Chair Force Engineer has a useful post on the assumptions that go into the various choices of lunar architecture, an issue on which I kvetch on at least a weekly basis, because NASA steadfastly refuses to show its work. He delves into Ares vs Direct issues much more deeply than I ever bother to do, because, frankly, both approaches are flawed. I don’t have a vehicle-design dog in the fight. I like to argue at a higher level, which is, what is our institutional approach to becoming spacefaring: NASA develops its own vehicles for its own limited needs, or the federal space establishment encourages a private space industry off of which NASA can leverage to accomplish not only its own goals, but those of others?

But for those who like to design launch systems, and get down into those weeds, CFE offers some interesting contrasts between Direct and NASA’s current approach. I generally agree with his conclusion (as far as it goes):

I would like for the next NASA Administrator to call time-out and order a re-evaluation of crew and cargo launch strategies that takes development costs into account with infrastructure and operational costs for the expected duration of Project Constellation (from now until at least 2025.) The agency should look at permutations of all realistic crew launch & cargo launch designs. Examine Ares I, Jupiter 120, Atlas V Heavy, Delta IV Heavy, and Wide-Body Atlas for crew launch. Take a gander at Ares V, Jupiter 232, and a side-mount Shuttle Derived Vehicle similar to Shuttle-C. Take a realistic look at the assumptions which are driving the Orion capsule weight (especially the amount of volume available to each crew member) and the number of man-days the Altair lander is expected to support on the lunar surface.

But there are a lot more fundamental assumptions that have to be examined. For instance, if we focus a small fraction of the billions being spent on developing unneeded launch systems instead on orbital infrastructure (EVA equipment, docking protocols and hardware, mating interfaces, tugs, etc.) and utilize innovative approaches like Bigelow’s facilities for habitat, how much would we do with existing launch systems, and future (small) space transports that could drive down costs? It would be an interesting exercise, and one that NASA has never engaged in (because the insanely wrong lesson it learned from ISS was to avoid orbital operations and assembly) to challenge them to come up with a way to get to the moon with existing launch systems. Because that is the route to becoming spacefaring.

[Update a few minutes later]

One other thought, and one that I tried (unsuccessfully) to inject into the CE&R results that we were submitting to NASA back before Mike became administrator. NASA should consider marginal costs per mission, and average costs per mission (including amortization of development costs), and let that drive them toward architectures that are scalable to much more activity. From that standpoint, ESAS is an utter disaster.

Al Fansome has some numbers to show where the Obama administration puts space in terms of federal R&D priority (scroll down to the eleventh comment):

I reviewed the stimulus package for the science & tech agencies. I have listed them by order of amount received in the stimulus bill.

DOE receives $43.9 Billion (for energy related projects.)

NIH receives $4.6 Billion.

National Telecommunications & Information Administration receives $3.8 Billion.

NSF receives $2.5 Billion.

NOAA receives $1 Billion.

NASA receives $600 million.

NIST receives $500 million.

Now you may think “well at least NASA got more than somebody.”

But wait, the President’s budget request for NIST for FY2009 was $678 million.
http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/releases/budget_2009.htm

The NIST stimulus package of $500M is 74% of its FY2009 budget request.

FWIW,

– Al

PS — This is completely depressing.

I’m certainly not surprised. I keep telling people that civil space isn’t important. This is just more proof of that.

Continue reading Sucking Hind Tit →

I’ve commented in the past (even recently) that risk estimates of continuing to fly the Shuttle are overblown. There are good arguments to retire the system, but the risk of losing the crew isn’t one of them, both because they aren’t as high as people are saying, and because losing another crew wouldn’t be the end of the world. As I’ve said repeatedly, if we’re not willing to risk human lives on spaceflight, then it’s probably not worth doing. Anyway, Dick Covey, former astronaut and head of USA, apparently agrees with me (at least about the risk numbers):

The often-quoted PRA numbers do not factor in the continuous improvement in the vehicle and operations — of which there have been numerous and significant changes — or the quality and performance of the team that makes it work.

PRA estimates alone should never be used to reach a go/no-go determination on flying one, two or 10 more missions. PRA is intended primarily to provide an analytical yardstick for making sound engineering decisions about the development of a system and whether incremental changes in a system would improve or degrade relative safety.

Applying statistical probability techniques to the space shuttle PRA number to determine the risk of flying multiple missions implies a randomness in safe shuttle operations that does not exist, and belies the real approach to risk identification and management that defines the current space shuttle program.

The shuttle currently operates at the highest level of safety in its history. It is not without risk, but that risk is better understood and mitigated now than at any time in shuttle history.

Absolutely. The Shuttle has never been safer than it is today. Mike Griffin has just been using the PRA numbers to scare Congress into retiring the system so he could free up the funds for the Scotty rocket.

And this nonsense about needing “recertification” (whatever that means — it was never “certified” in the first place) in 2010 is just that. The CAIB never really provided any basis for this date. It’s an arbitrary one that just happened to coincide with the planned completion of ISS, so it seemed like a good marker for the decision as to whether or not to continue to program. We don’t really know if the vehicles need an OMDP, or mini or nano OMDP. We would just have to continue to inspect as we fly.