Thoughts over at Space Transport news. It was a little dismaying to see Augustine’s comment.
I have no predictions as to the outcome, but I’m not particularly hopeful, given the nature of bureaucracy and entropy. But we are continuing to get useful ideas out there, for the private sector to pick up on even if we continue to waste billions on NASA’s HSF program.
[Update in the evening]
This article would indicate that the panel overall remains stuck in the conventional wisdom that heavy lifters are on the critical path to space exploration. One of the hopes for my piece in The New Atlantis was to break that consensus, but it doesn’t seem to have succeeded, so far.
[Late evening update]
Here’s an interesting chart (that appears to have been captured by a camera at the actual presentation) that summarizes the seven options currently being considered. I assume that “IP” is international participation (aka the Russians). I’m not sure what “SH” means, but perhaps one of my readers will be smarter at deciphering than me. I’m guessing something like “Super Heavy.”
Note that the panel (as a whole — there could be dissent among individuals) assumes that refueling is not an option within the current budget, as the chart is currently configured. Note also that it assumes that Ares V is required. I assume that these two assumptions are not coincidental. Take away the heavy lifter, and there’s abundant budget for depots, and other things.
The real question to me is: what is the driver for the perceived heavy-lift requirement? Is it a credibility factor with the flight rate necessary for smaller vehicles to deliver all the propellant for (say) a Mars mission? Or a “smallest biggest piece” (again for, say, a Mars mission) that begs credibility in terms of ability to assemble it on orbit? Or a “let’s keep the options open for some kind of need that we can’t anticipate”? Or all of the above? I expect that we will know the answers to these questions in a very few weeks. I don’t think that the panel will hide the ball the way that NASA did with ESAS.
But one hint might be in noting that the Mars mission (presumably to the surface) is the biggest driver — it assumes both “many” Ares V launches while also noting that refueling is “enabling” (i.e., cannot be done without it). This is a simple recognition of the reality that at some point, even the heavy-lift fetishists have to recognize that there is a limit to the degree to which they can afford to avoid orbital operations — there are some missions simply a bridge too far to do with a single launch.
Anyway, I’m slightly more encouraged by this chart, if for no other reason that it recognizes refueling as a viable option, and that minds are clearly starting to change. I may have more thoughts anon, though, and it’s a long way to August 31st, I suspect, with a lot of perturbations to come.
[Update a few minutes later]
One other point. The chart isn’t good news for Ares I.
[One more update before crashing to catch with with loss of last night’s sleep]
“Brad” has some more comments on the table:
1) The porklauncher, Ares I, looks dead. Only two of the seven options use Ares I, and one of those two options uses commercial crew services as well.
2) Commercial crew services is going to happen. Five out of the seven options exploit commercial crew services.
3) The Shuttle orbiter looks like it will still retire close to schedule. Only one of the seven options extends orbiter operations through 2015.
4) Ares V may not survive. Even though HLV is endorsed with every option, Ares V is only included in four out of the seven, and those four (IMHO) consist of the less probable choices.
5) Propellant depots are enabling to one option, and mentioned as enhancing three options, so depots are not ignored and have a fair chance for future development. Particularly when you take into account that commercial services are included in every option.
6) The ISS is not going to de-orbit in 2016. Five of the seven options extend ISS operations through 2020. The committee’s hope to expand international cooperation will only emphasize the importance of the ISS. Perhaps this might not be a drain on NASA, if international cooperation offsets the cost of flying ISS beyond 2016.
[Thursday morning update]
Todd Halvorson reports on the subject. Does anyone else see something missing in the reporting? You know, the thing that’s “enabling” for Mars First?
I was really hoping we’d see some sort of elaboration today of the reasoning/analysis behind Jeff Greason’s comment from last week that he wasn’t sure 25mT was enough anymore. The assumption that new heavy-lift needed to be developed seemed to be behind all of the 7 options presented by the committee. Considering the resultant cost of such an assumption, I’d really like to see it substantiated.
