Category Archives: Space

Economics, Political Commentary, Space

What Fresh Hell Is This?

35 Comments

ATK is making noises about commercializing Ares 1. Unsurprisingly, it’s full of bovine excrement right off the bat:

Ron Dittemore, president of ATK Launch Systems, said the human-rating that led NASA to build the Ares I first stage around the shuttle booster should also be attractive to other customers with “high-value” payloads, including the Defense Dept. and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).

“Ares I can deliver humans, can deliver payload to low Earth orbit; it can deliver payload to geosynchronous Earth orbit and beyond – planetary missions – it’s got that much capability,” Dittemore said at the 24th National Space Symposium here. “And what’s unique is that since we’re designing this vehicle with human reliability, proven demonstrated systems, high-value payload customers may see a real attractiveness to putting either DOD or NRO payloads on this launch system.”

First of all, the Shuttle booster is not “human rated.” The Shuttle itself is not, and never has been, human-rated (I’ve said it before, and I’ll say it again: I wish that we could expunge the phrase “human rating” from our vocabulary–very few phrases in the space business are as misunderstood and misused by so many as this one). What he means is that the fact that they have been willing to use the SRB for the Shuttle (despite the fact that in the case of Challenger, it destroyed the vehicle and killed the crew) led them to decide that it was reliable enough to use for Ares.

One of the things that people don’t understand about “human rating” is that it is not (just) about reliability, which is the probability of mission success. Human rating is about safety, which is a different thing. It is about the ability to know when the mission is about to go sour, and the ability to safely get away from the vehicle before it does. So while reliability is nice, what’s much more important is warning time and escapability, from the launch pad all the way to orbit (something that the Shuttle has never had, which is why it’s not human rated).

But satellites aren’t going to have a launch escape system, so they don’t care about human rating. What they care about is reliability, and I have seen zero evidence that Ares is going to be more reliable than either Delta IV or Atlas V. Human rating the latter two vehicles will not involve making them more reliable–it will involve putting in the systems needed for adequate failure onset detection (FOSD) and ensuring that they have adequate performance to eliminate abort blackout zones throughout their trajectory (something much more difficult for the Delta than the Atlas, due to to its underpowered second stage). So from a mission assurance standpoint, Ares has nothing to offer to a satellite owner over the current commercial vehicles.

Moreover, there is no discussion of cost. Even if they can get away with not having to amortize development, because the government paid for it and it’s sunk, how much of an army will a NASA-developed/operated vehicle require? History would indicate a pretty large one, particularly given the politics of the situation. So will a commercial launch have to pay its share of the annual fixed operating costs, or will ATK (unfairly) be able to subsidize and undercut the ULA by only paying marginal costs for the launch, and having NASA pay the freight for the rest? And it will have to use the VAB for processing, and the NASA pad for launch. Will NASA be reimbursed for the use of its facilities? How much?

This seems like a huge potential bucket of worms, and all because NASA decided that it had to develop its own launch vehicle.

Is ATK serious? I doubt it. I suspect that this is just a PR move to maintain political support for it among the rubes inside the Beltway who don’t understand these issues, to show that it has applications beyond the NASA lunar (and ISS) missions. Unfortunately, it may work.

[Update a couple minutes later]

Oh, and how could I forget this? How thrilled will the satellite owners be to put their bird on the paint mixer that is the Ares 1, on top of that five-segment solid, when they can get a smooth ride on a Delta or Atlas?

Business, Space

The State Of The Industry

13 Comments

I mentioned yesterday that, in addition to hawking rockets, John Carmack had an assessment of the state of the industry and his competition. If you didn’t read it, it’s well worth a read, and I largely agree with it. Just a few quibbles:

Scaled / Virgin is the safest bet for success. Outside of the X-15, Space Ship One is the only example of a reusable, 100km class manned vehicle. Everyone else, us included, requires a lot more extrapolation for an investor to believe in, and the problem isn’t nearly as trivial as some people like to make it out to be with the “There are no technical challenges, just give us the money!” lines. It is not true that any old team could have won the X-Prize if Paul Allen had given them $20 million.

