Category Archives: Space

Apollo Uber Alles

Dwayne Day is complaining today at The Space Review about my and others’ use of the word fascism to describe NASA’s human spaceflight program, though he doesn’t call me out by name (interestingly, when you do the Google search he suggests, this post doesn’t even come up in the top ten, though it’s only a link away from some of them).

I’ll make two points. First, if he actually read Jonah’s “screed” (his word), it isn’t obvious from this review. For example, he says that Jonah doesn’t criticize conservatives for their own fascist tendencies in the book, but that’s patently false. And he seems to fall back on the old leftist paradigm that the epitome, almost definition of fascism were the Nazis and Mussolini’s Black Shirts:

Fascist governments do not allow other competitors to exist. The first thing they do when they gain power is to eliminate their opposition at the point of a gun. Usually they started with the primary threat, the communists, then the fascists turned their weapons on less organized and non-political groups, like the Jews and the gypsies. Fascist groups have also reveled in their militaristic attributes such as discipline and uniforms and strength and weaponry. The groups most identified with fascism–the Nazis and the Italian fascists–were paramilitary organizations that sought to enact their goals through force. It is impossible to separate fascist ideology from the methods used to implement it.

Take out the words “communists,” “Jews,” and “gypsies,” and in what way does this not describe Stalin’s USSR? Did they not eliminate their opposition at the point of a gun? Did they not have “discipline and uniforms and strength and weaponry” (recall all those May Day parades with the missiles and tanks rolling down the streets, and goose-stepping Soviet troops)? Did they not “enact their goals through force”? Is not the same true of North Korea? Or Cuba?

What Dr. Day is talking about is what fascists do when they actually gain power, but fascism is not just the use of force. It is a set of ideas, to be implemented by whatever means necessary.

My second point, as I wrote in the previous post, is that those ideas are described in Jonah’s book, particularly in reference to Apollo.

From the first edition, pages 210-211 (my annotations are in square brackets, and red), “Even Kennedy’s nondefense policies were sold as the moral analogue of war…His intimidation of the steel industry was a rip-off of Truman’s similar effort during the Korean War, itself a maneuver from the playbooks of FDR and Wilson. Likewise, the Peace Corps and its various domestic equivalents were throwbacks to FDR’s martial CCC. Even Kennedy’s most ambitious idea, putting a man on the moon, was sold to the public as a response to the fact that the Soviet Union was overtaking America in science…”

He went on. Again, the red text is my annotation of his words.

“What made [Kennedy’s administration] so popular? What made it so effective? What has given it its lasting appeal? On almost every front, the answers are those elements that fit the fascist playbook: the creation of crises [We’re losing the race to the Soviets! We can’t go to sleep by a Russian moon!], national appeals to unity [They are our astronauts! Our nation shall beat the Soviets to the moon!], the celebration of martial values [The astronauts were all military, the best of the best], the blurring of lines between public and private sectors [SETA contracts, anyone? Cost plus? Our version of Soviet design bureaus?], the utilization of the mass media to glamorize the state and its programs [The Life Magazine deal for chronicling a bowdlerized version of the astronauts’ lives], invocation of a “post-partisan” spirit that places the important decisions in the hands of experts and intellectual supermen, and a cult of personality for the national leader [von Braun…”Rocket scientists”…not just Kennedy Space Center, but (briefly) Cape Kennedy].”

Obviously, this can go overboard, and Dr. Day has some legitimate complaints. While certainly leftists use the term (as Dr. Day describes) to simply insult anyone who disagrees with them and shut down discussion, and have done so for years, that is not the way that it is being used here, at least not by me. I don’t think that it’s an insult to call something fascist (though I’ve certainly been called that enough times myself when that was the clear intent). I am not merely being Seinfeldian when I always append the phrase “not that there’s anything wrong with that” to my usage of the word. I really mean it. Hitler gave fascism a bad name. Not to imply, of course, that I think that these are good ideas. Just that they’re not intrinsically evil, and many millions of people in this country apparently buy into them, as demonstrated by Obama’s campaign success.

In any event, I do think that it is a useful prism through which to view the program for the purposes of analyzing it, and trying to develop a more useful space policy. If we can recognize it for what it is, we stand a much better chance of moving things in a more useful direction, and one more in keeping with traditional American values, and classical liberalism.

A Solution To The Ares 1 Problem

A tuned mass vibration damper:

Due to both the immense size of Taipei 101 and the fact that it sits just over 600ft from a major fault line, engineers had no choice but to install one of this size at a cost of $4m. Too heavy to be lifted by crane, the damper was assembled on site and hangs through four floors of the skyscraper. It can reduce the building’s movement by up to 40%.

And only 728 tons. Hey, the vehicle’s already overweight. What’s a little more?

PDR Problems?

