56 thoughts on “The Falcon Heavy”

  1. From the article: “The Falcon Heavy rocket, with reusable side boosters, costs $90 million. For a fully expendable variant of the rocket, which can lift a theoretical maximum of 64 tons to low-Earth orbit, the price is $150 million.”

    On Monday Mr. Musk tweeted that expending only the center core and recovering the side boosters by landing them on barges at sea exacts only about a 10% penalty over flying fully expendable, and that is one reason they are building their second East Coast ASDS, A Shortfall of Gravitas. His quoted price for this configuration — “around $95M” — seems rather low, but some stories are suggesting that FH flying with 3 reused booster cores will actually price well under $90M.

    https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/963094533830426624

    1. “If you need a rocket, come on down to Crazy Elon’s Used Rockets! We’re practically givin’ ’em away!”

      1. That would be the fully reusable FH second stage which doesn’t have to be a SpaceX product.

        “Want that family vacation that’s out of this world? We have great terms on a six crew runabout with all the features of home with microgravity entertainment for kids and pets. Determine for yourself if cats really have the power to teleport themselves from freefall to some hidden corner.”

        1. Building off the premise that cats are the number one cause of raid wipes.

          Reporter: “Why did the bigly freaking ship lose life support?”

          Musk: “Turns out, um. Cats. They don’t really work out in space very well. Yeah. Yeah. You think its simple but its really much more complicated. Yeah. They really like to chew on wires and can fit in places we didn’t anticipate.”

    1. SLS, like it’s cousin controlled nuclear fusion, is a technology of the future that must be invested in! Always has been, always will be.

      1. Yes, that analogy keeps occurring to me.

        The noxious failure mode of government R&D is not being to admit “this approach is broken”. It turns into rent seeking that goes through the motions but won’t lead to the ostensibly desired outcome.

          1. There’s no benefit to success when you’ll get paid more for failing.

            This is why we now have engineers and scientists retiring after spending their entire career not building working fusion reactors.

          2. And also, if you suspect that what you’re working on isn’t likely to work, you have no incentive to rapidly advance to the point that its unworkability is obvious. Better to be slow and plodding and keep the gravy train going as long as possible. This has the advantage of allowing one to lie to oneself that you aren’t REALLY being dishonest about it. After all, it MIGHT work out, and being careful is good.

    2. I think Anthony Colangelo (Main Engine Cutoff) is probably on target: 2020 becomes a dangerous date for SLS, with Falcon Heavy now in regular operation, and New Glenn and Vulcan moving into their test flight history. At that point, you have more than just a super heavy launch option; now you’d have a super heavy launch market. Especially if SLS has slid *again* to the right by that point.

      I still tend to think SLS gets at least 2-3 launches, which might be enough to a) salve honor, and b) buy a couple more election cycles for the space state mafia. But perhaps 2020 is when NASA is allowed to chart a wind down path.

        1. Yes, in the same way 2017 was a big year for space – terrific in its own right, but just a foretaste of even more remarkable things to follow. The entire decade of the 2020’s is shaping up to be a new golden age of space achievements.

          1. Yup, there are so many things supposed to happen in 2020, not just with the USA but globally. I think you are right about it being the kick off for a golden age of space achievements. It will be really cool to see more countries and companies get into the race.

      1. Yeah, 2020 definitely looks to be the year all this comes to a head.

        I, too, used to think SLS might get in two or three launches before biting the dust. Now I think “one and done” is far more likely and that even death before first launch is a significant possibility. The 33 months needed to re-do VAB and the rest of the SLS launch infrastructure between the Block 1 mission and the first Block 1B will, in my estimation, prove to be a bridge too far.

        1. This. I even thought FH was going to flop (it does have 27 first stage engines, it’s insane, it’s like the Soviet N1 on steroids) and yet SLS would still bite the dust, due to cheap Falcon 9 Block 4 launches. With a working FH? It’s no contest. Especially with that crappy Delta IV upper stage on the SLS.

          SLS is dead on water. My only regret, is the loss of a facility like the close to New Orleans. It’s close to the Mississipi, it’s in the crossroads to both the Cape Canaveral/Kennedy and Texas, it’s ideal for something like Musk’s BFR or Bezo’s Frankenrocket. NASA needs to open up the facility to third parties, lease the space on that huge building, the facility and tools are being wasted on poor IP, they should just rent it out to private concerns which can use it to the fullest.

    3. When New Glenn and/or Vulcan are flying. Unless they come up with something other than redundancy to keep development going.