On this last sentence, while I don’t have any reason to think that John is aiming that comment at me in particular, I have made statements, both at Space Access a couple weeks ago and here, that some might mistakenly take to mean that I would dispute this. I have said that Burt’s success lay not (just) in his engineering talents, but more importantly, in his reputation and ability to raise the money. When I said that the mystique of Burt has been broken, my point was that many people believed (and still may believe) that only Burt could have won the X-Prize, in terms of technical capability, and I don’t believe that to be the case.

Clearly, only Burt was capable of raising the money (at least from Paul Allen) to win the X-Prize, and that this was the critical achievement. I do believe that there are others who, had they been adequately funded (i.e., on the same level as Burt) could have won as well. That does not mean that I believe that “any old team” could have done it–there were obviously many teams that couldn’t engineer their way out of a wet kleenex. It takes a combination of engineering capability and funding. There was more engineering capability than funding available, at least at the time, and only Burt had both, so Burt won.

I also agree with John’s assessment that Scaled’s approach is low risk, but also high marginal cost and not particularly operable (and not as safe as advertised from the standpoint of propulsion–I’ve long been on record as saying that hybrids have been overhyped from a safety standpoint, and have suggested to Alex Tai that he should be soft peddling this aspect). They’ve chosen a hyperconservative design that will be safe, but they also risk getting undercut in price by more operable systems with lower marginal costs, and marginal costs are important when you get into a price war. Sir Richard has the funds to subsidize the system for a while to compete, but I doubt if he wants to do it forever. So they are smart to be a space line that will have access to other vehicles, because I suspect that they’re going to decide that they need options other than WK2/SS2.

I also agree that Dreamchaser is not a promising concept (again, partly because hybrids have been overhyped). I thoroughly agree with his pithy assessment of EADS/Astrium’s laughable proposal: “Oh, please.”

I think that his assessment of his own efforts is valid. He has taken an approach of build a little, test a little, and expanded it to build a lot, fly a lot, and he does in fact probably have more test time than all the other folks put together (though as he notes, XCOR is likely to catch up quickly as they move forward with X-Racer and Lynx).

The great thing is that we don’t have to bet on a single horse. There are a number of competing approaches, both in terms of how to develop vehicles, and what kind of experience to offer to the customers. You’ll never get me in the fishbowl, both because I’d feel much too exposed, but also because I don’t think that I’ll ever trust engines alone to get me down safely. That doesn’t mean that it won’t be a successful concept in the market, though. Unlike many, I don’t foolishly extrapolate my own interests to the rest of the marketplace. I think that there will be different strokes for different folks, and that only by trying a number of different approaches will we see how many of them will be successful, and which will be most successful, which is something that will never happen under a government space program (though we had at least a shot at it under Steidle’s plan for a CEV fly-off, until Mike came along and canned him, and implemented the One True Concept).

We’ve been talking for a long time about a return to the early days of aviation, with a wide variety of approaches, and letting the market sort it out. It appears that we’re finally on the verge of seeing that happen, and I find it very exciting, for all that it’s belated.

Space

Parabolic Arc Update

5 Comments

A few weeks ago, I mentioned a new space blog, called Parabolic Arc, which had pretty good content. Unfortunately, the colors chosen for it (gray text on black background) made it almost literally unreadable. That problem has been fixed, so I’d urge folks to check it out again. (It’s been in the blogroll for a while. I’m actually tempted to move it up higher in preference to some others that are being updated very infrequently).

Business, Economics, Space

Rockets For Sale

7 Comments

John Carmack mentioned this at the conference a week and a half ago, but I don’t think I reported it, at least not in any detail. Armadillo is willing to sell vehicles to anyone who wants to fly them (presumably subject to ITAR restrictions):

The way to look at it is as a “rocket trainer”, rather than a vehicle that can perform any kind of real lunar or suborbital mission. We don’t pretend that the vehicles could actually land on the moon, but if you want to hack on a real, flying system, there is a lot of value to be had.

The price is $500k. The experience of the Lunar Lander Challenge shows quite clearly that you aren’t likely to do it yourself for less, even if you spend a couple years at it. Several intelligent and competent people thought otherwise, and have been proven incorrect.

