If this story, and this one are accurate, it would seem to me that Iraq is in a state of war with Syria (and probably other nations, such as Saudi Arabia, as well). After all, they seem to be sending in people to murder Iraqis and attack its government. I’m not sure at this point exactly what they can do about it, but I would think that at the least it would be useful to state the reality, to call them on it. Perhaps in a year or two, after being given sufficient training, the Iraqis themselves will institute a regime change in Damascus. Which raises the interesting issue of whether or not Syria has any of Saddam’s WMD…

[Update at 5 PM EDT]

Along those lines, this looks like good news, if accurate:

American troops backed by helicopters and war planes launched a major offensive against followers of Iraq’s most wanted insurgent, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in a desert area near the Syrian border, and as many as 100 militants were killed, U.S. officials said Monday.

On the sixtieth anniversary of the formal end of fascism in Europe, Andrew Sullivan has a very disturbing email from the Netherlands.

Would that it were so, but we’ve seen comparable brutality and cruelty since, from Mao, Pol Pot, Kim pere et fil, Saddam and others. We now fight a new totalitarian enemy that would cheerfully do the same, should we grant it the power. On the sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of the concentration camps in Europe, Chuck Simmins has some remembrances.

The Iraqi insurgents were boo-hooing to Zarquawi last week that their morale is low. Ain’t it a crying shame?

The author of the letter also “admonishes ‘the Sheik’ for abandoning his followers” after last year’s U.S. siege on Falluja, west of Baghdad.

U.S. forces led an assault then on the Sunni Triangle city’s terrorist network believed to be run by al-Zarqawi.

Because of the “continuous pressure by Iraqi and [U.S.-led] coalition forces,” a military statement said, al-Zarqawi has relied on his cell leaders to conduct operations while he is forced to evade being killed or captured.

Doesn’t your heart just go out to them?

The Iraqi insurgents were boo-hooing to Zarquawi last week that their morale is low. Ain’t it a crying shame?

The author of the letter also “admonishes ‘the Sheik’ for abandoning his followers” after last year’s U.S. siege on Falluja, west of Baghdad.

U.S. forces led an assault then on the Sunni Triangle city’s terrorist network believed to be run by al-Zarqawi.

Because of the “continuous pressure by Iraqi and [U.S.-led] coalition forces,” a military statement said, al-Zarqawi has relied on his cell leaders to conduct operations while he is forced to evade being killed or captured.

Doesn’t your heart just go out to them?

The Iraqi insurgents were boo-hooing to Zarquawi last week that their morale is low. Ain’t it a crying shame?

The author of the letter also “admonishes ‘the Sheik’ for abandoning his followers” after last year’s U.S. siege on Falluja, west of Baghdad.

U.S. forces led an assault then on the Sunni Triangle city’s terrorist network believed to be run by al-Zarqawi.

Because of the “continuous pressure by Iraqi and [U.S.-led] coalition forces,” a military statement said, al-Zarqawi has relied on his cell leaders to conduct operations while he is forced to evade being killed or captured.

Doesn’t your heart just go out to them?

It hadn’t previously occurred to me that the fall of Saigon, thirty years ago today, was in turn almost exactly three decades after the fall of Berlin and the end of the war in Europe, six decades ago.

Quite a contrast in American power. The fall of Saigon was a post-war low point for American foreign policy, but it didn’t end there–in many ways it was a prelude to the greater humiliation of the Iran hostage crisis, and a long string of shows of American weakness in the face of new confrontations by the new totalitarians–the Beirut barracks bombing, the foolish overtures to the mullahs in Iran/Contra, the pullout in Somalia, the ineffectual responses by the Clinton administration–that eventually culminated in the destruction of the twin towers.

As Glenn points out, many (though of course not all) critics of US policy would be happy to see Americans standing on the roof of a Baghdad embassy, being evacuated by helicopters, in renewed joy at our comeuppance, like that of thirty years ago, in thinking that we could defend the world against those who despise western notions of freedom. I hope (and in fact think) that due to our wakeup call almost four years ago, our resolve will prove more durable today, mirroring that of sixty years ago, rather than thirty.

It hadn’t previously occurred to me that the fall of Saigon, thirty years ago today, was in turn almost exactly three decades after the fall of Berlin and the end of the war in Europe, six decades ago.

Quite a contrast in American power. The fall of Saigon was a post-war low point for American foreign policy, but it didn’t end there–in many ways it was a prelude to the greater humiliation of the Iran hostage crisis, and a long string of shows of American weakness in the face of new confrontations by the new totalitarians–the Beirut barracks bombing, the foolish overtures to the mullahs in Iran/Contra, the pullout in Somalia, the ineffectual responses by the Clinton administration–that eventually culminated in the destruction of the twin towers.

As Glenn points out, many (though of course not all) critics of US policy would be happy to see Americans standing on the roof of a Baghdad embassy, being evacuated by helicopters, in renewed joy at our comeuppance, like that of thirty years ago, in thinking that we could defend the world against those who despise western notions of freedom. I hope (and in fact think) that due to our wakeup call almost four years ago, our resolve will prove more durable today, mirroring that of sixty years ago, rather than thirty.

It hadn’t previously occurred to me that the fall of Saigon, thirty years ago today, was in turn almost exactly three decades after the fall of Berlin and the end of the war in Europe, six decades ago.

Quite a contrast in American power. The fall of Saigon was a post-war low point for American foreign policy, but it didn’t end there–in many ways it was a prelude to the greater humiliation of the Iran hostage crisis, and a long string of shows of American weakness in the face of new confrontations by the new totalitarians–the Beirut barracks bombing, the foolish overtures to the mullahs in Iran/Contra, the pullout in Somalia, the ineffectual responses by the Clinton administration–that eventually culminated in the destruction of the twin towers.

As Glenn points out, many (though of course not all) critics of US policy would be happy to see Americans standing on the roof of a Baghdad embassy, being evacuated by helicopters, in renewed joy at our comeuppance, like that of thirty years ago, in thinking that we could defend the world against those who despise western notions of freedom. I hope (and in fact think) that due to our wakeup call almost four years ago, our resolve will prove more durable today, mirroring that of sixty years ago, rather than thirty.

If I were going to be home this weekend, I’d think about attending and reporting on this event, but I’m going to be in Phoenix at the Space Access Conference.