  2. Gwynn Shotwell doesn’t know how to make a rocket cost 400 million, but she’s in good company; neither does ULA with the Delta IV H, especially if one counts the billion a year for “launch assurance”. 🙂

    As for SLS, it was announced the same year as Falcon Heavy, 2011. It, like Falcon Heavy, is largely derived from existing systems (Falcon 9 for Falcon Heavy, Shuttle for SLS). For many years, Falcon Heavy was derided as “a paper rocket” or “a PowerPoint rocket” because it, unlike SLS, did not actually exist.

    SLS has cost around 12 billion (I think) so far, not counting the Orion, and, strangely, not counting the billions for the Expedition Upper Stage. Falcon Heavy cost around 500 million, including the first flight.

    Let’s talk payload. SLS block 1b, which is all there will be until at least 2030, is supposed to loft about 70 tons to LEO. Falcon Heavy is supposed to loft 63 tons to LEO in fully expendable mode. That’s pretty darn close, but overlooks the fact that the Falcon 9 upper stage is undersized for Falcon Heavy (the same way the Interim upper stage is for SLS). Stretching the upper stage on Falcon Heavy claimed to add significant payload capacity, and should not be technically challenging. So, SLS 1b and Falcon HEavy are in the same class for LEO, but SLS’s cryo upper stage gives it an edge beyond LEO.

    The biggest decider is cost. SLS costs so much to build and operate (It requires a massive standing workforce) that it will have at best a very low launch rate (once a year or longer) at astronomical cost, plus NASA can’t afford both it and payloads for it. Even if we accept the 500 million per launch estimate from way back in 2012, the standing costs (which I don’t believe were considered) will balloon that.
    It costs too much, and is in dire need of total cancellation.

    Will SLS be canceled? My guess is no, because pork.

    1. It, like Falcon Heavy, is largely derived from existing systems (Falcon 9 for Falcon Heavy, Shuttle for SLS).

      It’s hard to push on that point too hard; the only really intact major components to come over from Shuttle are the RS-25’s. The main core is a different diameter from the ET, uses different tooling, different tankage, different avionics…the SRB’s are considerable upgrades…DIRECT Jupiter, this is not.

      SLS has cost around 12 billion (I think) so far

      It’s a little work to figure out just what SLS has cost. Technically it’s about $14 billion formally spent since its inauguration in 2011; but it inherits the 5 segment SRB’s from Ares, so that cost has to be built in, too. And that doesn’t count cost of changes that have to be made to GSE, the crawler, etc. It’s got to be over $20 billion by the time EM-1 flies.

      SLS block 1b, which is all there will be until at least 2030, is supposed to loft about 70 tons to LEO.

      Actually, it is SLS Block I which is 70 mT to LEO. But Block I only flies once (EM-1). Then they upgrade to Block IB – toss the ICPS and replace it with the Exploration Upper Stage, which brings the payload to LEO up to 105 mT. And in fairness, that is a significant upgrade over Falcon Heavy, and not just in fairing diameter. (And, yes, the advantage is more pronounced beyond LEO.)

      Of course, Block IB will not fly until 2023 NET. By that point, BFR might even be approaching flight testing. And BFR will lift a whole lot more payload than the Block IB.

      And either way, Falcon Heavy has the advantage of a) being ready NOW, and b) absolutely no cost to the federal government for its development.

      1. Great points.

        I goofed on the block 1 vs. block 1b capacity. I wasn’t aware until I just looked that block 1b requires a major core redesign and stretch as well as the different upper stage.

        This begs the question of why they are doing block 1 at all, if it will only fly once before block1b. Shades of Ares 1 (oft called Estes 1)?

    1. True – assuming BFR retains the current specifications. 150 mT over 130 mT for SLS Block 2.

      And however delayed BFR will be over Musk’s “aspirational” timeline, it’s still pretty likely to be flying before Block 2.

      1. At this rate, BFR might make orbit before SLS block 1 does. SLS first launch is currently scheduled for late December 2019, which simply is not possible, a fact acknowledged even by the SLS team. So, 2020 at the earliest, and that’s only true if there are no problems or delays (which there always are). But, given where they actually are and their track record, 2024 to 2025 is quite possible. And if that’s the case, BFR, if its schedule slips merely double its currently-planned development time, could reach orbit first.

          1. Thanks Rand,

            I wasn’t aware that the slip was official, but you’re right, it is. I can’t help but notice it was announced the same day as Trump’s proposed NASA budget. Perhaps some felt that was a convenient scapegoat to blame for something certain to happen anyway.

        1. I really doubt that EM-1 will slip any later than early 2021, unless something quite unexpected happens.

          But it is quite possible that EM-2 will indeed slip to the 2024-25 timeframe.

          And even this would be very damaging to SLS’s cause, if commercial heavy lifters are developing at anything like the rate we expect.

        2. Don’t count on it. BFR has too many new technologies in it. It needs to be de-scoped, and broken into sub-components, or it risks a major failure of epic proportions ala X-33.

