One More Thought On Fleet Grounding

I earlier noted the irony that the one part of the Shuttle that has actually been reliable (the Orbiter) is the one that Mike Griffin wants to retire. Both Shuttle disasters were caused by the non-Orbiter parts (SRB in the case of Challenger, ET in the case of Columbia), and those are the pieces that he wants to build the new vehicles out of (SRB as a lower stage for the crew vehicle, and SRB and modified ET for the heavy lifter).

Of course, the response will be that the only reason those failures were a problem was because of the overall system configuration with the Orbiter. Since both the new concepts will have the payload on top, where blow torching from joint leaks, and falling foam won’t cause problems, that makes it OK (though that’s actually not true with the heavy lifter, since the ET was the first casualty from the SRB failure, before the Orbiter broke up).

Which brings up a question: how much side forces were detected during the Challenger launch from the SRB leak (presumably from attempts by the TVC to keep the vehicle straight)? Does anyone know (I assume that the data may be in the Rogers Commission Report)? Would it have caused a problem with “the stick”?