The San Francisco Chronicle has some positions on space policy from the presidential candidates.

Sen. John Edwards: “I am a strong supporter of our space program. It reflects the best of the American spirit of optimism, discovery and progress. A manned mission to Mars is in the American tradition of setting ambitious goals for exploring space, but we must be able to pay for the program.”

What does that mean? Sounds like he’s saying it would be a nice thing to do if we can afford it, but he doesn’t know whether we can, and it wouldn’t necessarily be a priority of his to find a way to do it. And of course he focuses on the mission to Mars, with no hint of an understanding of broader issues or purposes.

This isn’t a statement that’s going to gather any significant support from the space activist community (not that it’s an important voting block). He’s just trying to avoid taking an actual position.

Sen. John Kerry: “Our civilian space program represents a great
opportunity for scientific research. Sending a person to Mars is a great mission worthy of a great nation like America. Given the Bush budget deficit, it is imperative that we balance funding for a manned mission to Mars against critical domestic needs as well, such as education and health care.”

Again, hardly a forthright declaration of intent, and again, the focus is on sending someone to Mars. And again, no sophistication or nuance, or indication of an understanding of the issues.

Also, it betrays either a fundamental ignorance of budgetary matters, or disingenuousness (you can guess where my money would be), because it implies that the budgets for space, and education and health care are somehow comparable, and that there is a scale on which we could place space on one side, and the social programs on the other, and it would be roughly balanced. The reality, of course, is that you could pay for a mission to Mars with a single month’s expenditure on those other items, and get a lot of change.

You could fund an invigorated space program with a tiny fraction of the education and health budgets, but if you took all the funding going into federal space activities and put it into education and health, it would hardly be noticed.

Both Kerry’s and Edwards’ statements are empty motherhood, but Kerry’s seems more cynical to me.

Rep. Dennis Kucinich: “An International Space Station in Earth orbit is a far more practical launch platform than a base on the moon. So, if we as a nation decide to send manned missions to Mars, I would not support construction of a lunar base. In regard to space exploration, we are faced with an unprecedented national deficit and a war without end, both of which will force this nation to abandon many hopes, dreams and aspirations, including space exploration, if allowed to continue.”

I actually like Kucinich’ position better. It seems much more honest.

I don’t agree with it, and he’s technically wrong, but it looks like he’s actually given the matter some thought, in the warped mindset in which he lives, and he actually has a position. It sounds as though he’d actually try to fund something (albeit at the expense of the Pentagon budget).

Al Sharpton: No response.

No surprise. No disappointment, either, except that he might have said something amusing.

President Bush: No response.”

No need for one. He’s on record as of January 14th what his space policy is.

From a purely space policy standpoint, I think that George Bush is the best candidate. His policy’s not perfect, but it’s a vast improvement over that of Clinton, and either Kerry or Edwards would be likely to return to a more Clintonesque policy, with emphasis on jobs and international cooperation, and a lack of interest in actual accomplishments. To the degree that the president’s policy is a good one, they can almost be counted upon to reverse it simply because it’s his, and there’s nothing in either of their stated positions here to indicate that their replacement would be an improvement in any way.

Last fall, some clueless Arizona legislators were contemplating handing over the state cryonics industry to the funeral industry.

The notion was roundly and appropriately panned, but unfortunately, it doesn’t seem to have gone away. They’re still at it.

If you’re an Arizona resident, and interested in extending your life (or just slapping down legislative stupidity), use the tips at this site and contact your state representative.

[Update on Thursday morning]

Looks like most AZ legislators have more sense than Mr. Stump. Thanks to vigorous action on the part of Alcor, this bill is going nowhere.

[Update on Friday]

Ron Bailey has further commentary.

Endquote and good point:

Far from protection for frozen heads, this looks like just another attempt to use government to restrict competition—because, in a devoutly-to-be-wished world where cryonics dreams come true, the undertakers, and their regulators, will be out of business. And good riddance.

Well, I was wrong.