          1. Joining the Brotherhood of the Traveling Goalposts are we?

            You didn’t think FH would work “because N-1.” But FH does work because it is obviously not N-1.

            Now, you don’t think BFR-BFS will work “because size.” But the engine technology already works. The tankage technology already works. There will be no troublesome Helium systems. Software and avionics will be modest modifications from F9 and FH practice. TPS will be PICA-X. Where do you see any large risk factor?

          2. What “new technologies” does BFR have in it?

            For some values of “new”…

            Very large composite propellant tanks.

            Recovery of large propellant tanks (composite or not) after orbital entry.

          3. As already noted, a superscale test article tank has already been built and tested. That risk has been retired. Re-entry has been thoroughly characterized by Falcon 9 ops.

            In point of fact, re-entering a large composite structure should be less fraught than re-entering a large metal object, especially one that is largely aluminum. Composites don’t lose strength with elevated temperature until they actually begin to burn. They’re like wooden roof trusses in that respect. Metal, especially aluminum, softens significantly with elevated temperature, losing a lot of its strength. And yet F9 lands. BFR and BFS present no new re-entry problems. Their composite structure, in fact, represents a solution to one of the problems with re-entering metal structure. I expect their service lives to exceed early expectations.

          4. – Large non-spherical cryogenic composite tanks. Of which a test article was made yes, but it was pressure tested with water, not LOX even, and guess what, the seams failed before the design test pressure was reached. So no the risk was NOT retired.

            – Flight proven full-flow reusable LOX/Methane engines. It seems easy, but I keep hearing about novel alloys requiring qualification. This is actually the one furthest along since it has been ground tested at subscale. If you think there aren’t issues when scaling up engines, you should read more about combustion instability and the F-1 engine’s development history. Of course, today, we have modern combustion simulation tools, like the ones SpaceX developed, so the chance of having to blow up engines like Glushko with his RD-270 are minimized.

            – A large enough space grade Methane supplier and the specs for space grade Methane. I kid you not, it’s that bad, the fuel isn’t qualified and there are no good standards out there for it. If you think this isn’t a problem, read about Goddard exploding engines in his shed because of issues with variable Gasoline quality during and after WWII.

            – Putting it all together.

            – I won’t even discuss reentry, or construction facilities for such large diameter vehicles, but those aren’t trivial issues either. Sure it can be done, but it takes time, and the timescales don’t match with those Elon spouts out. But that’s hardly a new thing with SpaceX, let alone with such a huge new project.

          5. “As already noted, a superscale test article tank has already been built and tested. That risk has been retired. Re-entry has been thoroughly characterized by Falcon 9 ops.”

            SOME of the rusk has been retired. But testing large composite tanks on the ground is not the same as testing them in flight. And testing reentry at around Mach 8 is very different from testing reentry of propellant tanks at Mach 25, so it’s utterly wrong to say F9 has “thoroughly characterized” the problem facing BFR’s upper stage. BFR entry isn’t even going to be engine-first like F9’s first stage, right?

          6. Rand, you sometimes speak of fluffy.

            Will the BFS be fluffy? Will it slow down quickly in the upper atmosphere and what will the heat loading be like in your estimation?

  3. Today we think it crazy to fly on a used rocket, but I think soon it will be odd to prefer flying on an unproven rocket’s first test flight versus a reliable workhorse.

    One thing for certain, by getting its hardware back to study; SpaceX reliability will soon well surpass NASA/USA.

  4. I worked it out: based on SpaceX estimates (so, yes, shaker-of-salt required) the cost per pound to orbit aboard a BFR would be about the same as the cost per pound to ship via FedEx overnight from New York to Singapore. That puts space in reach of a lot of startup companies.

  5. I wonder how an Atlas V Heavy would compare to the Delta IV Heavy? ULA originally announced such a variant of Atlas, but chose to pursue only the Delta IV Heavy.

  6. Amazing that the European calling for a change in how to do space launches failed to use two words in the blog post…

    Commercial –
    Reusable –

    They have to embrace the commercial sector and run a cots program.. but then that company will only be from one of the member countries… they do not see themselves as united.

    1. Or, rather, they see themselves as *only* being united by the EU bureaucracies, which, like ESA have to do a delicate political balancing act to both disguise the political parochialism in their resource allocations *and* to keep allowing any semblance of technical progress in what they do. They cannot support allocations to 3 companies spending their governments’ money to make reusable rockets with political allocations, much less the 30 companies to match true EU diversity.

  7. I admire Zubrin’s knowledge and zeal. He always reshapes his thinking to support getting to Mars the fastest with what is available or could relatively easily be available. It is always energizing despite the janky engineering assumptions or maybe because of them?

