Thoughts on NASA procurement problems over at Space News:
To an outsider, it seems self-evident that NASA’s procurement process is the thing that is broken, or we wouldn’t even be having this conversation. Look at Falcon 9, from drawing board to successful first flight in much less than 10 years, and an expenditure on the order of half a billion dollars, and compare that with Ares 1, and tell me NASA still knows how to run programs. Compare it further with the program requirements documents for Mercury and Gemini, highly successful programs back when we knew a lot less about spaceflight than we do today.
There’s no way Ares 1 and the Orion crew capsule should have cost anywhere near what they were costing, or take anything like as much time as they were taking, to get up and fly. Whether the problem lies within NASA, or with the government procurement rules within which NASA is constrained to operate, is a question that needs answering. But the end result is the same: another decade lost, and American astronauts sitting by the side of the road with their thumbs out, waiting for the next Soyuz launch.
Arguably our most successful manned program, the Gemini program, was conducted from start to finish in less than five years. It cost (including 10 crewed flights) somewhere between $5 billion and $7 billion adjusted for inflation — less than we have spent on Constellation/Ares without even making it to our first orbital test flight. Gemini did everything we need from a crewed spacecraft, at least until we get out of cislunar space. Put a beefed-up heat shield on it and it could have gone to the Moon, and there were some studies for that. That’s what we did when the U.S. had a cumulative total experience in manned spaceflight of three man-days — not man-years, not even man-months.
I am not an engineer. My degrees are in history and business. If I am anything, I am a historian. So, as a historian, I ask: What’s so hard about replicating this level of capability, with technology that’s 40 years more mature?
Well, as another (amateur) historian, I’ll answer the question. That was then, this is now. In the sixties, actually accomplishing things in space was important, because we were in a race with the Soviets. Today, developing useful space hardware isn’t important. Maintaining jobs in certain congressional districts is.
As for this question:
Whether the problem lies within NASA, or with the government procurement rules within which NASA is constrained to operate, is a question that needs answering.
I think that has been answered. DARPA last fiscal year had an RFP out to for a competition to find a new way to procure items. The government procurement rules is a major source of delays.
Another issue is much more risk was acceptable during Gemini than today. This doesn’t account for why Falcon moved faster than Ares, but SpaceX also did more testing in remote areas. NASA, if anything, has reduced testing as failures may make for bad PR.
Wow, I was just thinking about this yesterday:
http://spacewhatnow.com/2010.11.01_arch.html#1289262556526
The history of the Gemini Program cited (available online through the NASA history office) in the post is an excellent read, by the way.
I think another symptom of bureaucratic ossification came through the safety arguments about man-rating Saturn. Atlas and Titan had to be used because there was no alternative and something needed to happen quickly (the fact that they’d flown a few times didn’t hurt either). As things started stretching out, the CYA-ness started kicking in.
Also, what’s missing from the proposed spec is STEM educational outreach, equal opportunity, the need to have things built in multiple Congressional districts…
I attended engineering meetings a few times at a company I worked for many years ago until I figured out they were a complete waste of time. The first meeting seemed to go well and I looked forward to the next one. The next meeting they discussed the exact same issues but had no actions or results. The third time confirmed I was wasting time attending these meetings and so I never went to another one.
Why is it we seemed to have a can do attitude when it was vacuum tubes and flint knives but a can’t do attitude with the amazing tech. available to us today? Unless I’m missing something, it’s not about being risk averse. It’s not even a question of spinning tires. It seems like a problem of people not being able to focus and address the many issues needed to get things done. As if they see no connection between making daily progress and the overall goal.
Oh look, the “hitching rides” metaphor again.
Repeating myself: even if NASA had another vehicle to fly astronauts on they would be flying them on Soyuz. Why? Because *that was the deal*. Shuttle builds the station, Soyuz delivers the expedition crews.
Trent, That was *not* the deal and is certainly not what happened. As soon as a commercial lift to orbit is available, NASA will be in line to buy tickets. They have been all too obsessed with providing their own lift, but that fit of madness seems be passing.
“That was then, this is now. In the sixties, actually accomplishing things in space was important, because we were in a race with the Soviets.”
Well that’s only a part of it. Another part was that in the late 50’s early 60’s we (and the Soviets) were really at the start. We did not have the calcified, ossified, fossilized organizations that exist today. Back then there was the pressure of being in a race, which you speak of, but there was also an essentially clean sheet of paper; especially organizationally. It’s a common feature of organizations that when they start out with a great goal, lots of pressure and lots of backing, they can be effective and efficient (even socialistic ones). Trying to maintain that efficiency and excitement over time is very hard to do. Not impossible; but hard.
It’s also important to remember that NASA didn’t have to design and build the Titan II (what a beautiful looking missile) from scratch. The Air Force did that. So those costs are hidden in the Gemini program cost. There had to be some man rating work and test work with a Gemini on top, but the hard part had been done and paid for.
If I were rich, I’d buy the Gemini plans and build new ones, with updated electronics, of course.
What a surprise. A historian doesn’t think it’s very hard to do an engineer’s job. Likewise, as an engineer, I suspect it’s not too hard to be a historian. All you have to do is write down a bunch of facts. Shouldn’t be too hard. What could possibly go wrong?
Am I missing something here? As far as I can recall, the Apollo programme was just as encrusted with pork as NASA is now; oddities such as having Mission Control in Houston while launches were from Florida, shipping major pieces of hardware all over the USA to ensure the building of components was scattered around, that sort of thing. Of course, the latter necessitated the construction of specialised hardware such as the Guppy transports and various barges.
And my favourite hobbyhorse; shutting down Orion to help pay for it, and shutting down NERVA for reasons I haven’t been able to find out.
I remain convinced that the powers-that-be wanted (and still want) Apollo to remain what it was; a hugely expensive Cold War gambit with no practical uses whatsoever. And for the whole of humanity to stay on this mudball.
And for the whole of humanity to stay on this mudball.
Well, of course. Can’t control the people if they are beyond your reach.
Ed – Precisely. With a healthy side-serving of American bureaucrats and/or politicians who want their country to stay the biggest fish in a small pond.
Once humanity gets out into space, if it ever does, sooner or later American hegemony is over – for good.