RLV Potpourri

Clark Lindsey has a lot of good stuff today over at RLV news, including SpaceShipOne’s first in-flight test of their rocket engine, the SpaceX extravaganza in Washington, and some promising developments by the Japanese (perhaps I was a little too hasty in dissing them–we’ll see if they allow this effort to flower).

I do want to clarify one point, though.

…I’m sure that Elon would agree with Rand Simberg and others who say that man-rating is an obsolete term. All vehicles should be built to the highest degree to not fail, regardless of whether the payload includes people or not.

To be precise, all reusable vehicles should be built to the highest degree not to fail. Optimal reliability for an expendable is an economic trade based on payload value and insurance rates, so it may still make sense to talk about man or (to use the current PC NASA term) human rating of the Delta IV and Atlas V for OSP. It’s pretty clear, at least to me, that for a number of reasons, neither of those vehicles are going to be usable off the shelf for that mission, despite public impressions to the contrary.

Meteor Strikes Earth–Women, Minorities And Endangered Species Hardest Hit

That’s not exactly the headline of this dumb NYT editorial, but it almost could be.

Let’s leave aside that no meteor has ever struck the earth, or anything else, other than eyes (a meteor is the flash of light that an object makes when it hits the atmosphere–not the physical object itself). They talk about how life has been devastated in the past by bombardment from extraterrestrial objects, but instead of proposing that we do something about it, they use it as an opportunity to preach about how we’re extincting too many species. In fact, they not only don’t propose doing anything about it, they deny that anything can be done.

There’s no controlling the possibility of a meteor strike. But there’s every reason — ethical and practical — for preventing our own habitation of earth from having the same impact.

Well, in fact, there is “controlling the possibility of a meteor [sic] strike.” One starts looking for them, and as Clark Lindsey (from whom I got the link) points out, one develops the spacefaring capability to divert them, which is entirely feasible, and relative to the cost of being hit, quite affordable.

It’s particularly ironic that the Gray Lady publishes this silliness on perhaps the eve of a major change in space policy that might, in fact, ultimately lead to such a capability, but I guess that there’s some comfort in knowing that, even under new management, some things at the Times never change.

A Quality All Its Own

The Japanese lost a rocket with its payload of surveillance satellites the other day.

Given the current dangerous situation in the Korean peninsula, in their own backyard across the Sea of Japan, it was a painful loss, and one that they really couldn’t afford. The North Koreans have launched missiles across Japanese territory, and are developing nuclear weapons, so far unhindered by either diplomacy or threats, and a lack of space-based intelligence about their behavior and intentions could prove disastrous in the future, perhaps even in the near future.

Unfortunately, in developing their own space capabilities, the Japanese have taken a cue from our own failed space activities, having no successful ones to emulate. Like NASA and, for the most part, the Air Force, they delude themselves that affordable and reliable launchers can be built by souping up ballistic missiles and flying them a few times a year.

In the 1980s, the Japanese became renowned for the high quality of their automobiles, an ironic turn of events, because a scant few years earlier they had developed a reputation for cheap, unreliable toys masquerading as cars. I can attest to this personally, as an owner and semi-daily driver of a Honda from that period with over a quarter of a million miles on it, and still on its first clutch with no major repairs to date.

They accomplished this by importing American concepts of statistical quality control from people like W. Edwards Deming. By continually improving their production processes over millions of units, they gradually achieved a world-class ability to build reliable and long-lasting cars that eventually forced the American auto industry out of its complacency, though not before entirely restructuring it and, in some cases, forcing mergers or causing parts of it to be bought out by foreign interests.

They were so successful in adapting American techniques for their terrestrial transportation industry, that they hoped they could be equally successful in space transportation by following the same strategy.

There were only two problems. First, neither the Americans nor the former Soviets were actually that good at doing space. Their launch systems were extremely expensive and highly unreliable. They only seemed good at it because there was never any truly good space program with which to compare them.

Consider–the most reliable proven launch system is probably the Soviet (now Russian) Proton. According to International Launch Services, the western firm that markets it, and has a strong interest in putting the best face on its capability, it has a 96% reliability record in about 300 launches over the past four decades. They state this with apparent pride.

Let’s put that in everyday terms.

Imagine that once out of every twenty five times you drove to the grocery store, you not only didn’t get there, but your car was destroyed with all aboard.

Imagine that four times out of every hundred flights of an airliner, it was lost with all passengers. That would amount to thousands of downed aircraft per year and millions of lives, assuming that you could get the airlines to continue to buy replacement airplanes, and people to purchase tickets on death’s lottery, with such appalling odds.

Can you imagine anyone with a straight face, and not a hint of irony, calling such a vehicle “reliable”? It’s no way to run a railroad or, for that matter, an airline or auto industry. We shouldn’t accept it in space either, yet we do.

What’s the problem? I’ve written before about how the low volume of activity leads inevitably to high costs. But it also leads to low reliability.

