Space History

Changed Tone at Space Access

Space access last year was an excellent conference. I met Jeff Foust and have been writing for the Space Review ever since. I met David Livingston and was since on his show twice, signed his corporate space ethics pledge and have co-authored a paper with him. I met Thomas Olson and now I am on the Colony Fund’s board of advisors.

But comparing last year’s program to this year’s there are several differences.

There are more political and regulatory discussions this year. Last year we praised Tim Hughes, who was pivotal in getting 5382 passed. This year, he is presenting. Last year political priorities was part of “open mike” time. This year there is a panel. Last year there was one presentation from AST. This year there are two. Last year there was an informal workshop on the FAA AST license process. This year there is a panel discussion on policy.

I am part of the change. On Friday night, I am co-presenting a paper first posted here. (Look for an update as soon as I can get it uploaded.) There is also a new panel discussion about what venture capitalists are looking for. These two additions really focus on calibrated business-goal setting, and filtering and tempering the pro-space rhetoric to enhance credibility.

The community will be taken more seriously if it graduates from being a victim to being proactive about removing alleged barriers, upholding standards of ethics and the professionalism on the business side of space access. This change was already underway last year, but perhaps in the next few years Space Access may yet become the kind of tacky commercial conference that Esther Dyson prefers.

Political Commentary

None Of The Above

I’ve made this point before, but it seems I have to point it out almost continually. Glenn discusses Bush’s current (relatively) low approval rating. This number is, to me, almost always politically meaningless, though the pundits always want to freight it with inappropriately great import. The underlying thesis, of course, is that since the president’s approval ratings are low, this somehow represents a great opportunity for the Democrats, and that if only the numbers had been like this back in the fall, John Kerry would have been swept into office.

Nonsense.

It may be an opportunity for some theoretical Democrat party–one to which I might even in that bizarro universe belong, and for whose candidates I’d vote. But not in this universe, not with Moveon.org, and Howard Dean, and Ted Kennedy continuing to call the shots. The mindless assumption that unhappiness with one major party translates into happiness with the other continues to pervade the conventional wisdom, but consider:

I was very happy that Al Gore was not elected president in 2000. Ecstatically, almost deliriously happy. And this was even before September 11–that event just made me all the more relieved. But on any day of the Bush presidency since he took the oath of office, if you’d asked me if I approve his performance, I’d say no. On free trade, on government spending, on education, on his faux support for the “assault-weapons” ban, on any number of things, I strongly disagree with his stances and disapprove of his presidency. But since I’m not offered anything better from the other party, this is meaningless in terms of his theoretical electoral prospects, or even in terms of his getting my support on initiatives with which I agree.

Since the conventional wisdom is that Bush is a “conservative” and a “right winger” (though if a Donkey president had pushed through many of the things that this president has, e.g., the education bill co-developed with Ted Kennedy, or the huge Medicare enlargement via the prescription drug benefit, the press and the Democrats would be praising him and them to the skies), then the assumption is that unhappiness with him is unhappiness with the “conservativeness” and “right-winginess” of his proposals, and that the solution to improving his “approval” rating is to “move to the center.” The explanation rarely seems to take into account that the unhappiness may be due to lack of diligence in executing his “right-wing” proposals, or that in fact (as was the case with, for example, the education bill, or steel tariffs), they aren’t “right-wing” at all. The fact that many libertarians’ and self-identifying conservatives’ unhappiness might be dragging down his numbers never seems to occur to these people.

Of course, that might be one of the reasons that their electoral prognostications often turn out to be so wrong…

Space

“Human-Rated” SRBs?

Clark Lindsey points to a study (with which new NASA administrator Mike Griffin was heavily involved) that’s been kicking around for about a year now, apparently popular with some in the astronaut office, proposing an SRB-based crew launch system. Clark notes that “The reasoning is that this system could be developed more quickly than a CEV on a Delta IV or Atlas V since the SRBs are already ‘human-rated.'”

Well, not exactly. At least, they (correctly) don’t say that. As I’ve noted many times in the past, the phrase “human rated” is a very misleading one. What they actually say is that “…the SRM has proven to be the most reliable launch vehicle in the history of manned space flight, with no failures in 176 flights following the modifications implemented in the aftermath of the Challenger accident.”

The reality is that the SRB is not “human rated.” In fact (surprising to many) the Shuttle itself is not. “Human rated” or “man rated” is a phrase that so many misuse that I’d just like to purge it from our vocabulary, because as I’ve explained, it’s really a relic of the sixties. All we can say about the SRB is that it has flown reliably (at least after the O-ring problem was resolved) on our only vehicle that carries crew. As such, it may be the basis of a relatively (as expendable launchers go) safe ride for astronauts.

One thing that I never see mentioned in this concept, though, is how they propose to do roll control. The current SRB has none, because it is part of a larger vehicle, which rolls by gimbaling its nozzles. As a stand-alone system, it would have no roll authority at all, without adding fins or a reaction control system. Is that what those little appendages down at the bottom of the figure in Clark’s post are meant to represent?

In any event, such a vehicle will in fact be a new launch system (and one with a pretty rough ride and probably pretty high accelerations toward the end of the burn)–no one will be able to simply stick a capsule on top of an SRB.

