I haven’t commented on this, but the New Scientist has a fairly extensive story of Armadillo’s bad weekend.

What do I think?

First of all, full disclosure. I’m working, as I write this, for one of Armadillo’s competitors, on SBIR proposals. But it’s a close-knit community, even among the competitors.

And having said that, I don’t think it’s a disaster for Armadillo. These kinds of things are going to happen along the way, as we start to understand how to develop operable and affordable space transports (a goal that has eluded both the military and NASA, almost half a century after the dawn of the space age). I also find it interesting (and I have to confess, somewhat amusing) that the failure was fundamentally a software failure, given the pedigree of the company that provided the funds that created the vehicle:

Post-crash analysis has revealed what went wrong

I haven’t commented on this, but the New Scientist has a fairly extensive story of Armadillo’s bad weekend.

What do I think?

First of all, full disclosure. I’m working, as I write this, for one of Armadillo’s competitors, on SBIR proposals. But it’s a close-knit community, even among the competitors.

And having said that, I don’t think it’s a disaster for Armadillo. These kinds of things are going to happen along the way, as we start to understand how to develop operable and affordable space transports (a goal that has eluded both the military and NASA, almost half a century after the dawn of the space age). I also find it interesting (and I have to confess, somewhat amusing) that the failure was fundamentally a software failure, given the pedigree of the company that provided the funds that created the vehicle:

Post-crash analysis has revealed what went wrong

I haven’t commented on this, but the New Scientist has a fairly extensive story of Armadillo’s bad weekend.

What do I think?

First of all, full disclosure. I’m working, as I write this, for one of Armadillo’s competitors, on SBIR proposals. But it’s a close-knit community, even among the competitors.

And having said that, I don’t think it’s a disaster for Armadillo. These kinds of things are going to happen along the way, as we start to understand how to develop operable and affordable space transports (a goal that has eluded both the military and NASA, almost half a century after the dawn of the space age). I also find it interesting (and I have to confess, somewhat amusing) that the failure was fundamentally a software failure, given the pedigree of the company that provided the funds that created the vehicle:

Post-crash analysis has revealed what went wrong

Since it did the deorbit burn about half an hour ago, Endeavour should be starting to test its tiles right about now. Hoping for the best.

[Update a few minutes later]

Apparently they came through entry all right. Landing in a few minutes. It will be interesting to see the extent of the belly damage once they reach the ground.

[Update a few minutes prior to landing]

I just heard the double sonic boom. It rattled the house. I’ve never heard one in Florida before. The last time I did was in California, on an Edwards landing. I guess they were approaching the Cape from the south.

[Update]

The vehicle just rolled (apparently safely) to a stop.

[Post-flight update]

Interesting unintended consequences, if it turns out to be the case:

While the resulting damage was later found to pose no risk to the safe return of the orbiter or its seven-astronaut crew, NASA has found similar foam shedding events on its last few shuttle flights. The damage from any such foam loss to an orbiter’s heat shield is not believed to be catastrophic, like that which led to the 2003 Columbia accident, but engineers are analyzing it just to be sure, Hale said.

The increased frequency has prompted speculation that an extra hour added to launch countdowns – to allow inspections teams to scan shuttle fuel tanks for ice build-up – may actually contribute to ice formation that ultimately cracks or looses foam debris.

There are no risk-free choices.

Is it just me, or is this Onion piece on space tourism uncharacteristically lame?

There’s been a very interesting discussion in comments over at Space Politics about VSE, ESAS, and public perception. Jim Muncy challenges us to an exercise:

I would respectfully request everyone ask themselves two separate and distinct questions. Answer them independently, in any order you want.

1) As a prelude, add any

Katherine Mangu-Ward compares and contrasts NASA’s safety approach to that of private industry.

XCOR needs one.

And once again, ITAR rears its ugly head.

Tariq Malik has a good story on the current state of the Shuttle tile issue.

Apparently, the concern is not for loss of the vehicle (and of course, the crew, but we have lots of astronauts*, and only three orbiters left). The concern is whether or not a repair will reduce the turnaround time for repair on the ground that’s worth the risk (to both crew doing EVA and the vehicle, in the event they actually make things worse by dinging it somewhere else or botching the repair) of attempting to repair it.

I don’t have access to all the data, but I’d be inclined to come in as is, assuming that it really doesn’t risk vehicle loss.

Someone on a mailing list I’m on noted that they wouldn’t want to be the person who signed off on a return without a repair. As I commented there, there are risks either way. If they attempt to repair it, and lose the vehicle on entry, it would be easy to second guess the decision, and decide after the fact that the repair caused the loss, whereas leaving it alone might have brought them home all right.

There are no risk-free decisions. Every action in life, every breath you take, is a gamble. It’s just a matter of judging the odds.

[Friday morning update]

Sorry, Keith, but it wasn’t a joke. It’s a description of reality. I know that you have trouble with that sometimes.

[Monday morning update]

In rereading Keith’s strange comment, I have no idea what he’s talking about here:

…to make sure to get a link to a drunk astronaut story in the process.

The only story I linked (other than Tariq Malik’s) to was one about Lisa Nowak, the main point of which was that NASA has too many astronauts. Reading is fundamental.

* Of course, the fact that we’d lose Barbara Morgan, the other “teacher in space” (quotes because she’s officially an astronaut) would have dire PR effects.

Over at Advanced Nanotechnology this week.