Popular Mechanics has a new podcast up with interviews with Bob Bigelow (presumably on space hotels) and Tom Jones about spacewalking (among other non-space topics).

The latest roundup of links at New Space News is up.

Clark Lindsey has scored an interview with Glenn Reynolds on the subject of space.

He also has an interesting update on plans for Kistler.

Someone was asking last week about pictures from the NewSpace Conference, other than the one of Misuzu and her space fashions. Jeff Foust has put some up on Flikr.

Clark Lindsey notes an interesting (and useful) shift in the conventional wisdom, in the wake of the Rocketplane Kistler/OSC joint venture.

SpaceX has moved to “version 1.1” which expresses Elon Musk’s confidence that the next launch will not have the same problems as the first. (In software culture, which Musk earned one of his fortunes in, an initial version of 0.9 or no version augmentation from previous expresses scepticism. 1.1 or augmentation of the major or minor version expresses confidence.) To fix the specific failure from the last launch “…any exposed aluminum B-nuts are being replaced with either an orbital welded joint or a stainless steel B-nut that won’t corrode.” To fix many other sources of potential failure, the electronic monitoring, automatic launch procedures, remote monitoring, exterior redesign and better climate control for payload are all excellent improvements. Bravo!

The oversight by managers they implemented needs more details released before I would recognize it as a new improved way of doing business. (Finally, while I have seen another company launch with the engine compartment on fire, a technical coup may be a PR mistake.)

In other news, Musk’s electric car company is making headlines.

A Dneper rocket carrying a lot of Cubesat university experiments failed to get them to orbit. I’m glad that wasn’t Bigelow’s Genesis 1 flight, though.

And it demonstrates once again that no one currently builds reliable launch systems. It also shows the continuing folly of using (in this case literally) converted munitions as transportation devices. Until we fix the problem of reliability and affordability (issues that NASA’s plans don’t even attempt to address), it’s pointless to plan lunar or Mars missions.

In light of the recent GAO report, Keith Cowing is being pretty hard on ESAS himself:

The CEV/CLV is already a debacle of epic proportions with the contractor teams saddled with requirements that change on a daily basis (as the GAO report infers [I think he means “implies”–rs]), a launch vehicle with severe technical deficiencies, and 8A small business set asides that guarantee that minimally competent companies with little experience in this realm are placed in the critical path of the program. The sense of doom is so bad that many of the top engineers at the primes refuse to work on the CEV, preferring to remain with the more stable military programs. Everyone is expecting a repeat of 1992/93 when the Space Exploration Initiative collapsed under the weight of unrealistic schedules, reduced budgets, and a new president from a different party who cared little for the return to the Moon effort.

I have to say that, from the inside of one of the contractor teams, I’m not seeing those kinds of things, at least to that degree, but I don’t necessarily have that much visibility. For example, I don’t know of any “top engineers” who have refused to work the program, but then, I don’t know that many “top engineers.” And we haven’t had a formal requirements change since January (at least until this week, when a new Systems Requirements Document came out), though there have been many questions about potential trades that need to be performed, from which one can infer requirements changes coming down the pike in the future (probably upon award in late August or early September).

[Update at 10:30 AM PDT]

As Keith notes in comments, I misread that. It’s a reader’s comment, not his. I was mislead because I didn’t read carefully, and there was only one.

In light of the recent GAO report, Keith Cowing is being pretty hard on ESAS himself:

The CEV/CLV is already a debacle of epic proportions with the contractor teams saddled with requirements that change on a daily basis (as the GAO report infers [I think he means “implies”–rs]), a launch vehicle with severe technical deficiencies, and 8A small business set asides that guarantee that minimally competent companies with little experience in this realm are placed in the critical path of the program. The sense of doom is so bad that many of the top engineers at the primes refuse to work on the CEV, preferring to remain with the more stable military programs. Everyone is expecting a repeat of 1992/93 when the Space Exploration Initiative collapsed under the weight of unrealistic schedules, reduced budgets, and a new president from a different party who cared little for the return to the Moon effort.

I have to say that, from the inside of one of the contractor teams, I’m not seeing those kinds of things, at least to that degree, but I don’t necessarily have that much visibility. For example, I don’t know of any “top engineers” who have refused to work the program, but then, I don’t know that many “top engineers.” And we haven’t had a formal requirements change since January (at least until this week, when a new Systems Requirements Document came out), though there have been many questions about potential trades that need to be performed, from which one can infer requirements changes coming down the pike in the future (probably upon award in late August or early September).

[Update at 10:30 AM PDT]

As Keith notes in comments, I misread that. It’s a reader’s comment, not his. I was mislead because I didn’t read carefully, and there was only one.

In light of the recent GAO report, Keith Cowing is being pretty hard on ESAS himself:

The CEV/CLV is already a debacle of epic proportions with the contractor teams saddled with requirements that change on a daily basis (as the GAO report infers [I think he means “implies”–rs]), a launch vehicle with severe technical deficiencies, and 8A small business set asides that guarantee that minimally competent companies with little experience in this realm are placed in the critical path of the program. The sense of doom is so bad that many of the top engineers at the primes refuse to work on the CEV, preferring to remain with the more stable military programs. Everyone is expecting a repeat of 1992/93 when the Space Exploration Initiative collapsed under the weight of unrealistic schedules, reduced budgets, and a new president from a different party who cared little for the return to the Moon effort.

I have to say that, from the inside of one of the contractor teams, I’m not seeing those kinds of things, at least to that degree, but I don’t necessarily have that much visibility. For example, I don’t know of any “top engineers” who have refused to work the program, but then, I don’t know that many “top engineers.” And we haven’t had a formal requirements change since January (at least until this week, when a new Systems Requirements Document came out), though there have been many questions about potential trades that need to be performed, from which one can infer requirements changes coming down the pike in the future (probably upon award in late August or early September).

[Update at 10:30 AM PDT]

As Keith notes in comments, I misread that. It’s a reader’s comment, not his. I was mislead because I didn’t read carefully, and there was only one.