The biggest difference between Japan’s auto industry and Japan’s rocket industry is not the almost unfathomable power that the rockets put out, or the harsh environment in which they operate, or their high cost per rocket. The biggest difference is that, as noted above, they built millions of cars, and they’ve built, at most, dozens of rockets.

There’s an old aphorism that “quantity has a quality all its own.” For this particular case, there’s a reverse corollary–quality requires a quantity all its own. Statistical quality control is very useful when running a million cans of beans, or a million Honda Accords off a production line.

However, it’s meaningless when only building a few of something, and only using (and in this case, expending them) a few times a year. There’s almost no measurable learning curve, and because they’re expendable, making each flight a first flight, there’s no opportunity for the traditional “shakedown cruise.” Infant mortality is high, and so, when we lose the baby, we also lose the bathwater, the bathtub, the bathroom, and the house that contains them all.

There’s only one way out of this dilemma. We have to make a conscious national decision to do enough in space to start climbing the learning curve, rather than remaining at a base camp at the bottom. Until we make a deliberate choice to become a truly spacefaring nation, we will never have either affordable launch, or reliable launch (and unreliability has its own obvious costs, making the status quo even more unaffordable).

If the government, whether ours or Japan’s, wants and needs assured access to space (and both must clearly think they do, because they continue to spend and perhaps misspend billions of dollars on it), it will have to decide to buy more than it thinks it needs to ensure that it has what it needs at an acceptable price. The decision makers must consider the possibility of simply putting out an order for currently-unthinkable numbers of launches and pounds of payload to orbit, to allow the private sector to do what it does best–driving down costs and increasing quality through competition and volume.

In the long run, it may turn out to be a bargain, and it’s hard to imagine how we could do much worse–we certainly can’t afford to continue with the failed thinking that carpeted the seabed with two more expensive (and perhaps, considering the stakes, priceless) satellites just a few days ago.

The Failed Paradigm That Won’t Die

The Japanese lost a rocket and its payload of surveillance satellites yesterday. Once again, like the Chinese, their decision to play “follow the leader,” instead of being a leader, has come back to bite them and their space program. Taking the lead from the government space agencies of the US, Russia and Europe, they continue to operate under the delusion that space launch can be made affordable and reliable by souping up expendable ballistic missiles, and launching them a few times a year. The reality is that neither goal can be achieved by that method.

No matter how vaunted your quality control, and technological prowess, it is simply not possible to reliably or affordably build vehicles for which each flight is a first flight and a last, particularly when you build so few.

This is why I don’t fear international competition when it comes to space. The only people really making breakthroughs and demonstrating innovation right now are in the Anglosphere, and are for the most part American (though they have nothing to do with NASA). By the time the rest of the world realizes what’s happening in Mojave and other places, they’ll be too far behind to catch up.

And by the way, I should add, via Mark Whittington, that the Chinese have now set out their bold space goal–they’ll put a man on the moon in 2020–sixteen years from now, and only half a century after we did it. I found this part particularly amusing:

…until Luan’s comments, officials had denied having plans for a manned lunar landing. They insisted that, in contrast to the U.S.-Soviet space race of the 1960s, China was moving at its own careful, cost-effective pace.

Careful, perhaps, but hardly cost effective.

And Mark thinks that this will, or should, have the American public quaking in our collective boots?

At that rate, they’ll be greeted on arrival by the concierge at Club Med Luna…

The Failed Paradigm That Won’t Die

The Japanese lost a rocket and its payload of surveillance satellites yesterday. Once again, like the Chinese, their decision to play “follow the leader,” instead of being a leader, has come back to bite them and their space program. Taking the lead from the government space agencies of the US, Russia and Europe, they continue to operate under the delusion that space launch can be made affordable and reliable by souping up expendable ballistic missiles, and launching them a few times a year. The reality is that neither goal can be achieved by that method.

No matter how vaunted your quality control, and technological prowess, it is simply not possible to reliably or affordably build vehicles for which each flight is a first flight and a last, particularly when you build so few.

This is why I don’t fear international competition when it comes to space. The only people really making breakthroughs and demonstrating innovation right now are in the Anglosphere, and are for the most part American (though they have nothing to do with NASA). By the time the rest of the world realizes what’s happening in Mojave and other places, they’ll be too far behind to catch up.

And by the way, I should add, via Mark Whittington, that the Chinese have now set out their bold space goal–they’ll put a man on the moon in 2020–sixteen years from now, and only half a century after we did it. I found this part particularly amusing:

…until Luan’s comments, officials had denied having plans for a manned lunar landing. They insisted that, in contrast to the U.S.-Soviet space race of the 1960s, China was moving at its own careful, cost-effective pace.

Careful, perhaps, but hardly cost effective.

And Mark thinks that this will, or should, have the American public quaking in our collective boots?

At that rate, they’ll be greeted on arrival by the concierge at Club Med Luna…

Biting Commentary about Infinity…and Beyond!