Comments at nasaspaceflight dot com are suggesting rumors that DoD isn’t too keen on sharing its EELVs for NASA human spaceflight.
The claim is that suggestions of this were raised at today’s meeting of the A-Team.
Now that would complicate things.
Can anyone explain why the DoD would feel that way? Would it be too slow to ramp-up production? What is the expected scarcity?
There is concern that NASA’s “human rating” requirements would raise the costs, and impact operations.
Argh!
Will SpaceX face this problem as well? Is Falcon 9 not “human-rated” and would it have to be human-rated if it launches a crewed version of the Dragon on behalf of NASA (or even not on behalf of NASA)?
Back to EELVs –I imagine all the astronauts would sign a form saying that it is ok if their launch vehicle isn’t human rated, but I also imagine that this has been suggested and rejected many time already.
Whoops, sorry to ask about SpaceX — googling easily answers this question.
It would seem that there are others in NASA other than Griffin that feel the need to use the notion of human rating as a cudgel to beat away competitors to their heavy lift wet dream.
Would the DoD be complicit to come up with this fear on their own? Or, are various NASA insiders injecting this fear into key stakeholders at this critical junction of project planning?
Reading between the lines of John S.’s comments in Monday’s Shuttle Program Standup meeting: If you’re a Shuttle employee or a Shuttle Hugger, the cavalry is coming to the rescue in about a month.
BlueMoon
I caught up on forum.nasaspaceflight.com, and I saw references to insistence on human-rating coming out of the astronaut office (in addition to the resistance to the use of EELVs from the DOD). I’m confused about the stance of the astronaut office – I would expect them to insist on human-rating only if it made sense. Clues welcome.
Why would any sane astronaut prefer to ride in the Shuttle orbiter compared to a capsule on an EELV (with or without a LES and/or “man rating”)?
I also don’t understand the DOD concerns about the EELV, especially if they are about cost. The more EELV units that NASA buys, man rated or not, the cheaper the unit cost of the EELV to the DOD.
Why would any sane astronaut prefer to ride in the Shuttle orbiter compared to a capsule on an EELV (with or without a LES and/or “man rating”)?
Actually, I’d prefer the Shuttle to a capsule, but I’m claustrophobic. I also think that Shuttle safety is underrated (particularly now) and that capsule safety is overrated.
Brock, NeilH on forum.nasaspaceflight.com cited this article:
“www.thespacereview.com/article/421/1” and in particular, paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 to explain the DOD concerns.
The Nasaspaceflight.com thread is here:
“forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?PHPSESSID=50e7afadc8cc484414c4af724f99670b&topic=18191.0”
and the comment that I’m referring to is on page 26 of that thread.
That was for “Brad”, not “Brock”. Please dilute my comments with brilliant space policy insights.
Looking at the table of options some things leap out at me.
1)The porklauncher, Ares I, looks dead. Only two of the seven options use Ares I, and one of those two options uses commercial crew services as well.
2)Commercial crew services is going to happen. Five out of the seven options exploit commercial crew services.
3)The Shuttle orbiter looks like it will still retire close to schedule. Only one of the seven options extends orbiter operations through 2015.
4)Ares V may not survive. Even though HLV is endorsed with every option, Ares V is only included in four out of the seven, and those four (IMHO) consist of the less probable choices.
5)Even though propellant depots are not central to any option, they are not ignored and have a fair chance for future development. Particularly when you take into account that commercial services are included in every option.
6)The ISS is not going to de-orbit in 2016. Five of the seven options extend ISS operations through 2020. The committee’s hope to expand international cooperation will only emphasize the importance of the ISS. Perhaps this might not be a drain on NASA, if international cooperation offsets the cost of flying ISS beyond 2016.
Edit point 5)
In actuality, propellant depots are central to one of the seven options (D’oh!)
Assuming the final three options the Augustine committee presents to Obama strongly resemble one of the seven options presented, I have a best guess as to which three.
1)Baseline derived from program of record, the stretched out NASA ESAS plan. This might be provided as the most conservative of the choices.
2)Deep space. This might be provided as a mid-range of the options.