[Update about noon eastern]

I just noticed another depressing little statement in the report: “During the time frame addressed by this report

Space

“Human-Rated” SRBs?

Clark Lindsey points to a study (with which new NASA administrator Mike Griffin was heavily involved) that’s been kicking around for about a year now, apparently popular with some in the astronaut office, proposing an SRB-based crew launch system. Clark notes that “The reasoning is that this system could be developed more quickly than a CEV on a Delta IV or Atlas V since the SRBs are already ‘human-rated.'”

Well, not exactly. At least, they (correctly) don’t say that. As I’ve noted many times in the past, the phrase “human rated” is a very misleading one. What they actually say is that “…the SRM has proven to be the most reliable launch vehicle in the history of manned space flight, with no failures in 176 flights following the modifications implemented in the aftermath of the Challenger accident.”

The reality is that the SRB is not “human rated.” In fact (surprising to many) the Shuttle itself is not. “Human rated” or “man rated” is a phrase that so many misuse that I’d just like to purge it from our vocabulary, because as I’ve explained, it’s really a relic of the sixties. All we can say about the SRB is that it has flown reliably (at least after the O-ring problem was resolved) on our only vehicle that carries crew. As such, it may be the basis of a relatively (as expendable launchers go) safe ride for astronauts.

One thing that I never see mentioned in this concept, though, is how they propose to do roll control. The current SRB has none, because it is part of a larger vehicle, which rolls by gimbaling its nozzles. As a stand-alone system, it would have no roll authority at all, without adding fins or a reaction control system. Is that what those little appendages down at the bottom of the figure in Clark’s post are meant to represent?

In any event, such a vehicle will in fact be a new launch system (and one with a pretty rough ride and probably pretty high accelerations toward the end of the burn)–no one will be able to simply stick a capsule on top of an SRB.

[Update about noon eastern]

I just noticed another depressing little statement in the report: “During the time frame addressed by this report

Space

“Human-Rated” SRBs?

Clark Lindsey points to a study (with which new NASA administrator Mike Griffin was heavily involved) that’s been kicking around for about a year now, apparently popular with some in the astronaut office, proposing an SRB-based crew launch system. Clark notes that “The reasoning is that this system could be developed more quickly than a CEV on a Delta IV or Atlas V since the SRBs are already ‘human-rated.'”

Well, not exactly. At least, they (correctly) don’t say that. As I’ve noted many times in the past, the phrase “human rated” is a very misleading one. What they actually say is that “…the SRM has proven to be the most reliable launch vehicle in the history of manned space flight, with no failures in 176 flights following the modifications implemented in the aftermath of the Challenger accident.”

The reality is that the SRB is not “human rated.” In fact (surprising to many) the Shuttle itself is not. “Human rated” or “man rated” is a phrase that so many misuse that I’d just like to purge it from our vocabulary, because as I’ve explained, it’s really a relic of the sixties. All we can say about the SRB is that it has flown reliably (at least after the O-ring problem was resolved) on our only vehicle that carries crew. As such, it may be the basis of a relatively (as expendable launchers go) safe ride for astronauts.

One thing that I never see mentioned in this concept, though, is how they propose to do roll control. The current SRB has none, because it is part of a larger vehicle, which rolls by gimbaling its nozzles. As a stand-alone system, it would have no roll authority at all, without adding fins or a reaction control system. Is that what those little appendages down at the bottom of the figure in Clark’s post are meant to represent?

In any event, such a vehicle will in fact be a new launch system (and one with a pretty rough ride and probably pretty high accelerations toward the end of the burn)–no one will be able to simply stick a capsule on top of an SRB.

[Update about noon eastern]

I just noticed another depressing little statement in the report: “During the time frame addressed by this report

Space

Battlestar Galactica?

Keith Cowing also wonders why NASA would want a missile defense analyst on a space exploration advisory committee. My reading of the VSE and the Aldridge Report is that the new vision should support several goals, one of which is defense, both national and planetary. It would in fact be quite useful to have someone from the space defense community involved in the planning, to keep an eye out for opportunities for synergism, and to bring a different perspective in the development of systems that could both help in that defense goals, and perhaps complicate them if done without consideration of those other strategic needs.

While it’s not obvious to me exactly how they would fit (other than for the planetary defense role), concern about how LEO activity will coexist with potential LEO missile defense systems is worth worrying about, and it’s not a bad idea to have someone on board who does think about such things for a living.

Space

Diesels In Space

Keith Cowing wonders why NASA is procuring hardware for military tanks.

Well, without discounting the possibility (even likelihood) that there is something bureaucratically suspect going on here, there is a plausible justification, in that the technology for an oil-free turbine would be very handy for space applications (e.g., power conversion for nuclear systems), reducing maintenance and helping with reliability. Since the funding is from Glenn (NASA’s propulsion center), it makes sense that it would develop this potential dual-use technology. It may even have other civilian terrestrial spinoff applications.

It is strange that the applications cited are so military specific, though. Equally strange is that the application (a diesel environment) is so specific so as to make it look suspect as a pure technology development. We’re a long way off from space diesels.

Biting Commentary about Infinity…and Beyond!