A year ago, right after the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia, I predicted that the standdown from the Columbia disaster wouldn’t be anywhere near as long as the one after the loss of the Challenger (over two years), but it now looks as though it may in fact approach it.

My reasons for that prediction were two:

First, that the shuttle was needed to support the continued construction and maintenance of the space station (a circumstance that didn’t hold in the late 1980s). Second, I didn’t think that the investigation would reveal as much of a problem this time as when Challenger was lost, in terms of poor NASA judgement.

But apparently, in the wake of the harsh criticism of the Gehman Commission, NASA has become ultraconservative in Shuttle operations. The unwillingness to risk a Hubble maintenance mission is one symptom of this. The recent announcement that the first post-Columbia flight will be delayed until at least a year from now is another.

I didn’t agree with the Hubble decision (and continue to disagree), and I think that NASA is being too cautious now in delaying return to flight. Of course, I thought they were after Challenger as well–they could have safely flown a month later, as long as they did it in reasonably warm weather that wouldn’t freeze O-rings, and much of the redesign of the Solid Rocket Booster joints was overkill, or at least it wasn’t necessary to wait until it was complete to start flying again.

Is the Shuttle as safe to fly as it can possibly be right now? No, but that’s a foolish standard.

While “Safety First” has a nice ring to it, there has to be a rational balance between safety and effectiveness. After all, the safest flight of a Shuttle (or for that matter, any vehicle) is the one that doesn’t occur at all (effectively the course taken over the past year, and apparently the next as well).

We are spending almost as much on the Shuttle when it doesn’t fly as we would if it were–NASA can’t simply put the processing staff in cold storage until they decide to fly again, and if they lay them off, there’s a good chance that they won’t be available when they decide to return to flight, so we’re spending the money and getting very little value for it.

I’ve long argued that, despite the national keening and wailing when astronauts die, the real asset at risk in a Shuttle launch is the orbiter itself, of which we now have only three left, and each of which would cost many years and several billion dollars to replace, given that the tooling needed to build them, and many of the subcontractors who contributed to their construction no longer exist. We simply couldn’t afford to risk losing another one, and have any hope of maintaining a viable fleet into the future.

But that argument went away on January 14th, when the president announced his new space policy.

In fact, as September 11, 2001 was a watershed date in our foreign policy, January 14th, 2004 was, or at least should be seen as, a similar demarcation in national space policy. On that date, among other things, it became formal policy of the United States that we would no longer rely on the Space Shuttle into the indefinite future. That policy implicitly converted the Shuttle fleet from a precious and irreplaceable asset to be protected at all costs, to a depreciating one, from which as much value should be extracted as possible before it is retired in a few years.

The Gehman Commission report came out before January 14, and while it requested a new space policy vision, it didn’t necessarily anticipate it. While it recommended augmenting Shuttle with a new manned launch system, it didn’t necessarily recommend eliminating the Shuttle quite as quickly, and if it had, the recommendations might have been a little different. To the degree that NASA policy remains driven by the CAIB recommendations, it would be useful to have a reconvening of the commission and revisit them to determine if the president’s new policy might modify them.

Under the new policy, there will be no more than another couple dozen flights or so of the fleet. It’s unlikely that what happened to Columbia will happen to another vehicle, because even if the foam problem isn’t fixed, the chances of a repeat over that number of missions is very low. After all, this was the first time it happened in over a hundred. And even if there is another event, we could probably still complete the ISS with the remaining fleet of two, though it might delay it another year or so. In addition, the president’s policy implies that completion of the ISS is no longer an urgent national goal (most Beltway insiders know that the main reason it wasn’t cancelled was to avoid upsetting the international partners–not because it’s in any way essential to the new goals).

Under those circumstances, we really should ask ourselves if the costs of modifying the Shuttle system for improved safety, and the opportunity costs of not flying while continuing to pay the salaries of the Shuttle program personnel, are really worth the avoided (low) risk of not losing another orbiter and crew.

