Following the speakers’ presentations, there is now a panel discussion on regulations, consisting of the people who will be affected by them–Chuck Lauer from Rocketplane, Jeff Greason of XCOR, John Carmack of Armadillo Aerospace, and John Powell of JP Aerospace.

Chuck is describing the surprise when the bill passed late last year, and is excited by the prospects. “Right thing at right time” and AST seems to take it seriously and recognizes the importance of doing it right. “We’re the first, please be gentle with us.” Rocketplane’s schedule corresponds very closely with their rulemaking schedule (which was what happened to Burt). They plan to fly next year, and are working closely with AST. They are getting good feedback, and think that it’s a good collaborative process.

Greason: How many are in the launch business? How many actually respond to NPRMs? Those are the people are are really in the launch business.

“If this is like farming, last year was harvesting a great crop.” “Now we’re tilling and weeding and prepping, and the regulatory process never stops.” Message is to get involved. Regulations aren’t perfect, but are incredibly close to it compared to what they could have been. “Overall approach and architecture of regulations looks excellent.”

Carmack: Haven’t interacted this much this year because no race for the X-Prize, and vehicle has changed significantly. Much of testing can still be done under amateur rules. XCOR has a much easier time because he can test on premises in Mojave, whereas they have to travel all the way to New Mexico to do flight test. Still not comfortable with dealing with frustrating aspects of simply having to get permission for a smaller engine, burning slower. Want to get permission to operate closer to Dallas. In general AST people easy to work with, and Armadillo recognizes that many of the issus (e.g., environmental impact) aren’t within their power to ameliorate. Still need a licensed spaceport for vertical-launched vehicles. Thinking about launching and landing from a barge, and are planning to participate in X-Prize Cup activities in New Mexico.

John Powell: “In an unusual position with respect to AST–has read the rules, and he likes them, and isn’t quite sure how to handle that.” Rules are “shoulds” rather than “shalls,” which gives necessary flexibility at this stage of the game. Need to keep an eye on the words as the rules evolve, to keep them from becoming too prescriptive too early.

Lauer points out that Melchior Antunano at the FAA has provided a lot of good guidance as to potential medical protocols, and that Rocketplane has been getting good support from his people (he surmises that Antunano wants to fly himself). Greason says that the medical guidelines are the most detailed of all of them, and the approach is good, but is concerned that they’re looking beyond suborbital flight to orbital flight, and this is probably premature because we’re not that smart yet, and he’s concerned that some of the orbital thinking has crept back into suborbital. Need to recognize that the flight regimes are a continuum, no clear distinction between medical requirements for 3 gees and 3.1.

In response to question about vertical spaceports, it’s pointed out that space traffic and air traffic are currently poorly integrated. This needs to be fixed.

Mitchell Burnside Clapp points out Burt’s differences with many of us in the room, and that he’s built many more spaceplanes than many of us. Does the panel want to comment. Powell points out that certification regime is wonderful in theory, but it’s not here yet, and (Greason points out) it’s probably premature to have it now. Greason: “Fly at own risk” won’t last forever, and we all understand that. Most agree on level of safety necessary for viable industry. Mitchell interrupts to point out Burt’s research into early aviation safety (one in thirty-three thousand). It turns out to be the same as the current FAA numbers for uninvolved public. Question is whether to solve on consequence-based process (current approach) or probability-based process.

Greason points out that reusable vehicles drive reliability for business reasons, regardless of regulations or license requirements. Question is whether level of safety will evolve out of evolutionary design process, or safety mandates by federal government. Doesn’t think we’re smart enough for latter yet.

Lauer notes that in the future, if we’re doing suborbital flights for intercontinental transportation, the license/certification argument will become moot, because those vehicles will have to be integrated into the existing internationalair regulations.

Jeff says that we have to find the things we agree on, and push those as a united front. John Powell points out that there’s a new issue on UAV airspace, which has become extremely contentious. We have an opportunity right now to form things properly before some of the new airspace regimes come in, not to mention insurance companies and other stakeholders as the process evolves.

Criticism of AST that the regulatory process is too set in stone, with too much inertia, and cautions that we don’t want to have happen what happened to the ELV people, who got a set of rules that seemed designed to put them out of business, and had to work very hard and spend a lot of money to fix it. Important to get things going in the right direction early (i.e, now).

“Can’t get a categorical exclusion for environmental protection act until we have a category, and can’t get a category until there are multiple things to put in it.” A catex for this isn’t in the cards immediately, and it would be a very difficult thing to do politically.

Tim Hughes, the staffer for the House Science Committee primarily responsible for last year’s legislation clarifying the regulatory situation for suborbital passenger flight, gave an interesting talk at the conference about the history and philosophy behind the bill.

