Henry Vanderbilt isn’t very happy with NASA’s exploration plans:

This Apollo redux has the same fatal flaw as Apollo: The specialized throwaway systems invented to get (back) to the Moon ASAP were (will be) far too labor-intensive at far too low a max flight rate to allow affordable followup. The new ships are not only based in significant part on existing Shuttle components and facilities, but they are to be operated in significant part by the existing Shuttle organization. IE, tens of thousands of people narrowly specialized in various aspects of flying a handful of astronauts on a handful of missions a year – at, by the time all this fixed overhead is added up, billions of dollars a mission.

Like Apollo, NASA’s new ESAS plan has built into it the seeds of its shutdown by some future Congress, once the warm glow of the first few daring missions has once again faded…

…Once what’s come out unofficially so far becomes official, we will have no choice but to decline further support for new NASA exploration funding, and if as seems likely we can’t persuade our fellow SEA members to join us, we will have to regretfully resign.

Sadly, I find nothing at all here with which I can disagree.

[Update a few minutes later]

Aviation Week also says (correctly) that it’s Apollo redux, and is skeptical about its political prospects.

…basically using a replay of the Apollo approach of the 1960s, with updated electronics.

And here’s another problem:

Rewriting the exploration-hardware development plans drafted under his predecessor, Griffin will exert tighter control over hardware design, leaving much less to the imagination of the contractors and perhaps building the new vehicles in NASA facilities.

Shades of X-38…

Henry Vanderbilt isn’t very happy with NASA’s exploration plans:

This Apollo redux has the same fatal flaw as Apollo: The specialized throwaway systems invented to get (back) to the Moon ASAP were (will be) far too labor-intensive at far too low a max flight rate to allow affordable followup. The new ships are not only based in significant part on existing Shuttle components and facilities, but they are to be operated in significant part by the existing Shuttle organization. IE, tens of thousands of people narrowly specialized in various aspects of flying a handful of astronauts on a handful of missions a year – at, by the time all this fixed overhead is added up, billions of dollars a mission.

Like Apollo, NASA’s new ESAS plan has built into it the seeds of its shutdown by some future Congress, once the warm glow of the first few daring missions has once again faded…

…Once what’s come out unofficially so far becomes official, we will have no choice but to decline further support for new NASA exploration funding, and if as seems likely we can’t persuade our fellow SEA members to join us, we will have to regretfully resign.

Sadly, I find nothing at all here with which I can disagree.

[Update a few minutes later]

Aviation Week also says (correctly) that it’s Apollo redux, and is skeptical about its political prospects.

…basically using a replay of the Apollo approach of the 1960s, with updated electronics.

And here’s another problem:

Rewriting the exploration-hardware development plans drafted under his predecessor, Griffin will exert tighter control over hardware design, leaving much less to the imagination of the contractors and perhaps building the new vehicles in NASA facilities.

Shades of X-38…

Henry Vanderbilt isn’t very happy with NASA’s exploration plans:

This Apollo redux has the same fatal flaw as Apollo: The specialized throwaway systems invented to get (back) to the Moon ASAP were (will be) far too labor-intensive at far too low a max flight rate to allow affordable followup. The new ships are not only based in significant part on existing Shuttle components and facilities, but they are to be operated in significant part by the existing Shuttle organization. IE, tens of thousands of people narrowly specialized in various aspects of flying a handful of astronauts on a handful of missions a year – at, by the time all this fixed overhead is added up, billions of dollars a mission.

Like Apollo, NASA’s new ESAS plan has built into it the seeds of its shutdown by some future Congress, once the warm glow of the first few daring missions has once again faded…

…Once what’s come out unofficially so far becomes official, we will have no choice but to decline further support for new NASA exploration funding, and if as seems likely we can’t persuade our fellow SEA members to join us, we will have to regretfully resign.

Sadly, I find nothing at all here with which I can disagree.

[Update a few minutes later]

Aviation Week also says (correctly) that it’s Apollo redux, and is skeptical about its political prospects.

…basically using a replay of the Apollo approach of the 1960s, with updated electronics.

And here’s another problem:

Rewriting the exploration-hardware development plans drafted under his predecessor, Griffin will exert tighter control over hardware design, leaving much less to the imagination of the contractors and perhaps building the new vehicles in NASA facilities.

Shades of X-38…

Defense Industry Daily has a rundown on current plans for SpaceX, and their leap directly from Falcon 1 to Falcon 9. They don’t mention the recent engine test failure, though.

It’s also amusing that they describe Mike Griffin as “…a former NASA exec and president of the venture-capital firm In-Q-Tel.”

I’m pretty sure he has a new job now.

He’s talking about the DHS, but Cliff May may have an explanation for NASA:

When bureaucracies become sclerotic, they don

If this story is true, it looks like Prometheus is dead. No nuclear propulsion for the foreseeable future.

This part, though, is a little puzzling:

NASA had hoped to develop the nuclear propulsion system to carry spacecraft beyond the solar system, according to a June 19 story in the Times Union.

That’s news to me. I thought the program’s purpose was to enable easier exploration of the solar system, not to go beyond it.

Jon Goff has some interesting speculation about the recent changes in SpaceX payloads. There are some even more interesting comments to the post, including one from the horse’s…errrr…Falcon’s mouth.

In the wake of the damage to Michoud by Katrina, and the threat to the Cape from Ophelia, one of Alan Boyle’s readers has an idea to avoid further impacts to the space program from tropical weather:

NASA will have to weigh the benefits of the possibility of keeping space shuttle faculties in the Gulf Coast or relocating elsewhere in the United States to avoid the specter of frequent hurricanes. In the beginning of the space shuttle program, Vandenberg Air Force Base (Lompoc, Calif.) was to be a West Coast launch site. Thanks to budget cuts, Vandenberg AFB never was expanded for shuttle launches. While NASA might have gotten off easy this time, NASA might not be so lucky after the next hurricane. NASA and its contractors might consider moving back out to the West Coast and move its displaced workers at the same time. The facilities are still here at Plant 42, Edwards Air Force Base and Phillips Laboratory as well as throughout Southern California.

“Having grown up in the Antelope Valley (in Lancaster), in the shadow of Edwards AFB (where the shuttle landed last time) and Palmdale

If you only read the head on this story, you’d think that Neil Armstrong is claiming that a Mars mission is easier than a lunar one. But he’s not comparing a future lunar mission to a future Mars mission–he’s comparing a future Mars mission to Apollo. Based on the headline, though, it’s not at all clear that the reporter understands that.

[Update at 2:50 PM PDT]

It occurs to me that I’m too hasty to blame the reporter. Headlines are usually the copy editor’s responsibility.

Jeff Foust has a preliminary damage assessment of the hurricane and its aftermath on the space agency’s near- and far-term future.