A rational assessment might indicate that the answer is no, but then, one can’t always expect rational assessments to prevail in programs so dominated by politics as our space program remains, and I suspect that decisions will continue to be made on the basis of a mindset that’s “soooo January 13th.”

Leonard David continues to report from this week’s planetary defense conference in Garden Grove, CA.

The consensus? We need to get more serious about this threat.

NASA now supports — in collaboration with the United States Air Force — the Spaceguard Survey and its goal of discovering and tracking 90 percent of the Near Earth Asteroids (NEAs) with a diameter greater than about one-half mile (1 kilometer) by 2008. If one of these big bruisers were to strike our planet, it would spark catastrophic global effects that would include severe regional devastation and global climate change.

By charting the whereabouts of these celestial objects, it is anticipated that decades of warning time is likely if one of the large-sized space boulders was found to be on a heading that intersects Earth.

But a uniform message from the experts attending this week’s planetary defense gathering is extending the survey to spot smaller objects, down to some 500 feet (150 meters) in diameter. These asteroids can wreak havoc too, but on a more localized scale.

For instance, if one of these smaller asteroids were to strike along the California coast, millions of people might be killed, Morrison said. A little further to the east, he added, “a nice crater out in the desert” would become a tourist attraction…

…Developing a viable mitigation campaign, Yeomans explained, demands three prerequisites: “You need to find them early. You need to find them early. And we need to find them early.”

This needs to be more closely coordinated with the president’s new space policy, both programmatically and politically.

There’s an interesting conference this week just down the street from where I’m working. Unfortunately, I’m too busy working to attend, but it’s nice to see people taking this threat more seriously.

Dwayne Day has the conclusion to his piece at The Space Review on the history of the SEI program. A key point, that I’ve often made, and one that the Easterbrooks and other spewers of costing nonsense should understand:

One of the major problems facing NASA was a cultural one, an inability to think of new human spaceflight projects in terms other than the Apollo paradigm. During Apollo, NASA had gotten a huge amount of money and a great deal of autonomy and many at the agency still thought they would conduct SEI in the same manner. They therefore felt no pressure to keep costs under control.

But in addition to the cultural inability of agency personnel to stop thinking in terms of Apollo budgets, NASA, like all government agencies, had to deal with different internal and external constituencies, each clamoring for its own priorities. The space agency’s facilities are spread throughout the country at various field centers, each of which represents different interests such as human spaceflight and robotic exploration, and each having advocates in Congress. In addition, NASA has also had a less obvious rivalry between its scientists, who want to collect data, and its engineers, who want to build equipment. In many ways the 90-Day Study was a reflection of all of these conflicts within the agency, combined with an unwillingness by NASA Headquarters to clearly establish priorities, starting by saying no to some of its constituencies.

When I first saw her, she was small enough to hold in my hand.

My lover of the past seven years had just moved out, and taken custody of the cat (only fair, since it was originally hers). In sudden need of feline companionship (generally easier and faster to replace than the feminine variety–at least a satisfactory replacement), I responded to an ad on the bulletin board in the local grocery in El Segundo, and went to a house a few blocks from mine that was dispensing kittens from a recent litter.

They were standard-issue tabbies, though a claim was made that they had a Siamese grandmother. There were four of them, playing with each other. That is, three of them were playing, and one was standing back, more aloof. It was a grayish color, with just a hint of brown stripes. It was a little smaller than the others, and looked to be the runt.

I reached over and scratched between its outsized ears. It didn’t seem afraid.

“Her name is Francesca,” one of the girls of the household offered helpfully. I opined that it was a pretty big moniker for such a little cat.

I picked it up to inspect the nether regions, in order to verify the gender, and allow it to be henceforth described by a slightly more specific pronoun. After the inspection, she (as it indeed turned out to be) curled up in my hand, and promptly fell asleep.

I realized that my choice was to either wake her up, or take her with me. She seemed to have adopted me, and it was the beginning of a long relationship in which she would, whenever possible, seek (and generally find, at least for a while) slothful slumber on various temporarily horizontal parts of my body.

