Can they close the gap? It’s possible (though it seems unlikely) that they could have a successful Falcon 9 launch before a successful Falcon 1 launch. They don’t seem to be letting Falcon 1 problems slow down the Falcon 9 schedule.
Category Archives: Space
The Wrong Split
It’s not very often that I have a new thought about space, but when I do, I should post it here, rather than debuting it at Space Politics, as I did yesterday. Here’s a repeat.
In response to a comment by Stephen Metschan that “According to Dr. Neil Degrasse Tyson, 80% of the life cycle cost of space is in the spacecraft and mission not the launch system,” I wrote:
“That’s because we haven’t been doing human exploration to the moon and Mars for the time period over which he gathered that data. The vast amount of payload delivered to orbit for a spacefaring civilization (at least initially, until we are getting it from extraterrestrial sources) is propellant, which costs almost nothing on earth, but is very expensive in space when it’s put up on an expensive launch system. And propellant is almost infinitely divisible, and something that can go up on large vehicles, small vehicles, high-reliability vehicles and low-reliability vehicles. But the important thing about it is that it go up on low-cost vehicles.
I’m always amused by the absurd notion that the mistake we made in the past was mixing crew and cargo.
No.
The real mistake that we made was mixing cargo (which is high value, at least if it’s space systems, as opposed to logistics, regardless of whether people are being delivered) and propellant. Once you stop doing that, the rationale for large vehicles goes away completely. It can be done with existing vehicles, or new lower-cost vehicles. But it doesn’t need expensive new and large expendable vehicles. And in fact they are counterproductive.”
I should expand on this sometime. I think that there’s an interesting economic argument for “impedance matching” vehicle costs to payload costs.
Mike Griffin’s Frustration
I was going to have some comments about the administrator’s leaked email, but haven’t had the time. Fortunately, over in comments at Space politics, “anonymous.space” picks up my slack:
He didn’t mean for it to be shown to the outside world, but the revisionism, hypocrisy, and self-adulation in Griffin’s email is pretty shocking, even this late into the ESAS/Constellation debacle. It’s either that, or he’s been lying about his real positions for a long time. Griffin wrote:
“Exactly as I predicted, events have unfolded in a way that makes it clear how unwise it was for the US to adopt a policy of deliberate dependence on another power for access to the ISS.”
Griffin never predicted this. Instead, Griffin repeatedly stated that the VSE — including its 2010 date for Shuttle retirement — and the accompanying NASA Authorization Act of 2005 provide the nation with its best civil space policy in decades. In fact, Griffin said so as recently as January 2008 in an STA speech:
“I consider this to be the best civil space policy to be enunciated by a president, and the best Authorization Act to be approved by the Congress, since the 1960s.”
See here.
In fact, just before becoming NASA Administrator, Griffin even _led_ a study that argued as one of its central conclusions/recommendations that the Space Shuttle could and should be retired after ISS assembly reached the stage of “U.S. Core Complete”, certainly no later than 2010.
See here.
If Griffin was really so prescient as to predict the situation that NASA’s human space flight programs are in now, then he should have spoken up years ago instead of repeatedly signing onto studies and policies that are flawed according to the argument in his email. In fact, it would have been wrong for him to have lobbied for the job of NASA Administrator to begin with if he really thought that the President’s policy was so compromised.
Griffin should resign immediately and apologize if his email reflects what he’s actually believed all these years. If not, and his email represents how Griffin has recently changed his views, then Griffin should admit that he was wrong to sign onto the policy, argue that the policy needs to be revised, and resign if it is not revised in a manner that he can support.
Griffin also wrote:
“In a rational world, we would have been allowed to pick a Shuttle retirement date to be consistent with Ares/Orion availability”
Griffin is confused about both chronology and causality in this statement. The Shuttle retirement date came first — as a recommendation about Shuttle operability and certification in the CAIB report and then as policy in the VSE. The replacement for Shuttle (originally CEV in the VSE and then Ares/Orion in ESAS) came second and was supposed to have a schedule that was responsive to that Shuttle retirement date.
In a rational world, a rational NASA Administrator would have picked a rational Shuttle replacement that could be developed rapidly and fielded soon after the 2010 deadline for Shuttle retirement using the available budgetary and technical resources. Instead, Griffin chose an Ares/Orion system that is so technically compromised that it can’t complete even its preliminary design review before the end of the Bush II Administration and is so costly that it can’t be flown operationally within the available budget until 2015 (and even that date has only a limited chance of being met).
Gemini took less than four years to develop and fly. In the same amount of time, Ares I/Orion will not complete its preliminary design review. That is not rational.
Apollo took seven years to develop and fly (to the Moon). In the same amount of time, Ares I/Orion will still be (at least) three years from flying (to the ISS). That is not rational.
Griffin also wrote:
“We would have been asked to deploy Ares/Orion as early as possible (rather than “not later than 2014″) and we would have been provided the necessary budget to make it so.”