The intent of the legislation was clearly to help the industry grow, and they came up with what they hope was a good balance between safety and progress. Things they didn’t consider included ITAR issues, which came up repeatedly in last week’s hearings, and he said that this perhaps should have been considered, but that it might have held up the bill, because this is a much more contentious issue, particularly in terms of its implications for national security. In response to questions, he said that there are no current plans of which he’s aware to renegotiate the Outer Space Treaty and Liability Conventions to mitigate some of the insurance issues.

George Nield of the FAA will be speaking next.

He’s giving a short history of the AST office, pointing out that they have to maintain a balance between safety and avoiding stifling the industry, which is a delicate balancing act (Simberg note: and it’s one that the FAA no longer has to do for aviation, as a result of changes made in the charter after the Valuejet crash a few years ago–they’re now supposed to focus only on safety, which is why it might be a good idea to get this office back out of the FAA).

Now he’s talking about the Vision for Space Exploration, and pointing out that part of the vision was to include commercial opportunities as well. He’s describing a US Space Transportation Policy update early this year that mandates that the government procure commercial space transportation services whereever and whenever possible. Going over a list of significant events last year, including Burt’s historic flights, and the provision of XCOR’s launch license at this conference last year.

“We’re at the dawn of a new era.” “First to market groups will be small entrepreneurial companies.” “Designs will feature creative application of existing technologies. Citing Futron study to indicate that there is indeed a market for suborbital flights, capable of generating over a billion dollars a year by 2021. Orbital flights will happen as well, but market will be smaller in near term.

What’s different now? We have supportive national policy, including the words “public space travel” in the Space Transportation Policy for the first time in history, with responsibility falling on Secs of Commerce and Transportation to carry that out. We have realistic objectives this time: no technology breakthroughs required, suborbital trajectories with primary emphasis on passengers, using available technologies. We also are seeing non-federal funding become available from numerous wealthy individuals, as well as good support by state and local governments. Prizes are helping as well. The regulatory framework is in place with the Commercial Spacelaunch Amendments Act, which puts Congress and administration on the record as supporting human spaceflight.

FAA has a very ambitious homework assignment to write the regulations for passengers, experimental permits, and license requirements, which will result in a Notification of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) in a year or two.

Talking about Branson, because he’s the one we know the most about, not necessarily because FAA thinks that he’s got the inside track. Branson’s plans imply 2600 people launched into space each year, so that if Shuttle retires in 2010, and Branson flies in 2008, there will be ten times as many people flown into space privately by that time as have flown in space to date by governments. He sees no showstoppers, and FAA is committed to promote this activity in a way that continuously improves its safety.

Question: Do the new regs apply to orbital as well as suborbital? Yes and no. The experimental permit, for one, only applies to suborbital. Orbital regulation will continue to evolve as we learn more from suborbital experience. FAA is strongly supportive of this conference and think that it plays a major contribution. Announcing Craig Day, from AIAA to come up to announce a cooperative effort between government and industry to come up with guidelines for RLV safety regulations. Neild points out that there are still people who want to see reusable vehicles certified (didn’t mention Rutan’s name, but we all know who he means). He still doesn’t think we understand enough about reusables to do this, and points out that a feathered tail for reentry or a propulsion system using laughing gas and rubber wouldn’t have gotten certification (amusing dig at Burt).

Half hour break starting now, after which will be a talk from Michelle Murray of FAA about the launch licensing process.

[Update a couple minutes later]

Michael Mealing, who’s sitting behind me, has pictures.

Michelle has started talking. I don’t know if she’ll have much worth blogging–it seems to be a description of the process for regulatory rulemaking.

One key point she’s coming to now–they want public participation in the development of these rules. Feedback can be provided electronically or by paper. Everyone will be able to see everyone else’s comments (unless someone wants to provide proprietary info, in which case a note will be made in the public docket that such an input exists but it not available). They may have public meetings for the purpose of fact finding where a particular issue is controversial. Meetings may be in meatspace or virtual, and will be announced in the Federal Register, at least thirty days prior, along with email notifications to affected parties if they know who they are (e.g., in this case, they might send an email to Henry Vanderbilt, or the RLV working group of the Commercial Space Transportation Committee (COMSTAC)). Public requests of a public meeting can also trigger one. They haven’t yet come to a decision as to whether or not they plan to have a public meeting for this new rule-making process arising from last year’s legislation. They probably will have one, but haven’t determined when yet. May consider having one in conjunction with this conference or an RLV working group meeting.