I think that she left her mother too soon–she wasn’t properly weaned (perhaps partly because she was the runt of the litter, and could never get enough). For years after I got her, she would suck my finger with gusto if I offered it to her. It also took her a while to learn to, in Garrison Keillor’s immortal words, work up the courage to do what needs to be done.

When I first got her home, Stella (as I subsequently renamed her) hid under various articles of furniture for the first couple days. I gradually coaxed her out with bowls of food and milk.

At first, she wouldn’t go outside. Gradually, she started to adventure out the door, but she would only go as far as the extent of the shade of the house, stopping at the terminator drawn by the sun. She was like a little groundhog, fearing her own shadow.

But eventually, she worked up the grit and gumption to explore the whole yard, and after a few weeks, she would come in only for food and to sleep on me, two passions in which she indulged herself almost to the end of her days.

It turned out that the aloofness toward her siblings at our first meeting was not out of character–Stella hated cats with a fierce passion (again, perhaps a symptom of having to fight for her place at the dairy, and often losing). I’m not sure what she thought she was.

Accordingly, when Patricia brought Jessica into the house a few years later, she didn’t take well to the interloper, growling at her whenever in her presence (other than at dinner time, when she was too busy stuffing her jowls to notice the other cat next door).

Taking her away from her mother early didn’t seem to have damaged her other natural instincts–she was a great ratter, one time cleaning out the garage from an infestation. But she’d been slowing down in recent years, as she approached her fifteenth birthday.

I dropped her off at the vet on Thursday evening for a follow-up visit from her hospital stay last week. She’d been eating all right for the past couple days, but I didn’t get a chance to feed her before I took her in, because I had been working late and had to get her there before the office closed. I boarded her there for the weekend because I was going away, and there was no one else who could get the pills into her twice daily. I planned to pick her up on Monday morning before work.

On Friday, I got a call from the vet. She told me that her blood count was back down as low as it was when I first brought her in the previous week, and that she was extremely weak again, with a lowered temperature. She was afraid that there was more going on than just the blood parasite that had been diagnosed, and for which she was being treated. She thought that without another transfusion, she would not last long.

Unfortunately, even with another transfusion, the prognosis was poor, and it would be very expensive, because this time she would have to go to an emergency clinic to have the blood typed, and a battery of tests to determine what the problem was. She feared that it was perhaps a previously undiagnosed cancer.

The choices were to spend thousands of dollars to keep her alive a while longer, or to see if she could fight her way back again, and hope for the best. She didn’t seem to be suffering, other than being very weak, so there was no consideration of euthanizing her. I was torn because I was two thousand miles away, and didn’t want her to die alone, in a strange place, but I was helpless, short of spending a lot of money that I didn’t have, probably in futility.

We decided to give her one more chance to fight her way through, as she had the previous weekend, but with little hope.

On Saturday, the doctor called to tell me that the fierce little flame had finally flickered out in the night. No more clawing furniture, or catching rats, or sitting on laps, unless she’s gone to a place where all those feline recreations are available in abundance, and perpetuity. Jessica now has no one to annoy by batting her tail, or leaping from heights.

She’ll be cremated, and I’ll scatter the ashes in the yard in which she spent so many contented hours playing and sunning.

How do these little creatures insinuate themselves so deeply, so inextricably into our lives and hearts? We’ve bred them for certain traits over the millennia, but in some ways, just as they adopt us now (as Stella adopted me), perhaps they’ve bred us as well, in a coevolution. It’s hard to know, but I suspect that when we spread our consciousness into the universe, theirs will go with us. And if I go myself, I think I’ll save a few of the carbon atoms from her corporeal existence to take along as well.

I just got back from an LA Press Club event, where I met Geitner Simmons, who proved a very affable and knowledgable gentleman from the Tarheel State, though he’s now living in Omaha. He’s working on a book on the links between the cultures of the American West and the American South.

I’m flying to Michigan early tomorrow to visit family, so there won’t be any free ice cream until Monday. But heck, you don’t want any anyway–it’s winter time.