You can have either a module or a quad, at your choice. The quad has more hover duration, but it is more of a hassle to operate. A module could be fulfilled right now, a quad would take about three months to build, since we are still planning on using Pixel for LLC this year and other tasks. The engine will be one of our new film cooled stainless chambers, and we will warrant it for ten flights. If it blows up or burns through in that time frame, we will replace it. We will not replace the vehicle if it crashes, but historically our engine problems have been visible at startup, and you should have an opportunity to abort the flight. Ground support equipment is included, except for the lox dewar(s), which would be specific to your local lox vendor. We will test the vehicle ourselves, then train your crew to operate it. You get copies of our experimental permit applications and information about the insurance policies we use for permitted flights. Details on modifications to the flight control software are negotiable.

If he got a big order, or multiple customers who wanted delivery ASAP, I wonder how he’d respond? Would he ramp up production (with the intrinsic risks to quality), or keep supply constant and crank up the price? As I’ve said for a long time, at some point this is going to have to transition from a hobby to a business for him, and it seems to me that this has the potential to force that decision, if he has a significant number of takers.

I also wonder how much new engines will cost, assuming that they’re only good for ten flights (he doesn’t say that, but it’s all he’s willing to warrant them for). Let’s say that the engines are half the cost of the vehicle. That would mean a cost of $25K a flight to amortize the engines, which is a lot more than propellant costs. It seems to me that if he only thinks that he can get ten flights, engine life is where his emphasis needs to be for reducing operating costs. It’s also hard to see how he can charge the same amount for a module as a quad, since the latter has four engines in it. I’d really like to understand more about this proposition.

He follows up the offer with his assessment of the industry (and his competition), but I’ll save my thoughts on that for another post.

Political Commentary, Space

Griffin’s COTS Contradictions

8 Comments

Jeff Foust reports on the administrator’s testimony before the Senate:

“Do not confuse my desire for international collaboration for a willingness to rely on others for strategic capability,” he said in open remarks at a subcommittee hearing of the Senate Appropriations Committee last week. Dependence on Soyuz “is not an option we would choose, but it is where we are today. In fact, we must seek an exception to the Iran Syria North Korea Nonproliferation Act because we have no immediate replacement for the shuttle and no other recourse if we wish to sustain the ISS.”

Given that statement, you would think that Griffin would be interested in accelerating domestic commercial options like COTS that would lessen or eliminate an reliance on the Russians. Yet, in his comments later in the hearing, he was not that interested in pursuing a crew option for COTS (also known as Capability D) on an accelerated schedule.

Yeah, you’d think. But I suspect that he fears that if COTS is seen to be making too-rapid progress, it will jeopardize funding for Ares/Orion, by making them seem superfluous. Of course, the traditional argument is that they are designed for the lunar mission, whereas a station crew transfer capability wouldn’t have that additional capability. And Orion is supposedly not just for going back to the moon but for use in a Mars mission as well (though it is never explained what its role is in such a mission). I can’t believe anyone seriously believes that a Mars mission would be performed in a glorified Apollo capsule–it’s simply too small, and the crew would go nuts. If it’s meant as the means to return them to earth upon return to earth orbit, well, OK, but it’s pretty pathetic to think that, seventy years after the first lunar landing, we would still be returning people to the planet in a capsule on a chute (particularly if they end up with a water landing).

Of course, the real danger is that we’ll get the worst of both worlds–a continuation of Ares/Orion, which are supposedly being built because they are necessary to go to the moon, but we drop the lunar mission from the policy, so they revert to simply replacing (or competing with) COTS crew capability. And unfortunately, as devoted Democrat Greg Zsidisin has discovered in a one on one, that seems to be exactly Obama’s plan. The only saving grace of it is that, in delaying the development by five years, it really means that the program will die. But it betrays a fundamental lack of understanding of the nature of space policy, and space hardware and development, on the part of Obama and/or his advisors. You can’t “delay” a program like this and have any hope that it won’t end up costing much more over the long run, particularly because you’ll lose many of the key personnel for it, who aren’t going to sit around twiddling their thumbs at no pay for half a decade while Obama solves the education problem. It’s really quite absurd. But then, most of his proposed policies are–one of the many reasons that he isn’t going to be elected.