Well, here is the first, big obvious result of the new administrator:

After examining many options, we have formed a policy on institutional support of systems engineering and integration in the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate portfolio, which underscores the importance of reinforcing the Government’s internal systems engineering competency. Accordingly, NASA has concluded that Government personnel at Headquarters and NASA Centers will implement systems engineering and integration in Constellation Systems and other areas of the Exploration program. Consequently, Exploration Systems Mission Directorate will not be releasing a Request for Proposals (RFP) for an Industry systems engineering and integration contractor.

For months, Admiral Steidle, head of EMSD has been saying that 2005 was “the year of system integration,” and it’s been clear that he wanted to let a contract out for this task in time to help get CEV off to a good start by the end of the year. There are a lot of issues and history associated with how NASA does large-systems integration, enough to fill more than one book, but the basic issues are competence of the agency, ability to hire/fire/compensate the best people for the job under civil service rules, and avoidance of institutional conflicts of interest if it’s performed by a hardware contractor. My sense had been that NASA was going to let a contract for this (as they did with the Shuttle–it went to Rockwell in conjunction with their win of the Orbiter contract), and put in place firewalls and other procedures to minimize conflict-of-interest concerns.

But according to this release, it looks to me as though Dr. Griffin has decided to preempt the Admiral, and thinks that he can oversee his civil servants adequately to do the job in house, and he wants to start to build up the capability to do so. This throws a wrench in the works of all the major contractors’ plans for Constellation. It will be interesting to see how it all shakes out, particularly combined with the desire to accelerate the CEV program (the desire is to move first flight up from 2014 to 2010, which puts schedule pressure on a lot of things in this decade).

I hope that some NASA types who are in the know will be at the Space Access Conference, and that I can pick their brains a little over a beer.

Clark Lindsey points to a study (with which new NASA administrator Mike Griffin was heavily involved) that’s been kicking around for about a year now, apparently popular with some in the astronaut office, proposing an SRB-based crew launch system. Clark notes that “The reasoning is that this system could be developed more quickly than a CEV on a Delta IV or Atlas V since the SRBs are already ‘human-rated.'”

Well, not exactly. At least, they (correctly) don’t say that. As I’ve noted many times in the past, the phrase “human rated” is a very misleading one. What they actually say is that “…the SRM has proven to be the most reliable launch vehicle in the history of manned space flight, with no failures in 176 flights following the modifications implemented in the aftermath of the Challenger accident.”

The reality is that the SRB is not “human rated.” In fact (surprising to many) the Shuttle itself is not. “Human rated” or “man rated” is a phrase that so many misuse that I’d just like to purge it from our vocabulary, because as I’ve explained, it’s really a relic of the sixties. All we can say about the SRB is that it has flown reliably (at least after the O-ring problem was resolved) on our only vehicle that carries crew. As such, it may be the basis of a relatively (as expendable launchers go) safe ride for astronauts.

One thing that I never see mentioned in this concept, though, is how they propose to do roll control. The current SRB has none, because it is part of a larger vehicle, which rolls by gimbaling its nozzles. As a stand-alone system, it would have no roll authority at all, without adding fins or a reaction control system. Is that what those little appendages down at the bottom of the figure in Clark’s post are meant to represent?

In any event, such a vehicle will in fact be a new launch system (and one with a pretty rough ride and probably pretty high accelerations toward the end of the burn)–no one will be able to simply stick a capsule on top of an SRB.

[Update about noon eastern]

I just noticed another depressing little statement in the report: “During the time frame addressed by this report

Clark Lindsey points to a study (with which new NASA administrator Mike Griffin was heavily involved) that’s been kicking around for about a year now, apparently popular with some in the astronaut office, proposing an SRB-based crew launch system. Clark notes that “The reasoning is that this system could be developed more quickly than a CEV on a Delta IV or Atlas V since the SRBs are already ‘human-rated.'”

Well, not exactly. At least, they (correctly) don’t say that. As I’ve noted many times in the past, the phrase “human rated” is a very misleading one. What they actually say is that “…the SRM has proven to be the most reliable launch vehicle in the history of manned space flight, with no failures in 176 flights following the modifications implemented in the aftermath of the Challenger accident.”

The reality is that the SRB is not “human rated.” In fact (surprising to many) the Shuttle itself is not. “Human rated” or “man rated” is a phrase that so many misuse that I’d just like to purge it from our vocabulary, because as I’ve explained, it’s really a relic of the sixties. All we can say about the SRB is that it has flown reliably (at least after the O-ring problem was resolved) on our only vehicle that carries crew. As such, it may be the basis of a relatively (as expendable launchers go) safe ride for astronauts.