3)Mars first. This might be provided as the high end of the options.
Whatever the final report says, I’m sure the minority dissenting opinions, where present, will make interesting reading.
Ares V = Death of Exploration
These are fast changing times, a single HLV design iteration that takes a decade to prototype and another three decades to recoup the original investment does not have an economic leg to stand on. It will be out of date before it flies. This will effectively side line NASA and give new space a free hand to do everything else. With an HLV distracting NASA new space funding should become much easier to come by.
I am not sure that NASA yet gets that it is now in a “space race” of sorts with the private sector. Is SpaceX, Bigelow, or someone else now likely to get into the depot business? I am picking that there will be a new space depot before there is a NASA HLV, though I would also give reasonable odds on the Ares V coming to a similar fate as Ares I – after a number of years and many billions of dollars (there is some precedent).
“Will SpaceX face this problem as well? Is Falcon 9 not “human-rated” and would it have to be human-rated if it launches a crewed version of the Dragon on behalf of NASA (or even not on behalf of NASA)?”
Falcon-9 was designed to be human-rated from its inception. Of course, some agency could always find some criteria by which it isn’t, if they tried hard enough…
Ares V = Death of Exploration
It may still mean the end of MSFC-built launchers if they screw up again. As they likely would.
How can astronauts prefer a solid first stage to a liquid one? (Those that are not paid ATK lobbyists, Bolden was one too btw.)
Quite many have ridden on Soyuz haven’t they? Maybe not those who are influential.
Heavy lift aside, the hopeful sign is the recognition about what the private sector can do. There’s been a real sea change in this regard. The latest Popular Mechanics (the Mythbusters issue) ran a piece on SpaceX and closed with the suggestion that SpaceX would get to Mars before the government. No popular media would’ve seriously suggested that ten years ago.
I don’t mind NASA continuing to do what it does, so long as it stays out of the way of the private efforts. We’re wasting so many billions these days on other things that it doesn’t matter much. I’m okay with a ramped up COTS program, too, though the libertarian in me balks at such things.
What does “NASA heritage” mean in the heavy lift column?
It seems a bit redundant to me that they have a main options column but then a beyond LEO column. To me the beyond LEO destination is the main option. Reading down the list it looks like they started off with the least likely options to save the best options for last.
The short version, I think, is that ‘heavy lifter needed’ is a belief system, and as reflected by Augustine’s closing remark, it would be amazing if the majority of the panel gave up that belief system in such a short time.
One thing in Halverson’s article in Florida Today: He takes as a given that all the options beyond the first three would cost more than the Obama budget, when as Jeff Greason tried to point out (as Clark has noted), that’s not at all a settled question.
Unfortunately, the short version on the chart is what got out to the media.
He takes as a given that all the options beyond the first three would cost more than the Obama budget, when as Jeff Greason tried to point out (as Clark has noted), that’s not at all a settled question.
Yes, just as it is not a settled question that depots are unaffordable or unnecessary in Options 1-3.
This slide looks interesting:
http://twitpic.com/cumyl
“No LEO assembly” gets its own bullet point.
Is there anything we can do to influence decisions at this point? Contacting congress critters? Phoning the board? I’ve obviously been influenced by reading this blog, but it sure seems to me that low-cost high frequency launches (not necessarily with large payloads), with assembly and lots of activity in earth orbit (with the resulting flexibility) makes infinitely more sense than trying to heave everything up at once from the bottom of this gravity well.
Imagine if, to explore America, the Europeans went from having no ship building and operating capability at all to constructing a giant (wooden) ship to send across the Atlantic carrying four people and all the supplies for the round trip. As opposed to what actually happened, where they first operated in small boats, then learned to lay down a keel and build bigger boats, and then operated those boats close to the coast, and then finally were able to cross the Atlantic, with difficulty, with ships that were reliable to operate on European trade routes. Or imagine if the air travel industry tried to go from nothing to a jumbo ocean-crossing aircraft (which would fly twice a year), skipping through all the intermediate stages where many different small aircraft were developed and flown, followed by larger more complex aircraft with greater range and capability.
