Jeff Foust has a post on what the panel is considering. As some of my long-time readers might guess, my choice would be Option 5 — Flexible Path. We don’t need a destination — we need a vision, and infrastructure. Once we have the capability to get into the vicinity of various locations, and developed depoting capabilities, we can then figure out the best way to get in and out of the wells. And the easiest resources aren’t in deep gravity wells — they’re in shallow dimples.

[Update a few minutes later]

I would note this paragraph, having now read the full document:

The transportation infrastructure decisions (decisions 4 and 5) will be examined as a comprehensive trade space of launcher vehicles, depoting and destinations. That is, we will examine the possible in-space transportation infrastructure to all likely destinations for each of the launch vehicle classes, with each of the depoting concepts.

That is, they have accepted depots as interesting options to consider as a fundamental part of an infrastructure (which one must to have any truly promising options).

Jim Muncy and John Olson (NASA Intergration Directorate) in a panel on requirements.

Muncy: Wants to raise some perspectives in the context of the Augustine panel activity. Has a list of goals (not exhaustive). Not discussing current architecture. If you don’t like architecture, you might find another reason why, but that’s not the purpose of the discussion.

ESAS didn’t just happen: space policy goals and assumptions and constraints that created it. One was that it would enable human exploration for Mars. Couldn’t do moon, then Mars, because they didn’t have the money. Another was that NASA would build a transportation system that it could use for decades (“build once”). Another, from Congress, was “use Shuttle-derived workforce infrastructure and base facilities.”

Classes of goals:
Destinations: (Moon, Mars, NEO, Belt)
Strategic: Affordability, drive technology
Political: Relevance (jobs/education/environment)
Infrastructure: new industries, training
Architectural: flexibility, utilize new things
Social: more public participation

One of the constraints is that you have to make it work, including commercial and international partners. How do you transition people from Shuttle to other jobs during the gap? Not an easy problem. It’s not just rocket science, but management, and business. Manageability is a constraint.

Crew safety and separation of crew and cargo were tenets that came out of Columbia and fed into ESAS. Transition to Constellation will encompass half of the agencies budget and is a major challenge. Average age of NASA employee is 47 and Shuttle is 53, so very uneven demographic spread due to unevenness in hiring over the years. Hiring ceilings and no RIF authority makes it difficult to hire needed skills when you can only replace by attrition. Very coastally located, with hurricane risk, add risk of facilities, and fifty-state job spread of Shuttle difficult to sustain.

Muncy: What is performance? Number of people on the moon? Number of jobs created in the right states? Growth of NewSpace industry? We (the Frontier Foundation) have to come up with out own set of goals that could be a check list against Augustine options.