    Small human Mars exploration missions with two-person crews could be mounted using three Falcon Heavy launches per mission.

    The flaw in this plan is that it relies on NASA to build new things, which they can do at great time and expense. You can’t tell me that the people building the SLS will be able to just whip out a Earth Return Vehicle or ISRU.

    Humans on the surface of Mars prospecting are needed but getting them there present unique engineering challenges. Even using a COTS like approach, it will take time.

    Intimating Zubrin, a quicker way to get to Mars is not to land them on the surface but to put them in orbit. Spacious habitats are much closer technologically than Mars to Earth rockets. Landing rovers to teleoperate is a known quantity. We also need imaging that is higher in quality than we have right now. This would also allow for serious prospecting many different sites and with humans there, it would happen faster.

    Maybe after this, we could use FH to put some people on the surface but it could be that BFR is ready to begin Mars missions at this point. The prospecting is needed for BFR missions anyway and the scores of people a BFR delivers will do more work than the teeny tiny number a FH could deliver.

  8. The possibilities abound. A reusable rocket system that can send 60 tons to orbit can also send 60 tons from New York to Sydney in less than an hour. For comparison, a Boeing 737 has an empty weight of 45 tons.

    OK. Y’all who do the maths for this stuff. How much could they deliver ptp considering it takes fuel to land and not just launch? Where is the kidney factory that would justify $90 million for super speedy delivery?

  9. Using the figure of 64 tons for $150 million, one gets a price of $1,172 per pound to LEO. Back when I was in this business, we were all promising to deliver payloads for “half the cost per pound” to LEO. That was always the benchmark.

    Back then (the 1990s), the one to beat was Delta II. It could put 13,000 pounds into LEO. The cost (not price) was $54 million. That equates to $4,154 per pound. Elon is offering to beat the Delta II by a factor of 3.5, not 2, with an expendable. And that’s on price, not cost. SpaceX is offering us space transportation at a price point below that where we predicted whole new businesses would appear.

    A number of my space commerce ideas are now viable at this price point. I say, let’s get busy and put them into action.

      1. I think ageism isn’t an issue as long as you can prove you’re agile enough. A lot of times, in any startup, business plans need to move on a dime, so the investors expect you to at least look up the part. See Muratore for example. He’s at SpaceX. He isn’t any spring chicken either. Or look at their anchor person. You know what? Having an old guy, in a team of youngsters, make THEM look more reliable. You could probably make yourself a bundle Rand, just spotting new talent and giving them credibility.

        1. There’s probably a bundle of people with cash, and a bundle of people with ideas and the drive, they need people with industry know-how to guide them at this moment.

  10. Zubrin is being unrealistic about a two man mars mission. Not that it couldn’t be done, but shouldn’t. The moon mission makes so much sense I expect it will happen as soon as a lander is available.

    The moon has nothing to do with a real mars mission.

      1. A one man mission could accomplish a lot but could also teach us a lot of wrong lessons. More people actually lowers both cost and risk per person.

  11. I’ve never liked SLS; I see it as having all the flaws of Apollo (far too costly to be sustainable) without any of the benefits. The cost is beyond astronomical, and will get worse. NASA won’t be able to afford payloads for it, and it’s development costs are sucking all the air out of the room. Were it not for SLS, needful things like prop depots and a host of other things could have been developed.

    But, even setting aside cost, it’s a mess. Orion is one example; it’s essentially a 20 day hab that serves as both ascent and descent vehicle (the added mass required to do that is enormous), so you’re pushing an enormous amount of mass through a lot of delta/v. The only plausible excuse for that is if it’s fully and cheaply reusable, which Orion is not.
    A vastly better approach, from both a mass and cost standpoint, would be take a lesson from Soyuz; only a tiny spherical section is the RV. It would be fairly simple to make a Soyuz-type RV (needed only for an hour or so free flight) to withstand high speed reentry, and replace the rest of Orion with a mission-suitable hab module, perhaps inflatable. So, Orion is an utter boondoggle on many levels, one of which is it is utterly unsuited for its planned missions.

    As for SLS itself, and in contrast to Falcon9/Falcon Heavy, just one issue is man-rating. NASA seems to be causing all sorts of delays in Commercial Crew via exacting safety specifications, including requiring multiple flights in final configuration for the LV before allowing a manned flight. Fair enough on that, yet EM-2 is planned to be a manned launch around the moon, using a whole new design of the SLS core (block1b) plus an unflown upper stage (EUS), after years with no SLS flights at all. Those are massive violations of NASA’s own guidelines, and a wonderful recipe for disaster.

    I hope SLS is canceled, and the sooner the better, and that’s even without its most glaring and insurmountable issue: cost.

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