Category Archives: Space

More On The “CAD Problem”

Jeff Finckenor responds to some of his critics in the comments section:

“He’s a whiner who didn’t get his way and went to the IG”

Not a terribly polite way to put things, but I suppose it is somewhat accurate. Of course “my way” which I was always advocating was a call to do a technical evaluation to determine what we really needed to do. You know, things like writing requirements, then making selections based on those requirements. Some people would call that good engineering. Some would call it federal law. It never happened. Had it happened then I wouldn’t have had any arguments to make and would have been shut down a long time ago. Had it happened and there were real reasons for MSFC and Constellation making the decisions they did, then I could have supported them even if I was less then thrilled. You go to the IG to report waste, fraud and abuse. I was duty bound to report what I saw as both a taxpayer and a government employee. If there wasn’t any meat to what I was saying, then the IG would have sent me away. They didn’t. Those who want to do the search may also want to look up a letter from Senator Grassley to NASA. It was a very powerful letter and appears to have been soundly ignored. It takes a lot of chutzpah to blow off the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, but NASA got away with it.

Those who argue with me will trot out an “evaluation” that was done in 2002, except that that evaluation was based on a CM tool ONLY (not CAD management), and it was fatally flawed in how it was performed. And yes, all you’re getting here is an opinion, and again my information has been documented and given to the appropriate authorities.

Was I asked to “stop working against management”? I guess that’s one way to put it, if I was willing to ignore reality, give up on the vision of what NASA needs to succeed, and toe the party line.

It was wrenching deciding 3 years ago that my job wasn’t worth the mess that I was seeing. I had basically decided that a NASA that could make a decision so badly (which is not quite the same thing as a bad decision, though in this case I believe it is the same), and not be able to correct itself was not a good place to work. So I committed to supporting good engineering practice and federal law, knowing that I might be forced out. 3 years later, I have given up, which was again wrenching for me. The politics are too overwhelming, and it is indeed not a good place for me to work.

Go read the whole thing.

All of the comments have to be very disquieting to fans of business as usual at NASA. It’s not about CAD. It’s about whether this is an institution that, despite the many talented people working for it, is capable of getting us into space in any serious way.

And So It Begins

As I noted in my recent PJM piece, if we are going to continue to fly the Shuttle, decisions must be made almost immediately to keep key infrastructure in place, that is due to be dismantled. Several legislators, including the presumptive Republican presidential nominee, have sent a letter to the White House urging just such an action. It will be interesting to see the administration response.

A Brief History

…and a depressing one, of the Vision for Space Exploration. There’s a piece missing in the chronology, though. “Safe, Simple, Soon” was not part of the original vision. That was a sales slogan that ATK came up with to promote their particular means of implementing it. As noted, though, it seems to be failing on all three counts.

Note the comment that PDR has slipped into next year.

[Update mid morning PDT]

More on the PDR slip. It’s all the way out to next spring.

The Heavy-Lift Fetish

I’ve discussed this many times before, but Al Fansome has a useful comment over at Space Politics (scroll way down–it’s in the forties):

Other than Bob Zubrin (e.g., the Mars Society), I don’t know of any space advocacy organizations who have made super-heavy-lift a priority. The only reason that super-heavy-lift is a priority now is because Mike Griffin came in and made a command decision. He already knew the answer — ESAS was a facade to justify the decision he had already made.

Let me try to give you a serious response to your question.

Have you thought about how all the truly GREAT engineering projects on this planet have been built?

Let me list a few obvious ones.

– The Pyramids
– The Great Wall
– The Empire State Building
– The Hoover Dam (or pick your favorite dam)
– The Eiffel Tower
– The Kremlin
– The U.S. Capitol Building
– The Statue of Liberty
– The Golden Gate Bridge

They all have at least ONE thing in common. The pieces of each & every one of these great engineering projects were transported to the final site in pieces, and then assembled on site.

Great engineering in enabled by low-cost transportation and the ability to assemble the technology on site.

We are KILLING ourselves by not taking the same approach to space.

Next — think about standard home construction.

1) There are estimated to be more than 100 million homes in America.

http://www.census.gov/prod/1/pop/p25-1129.pdf+Number+of+houses+in+United+States&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=us

Of that number, the estimated number of mobile homes is ~9 million
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/census_2000/001543.html

In other words, well over 90%, or over 90 million, of American “homes” (whether in single family dwelling, apartments, condos, etc.) are assembled by the same method that is used to assemble the great engineering projects. This choice is obviously driven by economics (nobody mandated this result.)

SUMMARY: The large majority of Western and Eastern civilization has been built using the approach of cheaply transporting the pieces of the construction project to the site, and then final assembly at that site.

So, why are we ignoring the dominant traditional approach that is used over the entire planet?

Why are we not assuming that the right way to build our space economy, and to develop the space frontier, is to develop & use reusable launch vehicles to transport things to space at very low costs, and then assemble the pieces on-site.

Mike Griffin gave a speech a couple years ago talking about constructing the great cathedrals in Europe. Well, those cathedrals were transported to the final site in millions of pieces, and then assembled.

We continue to treat space differently than earthly endeavors for contingent reasons of history, not rationality or technology. Thus we get the cargo-cult approach of ESAS, in which NASA attempts to replicate Apollo, except without either the associated urgency, or the budget.

[Update on Sunday afternoon]

Since some people seem to imagine that the oil rig is a useful analogy, let me expand on it. It actually is one, but not in a way advantageous to the heavy-lift fetishists.

Yes, it is assembled in port and then towed to its operational location. But this is in no way analogous to assembling on the ground and launching to orbit. This is because of the huge energy barrier between the two. It’s no big deal to tow something from one place in the ocean to another–that’s a very old technology, and an extensive transportation infrastructure exists with which to do so. Thus, it makes sense to assemble it essentially in the ocean, but near land, to take advantage of the local work force.

But note that what we don’t do with oil rigs is assemble them in Colorado, and then build a humungous custom truck (and associated reinforced roads, with clearances) to move it to the shore and put it in the water. But that’s essentially what people are proposing in saying that things should be fully assembled on earth, and then launched into space, on a giant rocket that flies just once in a while, at a very high cost (particularly after amortizing the development cost).

In space the oil rig scenario would be analogous to having an existing assembly facility in LEO (that had presumably been bootstrapped up), with a robust low-cost transportation infrastructure to get things to and from earth, and from point to point in space. The “oil rig” (or large telescope facility, or prop depot for use at L1) would be assembled there, and then a space tug would move it to its final destination.

This was in fact part of the original vision for the SSF in the eighties. The “dual truss” configuration was intended to act as an orbital assembly hangar. Unfortunately, we didn’t have the transportation infrastructure to support it. But the fact remains that what we need is not heavy lift, but affordable, reliable and frequent lift. Once we get the latter, it will become clear how to best utilize it to accomplish our goals.

More Thoughts On The Tether Permits

Paul Breed notes in comments that the decision to require permits or waivers for tethered testing didn’t originate with AST (though I never claimed it did), but with the FAA chief counsel’s office. To me, this is just one more argument for making the office independent of the FAA and report directly to the SecDot, as it did from its inception until the Clinton administration “streamlined” it into the FAA.