One thing that I never see mentioned in this concept, though, is how they propose to do roll control. The current SRB has none, because it is part of a larger vehicle, which rolls by gimbaling its nozzles. As a stand-alone system, it would have no roll authority at all, without adding fins or a reaction control system. Is that what those little appendages down at the bottom of the figure in Clark’s post are meant to represent?

In any event, such a vehicle will in fact be a new launch system (and one with a pretty rough ride and probably pretty high accelerations toward the end of the burn)–no one will be able to simply stick a capsule on top of an SRB.

[Update about noon eastern]

I just noticed another depressing little statement in the report: “During the time frame addressed by this report

Clark Lindsey points to a study (with which new NASA administrator Mike Griffin was heavily involved) that’s been kicking around for about a year now, apparently popular with some in the astronaut office, proposing an SRB-based crew launch system. Clark notes that “The reasoning is that this system could be developed more quickly than a CEV on a Delta IV or Atlas V since the SRBs are already ‘human-rated.'”

Well, not exactly. At least, they (correctly) don’t say that. As I’ve noted many times in the past, the phrase “human rated” is a very misleading one. What they actually say is that “…the SRM has proven to be the most reliable launch vehicle in the history of manned space flight, with no failures in 176 flights following the modifications implemented in the aftermath of the Challenger accident.”

The reality is that the SRB is not “human rated.” In fact (surprising to many) the Shuttle itself is not. “Human rated” or “man rated” is a phrase that so many misuse that I’d just like to purge it from our vocabulary, because as I’ve explained, it’s really a relic of the sixties. All we can say about the SRB is that it has flown reliably (at least after the O-ring problem was resolved) on our only vehicle that carries crew. As such, it may be the basis of a relatively (as expendable launchers go) safe ride for astronauts.

One thing that I never see mentioned in this concept, though, is how they propose to do roll control. The current SRB has none, because it is part of a larger vehicle, which rolls by gimbaling its nozzles. As a stand-alone system, it would have no roll authority at all, without adding fins or a reaction control system. Is that what those little appendages down at the bottom of the figure in Clark’s post are meant to represent?

In any event, such a vehicle will in fact be a new launch system (and one with a pretty rough ride and probably pretty high accelerations toward the end of the burn)–no one will be able to simply stick a capsule on top of an SRB.

[Update about noon eastern]

I just noticed another depressing little statement in the report: “During the time frame addressed by this report

Keith Cowing also wonders why NASA would want a missile defense analyst on a space exploration advisory committee. My reading of the VSE and the Aldridge Report is that the new vision should support several goals, one of which is defense, both national and planetary. It would in fact be quite useful to have someone from the space defense community involved in the planning, to keep an eye out for opportunities for synergism, and to bring a different perspective in the development of systems that could both help in that defense goals, and perhaps complicate them if done without consideration of those other strategic needs.

While it’s not obvious to me exactly how they would fit (other than for the planetary defense role), concern about how LEO activity will coexist with potential LEO missile defense systems is worth worrying about, and it’s not a bad idea to have someone on board who does think about such things for a living.

Keith Cowing wonders why NASA is procuring hardware for military tanks.

Well, without discounting the possibility (even likelihood) that there is something bureaucratically suspect going on here, there is a plausible justification, in that the technology for an oil-free turbine would be very handy for space applications (e.g., power conversion for nuclear systems), reducing maintenance and helping with reliability. Since the funding is from Glenn (NASA’s propulsion center), it makes sense that it would develop this potential dual-use technology. It may even have other civilian terrestrial spinoff applications.

It is strange that the applications cited are so military specific, though. Equally strange is that the application (a diesel environment) is so specific so as to make it look suspect as a pure technology development. We’re a long way off from space diesels.

Dale Amon has some interesting, and plausible, speculation about Richard Branson’s business plans for space transportation.

There are a variety of ways to subsidize space transportation. Rand’s idea to implement my proposal is a good one. I chose the $15 billion number not because I thought it was the minimum necessary to kick start the industry, but to beg the question about what we are getting from NASA for the same amount of money. I do not propose to use new spending.

Instead of an auction for launch services, followed by a delivery of cash on completion of the launch there are several other ways to implement a subsidy:

• Have a box on the launcher’s corporate tax return that says payload to orbit
• Have a box on the customer’s corporate tax return that says payload to orbit
• An application like student aid or a federal housing loan with a fixed subsidy level that is adjusted periodically based on the rate of takeup

Rand’s auction is simple and would set the price in advance of flying which would be good.

As for popularity, it will take someone like Eisenhower or Kelly to make this happen. If someone can make the case for California stem cells, the case for space access ought to be possible.