Unoriginal and rambling, I know, and preaching to the choir. But I can’t stop myself.
Apropos my comment that the ‘need’ for a heavy lifter is [part of] a belief system, I recall that when I first started concertedly talking to the media about space more than twenty years ago, I used to say something like,
“The barriers to practical spaceflight are far more matters of psychology than of technology.”
Despite progress outside the ‘establishment’ I see little reason to change that.
“Is there anything we can do to influence decisions at this point? “
Well they are taking comments from the public into account. Looks like they are mostly concerned of opinions on destinations not infrastructure.
Not sure, but I think this page is where you can submit feedback.
It looks to me like they are comparing the cost of Skylab to that of ISS as a justification for heavy lift and no orbital assembly. To me, that’s just absolutely bonkers.
Why is this
‘heavy lifter needed’
to be dismissed as a ‘belief system’ while this
“The barriers to practical spaceflight are far more matters of psychology than of technology.”
is to be accepted as self evident fact?
Not saying you’re necessarily wrong but we all have ‘belief systems’. Why should yours be accepted as profound insight while others’ be rejected as irrational baggage carried over from the past?
Pete said:
These are fast changing times, a single HLV design iteration that takes a decade to prototype and another three decades to recoup the original investment does not have an economic leg to stand on. It will be out of date before it flies.
You are almost certainly correct in your assessment that a single HLV design iteration will probably fail spectacularly $50-100B and 10 years on. Ares I is on its death bed, though not dead yet. I am by no means convinced of the viability of Ares V politically or economically. It will continue to be a jobs program that sucks up availalble capital and talent, but it will almost certainly never fly. I hope this rather obvious realization of the circumstances is one that Mr. Augustine drives home very clearly to the President.
This will effectively side line NASA and give new space a free hand to do everything else. With an HLV distracting NASA new space funding should become much easier to come by.
Unfortunately, I don’t share this sentiment. A similar thing happened with Shuttle, and instead of contracting out for cheaper rides NASA forced through legislation to outlaw commercial launchers. This did irreparable damage to the industry, cutting off at least one innovation cycle and allowing ESA to catch up – we still have not recovered. A similar thing is likely to happen when (not if) the gap grows considerably. I see the NASA congressional delegation funding purchases from Roskosmos long before it funds purchases from SpaceX; and putting in place onerous “safety” regulations that will make it virtually impossible to launch humans economically from US soil with anything but a publicly-financed launcher. Hopefully I am wrong.
I am not sure that NASA yet gets that it is now in a “space race” of sorts with the private sector. Is SpaceX, Bigelow, or someone else now likely to get into the depot business? I am picking that there will be a new space depot before there is a NASA HLV, though I would also give reasonable odds on the Ares V coming to a similar fate as Ares I – after a number of years and many billions of dollars (there is some precedent).
This is more true now than in the past, but its in investment phase right now. The bad news is that SpaceX is the only player with a chance of manned launch, and it’s a marginal one that relies on the success of a lot of things between now and then. Three failed Falcon 9 launches is probably not an option for the company, no matter how much Musk made on PayPal.
On the other hand, I don’t think NASA sees companies like Virgin Galactic and XCOR as a threat or would really know how to do anything about it if they did. These companies appear to represent the truly revolutionary technology path that has a chance to change launch prices by orders of magnitude and offer operational flexibility to the point where NASA will essentially not be able to crush them if they are able to get people to orbit – but that is 15+ years off. I also think Bigelow is a game-changer because he is essentially pursuing the same path as fuel depots – attacking demand side rather than supply side. He would be easy enough to stop by delaying a few ITAR applications, but I don’t see the political alarm bells going off like they are with COTS D.
A similar thing happened with Shuttle, and instead of contracting out for cheaper rides NASA forced through legislation to outlaw commercial launchers.
In what alternate history did this occur?
I don’t recall NASA getting legislation to outlaw commercial launches. I do remember them pushing (through heavy taxpayer subsidizies) to take over the commercial launch market in the early/mid 1980s. Following the Challenger explosion, commercial satellite launches weren’t allowed on the Shuttle any more.