As an aside, Jim Muncy said during the wrap-up panel last week in Phoenix that NASA has a bigger problem with the Iran Non-Proliferation Act than buying Soyuzes to replace Shuttle. Because the facilities are in the Russian segment, the ISS astronauts won’t even be able to use the potty if they don’t get a waiver, which could get pretty interesting on a six-month tour. The notion brought up the obvious jokes: “You’ll just have to hold it,” and “You should have gone before you launched…”

[Tuesday morning update]

Jon Goff has further thoughts:

…if you were a congressman or senator with a limited amount of money available, and you have two risky ventures to pick from to try and reduce the gap, what would you do? Would you place all your money on the one option where your money is going to be a relative drop in the bucket, and that even then has little or no chance of actually reducing the gap? Or would you invest at least part of your money in a much smaller program where it has a much higher probability of actually hastening the day when the US once again has manned spaceflight capabilities–and better yet, commercial manned spaceflight capabilities?

You do the math.

Unfortunately, the only math that interests most congresspeople is the number of jobs in their district or state, with “the Gap” a distant second place. Mike knows that, which is why he can get away with this stuff, or at least why he has to date.

Political Commentary, Space

Griffin’s COTS Contradictions

Jeff Foust reports on the administrator’s testimony before the Senate:

“Do not confuse my desire for international collaboration for a willingness to rely on others for strategic capability,” he said in open remarks at a subcommittee hearing of the Senate Appropriations Committee last week. Dependence on Soyuz “is not an option we would choose, but it is where we are today. In fact, we must seek an exception to the Iran Syria North Korea Nonproliferation Act because we have no immediate replacement for the shuttle and no other recourse if we wish to sustain the ISS.”

Given that statement, you would think that Griffin would be interested in accelerating domestic commercial options like COTS that would lessen or eliminate an reliance on the Russians. Yet, in his comments later in the hearing, he was not that interested in pursuing a crew option for COTS (also known as Capability D) on an accelerated schedule.

Yeah, you’d think. But I suspect that he fears that if COTS is seen to be making too-rapid progress, it will jeopardize funding for Ares/Orion, by making them seem superfluous. Of course, the traditional argument is that they are designed for the lunar mission, whereas a station crew transfer capability wouldn’t have that additional capability. And Orion is supposedly not just for going back to the moon but for use in a Mars mission as well (though it is never explained what its role is in such a mission). I can’t believe anyone seriously believes that a Mars mission would be performed in a glorified Apollo capsule–it’s simply too small, and the crew would go nuts. If it’s meant as the means to return them to earth upon return to earth orbit, well, OK, but it’s pretty pathetic to think that, seventy years after the first lunar landing, we would still be returning people to the planet in a capsule on a chute (particularly if they end up with a water landing).

Of course, the real danger is that we’ll get the worst of both worlds–a continuation of Ares/Orion, which are supposedly being built because they are necessary to go to the moon, but we drop the lunar mission from the policy, so they revert to simply replacing (or competing with) COTS crew capability. And unfortunately, as devoted Democrat Greg Zsidisin has discovered in a one on one, that seems to be exactly Obama’s plan. The only saving grace of it is that, in delaying the development by five years, it really means that the program will die. But it betrays a fundamental lack of understanding of the nature of space policy, and space hardware and development, on the part of Obama and/or his advisors. You can’t “delay” a program like this and have any hope that it won’t end up costing much more over the long run, particularly because you’ll lose many of the key personnel for it, who aren’t going to sit around twiddling their thumbs at no pay for half a decade while Obama solves the education problem. It’s really quite absurd. But then, most of his proposed policies are–one of the many reasons that he isn’t going to be elected.

As an aside, Jim Muncy said during the wrap-up panel last week in Phoenix that NASA has a bigger problem with the Iran Non-Proliferation Act than buying Soyuzes to replace Shuttle. Because the facilities are in the Russian segment, the ISS astronauts won’t even be able to use the potty if they don’t get a waiver, which could get pretty interesting on a six-month tour. The notion brought up the obvious jokes: “You’ll just have to hold it,” and “You should have gone before you launched…”

[Tuesday morning update]

Jon Goff has further thoughts:

…if you were a congressman or senator with a limited amount of money available, and you have two risky ventures to pick from to try and reduce the gap, what would you do? Would you place all your money on the one option where your money is going to be a relative drop in the bucket, and that even then has little or no chance of actually reducing the gap? Or would you invest at least part of your money in a much smaller program where it has a much higher probability of actually hastening the day when the US once again has manned spaceflight capabilities–and better yet, commercial manned spaceflight capabilities?

You do the math.

Unfortunately, the only math that interests most congresspeople is the number of jobs in their district or state, with “the Gap” a distant second place. Mike knows that, which is why he can get away with this stuff, or at least why he has to date.

