Sam, what I don’t understand about your proposal is, well, how it would actually work. The devil is always in the details in these things. When you say:

It would be private industry and individual citizens who could book whatever missions they wanted.

…what does that mean? What price will they get the service at? Who is purchasing from the launch providers?

My idea would be to have the government purchase some fixed (and large) quantity of various goods and space services (e.g., tickets to LEO, pounds to LEO, maybe even tickets and pounds to the lunar surface), use whatever there was a government need for, and auction the rest back on the market. If the market price turns out to be higher than the price paid by the government, then the program costs nothing at all (other than the cost of the services that the government needs). If it’s a lot more, presumably the providers would stop selling to the government (assuming they were allowed to opt out) and sell directly to the market. If the differential was low, then we’d have a subsidy, in which the cost of the program would be the difference in price between market and government cost of the service.

But in order to make this fly, the country (and its government) would have to decide that having large amounts of activities in space at reduced unit costs were sufficiently important to justify what would be considered a large expenditure in the context of current space activity (essentially doubling the NASA budget under your proposal, but I think you could do a lot of damage to the problem for a few billion a year). There’s been little sign of that so far.

See my proposal for a decentralized approach to developing space in this week’s The Space Review here. What people don’t seem to understand about my subsidy proposal that I first put forward last year (See recommendations 10 and 14) is that NASA and DoD would no longer be directing the space programs. It would be private industry and individual citizens who could book whatever missions they wanted. That would lead to the following benefits:

1) Freedom and liberty
2) Capitalism instead of central planning allocating capacity
3) Private development instead of government development

Government would be the primary beneficiary of cost savings since they are the primary space user. They would have more responsibility since all of space would become open for business.

Private industry and citizens would have new services that would be less valuable at first, but would be more price elastic than the government demand.

See my proposal for a decentralized approach to developing space in this week’s The Space Review here. What people don’t seem to understand about my subsidy proposal that I first put forward last year (See recommendations 10 and 14) is that NASA and DoD would no longer be directing the space programs. It would be private industry and individual citizens who could book whatever missions they wanted. That would lead to the following benefits:

1) Freedom and liberty
2) Capitalism instead of central planning allocating capacity
3) Private development instead of government development

Government would be the primary beneficiary of cost savings since they are the primary space user. They would have more responsibility since all of space would become open for business.

Private industry and citizens would have new services that would be less valuable at first, but would be more price elastic than the government demand.

See my proposal for a decentralized approach to developing space in this week’s The Space Review here. What people don’t seem to understand about my subsidy proposal that I first put forward last year (See recommendations 10 and 14) is that NASA and DoD would no longer be directing the space programs. It would be private industry and individual citizens who could book whatever missions they wanted. That would lead to the following benefits:

1) Freedom and liberty
2) Capitalism instead of central planning allocating capacity
3) Private development instead of government development

Government would be the primary beneficiary of cost savings since they are the primary space user. They would have more responsibility since all of space would become open for business.

Private industry and citizens would have new services that would be less valuable at first, but would be more price elastic than the government demand.

Thomas James expresses a fear about government lunar bases, and NASA, that I share. We’ve got to break out of Apollo mode. I hope that the new administrator understands this, but so far, I see little sign of it.

John Schwartz of NYT has written “NASA Is Said to Loosen Risk Standards for Shuttle” published today. My cost benefit analysis is here.

The statistics can be simplified. What are the failure modes? What are their probabilities? How much do those probabilities overlap? What rate is it OK for the shuttle to fail? How much does it cost to mitigate the failure modes? Stack rank them according to the highest increase in safety for the lowest cost. Go to work.

So we have a failure mode of about 1% based on 100 trials. So far it has cost $2 billion to mitigate it. That implies that NASA is acting as if the value of the orbiter and crew on each flight is $7 billion or more to make the benefits of the fix outweigh the cost ($2 billlion to achieve a less than 1% reduction in the probability of a fail in 28 flights. $2 billion/(28 * 1%) = $7 billion). The families of the 9/11 victims each received $2.1 million. To compensate the families of astronauts who may die at the same level would cost $15 million. At commercial prices of $16 million for a Falcon V which delivers about 1/4 of a shuttle’s worth to the ISS, we could buy 443 flights for $7 billion not counting range and payload costs or over 100 shuttles flights’ worth. Even using the Ariane at $4,000/lb according to Futron’s 2002 price estimate we could buy 28 shuttle flights’ worth of Ariane payload for $5.6 billion. With viable outside commercial options that are less expensive to build and operate than the shuttle is to just operate, the sale price of the shuttle would be zero. We should not be treating it like a $7 billion asset. So perhaps the cost/benefit analysis is a little off at NASA.

Or maybe the following quote from AWST, 4/11/2005 (subscription required) will give you a better feel for what is really going on at NASA:

“We had one place in the backpack where, because of the confined space, the wire bend was tighter than the specified engineering limit was. And the EVA folks said it will cost us $100,000 to fix this,” [Wayne Hale, the deputy shuttle program manager] said. “Well, in the space business, $100,000 is not a lot of money, so I said go fix this.”

This man should be relieved and someone put in place someone who can explain cost-benefit to the public.

Not that I’d noticed, but apparently today is the thirty-fifth Earth Day. Jim and Cooky Oberg said a year ago that the proponents of the day are thinking too small. Nothing’s changed since, apparently.

The president’s science advisor says that Mike Griffin will ride to the rescue, and save us from the dreaded gap.

Unlike Senator Hutchison, though, who unaccountably thinks gaps are a national security crisis, Dr. Marburger is more sanguine about them. Too much so, in fact, for my taste:

…more gaps in access were likely in the future of the U.S. space program. These gaps are to be viewed as a fact of life in space operations, he suggested.

“There will be future gaps from time to time. The thing to remember is that the president’s plan is a long-term, sustained commitment.” Gaps, he suggested, were simply a part of the continuing process of space exploration.

While I don’t in fact think that “gaps” are that big a deal, given the trivial things that we’re currently doing (and even planning) with our civil manned spaceflight program, I’m quite disturbed by the notion that they are an inevitable feature of space operations. Imagine if he’d said, “there will be future gaps from time to time in our ability to get into the air,” or “there will be future gaps from time to time in our ability to cross the oceans.”

Clearly, this isn’t an attitude that would be acceptable if we were actually doing anything important with humans in space. The fact that he can make such a statement is a window into his perception of the importance of being a space-faring nation, a goal at which the current plans for VSE still fall far short, for decades.

Senator Hutchison is going to be a distinct downgrade from Sam Brownback, when it comes to space policy, though she’ll probably be good news for JSC. It also means that one of her nicknames should be “Senator from ISS.”

In an article in which Bill Readdy says that NASA plans to accelerate the development of the CEV (not intrinsically a bad thing, given that it’s going to be built at all, and certainly in line with the new administrator’s desires), note this:

Sen. Kay Hutchison (R-Texas), subcommittee chair, said that NASA must work to avoid being caught without the ability to launch its own human missions to the ISS and low-Earth orbit.