One of the things I remember from that time is the May, 1986 failure of a Delta II booster. IIRC, the failure was due to a known glitch in the electrical or flight control system. Since the Shuttle was cutting so heavily into the launch market, the problem wasn’t fixed. After commercial flights were banned on the Shuttle, McDonnel Douglas had the financial incentive to fix the problem since they were cleared to market the booster.
I do remember them pushing (through heavy taxpayer subsidizies) to take over the commercial launch market in the early/mid 1980s.
That wasn’t a NASA “push.” It was national policy at the time the Shuttle decision was made for it to handle all US space transportation (hence its name, the National Space Transportation System). It had to do so in order to postulate the flight rate needed to justify its development and proposed operational costs.
There were no commercial companies at the time. Of course, one of their barriers to entry was the threat of having to compete with a taxpayer-subsidized system in the form of the Shuttle (and few realized in the early eighties just how uneconomical it was going to be).
It was never illegal, per se, to build a commercial launcher, though how to launch legally was problematic prior to the passage of the Commercial Space Launch Act in 1984, which established the regulatory regime for it.
I think it extremely likely that we will see a shuttle-derived vehicle selected in whatever plan is adopted. This is driven partly through the widely held (though probably mistaken) belief that heavy lift is needed for real exploration. However, I an nearly certain that it is mostly driven by the political need to keep people employed during the Great Recession.
I would rather see multiple EELV-class launcher combined with propellant depots, but I think the best that we can realistically hope for is (a) shuttle-derived HLLV combined with (b) EELV launch of the Orion capsule and (c) continuation of the ISS until 2020. This probably isn’t the best option, but it looks likely.
The positive things about it are:
1) Ares 1 is axed, but ATK/Marshall get a consolation prize to keep them busy.
2) EELV-class launchers get a new paying customer!
3) Orion gets a launcher with more payload capacity sooner.
4) Prop depots are still a possibility.
5) ISS isn’t thrown away in 2015.
6) Shuttle team stays employed (this might be a negative).
7) Shuttle usage can be stretched out longer (this might be a negative).
The negatives are:
1) HLLV cargo carrier (Orbiter replacement) will probably take longer and be harder to develop than anticipated.
2) NASA’s bureaucracy stays bloated.
3) The heavy-lift cargo cult continues.
4) Launcher development continues to eat up a large percentage of NASA’s available budget.
Re: HLLV cargo carrier (Orbiter replacement) will probably take longer and be harder to develop than anticipated.
Yes, I see re-starting SSME production (or rather, re-building it) or starting up the disposable version as slowing the Shannon Shuttle.
What happens to J2-X development in lieu of Shannon Shuttle? Does J2-X get slow-tracked/mothballed until we’re developing EDSs? Or are we doing EDS stages the same time we’re doing the boattail and disposable SSMEs for the Shannon Shuttle? It’s sounding expensive.
@ Alex
One advantage of Direct’s Jupiter 246 is that is uses 6 RL-10s and all of the costs of J2X development are avoided.
Large buys of RL-10s should also allow economy of mass production for others wishing to build an RL-10 based upper stage or EDS.
Doesn’t anyone here speak government? The options on that chart are arranged in order of cost, and hence in the current environment arranged in the order of priority. What you have (barring a gambling and originality that Obama hasn’t shown to date) is three options: 1. Baseline stretched (55% prob) 2. ISS focused (35%) 3. Dash out of LEO (10%).
In common :continuing Ares V (I personally suspect ARES-V stands for A Really Expensive Stupid Vehicle).
Rand,
“There were no commercial companies at the time. Of course, one of their barriers to entry was the threat of having to compete with a taxpayer-subsidized system in the form of the Shuttle (and few realized in the early eighties just how uneconomical it was going to be).”
You seem to forget pioneers like Space Services Inc. and Orbital Sciences which were both founded at the time.
