I just got an email from Pat Kelley:
I received a call from Anne Greenglass to tell me that Len’s ashes will be interred at Arlington cemetery with full military honors on September 17. Any of Len’s friends and cohorts who are in the Washington area on that date are welcome to come to the service. As we get closer to the date if I have any more information I will pass it along.
He’s referring to Len Cormier, who died of cancer a few days ago.
…about space policy
The three say they don’t know for certain why the White House has failed to provide the appropriate guidance and funding needed to implement the Vision, “though we suspect it can be explained by Bush not knowing all the facts about what the real impact of NASA’s annual budgets has been since the loss of the Columbia in 2003.”
I think the problem is less in the funding, and more in the lack of guidance. Once Griffin was hired, the White House apparently decided that it was mission accomplished, and refocused to much more pressing issues, despite the fact that NASA’s implementation seems to fly in the face of the original vision and the recommendations of the Aldridge Commission.
And Clark Lindsey gives them a lecture of their own:
These Senators don’t seem to know that NASA could have chosen to pursue an innovative low cost approach to space development and lunar exploration rather than choosing a very long and very expensive path to two new vehicles, both of which will be very costly to operate. These Senators apparently don’t even know about COTS, the one modest effort taken by the agency towards lower costs for space hardware development and operations.
Well, what most Senators don’t know, particularly about space, could fill a small library. Maybe even a large one.
Sorry I didn’t mention it yesterday so you could listen live, but hey, the ability to download and listen at your own convenience is one of the features of the Interweb. Last night I did a one-hour interview with Rick Moran on space stuff. Download it here.
As usual, Doug Cooke defends ESAS:
The “direct” variation fails to meet NASA’s needs on several grounds. It is vastly over-capacity and too costly to service the International Space Station, but worse, its lift capacity would not be enough for NASA to maintain a sustained presence on the moon.
Advocates for the “direct” variation are touting unrealistic development costs and schedules. A fundamental difference is that the Ares I and Orion probability of crew survival is at least two times better than all of the other concepts evaluated, including “direct”-like concepts.
Also as usual, he provides no evidence for his assertions. We are simply supposed to accept them because Doug Cooke says so. Have we ever seen the actual report that came out of the sixty-day study, with a description of methodology and assumptions? I haven’t.
I’m not necessarily a big fan of “Direct,” but his statement raises more issues than it answers. Why doesn’t the “lift capacity allow a sustained presence on the moon” in a way that ESAS does? Why should it be assumed that NASA’s new launch system will service space station? I thought that this was what COTS was for? What are the marginal costs of an additional Jupiter launch versus Ares 1?
Give us some numbers, and provide a basis for them, and we might take this seriously.
[Wednesday morning update]
More thoughts and comments at NASA Watch, and from Chair Force Engineer.
As usual, Doug Cooke defends ESAS:
The “direct” variation fails to meet NASA’s needs on several grounds. It is vastly over-capacity and too costly to service the International Space Station, but worse, its lift capacity would not be enough for NASA to maintain a sustained presence on the moon.
Advocates for the “direct” variation are touting unrealistic development costs and schedules. A fundamental difference is that the Ares I and Orion probability of crew survival is at least two times better than all of the other concepts evaluated, including “direct”-like concepts.
Also as usual, he provides no evidence for his assertions. We are simply supposed to accept them because Doug Cooke says so. Have we ever seen the actual report that came out of the sixty-day study, with a description of methodology and assumptions? I haven’t.
I’m not necessarily a big fan of “Direct,” but his statement raises more issues than it answers. Why doesn’t the “lift capacity allow a sustained presence on the moon” in a way that ESAS does? Why should it be assumed that NASA’s new launch system will service space station? I thought that this was what COTS was for? What are the marginal costs of an additional Jupiter launch versus Ares 1?
Give us some numbers, and provide a basis for them, and we might take this seriously.
[Wednesday morning update]
More thoughts and comments at NASA Watch, and from Chair Force Engineer.
