity. People are optional. A Shuttle can get into orbit with no crew aboard. It could return that way as well, with some minor design modifications (actuators for nose-wheel steering and brakes, and gear deployment). But no one gets to space without transportation. Many of us would walk there if we could, but we can’t.

Yesterday, we lost a quarter of our Shuttle fleet. The next time we fly, we’ll be putting at risk a third of the remainder. If we lose that one, every flight thereafter will be risking half of America’s capability to put people into orbit.

So, when I grieve the loss of Columbia, it’s not because it was just a symbol. What I truly grieve is the loss of the capability that it not just represented, but possessed. That vehicle will never again deliver a payload or a human to space. It cost billions of dollars to build, and would cost many billions and several years to replace. That was the true loss yesterday, not the crew. I think that people realize this on some level, but feel uncomfortable in articulating it.

As I said, we have to grow up on this issue if we want to open a frontier.

[Update a couple minutes later]

In rereading that post, and following the link to my initial post on hearing of the disaster, I found this sadly prescient (actually, much of the post was, including my initial second guess as to what had happened):

Someone in the comments section asks if the vehicle will be replaced. No, that’s not really possible — much of the tooling to build it is gone. It would cost many billions, and take years, and it’s not really needed at the current paltry flight rate. Assuming that they have confidence to fly again after they determine the cause, they’ll continue to operate with the three-vehicle fleet, until we come up with a more rational way of getting people into space, whatever that turns out to be. Unfortunately, because it’s a government program, I fear that the replacement(s) won’t necessarily be more rational…

My fear, at least to date, has been borne out. I hope that the new Augustine Commission and the new NASA management can rectify it, but it’s only a hope, not an expectation.

To Boldenly Go

…where NASA has never gone before. It’s apparently official that the president has nominated the agency’s first black administrator. But Lori Garver won’t be its first woman deputy administrator — that was Shana Dale.

Of course, they still have to be confirmed by the Senate. And while there were rumors that the administrated wanted “hoopla” associated with the announcement, the first day of a holiday weekend seems like a strange time if that was the goal. I’d have done it at the ISDC in Orlando later this week, with a lot of space-interested attendees present. I wonder if either of them will address the gathering? Lori used to be the executive director of NSS, which puts it on.

What does it mean? Heck if I know. I suspect, though, for good or ill, that neither of them took the job to shut down the NASA human spaceflight program.

And meanwhile, the Hubble-repair crew is stuck in orbit for another day, with continuing much-needed (though not nearly as much needed as it was a week ago) rain and thunderstorms on the Florida east coast. I don’t think they can put off landing past tomorrow, so it’s hoping for good weather at the Cape tomorrow morning, or going to sunny California.

[Update a few minutes later]

“Rocketman” isn’t happy, with what is arguably a slightly racist post (and accompanying comment from an anonymous commenter). I don’t think that either the ATK connection or the fact that he was briefly a “lobbyist” for them are or should be issues (with regard to the latter, the activity wasn’t within the ostensible administration guideline of the past two years). The amount of advocacy seemed to be pretty minimal, and there may even be bad blood there now.

I’m much, much more concerned about the prior (if not current) close relationship with George Abbey. I hope that he won’t be looking there for any advice.

[Update a couple minutes later]

Bobby Block over at the Orlando Sentinel has a story up now. This part concerns me a little:

There has been concern by some in the administration that Bolden would be biased towards human spaceflight and NASA’s current troubled Constellation program to return astronauts to the moon as a first step towards going to Mars later this century.

The Constellation program is wrestling with financial and technical woes and the president has called for a review of the current plans. The White House wanted to make sure Bolden had an open mind before nominating him.

An “open mind” with regard to what? More innovative and affordable means of carrying out the goal? I’m all for it. Or about the goal itself, and turning humanity’s back on space beyond low earth orbit? I hope not.

[Update early afternoon]

For me, the biggest strike against Bolden is that Bill Nelson was such a heavy supporter, and got his way. I should also add that the last time we had an astronaut as administrator (Dick Truly), it was kind of a disaster. He actively lobbied against the Space Exploration Initiative on the Hill in the early nineties, defying his own president. He was fired for his troubles, and replaced by Dan Goldin. But one shouldn’t indulge in the fallacy of hasty generalization and draw any grand conclusions about astronaut administrators in general from a single example.

