Category Archives: War Commentary

Prescient

A few months ago, T. M. Lutas made a bold prediction in the comments section of one of my blog posts:

Out of the 18 Iraqi provinces, 3 kurdish ones have their greatest security threats being foreign incursion from Turkey and Iran. Terrorism is successfully kept out. 4 arab provinces are under local management and we rarely, if ever, do anything there. That’s 7 down, 11 to go with the rest of the provinces in various stages along the road towards handover. I fully expect that when the balance is 10:8 instead of 7:11 that we’re going to see a sea change in coverage because “a majority of Iraq is under local control and relatively quiet” and all the MSM is going to realize that if they don’t get on the right side of this quickly, the deluge of broken credibility will very likely worsen and shorten their personal careers significantly.

I expect at least 3 more provinces to get handed over between now and the height of campaign season 2008. I’d like to think that at least 6 more would make the transition by then (obviating the need to explain Kurdistan’s special situation in the stats). The defeatists have to change the natural progression of Iraqi government and security institution building and do it soon or they’re going to be in deep trouble in 2008.

Well, he called it right.

Iraq’s army and police could be ready to take over security in all 18 provinces by the end of this year as the U.S. military moves toward a less prominent role in the country, U.S. officials said on Thursday.

“We look at it every month. We make recommendations. I think that if we continue along the path we’re on now, we’ll be able to do that by the end of 2008,” Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, the No. 2 commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, said when asked when Iraqi forces could take the lead in all provinces.

Harry and Nancy are no doubt very disappointed, since we refused to surrender to the enemy as they were demanding all last year.

“The Ring On Zarqawi’s Finger”

Michael Totten has an interesting discussion with some Iraqis:

According to the conventional narrative, Al Qaeda was rejected by Iraqis because they murdered Iraqis. They were far more vicious and hateful than the Americans they vowed to expel. The narrative is correct, as far as it goes, but Al Qaeda is detested for more than mere thuggery. Other armed groups have been able to maintain at least some popularity even though they also murder Iraqis. None of the others, though, violent though they may be, are so thoroughly totalitarian, so alien to the traditions of Iraqi culture, and so hostile to its centuries-old social fabric. Al Qaeda in Iraq tears at Iraq

“The Ring On Zarqawi’s Finger”

Michael Totten has an interesting discussion with some Iraqis:

According to the conventional narrative, Al Qaeda was rejected by Iraqis because they murdered Iraqis. They were far more vicious and hateful than the Americans they vowed to expel. The narrative is correct, as far as it goes, but Al Qaeda is detested for more than mere thuggery. Other armed groups have been able to maintain at least some popularity even though they also murder Iraqis. None of the others, though, violent though they may be, are so thoroughly totalitarian, so alien to the traditions of Iraqi culture, and so hostile to its centuries-old social fabric. Al Qaeda in Iraq tears at Iraq

“The Ring On Zarqawi’s Finger”

Michael Totten has an interesting discussion with some Iraqis:

According to the conventional narrative, Al Qaeda was rejected by Iraqis because they murdered Iraqis. They were far more vicious and hateful than the Americans they vowed to expel. The narrative is correct, as far as it goes, but Al Qaeda is detested for more than mere thuggery. Other armed groups have been able to maintain at least some popularity even though they also murder Iraqis. None of the others, though, violent though they may be, are so thoroughly totalitarian, so alien to the traditions of Iraqi culture, and so hostile to its centuries-old social fabric. Al Qaeda in Iraq tears at Iraq