And where is it going, in commercial space?
I have to say, I thought this was pretty funny:
Virgin Galactic has already been watching its back with the EADS suborbital space plane (pictured above), set to make its first flight by 2012. But now there’s cash across the pond. “We have invested substantial money into this project,” Auque said without citing exact figures. “The problem is that we need to create this market.”
I doubt very much that Virgin Galactic is worried that EADS Astrium is going to raise a billion dollars to build a suborbital tourist vehicle. There’s a reason that Auque didn’t cite “exact” (or even approximate) figures. He expects to do it mostly with someone else’s money, if he can find a sucker (like ESA?).
A commercial space wiki. I’ll have to add it to the blogroll (even though, technically speaking, it’s not a blog. But I don’t have a wikiroll…).
I have a new piece up over at Pajamas Media on space transportation and the Interstate Highway System.
Hey, it was Mike Griffin who made the analogy, not me.
I should also note that while the title is mine, the subheadline is theirs.
[Late afternoon update]
Only Mark Whittington would have the native talent to so misread this piece as to think that I was “expressing astonishment.” Of course, it’s not the first time that he’s fantasized about my views.
[Another update]
Now Mark is fantasizing that I actually want, or expect NASA to build the Interstate to space.
Well, it’s totally in character for him.
I sure wish he’d learn to read for comprehension.
Keith Cowing thinks that the Coalition for Space Exploration is asking the wrong questions.
If the Coalition for Space Exploration really wants to further the notion of a robust taxpayer-funded program of space exploration – one based on a solid footing of public support – then they need to start paying attention to what their polls actually say and stop trying to skew the results to say something that the numbers do not support. If, however, they want to support space exploration – regardless of how it comes about – then they need to re-examine their motives – and ask different questions.
People might not want to pay more taxes for space exploration, but they might be interested in buying a ticket.
Indeed.
As usual (and perhaps inevitably), an organization ostensibly set up for the purpose of supporting space exploration in general ends up being a NASA cheerleader. That’s partly because a lot of the funding for it comes from the space industrial complex. In any event, these polls should always be taken with a grain, if not a whole shaker of salt. They’re based on public ignorance, and once again demonstrate that support for the current plans are a mile wide and an inch deep.
Jon Goff has put up the fourth installment of his survey on space transport concepts. As he noted earlier, it could be the basis of a useful textbook on the subject, with a lot more work and analysis (and accompanying graphs and figures). When I was on The Space Show the other day, David got a chat from an aerospace engineering student about when he’d learn how to design low-cost launchers, because he hadn’t seen anything about that in any of his course work. This would be the text for such a course.
As Jon notes, TPS is a common thread in making reusable entry vehicles practical and cost effective. The Shuttle tiles are too high maintenance, and risky (as we saw with Columbia). However, a lot of these issues go away if the vehicle “swallows the tank” (as Rockwell and others proposed in their X-33 concepts). No external tank dramatically reduces the risk to damaging the tiles, and containing a hydrogen (or even hydrocarbon, though to a lesser degree) fuel tank makes the vehicle much more “fluffy”* on entry, considerably reducing the heat load. Because of the ET, Shuttle had unique TPS issues that future vehicles are less likely to have to worry about. And also, as Jon notes, XCOR is in the process of building exactly the type of “X-vehicle” that will be useful to start to prove out both trajectory and TPS concepts, something that NASA should have done years ago, and probably would have had it still been NACA.
[Update late afternoon]
Notwithstanding the silly microkerfuffle in comments, I should add that when I came up with the term “fluffy,” it didn’t occur to me to apply it to a vehicle. I really intended it to apply to something that actually is fluffy (i.e., homogeneously undense, e.g., liquid hydrogen), rather than something that has low average density, but very high local density with vast volumes of low or zero density. We should probably come up with some other word to describe a large empty tank, to distinguish between the homogeneous and heterogeneous cases.
*A word I came up with years ago at Rockwell to mean the opposite of “dense.” Others may have come up with it independently.