Category Archives: War Commentary

Don’t Settle

In fact, US Air should not only not settle, they should countersue against these people for (probably deliberately, based on most accounts) terrorizing the passengers and disrupting service. I’d be happy to even contribute to a legal fund for it. In fact, it would be a good idea to set up a fund and get all the airlines to contribute to it, because US Air is waging this battle for the whole industry.

Don’t Settle

In fact, US Air should not only not settle, they should countersue against these people for (probably deliberately, based on most accounts) terrorizing the passengers and disrupting service. I’d be happy to even contribute to a legal fund for it. In fact, it would be a good idea to set up a fund and get all the airlines to contribute to it, because US Air is waging this battle for the whole industry.

Don’t Settle

In fact, US Air should not only not settle, they should countersue against these people for (probably deliberately, based on most accounts) terrorizing the passengers and disrupting service. I’d be happy to even contribute to a legal fund for it. In fact, it would be a good idea to set up a fund and get all the airlines to contribute to it, because US Air is waging this battle for the whole industry.

Consensus?

You know, when the Washington Post tells the Baker Commission they’re out to lunch on their policy recommendations, you know they have to be out there:

…to embrace the group’s proposed “New Diplomatic Offensive” would be to suppose a Middle East very different from what’s on the ground.

Start with the supposition that resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is somehow central to ending the chaos in Iraq. In fact, even if the two-state solution sought by the Bush administration were achieved, it’s difficult to imagine how or why that would cause Sunnis and Shiites to cease their sectarian war in Baghdad or the Baathist-al Qaeda insurgency to stand down. It’s no doubt true, as study group chairmen James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton have said, that every Arab leader they met told them that an Israeli-Arab settlement must be the first priority. But the princes and dictators of Riyadh, Cairo and Amman have been delivering that tired line to American envoys for decades: It is their favorite excuse for failing to support U.S. initiatives and for refusing to reform their own moribund autocracies.

Baker is living in the past, and in an alternate reality.

No Jews Allowed

Mark Steyn, on the “Illustrious Seniors Group“:

Oh, but lest you think there are no minimum admission criteria to James Baker’s “Support Group,” relax, it’s a very restricted membership: Arabs, Persians, Chinese commies, French obstructionists, Russian assassination squads. But no Jews. Even though Israel is the only country to be required to make specific concessions — return the Golan Heights, etc. Indeed, insofar as this document has any novelty value, it’s in the Frankenstein-meets-the-Wolfman sense of a boffo convergence of hit franchises: a Vietnam bug-out, but with the Jews as the designated fall guys. Wow. That’s what Hollywood would call “high concept.”

Why would anyone — even a short-sighted incompetent political fixer whose brilliant advice includes telling the first Bush that no one would care if he abandoned the “Read my lips” pledge — why would even he think it a smart move to mortgage Iraq’s future to anything as intractable as the Palestinian “right of return”? And, incidentally, how did that phrase — “the right of return” — get so carelessly inserted into a document signed by two former secretaries of state, two former senators, a former attorney general, Supreme Court judge, defense secretary, congressman, etc. These are by far the most prominent Americans ever to legitimize a concept whose very purpose is to render any Zionist entity impossible. I’m not one of those who assumes that just because much of James Baker’s post-government career has been so lavishly endowed by the Saudis that he must necessarily be a wholly owned subsidiary of King Abdullah, but it’s striking how this document frames all the issues within the pathologies of the enemy.

I’ve never been a big fan of most of the people on the ISG (though Alan Simpson had his moments), but my esteem for Baker and Lee Hamilton has hit a new low.

Our Friends The Syrians

Victor Davis Hanson:

Does anyone really believe that Syria and Iran, at least in the short-term, abhor chaos in Iraq? Iran fought a long war with Iraq, and fears deeply American scrutiny of its nuclear program. Only a perceived mess in Iraq keeps the attention of the United States and, indeed, the world community away from Teheran. Ditto Syria that does not want more Cedar Revolutions on its borders, given that democracies or the efforts at such in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and Turkey now surround this dictatorship.

There were three wars fought to destroy Israel before the Golan Heights were taken. The withdrawal from Lebanon and Gaza did not lead to commensurate moderation on the part of the Islamists or dictators. And if the Study Group believes that Israeli concessions will result in Syria and Iran

The Myth Of Disengagement

Joel Himelfarb points out that we are talking to Iran and Syria, and have been throughout. We’re just not doing it the way they want us to:

The real issue today is that the Bush administration, which has been repeatedly burned in recent years when it tried to engage these governments, prefers discretion and holding lower-level talks. These regimes insist on holding well-publicized summits that yield them P.R. windfalls without forcing them to substantively change their policies.

They’ve got the speaking softly part down, but I don’t know if they have a stick of any size. And I agree with this wholeheartedly:

Based on the historical record, the advocates of U.S. engagement with these regimes are delusional. The record, from Carter to Bush II, strongly suggests that neither regime has any interest in cooperating with us in Iraq, and are more likely than not to view the Carter-Brzezinski-Hagel approach as a demonstration of American weakness.

A Flop

Donald Sensing on the ISG report.

Bottom line: the ISG report offers some good ideas when it sticks to Iraq itself, especially the recommendation that American Military Training Teams serving with Iraqi army units be reinforced and broadened and when it opens the door to a near-term intensification of direct military by US forces against the insurgency. But it flops hard when it wanders afield, especially when it fails to recognize that Syria and Iran are vested in our failure in Iraq, not our success. The two nations are not potential partners, they are enemies.

And I like and agree with “cerebrim”‘s comment:

Much like the 9/11 commission report, it’s being widely praised only by people who didn’t read or understand it.

Much like the 9/11 commission report, it achieved ‘bipartisanship’ by being self-contradictory, equivocating, and weaselly.

Much like the 9/11 commission report, its primary use seems to be a political bludgeon by various people who have no interest in actually implementing it, just decrying the people who don’t.

And much like the 9/11 commission report, its recommendations are unimplementable even if you were inclined to try – and you would be insane to want to.

Also, see Cox and Forkum: Then And Now. Yes, there is no substitute for victory. Of course, it’s been decades since we’ve had one, or allowed ourselves one.