8 thoughts on “FAA-AST”

  1. Jim Bennett’s idea of a Space Guard is looking better all the time. Get the non-warfighting aspect of space (like debris tracking) out of the Air Force, get the non-research aspect out of NASA, get launch licensing out of the FAA, consolidate all these mundane space ops in one quasi-military agency similar to the Coast Guard. Hell, there’s even enough pork in this realignment to satisfy more than half of Congress.

  2. If, for some reason, Congress felt they would not be able to provide that increase, then we’d be in a position where we’re going to need to prioritize what’s on our plate, and do the best that we can to keep up,” he said.
    Nield warned that such prioritization could result in delays in processing launch license applications or other oversight work. “That may mean some of the companies won’t be able to have the launch schedules that they’re hoping for, or get a quick turnaround on their licenses,” he said.

    This is worrisome, but not for the lack of additional funding.

    Now I don’t interact with the FAA-AST, so I don’t have knowledge of what value they may provide to launch companies, but my understanding is their launch license gating function is not a service for industry so much as a “protection” for the non-involved public.

    That, when faced with an increasing demand and a steady budget, their recourse is to threaten they will ration licensing and prioritize launches rather than consider to reduce the amount of oversight per license application demonstrates a dangerous inclination of the office (and/or those in charge). Whatever prioritization criteria they use, it will almost certainly be tied to some ambiguous, manipulable, social good. I doubt that they have data which makes the cost (and costs to industry in compliance) of their organization’s work traceable to any quantified and *necessary* benefit. By necessary I mean that industry couldn’t perform launches without it (for technical rather than political reasons) and that no entity but the government can provide it. I’m pretty sure that with the years of licensing they’ve done, and to my knowledge no catastrophes in which non-involved 3rd parties were damaged, their current process more than bounds whatever may be necessary to secure “safety” to the public. There is almost certainly room to shave down those licensing requirements, and thus the requirement for oversight manpower per license application (leaving aside any question of the necessity of launch licenses).

    So unsurprisingly, it looks like “more liberty” may be a more cost effective answer with no drawback. Also unsurprisingly, a self-licking ice cream cone prefers more ice cream and licking.

    1. With apologies to Worden, I’ve always liked the self-licking ice cream cone metaphor, but I think it either unfairly maligns ice cream (which is wonderful) by association or can misconstrue the subject as a type of virtuous cycle.

      To remedy that, I’ll remind you that all is not ice cream that comes from the cow. However the purveyors of… whatever is on that cone, would like you to believe it is ice cream and will sell it as such.

  3. I see 3 ways for a regulatory office to handle more demand from the regulated private industry:
    – a larger budget.
    – a bottleneck.
    – streamline regulation and operations.

    The last may be a best case scenario.

  4. If they can’t afford a rubber stamp and trained monkey, I suggest they eliminate the office. It’s not like safety would not still have enough focus from others and the army of lawyers in the world guarantees liability is covered.

    It may seem a trite answer (coming from me) but that doesn’t mean not correct.

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