Space Services achieved the first private space launch on September 9, 1982 from Matagroda Island in Texas. It was that launch that triggered the Commercial Space Act of 1984. Sub-orbital and never followed up due to the death of a key sponsor just hours before but the Space Services folks were willing to take on the Shuttle even when people believe it would be viable commercially. I also recall that FedEx’s Fred Smith was looking at the economics of buying a Shuttle for commercial launch, but that is another story.
BTW If you ever get the chance you should talk to Art Dula at one of the space law conferences about those pioneer days about how he had to go to a score of government agencies to get the paper done for it. And how that resulted to the creation of the FAA AST.
Shuttle C is the only HLLV option that stands a snow ball chance in hell of ever making it past the mock-up hardware stage. Ares V would require way more design input than our current government managed space program (NASA) can muster. NASA had its chance to make it happen back in 2005…they totally blew it with the Ares I fiasco. Moon Mars goals are now no more than mere fantasy spin. NASA manned space program is done. The upcoming ever widening gap will put and end to it. From here on it’s just money down a rat hole. So the attention now shifts to New Mexico and the private space industry. Providing of course that it can survive the upcoming socialist agenda generated financial debt melt down. We are at crossroads in history either we stand up and repute the socialist progressive assault on our financial sovenity or we fade into history as the nation that was. The clock is ticking we have only a few months remaining to stem the tide before the pendulum swings past the point of no return.
You seem to forget pioneers like Space Services Inc. and Orbital Sciences which were both founded at the time.
The “time” being referred to is the early seventies. And I’ve known Art for over thirty years. It wasn’t just his problems, but those of Arc Technologies that resulted in the CSLA, creating the Office of Commercial Space Transportation (which Courtney was the first head of) which later became AST after the Clinton administration folded it into the FAA (for no good reason, and not an improvement).
Shuttle C is the only HLLV option that stands a snow ball chance in hell of ever making it past the mock-up hardware stage.
I watched Mr. Shannon’s presentation about the Heavy Lift Vehicle proposal on youtube. One thing I took away from this was that the CG of the side mount pod would necessitate the Orion capsule to shifted back to the middle of the cargo pod and enclosed by the fairing. This would make a launch abort system even more difficult to implement. Shifting too much weight to the leading tip of the cargo pod would cause the main engines to gimble to their limit. Also there was concern that a range destruct on the SRB would send shrapnel out sideways rather than straight up.
One thing I kept seeing over and over through the various proposals was variations of a inline Shuttle C/Jupiter/Ares V. Hell, even one had the 2nd stage of the Ares 1 on top of the Ares V first stage — silly. One thing I gathered from the ‘NASA heritage’ label in the HLV column of the leading proposals chart is that the next HLV will most certainly be comprised of: the SRB’s, the SSME/J2X, and the LOX-Hydrogen tanks from the Shuttle ET.
Rand,
OK, so “in the early eighties” was a typo.
As for the Shuttle pushing to take over the commercial market, in the 1970’s most commerical comsats were launched by NASA on a cost basis. Replacing these NASA ELVs with the Shuttle seem a logical extension of the policy.
It was the French who proved a private launch market could exist with Ariane and until then it made little sense for Comsat firms to look for an alternative to the NASA cost based service. Yes, Ariane was government owned, but like the European Airlines and Railroads it was focused on the needs of commercial markets.
As for the Shuttle pushing to take over the commercial market, in the 1970’s most commerical comsats were launched by NASA on a cost basis. Replacing these NASA ELVs with the Shuttle seem a logical extension of the policy.
I understand the basis of the policy. I wasn’t the one criticizing it (though in retrospect it was a disaster). I was just pointing out that NASA never “pushed through legislation to make commercial launches illegal.”
It is definitely worrying. Even if it doesn’t take a lot of money, HLVs do. I just hope we can get enough support for depots and commercial stuff to get them off the ground before the status quo eats their lunch. I’m still somewhat hopeful that we’ll at least get something out of this, but this definitely does feel like a bit of an Empire Strikes Back kind of moment after Jeff and Chris’s presentations on the 30th.