Jeff Foust has an overview at The Space Review today about a new concept that many (including many in the astronaut office) are pushing as a CEV delivery vehicle–an SRB-based design, with a new J-2 powered upper stage. This is what many are calling a “single-stick” vehicle, as opposed to the EELVs with their strap-on boosters.

I actually agree that such a system could be built, and could have a (marginal) cost of a hundred million per flight (though it’s not clear what the actual cost per flight would be, including amortization of the development costs). However, the issues aren’t quite as simple as the proponents make out.

A major drawback of using an EELV to launch the CEV is that neither the Atlas 5 nor the Delta 4 are

The post title is the title of my (long) essay on space policy, that’s finally appeared on line in this quarter’s issue of The New Atlantis. It’s a survey of the myths of the old space age, and will probably form the basis for a book on which I’m working, between hurricanes, still moving into the new house, and trying to make a living.

And no, before anyone asks, I don’t in fact know why it’s right justified, and ragged left. Go ask the folks at The New Atlantis.

[Update a few minutes later]

The ragged left problem seems to be the use of non-standard HTML. It looks OK in Explorer–it’s only weird in Mozilla.

[Update on Thursday morning]

The justification problem has been fixed by the good folks at The New Atlantis (a publication that I highly endorse, and recommend that folks get a dead-tree subscription to, so you can get it early and often).

If you care about the future of commercial human spaceflight. Clark Lindsey explains why.

Paul Dietz points out (in comments) that if Frances hits the cape as a Cat 4 or greater, none of the major facilities are designed to take it. If the VAB, OPF and LC-39 are significantly damaged, it could mean that the Shuttle will retire even sooner than the current plan (i.e., it will never fly again). It would be a strange end to the current trajectory of our four-plus-decade manned space program, but it might be an opportunity for a clean start, since there won’t be an opportunity for a rear-guard action to save the Shuttle (and it may even finally put to rest notions of Shuttle derivatives, though that’s probably asking too much).

[Update a few minutes later]

As Paul mentions, he found the info at the new and improved NASA Watch, now with an infinite percent more permalinks.

Paul Dietz points out (in comments) that if Frances hits the cape as a Cat 4 or greater, none of the major facilities are designed to take it. If the VAB, OPF and LC-39 are significantly damaged, it could mean that the Shuttle will retire even sooner than the current plan (i.e., it will never fly again). It would be a strange end to the current trajectory of our four-plus-decade manned space program, but it might be an opportunity for a clean start, since there won’t be an opportunity for a rear-guard action to save the Shuttle (and it may even finally put to rest notions of Shuttle derivatives, though that’s probably asking too much).

[Update a few minutes later]

As Paul mentions, he found the info at the new and improved NASA Watch, now with an infinite percent more permalinks.

Paul Dietz points out (in comments) that if Frances hits the cape as a Cat 4 or greater, none of the major facilities are designed to take it. If the VAB, OPF and LC-39 are significantly damaged, it could mean that the Shuttle will retire even sooner than the current plan (i.e., it will never fly again). It would be a strange end to the current trajectory of our four-plus-decade manned space program, but it might be an opportunity for a clean start, since there won’t be an opportunity for a rear-guard action to save the Shuttle (and it may even finally put to rest notions of Shuttle derivatives, though that’s probably asking too much).

[Update a few minutes later]

As Paul mentions, he found the info at the new and improved NASA Watch, now with an infinite percent more permalinks.

Emailer Ken Talton asks:

I’m curious about the VASIMR engine, its performance and maturity. I understand you are working on Prometheus via JIMO and was wondering if the VASIMR technology is going to be used on that mission. For that matter how close to an actual space engine is this? What I’ve seen in print indicates that it has performance throttleable between ion engine efficiency and thrust like a chemical rocket. How does this compare to, say, a Spaceshuttle engine? Could it be used in a launch vehicle for instance? How big a breakthrough is it really?

JIMO is planned to use ion propulsion, a technology that is currently in use (in communications satellites and in Deep Space 1), and only requires scaling up. VASIMR is an entirely different kind of electric propulsion. Both types work by accelerating charged particles with electromagnetic fields, but ion propulsion is driven by electrostatic forces, whereas VASIMR accelerates a plasma using electromagnetic forces. It has the potential for much higher thrust (though lower specific impulse, so the fuel efficiency isn’t as good), but it’s only in the preliminary development stages. Neither type of engine would have high enough thrust/weight ratio to be used as an engine on a launch system–they’re only useful in space. There’s a good tutorial on the subject here.

Via Wired, it looks like the Da Vinci Project (now renamed the GoldenPalace.com space program) is running into problems with finding insurance.

Insurance is a huge deal for suborbital startups, and will probably turn out to be a showstopper for at least some of them. I was very surprised to find out how much of a problem insurance and launch licensing (including environmental regulation) were going to be when I first got seriously involved with this area. Launch licensing is partially addressed by Senate bill 2772, but insurance is still out there. If I was to start a suborbital launch services company tomorrow I’d tackle the insurance issue in parallel with vehicle development. The right vehicle design will keep insurance costs low, and the wrong design will drive them towards infinity.

Tim Worstall has some post-apocalyptic thoughts that are applicable to pre-apocalyptic space policy. I can never remind people enough the reason that we aren’t a true space-faring nation is not lack of technology or technologists–it’s lack of the viable institutions and means of organizing resources toward that end. Fortunately, that’s starting to change.

Tim Worstall has some post-apocalyptic thoughts that are applicable to pre-apocalyptic space policy. I can never remind people enough the reason that we aren’t a true space-faring nation is not lack of technology or technologists–it’s lack of the viable institutions and means of organizing resources toward that end. Fortunately, that’s starting to change.