[Update a few minutes later]

Jeff Foust is rounding up Congressional reaction, from Florida space coast congresswoman Suzanne Kosmas, Florida Senator Bill Nelson, and the chairs of the Science & Technology and Space committees in the House, Democrats all (and the latter, Gabrielle Giffords of Arizona, is a former astronaut herself married to an astronaut).

[Update a couple minutes later]

More reaction from Marc Boucher over at NASA Watch:

Ok, it’s now finally official, but what does this mean? NASA’s has some tough budget years ahead of them with Constellation over budget and negative or zero growth budgets coming. President Obama is a science guy and perhaps not so much a human space flight exploration advocate. The reality is that no matter how many speeches he gives where he touts the inspiration of NASA, it takes hard cold cash to make things happen, especially human space flight.

NASA’s fiscal year 2010 budget request of $18.686 billion includes $456M increase for science and $630M increase for Exploration. Some of that increase is because of the one time Recovery Act stimulus money. If you look at projected budgets for fiscal years 2011, 2012, 2013 you see either negative or zero growth. Already sources say Bolden expressed concern at his meeting with President Obama because he was told that further cuts to human spaceflight in future budgets might be needed.

I have no doubt Bolden is a leader, the question is, with the projected budgets he’ll have, can he get Constellation back on track and on schedule? And what effect will the Human Space Flight Review Panel have going forward?

It’s great to see a nominee like Bolden put forward but really how much can he accomplish? Will Bolden be bold in his leadership?

Good questions, all.

Contrarian

In the midst of all of the celebration of the successful repair mission, I’m going to dash a little cold water here. While I criticized the O’Keefe decision to not do the Hubble repair, it wasn’t a criticism of the decision itself, but rather of the rationale for it. I’ve never supported the mission, because I think that there were much better uses for the money, even for astronomy. But cancelling it because of risk to the crew was a dumb reason to do so (particularly because it made it easy for Griffin to reverse it when he came in). As always in these cases, it’s the money, stupid. And while I’m sure that we’ll get spectacular results from the fix, I remain convinced that there were better uses for the money.

Anyway, Rocketman agrees. Though I would note that the cost of a Shuttle flight isn’t a billion dollars for the purpose of determining the cost of this mission. What’s important for this analysis is the marginal cost of the flight, which, ignoring the cost of the telescope upgrade hardware, was less than a couple hundred million, including crew training. But it was still a lousy deal.

Engine Problems

Chair Force Engineer has been reading the DIRECT rebuttal, and says that there are problems with both the RS-68 and the SSME has an upper-stage engine. One point that he doesn’t make, but is a major issue, is that the SSME is not currently capable of air (or vacuum) start. It currently needs a lot of ground support equipment. Even ignoring the manufacturing cost (which will be recurring every flight), requalifying the hot box for second-stage work will be a major program cost and risk.

Abandoning reusables because of the Shuttle and X-33 is nuts. It’s Wile E. Coyote engineering.

Models Versus Reality

Jon Goff has been doing yeoman’s work in digging into the ESAS appendices. I’ve done a lot of this kind of architecture trade, and it is indeed extremely sensitive to assumptions. And from just this excerpt, while I haven’t read it myself (I can’t find the time from my day job, and I’m glad that Jon did), it sure looks like the game was rigged (which isn’t at all shocking in the context of all of the problems that have arisen). I was simultaneously saddened and amused by this:

I know that Mike Griffin was claiming that part of the reason for doing Ares-I was to teach NASA how to design launch vehicles again, and I guess we have documented proof of the need.

Seriously though, this is a common rookie mistake. You don’t go basing decisions worth tens of billions of dollars on an unvalidated design tool. Now, this isn’t saying that INTROS is a useless tool, just that it obviously doesn’t capture all the state of the art in stage design, and until it does, its results ought to be taken with the appropriate sized (apparently multi-ton) grain of salt.

Well, apparently NASA does exactly that. Or at least it pretends to base them on it. I don’t think that they’re going to pull the wool over Norm’s eyes, though.

Not Good Enough

There’s an old saying attributed to Voltaire that “the perfect is the enemy of the good.” There are multiple interpretations of this aphorism, but one of them is that one must often accept the achievable, even if flawed, in preference to the perfect but unachievable solution.