Griffin is just making up history with this statement. NASA was never asked to “deploy Ares/Orion” at all. Rather, the VSE directed NASA to develop a Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV, which eventually becameOrion), and provided a budget that supported CEV development. The VSE never directed NASA to develop a new launch vehicle that duplicated the nation’s military and commercial capabilities with yet another medium- to intermediate-lift launcher (Ares), and the budget never supported such a development. Ares I needlessly busted the VSE budget box from day one, requiring the termination of billions of dollars of ISS research and exploration technology development just to start its design activities.
And why does anyone have to ask Griffin to deploy a Shuttle replacement as early as possible when the VSE gives him the flexibility to develop a replacement anytime before 2014? Is the NASA Administrator really so unambitious and lacking in initiative that, instead of being given a deadline (which he’s blown by a year anyway), he also has to be told by the White House to execute a critical replacement program as rapidly as possible?
And then Griffin wrote:
“… for OSTP and OMB, retiring the Shuttle is a jihad rather than an engineering and program management decision.”
First, for the head of any federal agency to use the term “jihad” in written reference to the White House offices that set policy for and fund their agency – especially when the same White House has been leading a seven-year war against Islamic extremism – demonstrates such extremely poor judgement that it brings into question whether that agency head is still fit to serve.
Second, the 2010 date for Shuttle retirement was effectively set by the CAIB’s expert judgment about and extensive investigation into the vehicle’s operational and certification issues. OSTP and OMB (and NASA under the prior Administrator) simply reiterated the 2010 date in the VSE. If Griffin wants to challenge the 2010 Shuttle retirement date, then he needs to challenge the engineering and program management analysis and expertise of the 13-member CAIB and its 32 staff, not OSTP and OMB. OSTP and OMB read and followed the CAIB report on this issue. Apparently Griffin did not and has not.
The only things OSTP and OMB are guilty of is not fulfilling all of the White House’s funding commitments to the VSE and not stopping Ares I/Orion at the outset when those projects busted the budget, or later when they ran into insurmountable technical issues and schedule delays that made them programmatically and politically useless.
Griffin also wrote:
“Further, they [OSTP and OMB] actively do not want the ISS to be sustained, and have done everything possible to ensure that it would not be.”
For the same NASA Administrator who wiped out billions of dollars of ISS research and who referred to the ISS as a “mistake” in the press to criticize White House offices about their lack of support for the ISS is the height of hypocrisy. See (add http://www):
.usatoday.com/tech/science/space/2005-09-27-nasa-griffin-interview_x.htm):
Griffin needs to stop flailing in the political winds, make up his mind, and stick with a consistent position on the value (or lack thereof) of the ISS.
Finally, and this is a technical nit compared to the issues above, but towards the end, Griffin also wrote:
“The argument that we need to get Shuttle out of the way so that conversion of the VAB/MAF for Constellation can proceed is similarly specious.”
This totally misses the point. The VAB and MAF are just really huge shells that NASA can build anything in. It’s the launch and rocket test infrastructure (the pads, the mobile launcher platform, and test stands) that the Shuttle and Constellation system share, and which Constellation has to make modifications to, that will interminably slow Constellation development if Shuttle continues to make use of those facilities.
My kingdom for a rational NASA Administrator who reads and follows policy direction, develops programs within their allotted budgets, encourages and listens to independent technical advice, and has the capacity to admit when the current plan is fubar and adjust course in a timely manner.
Maybe in the next administration, regardless of who wins. But don’t bet on it. The only area in which I disagree with these comments concerns the Shuttle retirement date. As I noted in a later comment over there:
“…why did they pick 2010? What is magic about that date (particularly when no one really knows what ‘certification’ means)?
I had always assumed that the CAIB thought that the Shuttle should be retired ASAP, and that if it wasn’t, it would have to be ‘recertified’ for longer life (ignoring the issue that the term was undefined). But ASAP meant no sooner than ISS completion, which (I think even then) was scheduled for 2010 (at least after the Columbia loss and standown). Hence the date (it doesn’t hurt that it’s a round number).
The Shuttle doesn’t suddenly become less safe to fly in 2011, or even 2012. If there is a degradation, it is a gradual one, not a binary condition, and there is no obvious ‘knee in the curve.’ The date was driven by non-Shuttle considerations, IMO. If someone on the CAIB (e.g., Dr. Day) knows otherwise, I’d be interested to know that.”
And if Mike Griffin is now frustrated, and wants to know who to blame, he’ll see him the next time he shaves.
Alphabetical
Irene Klotz is hosting the latest carnival of space, with a different theme.
An Interesting Interview
…with Mike Griffin.
Not a lot new here for people who have been following it. And I would have a lot bolder vision for a “perfect world” than simply enough money to fly Shuttle while developing the Paintshaker. And he seems to be ignoring the issue that they share facilities and that mods have to occur (unless he was asking for enough money for new facilities for the new launcher).
And this is a useful point:
Q: When I tell non space people about the gap, the response is almost universally “you’re kidding.” Why is that?
