Category Archives: Space

PITA

Alan’s a great science and tech reporter, but I wish that he’d asked George Nield about this:

We have poured a pad for tethered hover testing at our new location, but there was a recent FAA re-interpretation of the law that absurdly states that testing under a tether, as we have been doing for over eight years, is now considered a suborbital launch, and requires a permit or waiver just as a free flight would. This is retarded and counterproductive in so many ways, and the entire industry is lashing back over it, but it is an issue we have to deal with in the next couple months.

Maybe I will.

Oopsie

Some folks have been criticizing the recent Orion parachute test failure as just one more screwup at NASA that they’ve been covering up, and made a bigger deal of it than it is, but Henry Spencer has a more nuanced, and correct view:

Foul-ups in testing are not uncommon, especially when the test setup is being tried for the first time. One of the headaches of high-tech test programmes is having to debug the test arrangements before you can start debugging the things you’re trying to test.

Sometimes a malfunctioning test setup actually gives the tested system a chance to show what it can do in an unrehearsed emergency. During a test of an Apollo escape-system in the 1960s, the escape system successfully got the capsule clear of a malfunctioning test rocket.

But sometimes the test conditions are so unrealistically severe that there’s no hope of correct functioning. Unpleasant though the result often looks, this isn’t properly considered a failure of the tested system. That seems to have been what happened here.

As I’ve noted before, requirements verification is where the real cost of a development program comes from, particularly when the only useful verification method is test.

Our Screwed-Up Space Policy

You know, the more I think about this, the more I think it should always have been a no brainer.

The first rule of wing walking is to not let go of the airplane with one hand until you have a firm new grip with the other. It’s pretty simple: don’t shut down the Shuttle until you have a replacement in place (and preferably redundantly).

The only reason we’re undertaking such a dumb policy is because of the panic after the loss of Columbia causing a desire to end the program ASAP, and an unwillingness to pay what it cost to fund the new development at the same time we were continuing to spend billions annually on keeping the Shuttle going. The notion that we can take the savings from ending the Shuttle to develop the new systems seems appealing, but it essentially guarantees a “gap.”

And it’s all a result of the fact that space isn’t important. Is there any other government activity where we arbitrarily assign a budget number to it, and then demand that its endeavors fit within that budget? But that’s the way Congress has always viewed NASA–that there’s a certain level of spending that’s politically acceptable, and no more. If space were important, we’d do what we did in Apollo–establish a goal, and then provide the funding necessary to achieve it. But it’s not, other than for pork and prestige. It’s important that we have a space program, but it’s not at all important that it accomplish anything of value. Until that attitude changes, we’re unlikely to get sensible policy.

Shake, Rattle and Roll

Keith Cowing has a report on today’s telecon to discuss the Ares 1 vibration issue. Apparently they’ve settled on a solution before they really understand the problem.

[Late afternoon update]

Bobby Block and Todd Halvorson have blog posts up as well. But I think that Halvorson’s reporting is a little garbled here:

Gravitation forces on the astronauts will be reduced to 0.25 Gs from around 5 to 6 Gs, the latter of which is about double the force exerted on shuttle crews.

I think that he’s confusing the steady-state acceleration resulting from thrust with the vibration acceleration ostensibly being mitigated by the springs and dampers. Also, it’s not a “gravitation force.” I’m assuming that NASA meant that they can reduce the oscillations on the crew couch from high gees to a quarter of a gee, but that’s independent of the gees imposed by thrust. If they’re only accelerating at a quarter of a gee, that would result in horrific gravity losses during ascent.

McCain’s Space Advice

Well, now we know what the “space experts” told John McCain yesterday up in Titusville.

As I noted in my piece at PJM, the options aren’t very pretty. The lowest risk course is to continue Shuttle past 2010, but to keep this option open, they have to take some immediate actions to keep production open on consumables, such as ETs. As I’ve noted before, it’s ironic that they’re shutting the system down just as they’ve finally wrung most of the bugs out of it. It still remains horrifically expensive, of course, but no more so than Ares/Orion, and it has a lot more capability. I think that the “recertification” issue is a red herring. Just because the CAIB recommended it doesn’t mean that it makes any sense, since no one knows what it really means. Nothing magical happens in 2010 that makes it suddenly unsafe to fly. That date was chosen as the earliest one that they could retire and still complete ISS, not on the basis that anything was worn or wearing out. They could just continue to fly, and do periodic inspections.

I found it interesting, but not surprising, that Lafitte recommended an acceleration of Ares. It would be more in his company’s interest to just give up on it and use Atlas, but I suspect that would be too politically incorrect to say with reporters around. He has to live with Mike Griffin for at least another few months.

What would I do if I were king? I’d stop buying Soyuz, and keep the Shuttle flying, I’d abandon Ares/Orion, and provide huge incentives to the private sector by establishing prop depots and paying good money for prop delivery. That would require more money than people want to spend, but we’d get a lot more robust transportation infrastructure, ready to go to either the moon or Mars (or other destinations) at a lot lower mission cost than NASA’s current plans. It’s what we would do if space were really important. But of course, it’s not, so we won’t.