Many defenders of Constellation use this argument, saying that if it’s not the best architecture, it’s good enough, and the only one politically feasible at this time, and that any other solution will only cause further delay. Implicit in this argument, of course, are the assumptions that further delay is unacceptable and that it is indeed good enough. Clark Lindsey points out an amusing analogy that Roger Pielke came up with in response to a similar argument by Paul Krugman that current plans for cap and trade are good enough — “Get on the bus.”

I don’t think that Ares is quite as bad as the idea of jumping the Grand Canyon with a Greyhound, but I do think it a vast waste of money, if our goal is space accomplishment rather than keeping parking lots full in Huntsville. From this space enthusiast’s perspective, it is not only imperfect, but it’s not even good enough. Even in the unlikely event that it is successful by NASA’s own cost and schedule criteria, it will be a disaster from the standpoint of making us space faring, flying far too little for far too much money per flight. The goals of the Aldridge Commission were good ones, and as currently planned, it contributes little to nothing to achieving them. As I wrote Sunday, if we need some additional delay to get it right, then we should do that, if it’s at all possible. And if it’s not possible, then we should just give up on having a useful and affordable space program, because this plan is so far from one that I certainly don’t want any more of my tax dollars spent on it.

[Update a few minutes later]

The goals of the Augustine review have been posted on the federal register:

The Committee should aim to identify and characterize a range of options that spans the reasonable possibilities for continuation of U.S. human space flight activities beyond retirement of the Space Shuttle. The identification and characterization of these options should address the following objectives: (a) Expediting a new U.S. capability to support utilization of the International Space Station (ISS); (b) supporting missions to the Moon and other destinations beyond low Earth orbit (LEO); (c) stimulating commercial space flight capability; and (d) fitting within the current budget profile for NASA exploration activities.

I can think of many architectures that would do a good job of those four goals, but Constellation isn’t one of them. It really only supports goal (b), and even that not very well. As Clark says, it will be both sad and amusing to watch NASA’s attempts to explain how it does.

Where’s My Flying Car?

And what happened to my space colonies?

Yes, it was never a mass movement, and even with the merger of NSI and L-5, I don’t think that NSS has ever had more than a hundred thousand members. I do think, though, that it is sufficiently appealing to a sufficient number of people that when we break out of the NASA paradigm, and the supply actually responds to demand, some people will live in space in the future.

[Evening update]

Clark Lindsey responds to Dwayne Day’s dyspeptic space colony post:

In the 1970s space had become a niche topic little noticed by the general public. Within that niche area one could search around and find a tiny sub-niche dealing with in-space orbital space colonies. Sure, there were the occasional articles and a handful of books about O’Neill space colonies and a small group of people had a high interest in them. However, you could say the same thing about a million other topics as well. Orbital space colonies never came close to being a topic that most people were aware of, much less considered in any thoughtful way.

If in 1980 you asked a randomly selected group of a thousand people what they thought about space, a thousand would say, probably in the first sentence, that space was wildly expensive. If you asked them if they had read an article about space colonies in the past decade, I doubt even fifty would say yes. And most of those fifty would say such colonies might be a great idea but are impractical while space travel is so wildly expensive.

Yes, as is the case of much of space policy, it’s all about information and perspective. (I’ve added “Media Criticism” to the categories for this post, and bumped it…)

More Crazy Talk From Rand

Yes, I understand that there is a desire to salvage the employment of people working on the existing space transportation industry, and particularly the Shuttle components, and that is what is driving the DIRECT design (and Stephen Metschan has weighed in with the conventional false wisdom in comments over there, about the problem with launch costs being one of Isp). The argument is that by using existing parts, we save on development costs. Which is true, probably. If development costs are all that matters.

But, you know, the reason we want to shut down Shuttle isn’t just because it’s “unsafe” (as though safety is a binary condition), but because it kills people at such a high operational cost. And the reason for the high cost? The very thing that they want to preserve, which is the standing army that supports Shuttle.

Now, in the unlikely event I were called to testify before Congress, the first thing that I’d ask them to do would be to ask themselves what goal they are trying to accomplish. Are they trying to accomplish things in space, are they trying to make us seriously space faring, or are they in the business of preserving/creating jobs (note, not wealth)? If the latter, then by all means, come up with Shuttle derivatives. If the former, we need a clean slate.

Sorry, but what some see as a feature, I see as a bug. If people like that feature, then let’s go ahead and keep space access expensive forever. But don’t give us this Bravo Sierra about how it saves money.