Griffin: The ‘you’re kidding’ part and the lack of notice, for several years it was something fairly far off in the future. The actual circumstance doesn’t even occur in the next president’s administration unless that president gets two terms. It certainly wasn’t occurring in this president’s administration and it doesn’t occur in any of the next couple of Congresses, right? Nobody around today was certain to be on scene when the actual consequence occurs. Moreover, I don’t think anybody reading about it in the papers … thought really that it was going to be allowed to come to pass.
A lot of people argue that we need governments to fund things like this because private industry is too short sighted.
Give me a break.
Sarah Shrugged
Irene Klotz has been won over by Sarah Palin and Ayn Rand. And the former Democrat is going to be following the campaign from a space perspective. Not sure how much she’s going to have to report. I doubt that it will be a big issue outside of Florida.
Where Did That Number Come From?
I hadn’t seen this before. Mike Griffin is claiming that extending Shuttle will dramatically reduce its reliability:
In April this year, he told a Senate panel: “If one were to do as some have suggested and fly the shuttle for an additional five years — say, two missions a year — the risk would be about one in 12 that we would lose another crew. That’s a high risk ….. [one] I would not choose to accept on behalf of our astronauts.”
So he’s saying that each of those flights has a probability of success of 99.1% (about one in a hundred chance of losing the vehicle). That’s the number that, when taken to the tenth power (the number of flights) comes out to a 92% probability of not losing a vehicle. 99% is slightly better than historical record, based on the two losses of Challenger and Columbia, but I would expect after all the money they spent on resolving foam and other issues that they should have a much safer vehicle now (probably the safest it’s ever been). Is he assuming some kind of reduction in reliability as the system ages or we can’t replace parts over that fiveyear period? I’m curious to know how they came up with it.
Impact Of New Space
There’s an interesting discussion in comments between Clark Lindsey and Dwayne Day (and others, though those are less interesting) on how much progress we have made in achieving the goals of the new private space industry over at Space Transport News.
Clark tends to be a glass-half-full kind of guy. Dr. Day thinks there are a few drops in the bottom, and they’re poisoned.
Sea Versus Space
Dwayne Day has an interesting history comparing undersea exploration technology with space exploration technology.
One other point of coming convergence–the increasing use of underwater suit concepts for space suits (particularly for high-pressure suits that can eliminate the need to prebreathe). Historically, NASA has generally ignored the undersea folks, though there has been a lot of private interaction (Phil Nuytten of Can-Dive has been developing hard suit concepts for decades). It looked like that might be changing with the selection of Oceaneering for the new EMU program, until NASA cancelled the contract and reopened the competition. We’ll see what the future holds, and if Hamilton Sunstrand retains their grip on the agency space-suit budget.
Whistling Past The Graveyard
The Ares graveyard, that is. Mark Whittington once again proudly demonstrates his ignorance about space technology. Some would be embarrassed by it, but never Mark.
Now, I’m not adroit at deciphering the somewhat arcane language of NASA documents, though I’ve read my share of them. But the numbers that Jon quotes is under a column called “Current Analysis” which is to the right of a column called “TPM REQT.” That suggests, just drawing on an ability to read the English language, that the numbers quoted are a snapshot in time and do not reflect where the folks working on Constellation expect to be when the Orion and Ares start flying. Therefore not quite as alarming as Rand, Jon, or the mysterious person who calls himself “Anonymous Space” would like to imply.
You’re right. You are not adroit (though there’s nothing “arcane” about this particular document). Of course it’s a “current analysis.” That’s the only kind of analysis that one can do in the present. When it’s redone in the future, that analysis will be the current analysis. And the current analysis says that the LOC/LOM are nowhere near what was originally promised for the vehicle (just as was the case for the Shuttle). There are no obvious ways to improve it–the hazards that lower it to those numbers are essentially intrinsic to the design, and probably not mitigatible within the mass budget. There is also no obvious way to “expect” something different in the future. This reality is almost certainly the reason that the Preliminary Design Review was delayed into next year.
It should also be noted that, despite the mythology about how “safe” the Saturn/CSM were, we were damned lucky to not lose a crew during Apollo. Had we flown a lot more missions, it’s almost guaranteed that we would have. Had the oxygen tank that exploded in Apollo XIII occurred on the way back, we would have lost the crew, no matter how innovative and responsive ground control was, no matter how many times Gene Kranz declared that failure was not an option. Sometimes, failure happens. And one of the reasons that space costs so much, the way NASA does it, is that when failure isn’t an option, success gets outrageously expensive.
But it gets better:
Putting it another way, it is so of like suggesting that the LOM probability for SpaceX’s Falcon 1 will be %100 just because the first three test flights have all failed to achieve orbit.
No, that is not “putting it another way.” That is saying something entirely different and utterly irrelevant. If he’s attempting to do a Bayesian probability of future Falcon success based on its history, the next flight would have a 75% chance of failure, not a hundred percent. But there’s a big difference between making an empirical estimate from past performance, and an analytical estimate based on a probabilistic risk analysis, the latter of which is where the Orion/Ares LOC/LOM numbers come from. Ares hasn’t flown yet, so it’s absurd to compare it to Falcon’s actual record.