Political Commentary, Space

Griffin’s COTS Contradictions

Jeff Foust reports on the administrator’s testimony before the Senate:

“Do not confuse my desire for international collaboration for a willingness to rely on others for strategic capability,” he said in open remarks at a subcommittee hearing of the Senate Appropriations Committee last week. Dependence on Soyuz “is not an option we would choose, but it is where we are today. In fact, we must seek an exception to the Iran Syria North Korea Nonproliferation Act because we have no immediate replacement for the shuttle and no other recourse if we wish to sustain the ISS.”

Given that statement, you would think that Griffin would be interested in accelerating domestic commercial options like COTS that would lessen or eliminate an reliance on the Russians. Yet, in his comments later in the hearing, he was not that interested in pursuing a crew option for COTS (also known as Capability D) on an accelerated schedule.

Yeah, you’d think. But I suspect that he fears that if COTS is seen to be making too-rapid progress, it will jeopardize funding for Ares/Orion, by making them seem superfluous. Of course, the traditional argument is that they are designed for the lunar mission, whereas a station crew transfer capability wouldn’t have that additional capability. And Orion is supposedly not just for going back to the moon but for use in a Mars mission as well (though it is never explained what its role is in such a mission). I can’t believe anyone seriously believes that a Mars mission would be performed in a glorified Apollo capsule–it’s simply too small, and the crew would go nuts. If it’s meant as the means to return them to earth upon return to earth orbit, well, OK, but it’s pretty pathetic to think that, seventy years after the first lunar landing, we would still be returning people to the planet in a capsule on a chute (particularly if they end up with a water landing).

Of course, the real danger is that we’ll get the worst of both worlds–a continuation of Ares/Orion, which are supposedly being built because they are necessary to go to the moon, but we drop the lunar mission from the policy, so they revert to simply replacing (or competing with) COTS crew capability. And unfortunately, as devoted Democrat Greg Zsidisin has discovered in a one on one, that seems to be exactly Obama’s plan. The only saving grace of it is that, in delaying the development by five years, it really means that the program will die. But it betrays a fundamental lack of understanding of the nature of space policy, and space hardware and development, on the part of Obama and/or his advisors. You can’t “delay” a program like this and have any hope that it won’t end up costing much more over the long run, particularly because you’ll lose many of the key personnel for it, who aren’t going to sit around twiddling their thumbs at no pay for half a decade while Obama solves the education problem. It’s really quite absurd. But then, most of his proposed policies are–one of the many reasons that he isn’t going to be elected.

As an aside, Jim Muncy said during the wrap-up panel last week in Phoenix that NASA has a bigger problem with the Iran Non-Proliferation Act than buying Soyuzes to replace Shuttle. Because the facilities are in the Russian segment, the ISS astronauts won’t even be able to use the potty if they don’t get a waiver, which could get pretty interesting on a six-month tour. The notion brought up the obvious jokes: “You’ll just have to hold it,” and “You should have gone before you launched…”

[Tuesday morning update]

Jon Goff has further thoughts:

…if you were a congressman or senator with a limited amount of money available, and you have two risky ventures to pick from to try and reduce the gap, what would you do? Would you place all your money on the one option where your money is going to be a relative drop in the bucket, and that even then has little or no chance of actually reducing the gap? Or would you invest at least part of your money in a much smaller program where it has a much higher probability of actually hastening the day when the US once again has manned spaceflight capabilities–and better yet, commercial manned spaceflight capabilities?

You do the math.

Unfortunately, the only math that interests most congresspeople is the number of jobs in their district or state, with “the Gap” a distant second place. Mike knows that, which is why he can get away with this stuff, or at least why he has to date.

Business, Space

More Propellant Depot Thoughts

8 Comments

Jon Goff has a wrap up of the issues (mostly technical) that came up in the panel discussion last Friday in Phoenix.

As he notes, there was little discussion of what other markets we can find than DoD and NASA. The problem is that until the capability is demonstrated, it’s going to be very hard to sell it to the conservative comsat industry. The nearest-term plausible private market that I can conceive of is Bigelow, if he still wants to do his lunar cruises. It would be interesting to put together a business model using Genesis modules swinging around the moon, and see if it’s greater or less than projected NASA Constellation needs.