I’d sure like to know a lot more about this:

Recently, an attempt at a PDR by ATK was called up short by the minions. Not even a goatee could make you feel warm and fuzzy that day. Having failed in their quest to show some level of design maturity, ATK was not even allowed to finish their presentations and were sent back to the showers to try again. And, oh, by the way, none of the ARES 1 designs at PDR, including the upper stage, include any of the modifications that will be required to turn the bladder basher into a real human space transportation system. That will come later. Makes one wonder why the PDR was scheduled if the design is that immature and missing pieces, don’t it?

If true (and there’s little reason to think otherwise, despite the happy talk from Jeff Hanley), how long will this farce go on?

Mark The Date

I just got an email from Pat Kelley:

I received a call from Anne Greenglass to tell me that Len’s ashes will be interred at Arlington cemetery with full military honors on September 17. Any of Len’s friends and cohorts who are in the Washington area on that date are welcome to come to the service. As we get closer to the date if I have any more information I will pass it along.

He’s referring to Len Cormier, who died of cancer a few days ago.

Senators Lecture George Bush

…about space policy

The three say they don’t know for certain why the White House has failed to provide the appropriate guidance and funding needed to implement the Vision, “though we suspect it can be explained by Bush not knowing all the facts about what the real impact of NASA’s annual budgets has been since the loss of the Columbia in 2003.”

I think the problem is less in the funding, and more in the lack of guidance. Once Griffin was hired, the White House apparently decided that it was mission accomplished, and refocused to much more pressing issues, despite the fact that NASA’s implementation seems to fly in the face of the original vision and the recommendations of the Aldridge Commission.

And Clark Lindsey gives them a lecture of their own:

These Senators don’t seem to know that NASA could have chosen to pursue an innovative low cost approach to space development and lunar exploration rather than choosing a very long and very expensive path to two new vehicles, both of which will be very costly to operate. These Senators apparently don’t even know about COTS, the one modest effort taken by the agency towards lower costs for space hardware development and operations.

Well, what most Senators don’t know, particularly about space, could fill a small library. Maybe even a large one.

“Not Silent”

As usual, Doug Cooke defends ESAS:

The “direct” variation fails to meet NASA’s needs on several grounds. It is vastly over-capacity and too costly to service the International Space Station, but worse, its lift capacity would not be enough for NASA to maintain a sustained presence on the moon.

Advocates for the “direct” variation are touting unrealistic development costs and schedules. A fundamental difference is that the Ares I and Orion probability of crew survival is at least two times better than all of the other concepts evaluated, including “direct”-like concepts.

Also as usual, he provides no evidence for his assertions. We are simply supposed to accept them because Doug Cooke says so. Have we ever seen the actual report that came out of the sixty-day study, with a description of methodology and assumptions? I haven’t.

I’m not necessarily a big fan of “Direct,” but his statement raises more issues than it answers. Why doesn’t the “lift capacity allow a sustained presence on the moon” in a way that ESAS does? Why should it be assumed that NASA’s new launch system will service space station? I thought that this was what COTS was for? What are the marginal costs of an additional Jupiter launch versus Ares 1?

Give us some numbers, and provide a basis for them, and we might take this seriously.

[Wednesday morning update]

More thoughts and comments at NASA Watch, and from Chair Force Engineer.

“Not Silent”

As usual, Doug Cooke defends ESAS:

The “direct” variation fails to meet NASA’s needs on several grounds. It is vastly over-capacity and too costly to service the International Space Station, but worse, its lift capacity would not be enough for NASA to maintain a sustained presence on the moon.

Advocates for the “direct” variation are touting unrealistic development costs and schedules. A fundamental difference is that the Ares I and Orion probability of crew survival is at least two times better than all of the other concepts evaluated, including “direct”-like concepts.

Also as usual, he provides no evidence for his assertions. We are simply supposed to accept them because Doug Cooke says so. Have we ever seen the actual report that came out of the sixty-day study, with a description of methodology and assumptions? I haven’t.

I’m not necessarily a big fan of “Direct,” but his statement raises more issues than it answers. Why doesn’t the “lift capacity allow a sustained presence on the moon” in a way that ESAS does? Why should it be assumed that NASA’s new launch system will service space station? I thought that this was what COTS was for? What are the marginal costs of an additional Jupiter launch versus Ares 1?

Give us some numbers, and provide a basis for them, and we might take this seriously.

[Wednesday morning update]

More thoughts and comments at NASA Watch, and from Chair Force Engineer.

Where Is The Money Coming From?

And where is it going, in commercial space?

I have to say, I thought this was pretty funny:

Virgin Galactic has already been watching its back with the EADS suborbital space plane (pictured above), set to make its first flight by 2012. But now there’s cash across the pond. “We have invested substantial money into this project,” Auque said without citing exact figures. “The problem is that we need to create this market.”

I doubt very much that Virgin Galactic is worried that EADS Astrium is going to raise a billion dollars to build a suborbital tourist vehicle. There’s a reason that Auque didn’t cite “exact” (or even approximate) figures. He expects to do it mostly with someone else’s money, if he can find a sucker (like ESA?).